FACT CHECK: 60% reject giving up Donbas; 59% would freeze the front

Introduction

One poll, two answers that cannot be merged

At the centre of the record, 7 August 2026 60% reject ceding Donbas 59% accept a freeze define the point at issue. Reporting by Ukrainska Pravda and the Kyiv Independent on a Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll shows two positions that are often flattened into one: opposition to ceding Donbas and conditional openness to freezing the war along the present front. That is a boundary, not an excuse: the available material supports a public that distinguishes sovereignty from a temporary line of control, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The record stops there.

A freeze is not a cession.

The distinction carries weight, 974 adult respondents 20 July to 3 August 2026 government-controlled regions place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The survey was conducted across Ukrainian regions under government control. Its published methodology identifies the sample and field dates, while the articles consulted do not provide a precise margin of error for fine-grained subgroup comparisons. The practical consequence is that the survey is a dated snapshot rather than a negotiating mandate; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. That is not a conviction.

Two questions produced two different majorities

Cession and a freeze are not synonyms

The documented starting point, territorial cession front-line freeze security guarantees define the point at issue. One question concerns giving Donbas to Russia; the other concerns freezing the war along the current line in exchange for security guarantees, funding, and weapons deliveries. The wording describes two distinct political and legal propositions. The wording matters here: the available material supports no honest reading can replace one question with the other, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The figure needs its source.

The date changes the reading, territorial cession front-line freeze security guarantees place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. One question concerns giving Donbas to Russia; the other concerns freezing the war along the current line in exchange for security guarantees, funding, and weapons deliveries. The wording describes two distinct political and legal propositions. The practical consequence is that no honest reading can replace one question with the other; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The video is not a verdict.

The contrast is the finding

Inside the stated case, 60% 59% KIIS poll define the point at issue. The near-parallel figures are not a contradiction. They show that many respondents can reject a formal transfer of sovereignty while considering a conditional cessation of fighting, a distinction the polling language itself requires. That restraint belongs in the conclusion: the available material supports the poll measures nuance, not confusion, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The claim remains attributed.

A number alone cannot settle it, 60% 59% KIIS poll place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The near-parallel figures are not a contradiction. They show that many respondents can reject a formal transfer of sovereignty while considering a conditional cessation of fighting, a distinction the polling language itself requires. The practical consequence is that the poll measures nuance, not confusion; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. A court has not ended the case.

A poll question carries the conditions written into it.

Sixty percent reject ceding Donbas

The categorical refusal

On the investigators' account, 60% Donbas security guarantees define the point at issue. Sixty percent of respondents categorically rejected ceding Donbas to Russia even in exchange for security guarantees. That is the clearest territorial finding in the reported survey and it keeps sovereignty at the center of the response. The record separates allegation from outcome: the available material supports the majority does not treat land as a simple bargaining chip, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The caveat changes the headline.

That is a boundary, not an excuse, 60% Donbas security guarantees place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Sixty percent of respondents categorically rejected ceding Donbas to Russia even in exchange for security guarantees. That is the clearest territorial finding in the reported survey and it keeps sovereignty at the center of the response. The practical consequence is that the majority does not treat land as a simple bargaining chip; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The number carries a limit.

The figure has a defined reach

In the operational tally, KIIS government-controlled regions adult respondents define the point at issue. The result comes from adults surveyed in regions under Ukrainian government control. It reports the views of that defined sample; it does not claim to record every Ukrainian view in occupied territory or abroad. This is a fact with a ceiling: the available material supports a poll has a population before it has a headline, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The law has its own timetable.

The wording matters here, KIIS government-controlled regions adult respondents place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The result comes from adults surveyed in regions under Ukrainian government control. It reports the views of that defined sample; it does not claim to record every Ukrainian view in occupied territory or abroad. The practical consequence is that a poll has a population before it has a headline; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The evidence is narrower.

A majority can reject surrender without rejecting a pause.

