ESSAY: Kim Jong Un's 155mm Howitzer — Pyongyang Adopts NATO Standards to Challenge the West

Introduction: a calibre that changes everything

June 25, 2026: a date to remember

At first glance, June 25, 2026 does not look like a historic day. And yet, on that day, at an undisclosed site in North Korea, leader Kim Jong Un personally oversaw weapons tests of considerable symbolic reach. Among the systems tested, the official North Korean agency KCNA mentioned a 155-millimetre self-propelled howitzer — a calibre that carries no small significance. It is precisely the standard calibre of NATO, the one used by the American, French, German, British, and roughly thirty other alliance member armies.

This is no coincidence. Pyongyang did not choose this calibre by accident. Choosing 155mm means aligning with a universal standard that will allow, when the moment comes, to fire shells compatible with ammunition captured in Ukraine or transferred through parallel circuits. It is a strategic, industrial, and geopolitical decision wrapped in the clothing of a simple ballistic test.

The Korean War anniversary as symbolic backdrop

The date of June 25 carries additional symbolic weight: it is the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War of 1950, a conflict that caused millions of deaths and has never been officially closed by a peace treaty. Kim Jong Un therefore chose this anniversary to demonstrate that Pyongyang has not forgotten — and above all that it is now capable of threatening with far greater precision and at far longer range than seventy-six years ago.

According to KCNA, the test also involved an upgraded 240mm, 24-tube multiple rocket launcher equipped with an autonomous precision guidance system whose range has been extended to 90 kilometres, as well as tactical ballistic missiles with a "special mission" warhead. Kim expressed his "great satisfaction" at the results, declaring that Pyongyang was pursuing automation, long range, and ultra-precision.

The 155mm: far more than a calibre

The NATO standard as a strategic target

Understanding why the 155mm is central means understanding the logic of military interoperability. Since World War II, Western armies have progressively standardized their artillery calibres to facilitate logistics, ammunition exchange, and cooperation between allies. The 155mm has become the backbone of NATO artillery, used in systems such as the French Caesar, the German PzH 2000, the South Korean K9 Thunder, and the American M109 Paladin.

By adopting this calibre, North Korea accomplishes several objectives simultaneously. First, it acquires a system compatible with the most modern warheads on the market — including those guided by GPS or IMU that Russia has learned to use on the Ukrainian battlefield. Second, it signals to its partners — and in particular to Moscow — that it can supply artillery ammunition directly usable on the front lines in Ukraine. Third, it sends a political message to the United States and South Korea: Pyongyang is no longer on an archaic armament trajectory.

A range of 65 kilometres: Seoul in the crosshairs

According to analyst Yang Moo-jin, the range of the North Korean 155mm howitzer now reaches 65 kilometres. Positioned near the demilitarized zone, this artillery piece is capable of striking portions of the Seoul metropolitan area, which is home to some 25 million people. The South Korean capital has always been theoretically exposed to North Korean artillery — but the precision and range of these new systems radically change the nature of the threat.

As early as May 2026, the site NK Insider reported that Kim Jong Un had inspected the production of three battalions of 155mm howitzers intended for deployment that very year in the long-range artillery units along the southern border. This is therefore not an experimental prototype: it is an industrial programme in active deployment. The threat is concrete, temporally precise, and is now documented by North Korean state media themselves.

The Ukraine–North Korea link: a strategic arms chain

North Korean ammunition on the Ukrainian front

The link between the North Korean armament programme and the war in Ukraine is no longer a matter of diplomatic suspicion: it is documented. American, South Korean, and Ukrainian intelligence services have confirmed that Russia has used North Korean artillery shells — in 122mm and 152mm calibres — on the Ukrainian front since at least 2023. The specialized Ukrainian site Defence-UA reported as early as May 2026 that Pyongyang's development of 155mm howitzers raised the possibility that Russia could eventually acquire them to deploy against Ukraine.

