Silencing a Ukrainian TV Station Digitally Is Also an Act of War

Two Hundred Thousand Requests a Minute Against the Truth

For three hours, hackers bombarded the website of a Ukrainian national television channel with up to 200,000 requests per minute, a denial-of-service attack documented by Ukraine's Security Service, the SBU. The botnet behind this offensive spanned nodes located in Asia, Europe and the United States, designed to mimic real user traffic and make detection harder.

This attack is not an isolated technical incident: it is part of a documented campaign of more than 16,000 Russian cyberattacks neutralized by the SBU since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, primarily targeting government agencies, financial institutions, the defense sector and, increasingly, Ukrainian media.

Why This Technical Distinction Hides a Democratic Stake

Reducing this attack to a matter of computer infrastructure would mean ignoring its true significance: silencing, even temporarily, a national source of information in a country at war is the same as depriving citizens of access to verified information at the exact moment they need it most.

It is this democratic dimension, more than the mere technical feat of the attack, that should guide our reading of this event and the broader Russian strategy it reveals.

The Site Stayed Online Despite the Intensity of the Assault

Despite the scale of this digital offensive, SBU cybersecurity specialists managed to keep the channel's website running without interruption, a technical outcome that reflects sustained investment in Ukrainian defensive capabilities since the conflict began.

This defensive success, achieved in a country whose resources are constantly stretched by the conventional war effort, deserves recognition that goes far beyond specialized information-technology circles.

A Success That Must Not Mask the Severity of the Threat

Celebrating this technical resilience, however, should not lead us to downplay the seriousness of the intent behind this attack: a determined adversary, with considerable resources, is actively trying to deprive Ukraine of its independent means of information.

This tension between a one-off defensive success and a persistent structural threat must remain central to any serious analysis of this digital war, which shows no sign of slowing down after more than four years of conflict.

A Propaganda Hijacking Attempt Narrowly Foiled

In 2025, another Ukrainian television group was targeted by a far more insidious attack: a phishing campaign followed by an attempt to penetrate its infrastructure, with the ultimate goal of taking control of the outlet to broadcast Russian propaganda under its legitimate name.

SBU specialists detected this intrusion in time, preventing a scenario that could have deceived hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian viewers into believing they were watching authentic, verified content.

What This Episode Reveals About Moscow's Real Intentions

This precedent illustrates an uncomfortable truth: Moscow's goal is not limited to temporarily disrupting access to information. In some cases, it aims to seize the very credibility of Ukrainian media outlets in order to turn their voice against their own audience.

This ambition, far more serious than a mere server overload, deserves to be understood as a deliberate attempt at mass manipulation rather than an isolated act of technical sabotage.

Unit 29155, a Central Actor in This Hybrid War

Several of these campaigns bear the mark of Unit 29155 of Russian military intelligence, the GRU, a unit initially designed as a cyber arm before expanding its scope to other hostile operations against Ukraine, including spear-phishing campaigns targeting President Volodymyr Zelensky's office and several ministries.

This same unit had deployed, even before the full-scale invasion, the destructive WhisperGate malware, designed to wipe data from Ukrainian computer systems, further proof that preparation for this war played out simultaneously on military and digital fronts.

A Chain of Responsibility That Leads Directly to the Russian State

These attacks are not the work of independent hackers acting on their own initiative: they are part of a strategy coordinated by Russian military intelligence services, which directly implicates the Russian state's responsibility in these information-destabilization operations.

This state responsibility, documented by several Western intelligence services over the years, should weigh into any future assessment of sanctions and accountability measures applied against Moscow for the full range of its actions during this conflict.

A Resilience Program That Goes Beyond Technology Alone

Faced with this persistent threat, the SBU launched a cybersecurity resilience program for local and regional media, in partnership with Ukraine's National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting, training nearly 450 participants across 20 regional locations covering the country's 21 oblasts.

This program acknowledges an essential truth too often overlooked: the best cyberdefense does not rely solely on sophisticated firewalls, but also on journalists and media managers trained to recognize and respond to intrusion attempts.

A Lesson Applicable Well Beyond Ukraine's Borders

This combined technical-and-human approach offers a model other democracies could usefully study, as disinformation and digital sabotage attempts by hostile state actors are no longer confined to the Ukrainian theater alone.

Ignoring this lesson would mean underestimating the adaptability required against adversaries who, like Russia, invest considerable resources in continuously refining their information-attack methods.

A Digital Front That Never Sleeps

This attack on a Ukrainian television station, specific as it is, illustrates a broader reality of modern warfare: physical and digital fronts are no longer separate, they operate in parallel, each reinforcing the other's destabilizing effect on the targeted society.

This fusion of military and digital dimensions demands an equally integrated response from Ukraine and its Western allies, where defending information becomes as strategic as defending physical territory.

A Threat the West Can No Longer Afford to Ignore

Western democracies, facing similar disinformation and digital sabotage attempts from Russia, China and other authoritarian regimes, must draw direct lessons from the Ukrainian experience to strengthen their own defenses before it is too late.

This heightened vigilance is not an optional luxury, it is a structural necessity for preserving the integrity of information in democratic societies increasingly dependent on their digital infrastructure.

A Vital Sector Targeted With the Same Intensity

Media outlets are not the only victims of this Russian campaign documented by the SBU: Ukrainian financial institutions are also among the priority targets, and a successful attack on this sector could paralyze routine transactions and directly affect the daily lives of citizens in the middle of a war.

This parallel targeting of media and financial institutions reveals a coherent strategy: simultaneously destabilizing access to verified information and confidence in economic stability, two essential pillars of a wartime country's social resilience.

A Coordinated Defense Across Several Critical Sectors

This convergence of targets has pushed the SBU to coordinate its defensive response across several critical sectors simultaneously, a cross-sector approach made necessary by an adversary that respects no sectoral boundary in choosing its targets.

This cross-sector coordination, though rarely highlighted in media coverage of this digital war, is a key element of the overall resilience Ukraine has had to build since 2022.

A Ukrainian Expertise That Should Circulate More Widely

The experience the SBU has accumulated facing more than 16,000 cyberattacks represents a practical cyberdefense expertise that few Western countries possess at this level of intensity, a strategic resource that should be shared more actively with Ukraine's partners.

This knowledge-sharing, already underway in certain bilateral cooperation frameworks, deserves to be extended to all Western institutions facing similar digital destabilization attempts from hostile state actors.

An Urgency That Should Not Wait for a Major Crisis to Be Taken Seriously

Too often, Western decision-makers give cyberdefense serious attention only after suffering a major attack themselves, a reactive approach that contrasts sharply with the proactive posture the Ukrainian experience should inspire.

Adopting the lessons of this Ukrainian digital war now could spare other democracies from later paying the same price Kyiv has had to pay to build its current resilience.

A Battle That Goes Far Beyond the Technical Realm

This attack of 200,000 requests per minute against a Ukrainian television channel is not merely a technical feat foiled by the SBU. It is a symptom of a broader war in which information itself has become a battlefield in its own right.

Recognizing this reality, documenting it precisely, and actively supporting Ukrainian cyberdefense efforts is a responsibility the West can no longer afford to treat as a secondary matter next to the apparent urgency of the conflict's physical fronts.

A Call for Collective Vigilance

Faced with an adversary that has repeatedly shown its willingness to silence or hijack Ukrainian media voices, the best response remains reinforced technical and political solidarity between Kyiv and its Western partners, without letup or information fatigue.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.