The transition to 155mm is all the more significant in this context because it theoretically allows North Korea to supply Russia with ammunition directly compatible with some of the artillery systems captured from Ukrainian forces or recovered on the battlefield. Ukraine received NATO equipment — the American M777s fire in 155mm — and any 155mm shell captured by the Russians could therefore potentially be fired back at Ukrainian positions using North Korean ammunition.

Russia as broker between Pyongyang and the global battlefield

The tacit agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang goes beyond simple arms transfers. Russia offers North Korea space technology, military satellite capabilities, and, according to some sources, support in the areas of submarines and nuclear propulsion. In exchange, Pyongyang supplies ammunition in large quantities to a Russian army that struggles to maintain its logistics lines. It is a partnership of circumstance that transforms an isolated regime into a key player in a European war.

What is particularly troubling about this equation is that international sanctions — supposed to isolate Pyongyang — have not prevented this rapprochement. Worse: they may have contributed to pushing North Korea into Russia's arms by offering it the opportunity to make its defence industry profitable on a captive market. The war in Ukraine has thus become a learning laboratory and a commercial catalogue for Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un and the ultra-precision doctrine

The three pillars: automation, long range, ultra-precision

During his visit to the test site, Kim Jong Un articulated what analysts describe as a three-pronged military doctrine: automation of weapons systems, long range allowing strategic targets to be struck without exposing forces, and ultra-precision reducing the number of munitions needed to neutralize a target. This triple requirement reflects the lessons that Pyongyang has drawn from the war in Ukraine, where the precision of FPV drones and guidance systems redefined the standards of modern combat.

The agency KCNA specified that the upgraded multiple rocket launcher — the 24-tube, 240mm launcher — now features an autonomous precision guidance system. This means that each rocket can theoretically reach its target without human intervention after launch. For an army whose doctrine has historically rested on saturation by volume, this is a considerable break: Pyongyang is learning to strike accurately, not just hard.

The "special mission" warhead: targeting airports, ports, and power plants

One of the most troubling aspects of the June 25 tests is the description of the warhead tested for the tactical ballistic missile. According to KCNA, this "special mission" warhead is designed to "inflict fatal damage on key targets, including airports, ports, and energy production facilities of the enemy." That is a list of critical infrastructure — exactly the kind of targets that Russian drones strike in Ukraine to destabilize the economy and civil society.

This explicit designation of targets is unusual for Pyongyang, which generally communicates in more oblique terms. It reflects a desire to signal clearly — to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo — that North Korea has developed strike capabilities against critical infrastructure. In other words, Pyongyang is not just saying it can strike; it is saying precisely what it is targeting. And that is not reassuring.

South Korea responds: the army of "drone warriors"

Seoul accelerates its counter-strike drone doctrine

Seoul's response to the June 25 tests reveals how military balances are shifting on the Korean peninsula. The very day after the tests, South Korean authorities announced they were forming an army of drone warriors, a direct response to the North Korean strategy of automation. South Korea drew the same lessons from the war in Ukraine as its adversary: cheap drones in mass quantities can compensate for conventional asymmetries.

This is the emergence of a form of balance of terror that can no longer be reduced to nuclear warheads alone. Both Koreas are now acquiring long-range precision strike capabilities that mutually threaten each other's critical infrastructure. The Korean peninsula is thus becoming a full-scale laboratory of future wars, where drones, precision artillery, and tactical ballistic missiles coexist with the nuclear threat in the background.

American bases in South Korea: priority targets

Analyst Yang Moo-jin noted that the capabilities tested on June 25 would allow North Korea to "strike across all of South Korea." That includes the American bases at Camp Humphreys — the largest American military installation outside the United States — and other strategic installations. By targeting American bases, Pyongyang seeks to deter Washington from intervening in the event of conflict, by raising the potential cost of American engagement.

This logic of extended deterrence is at the heart of Kim Jong Un's strategy. It is not only about threatening South Korea: it is about making any American intervention costly enough to be politically difficult to justify to the American public. North Korea has carefully observed how domestic debates in the United States have complicated support for Ukraine, and it is drawing its conclusions.

North Korea's nuclear arsenal: from deterrence to proxy war

The nuclear arsenal as a shield for conventional ventures

One often underestimated aspect of the North Korean strategy is the role that the nuclear arsenal plays in the regime's conventional freedom of action. By developing credible nuclear capabilities — North Korea is believed to possess approximately 50 nuclear warheads according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) — Pyongyang has given itself a strategic shield that makes any disproportionate military response against it politically risky.

It is within this framework that the development of conventional precision artillery takes on its full meaning. North Korea can now conduct sub-nuclear-level operations or provocations — arms deliveries, border disruptions, pressure on South Korea — under the deterrent umbrella of its atomic arsenal. The 155mm is not an alternative to the nuclear option; it is its tactical complement.

Enshrining nuclear status in the Constitution

In 2022, and then in an amendment adopted more recently in 2026, North Korea enshrined its status as a nuclear state in its Constitution. This decision, analyzed by The Guardian on June 24, 2026, also granted Kim Jong Un constitutional authority over nuclear forces, with the possibility of delegating launch authority to a command structure in an emergency. Analysts interpret this measure as protection against a "decapitation strike" — an attempt to eliminate the leadership before it can order a launch.

This institutionalization of the nuclear option sends a clear message: denuclearization is no longer an option that Pyongyang seriously entertains. Ho Ry, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses, stated that Pyongyang wants to "establish the idea that denuclearization no longer applies to North Korea." While Washington and Seoul officially maintain denuclearization as their objective, Kim has constitutionally closed that door.

The failure of international sanctions: an overdue reckoning

Thirty years of pressure that failed to prevent proliferation

The international community has imposed increasingly severe sanctions on North Korea since the 1990s. The UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions prohibiting arms exports, luxury goods imports, and various other commercial transactions. In theory, these sanctions aimed to deprive Pyongyang of the resources needed for its nuclear and ballistic programme. In practice, they have failed to achieve this objective.

North Korea today possesses an operational nuclear arsenal, intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the American mainland, and — as the tests of June 25, 2026 showed — increasingly precise and long-range conventional artillery. In parallel, Pyongyang has developed a blue-water navy, launched a 5,000-tonne destroyer capable of firing missiles, and committed to building two new warships per year for five years. This programme has been carried out in defiance of sanctions.

China and Russia: the holes in the net

Sanctions have never been fully effective because two permanent members of the Security Council — China and Russia — have never had a strategic interest in enforcing them rigorously. China accounts for more than 90% of North Korean foreign trade, and specialized economists regularly document sanctions evasion through third-party entities. Russia, since 2022, has graduated from minor actor to active strategic partner of Pyongyang.

In May 2026, during Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, Chinese state media did not mention the shared objective of denuclearization — even though it had been reaffirmed just weeks earlier by Trump and Xi at the White House. This gap between public rhetoric and the reality of Chinese practices is revealing. Beijing plays a double game: officially supporting denuclearization while maintaining North Korea as a strategic buffer state between itself and the American forces deployed in South Korea.

Ukraine as a technological accelerator for North Korea

Lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield

The war in Ukraine has constituted an invaluable observation laboratory for North Korean military engineers. In 2024 and 2025, North Korean soldiers were deployed alongside Russian forces in the Kursk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Those soldiers returned — the ones who survived — with direct experience of drone warfare, modern counter-battery tactics, and electronic warfare techniques. They observed the effectiveness of precision guidance systems against long-range targets.

The results are visible in the tests of June 25, 2026. The emphasis placed on autonomous guidance and long-range precision is no coincidence: these are exactly the capabilities that made the difference on the Ukrainian front. North Korea has in a sense made Russia pay for its arms supplies with a technological dividend: it learned modern warfare under real conditions.

Mass production as a comparative advantage

Beyond the technological learning, North Korea has demonstrated its capacity to produce ammunition in large quantities at a relatively low cost. In 2024–2025, Western estimates suggest that Pyongyang supplied Russia with between one and two million artillery shells. This industrial capacity is precisely what Russia lacks — its arms factories have been running at maximum capacity for two years — and what Ukraine lacks as well, being dependent on Western deliveries.

In a prolonged war of attrition like the one unfolding in Ukraine, the ability to produce ammunition in mass quantities is a first-order strategic advantage. Pyongyang knows this, and it is monetizing that capability. Adopting the 155mm calibre will eventually allow it to offer this ammunition to any buyer capable of using NATO systems — including, in a hypothetical but not unrealistic scenario, non-NATO states engaged in conflict.

The blue-water navy: a frequently overlooked dimension

The 5,000-tonne destroyer: a capability threshold crossed

In the shadow of the artillery tests, another North Korean development deserves attention: the 2026 launch of a 5,000-tonne destroyer capable of firing missiles. Kim Jong Un declared his intention to build two additional warships per year for five years. Combined with the increasingly advanced submarines that Pyongyang is developing, this emerging naval force sketches the contours of a blue-water navy capable of projecting North Korean military power well beyond the peninsula.

This is a major strategic break. Historically, North Korea was a land power with some coastal naval capabilities and an ageing submarine fleet. The destroyer programme signals a maritime projection ambition that did not previously exist. Combined with the nuclear ballistic missiles launched from submarines that Pyongyang is developing, this naval force could eventually allow North Korea to maintain a credible second-strike capability even if its land-based installations were destroyed.

Japan and Australia in the crosshairs

A blue-water North Korean navy fundamentally changes the security equation in the western Pacific. Japan, which already shares the waters of the Sea of Japan with North Korea, will need to reconsider its defensive posture. Australia, traditionally protected by its geographic distance from Asian flashpoints, will gradually fall within range of an expanding naval power. The United States, which maintains bases at Guam and in the Mariana Islands, will need to adapt its deployments accordingly.

This is precisely what researcher Ward of the Se Institute in Seoul signals when he notes that the North Korean arsenal is "vast and dispersed," that "the location of all these weapons is unknown," and that their threats are "intentionally ambiguous." Ambiguity is itself a strategic weapon: it forces the adversary to prepare for multiple scenarios simultaneously, dispersing its resources and attention.

Democracies facing urgency: a response of uneven geometry

Washington between engagement and disengagement

American policy toward North Korea under Donald Trump oscillates between radically opposed postures. In May 2026, Trump and Xi Jinping reaffirmed a "shared objective" of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula — a standard diplomatic formula that carries no concrete constraints for Beijing. In parallel, sources suggest that Trump is considering bilateral meetings with Kim Jong Un, pursuing the logic of his first attempts in 2018–2019 that ended in failure.

The problem with Trump's personal diplomacy with North Korea is that it tends to treat disarmament questions as relational problems solvable through charm and intimidation, rather than as structural questions rooted in the regime's survival calculus. Kim Jong Un has no reason to disarm, especially since the Libyan precedent — Gaddafi having abandoned his nuclear programme before being overthrown — demonstrated that disarmament can lead to the death of the leader.

Asian allies in disarray

South Korea, Japan, and Australia have each developed their own responses to the North Korean threat, but without sufficient coordination. Seoul is investing heavily in drones and long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking targets deep inside North Korea. Tokyo has adopted a "counter-strike" doctrine that theoretically allows it to attack North Korean launch sites before they fire. Washington maintains the United States Forces Korea (USFK) with its 28,500 soldiers.

But this three-speed response leaves blind spots. Trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan remains embryonic, hampered by historical tensions between Seoul and Tokyo. Meanwhile, Pyongyang is developing capabilities that, within a few years, could seriously compromise the response capacity of democracies in the region. The window for action is closing.

The Russian vector: how Moscow amplifies the North Korean threat

Russian technology transfers to Pyongyang

Western intelligence services have documented significant technology transfers from Russia to North Korea since the beginning of their enhanced strategic partnership in 2023. These transfers reportedly include assistance in the areas of military satellites, missile guidance systems, and potentially submarine propulsion. In exchange for the millions of shells delivered, Moscow is offering Pyongyang decades of technological advancement that Kim Jong Un could not have acquired alone.

This partnership has a direct implication for the significance of the June 25, 2026 tests. The autonomous guidance system of the 240mm rocket launcher may not be a purely North Korean achievement — it could reflect Russian technical assistance. Similarly, the extended range of 90 kilometres for the rocket system suggests propulsion improvements that could have benefited from foreign expertise. The distinction between indigenous and imported capabilities is increasingly blurred.

The Moscow–Pyongyang–Beijing axis and its limits

While the Russo-North Korean partnership is now well established, the question of triangular relations with China is more complex. Beijing observes with mixed feelings the rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang. On one hand, a Kim Jong Un backed by Russia strengthens the anti-Western axis that China does not fundamentally disavow. On the other, a North Korea that is too powerful or too unpredictable is a destabilization risk at China's doorstep.

The subtle balance that Xi Jinping attempts to maintain — supporting Pyongyang without giving it absolute carte blanche — could prove impossible to hold as North Korean military capabilities increase. A Kim Jong Un equipped with a blue-water navy, long-range precision artillery, and more than 50 nuclear warheads is far more difficult to control than a dependent leader whom Beijing could cut off from fuel and food within weeks.

The implications for global security

Proliferation beyond the peninsula

The development of a North Korean 155mm howitzer has implications that reach far beyond the Korean peninsula. If Pyongyang begins to export this system — or compatible ammunition — to other regional actors, the consequences could be destabilizing on a global scale. Potential buyers include states or non-state groups in the Middle East, Africa, or other regions of tension, who seek to acquire long-range precision artillery without the political constraints attached to Western arms sales.

North Korea has a long history of arms exports to problematic regional actors. It has sold missiles to Yemen, Syria, Egypt, and other clients. Adding precision artillery compatible with NATO standards to this commercial catalogue constitutes a qualitative escalation in its capacity to influence distant conflicts.

What Western democracies must do now

The democratic response to North Korea's military rise must go beyond the framework of sanctions to become an integrated strategy. First, a serious engagement with China on the real consequences of a North Korea equipped with blue-water capabilities — including the possibility that Seoul and Tokyo develop their own nuclear arsenals if the American guarantee becomes insufficient. Second, investment in missile defence systems deployed in South Korea and Japan. Third, the public and systematic documentation of arms transfers between Russia and North Korea to maintain diplomatic pressure on Moscow.

What we cannot do is continue to treat North Korea as a second-rank problem. The tests of June 25, 2026 showed that Pyongyang is no longer a military dwarf: it is an armed power methodically equipping itself with capabilities that threaten regional and potentially global security. The time for complacency is over.

When calibre becomes doctrine

The 155mm as a marker of planetary ambition

By adopting the 155mm calibre, North Korea is not simply copying a technical standard: it is asserting an ambition of interoperability with the rest of the armed world. It is a qualitative leap in the way Pyongyang now thinks of itself — no longer as an isolated regional power, but as a global actor capable of supplying, exchanging, and potentially deploying weapons compatible with systems used on all contemporary battlefields.

This ambition reflects a paradigm shift under Kim Jong Un: North Korea is no longer operating solely in a defensive survival logic. It is operating in a logic of expanding its influence through military power. June 25, 2026 will stand as a symbolic marker — a date on which Pyongyang signalled to the world that it had reached a new threshold.

The test as strategic communication

Kim Jong Un's communication surrounding these tests is as interesting as the tests themselves. He does not present them as purely defensive measures: he speaks of a "deadly and destructive offensive posture." He lists the targets in view — airports, ports, power plants. He declares the pursuit of ultra-precision and long range. That is the language of an offensive strategist, not a leader simply seeking to reassure his own citizens.

For security analysts, this language confirms what some had suspected: North Korea has developed a coherent military doctrine that goes beyond simple deterrence. It aims to create a credible area-denial capability for American forces in the region, while maintaining the ability to strike precisely at targets at the heart of the South Korean economy and infrastructure. The 155mm is just one piece of this puzzle.

The Korean peninsula as exporter of military doctrine

When Pyongyang teaches the world how to wage war

North Korea is no longer merely a regional actor confined to the peninsula. Since 2022, Pyongyang has become an active exporter of military doctrine. The millions of shells transferred to Russian lines have provided the North Korean army with real-conditions feedback that no exercise can replicate. North Korean officers have observed how their ammunition performed against Western counter-battery systems — a learning loop without precedent for Kim Jong Un.

The 155mm howitzer tested on June 25, 2026 may not simply be a copy of NATO standards: it is potentially a system whose design benefited from two years of real war experience in Ukraine. The Russo-North Korean partnership has become a bilateral learning loop: Pyongyang sends weapons, Moscow sends back performance data and tactical lessons refined through contact with Western systems.

The implications for global arms proliferation

If North Korea begins to export this codified expertise — in the form of weapons systems or training of foreign officers — the implications are profound. Actors in the Sahel, Yemen, or Syria could benefit from military doctrines refined through Ukrainian battlefield experience, without the constraints of Western export norms. This is a proliferation vector that multilateral institutions are structurally ill-equipped to monitor.

Sanctions can block cargo shipments of equipment. They cannot prevent the transmission of combat experience between strategic partners. The production of the North Korean 155mm howitzer according to sources from Defence-UA and United24Media has been documented since May 2026. The acceleration observed on June 25 confirms that Pyongyang has moved from development to production — and soon, perhaps, to export.

Conclusion: the hour of strategic awakening

A world that changed on June 25, 2026

The tests of June 25, 2026 are not an isolated event. They are part of a documented, coherent, ascending North Korean military trajectory that is transforming Pyongyang into a leading military actor in the Asia-Pacific region and, by extension through its arms exports, across the full range of contemporary conflicts. The 155mm howitzer is not just a weapon — it is a geopolitical signal of considerable reach.

What this demands of democracies

The democratic response must be commensurate with this reality. It requires enhanced coordination between the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. It requires a far more demanding engagement with China on the consequences of its complacency. It requires investments in missile defences, long-range strike capabilities, and intelligence on the real intentions and capabilities of Kim Jong Un. The time for speeches is over — the moment demands concrete strategies and committed budgets.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and my stated biases

I am a columnist-analyst specializing in international security and military strategy. I have no direct access to intelligence services and have never visited North Korea. My analysis rests exclusively on open sources: news agency reports, analyses from specialized institutes, official statements. I acknowledge a pro-Western bias in my analytical framework: I fundamentally believe that liberal democracies constitute the best governance system available and that they deserve to be defended vigorously.

What I do not know and my method

I do not know Kim Jong Un's real intentions. I do not know with certainty whether the capabilities announced by KCNA correspond to verified technical realities or whether they contain a degree of exaggeration for domestic consumption. I do not know to what extent Russian technology transfers contributed to the advances described. These uncertainties are real and I acknowledge them. My method consists of cross-referencing sources — Western news agencies, specialist analysts, defence sites, academic publications — and explicitly flagging when something is not corroborated. All factual claims in this article are drawn from published and identifiable sources.

Sources

Primary sources

Reuters via US News — Kim Jong Un oversees weapons tests, June 25, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korea: major weapons tests and drone warriors in the South, June 26, 2026

AP via SFGATE — Kim calls for a deadly offensive posture, June 25, 2026

Taipei Times — Kim praises tests, 65 km range for the howitzer, June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Kim Jong Un's "exponential" nuclear programme, June 24, 2026

Defence-UA — North Korea begins production of 155mm howitzers, May 9, 2026

United24Media — North Korea reportedly plans 155mm howitzers capable of reaching Seoul, May 8, 2026

NK Insider — Kim inspects long-range artillery for deployment along southern border, May 2026