Thirty-three percent would accept cession, mostly reluctantly

The minority position

In the financial trail described, 33% cession of Donbas reluctant acceptance define the point at issue. Thirty-three percent said they would accept a cession, mostly reluctantly, while seven percent were undecided. Those responses matter because they show that the rejection majority is not unanimous and that the reported choices involve heavy trade-offs. The public can see the action; it cannot yet see every consequence: the available material supports a minority is still part of the national picture, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The agreement still needs action.

That restraint belongs in the conclusion, 33% cession of Donbas reluctant acceptance place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Thirty-three percent said they would accept a cession, mostly reluctantly, while seven percent were undecided. Those responses matter because they show that the rejection majority is not unanimous and that the reported choices involve heavy trade-offs. The practical consequence is that a minority is still part of the national picture; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The source does not settle blame.

Seven percent were undecided

For any legal reading, 7% undecided respondents survey response define the point at issue. The seven percent who remained undecided make the arithmetic complete. Their presence also cautions against treating the poll as a binary command, especially when no precise margin of error was published in the articles consulted. The file names a condition rather than a guarantee: the available material supports uncertainty is a result too, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The next step decides more.

The record separates allegation from outcome, 7% undecided respondents survey response place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The seven percent who remained undecided make the arithmetic complete. Their presence also cautions against treating the poll as a binary command, especially when no precise margin of error was published in the articles consulted. The practical consequence is that uncertainty is a result too; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The finding is procedural.

Undecided respondents are not empty space.

Fifty-nine percent would freeze the present line conditionally

The stated condition

In the reporting available, 59% current front line security guarantees define the point at issue. Fifty-nine percent said they would accept a freeze along the current front line in exchange for security guarantees, financing, and weapons deliveries. The condition is integral to the answer; it is not an optional footnote. The institutional choice is now visible: the available material supports the offer in the question carries its own price, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The line between fact and inference holds.

This is a fact with a ceiling, 59% current front line security guarantees place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Fifty-nine percent said they would accept a freeze along the current front line in exchange for security guarantees, financing, and weapons deliveries. The condition is integral to the answer; it is not an optional footnote. The practical consequence is that the offer in the question carries its own price; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The poll does not negotiate.

Thirty-one percent reject that option

Within the stated timeline, 31% categorical opposition front-line freeze define the point at issue. Thirty-one percent categorically opposed a freeze. The remaining split shows that a pause in fighting is not equivalent to consensus, and that the stated external guarantees shape the willingness recorded by the survey. No larger conclusion follows automatically: the available material supports a conditional majority is not unconditional consent, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The damage remains unmeasured.

The public can see the action; it cannot yet see every consequence, 31% categorical opposition front-line freeze place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Thirty-one percent categorically opposed a freeze. The remaining split shows that a pause in fighting is not equivalent to consensus, and that the stated external guarantees shape the willingness recorded by the survey. The practical consequence is that a conditional majority is not unconditional consent; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The deployment is not peace.

The front line is not a deed of title.

Control of territory is not sovereignty

The legal difference

On the narrow question, current line of control Donbas territorial sovereignty define the point at issue. A freeze at the existing line concerns the immediate placement of forces. Ceding Donbas concerns sovereignty. The poll’s two questions make that difference visible, and the different responses show respondents are not treating the terms as interchangeable. The next test lies outside the announcement: the available material supports a line on the ground is not a legal transfer, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The source calls for restraint.

The file names a condition rather than a guarantee, current line of control Donbas territorial sovereignty place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. A freeze at the existing line concerns the immediate placement of forces. Ceding Donbas concerns sovereignty. The poll’s two questions make that difference visible, and the different responses show respondents are not treating the terms as interchangeable. The practical consequence is that a line on the ground is not a legal transfer; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The claim has not been independently confirmed.

The political difference

For the institutions named, temporary freeze formal cession Ukraine define the point at issue. The available reporting does not say that accepting a freeze means accepting Russia’s claim to territory. Reading it that way would erase the specific distinction KIIS put before respondents and would misstate the result. The distinction carries weight: the available material supports the wording refuses the shortcut, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The litigation remains alive.

The institutional choice is now visible, temporary freeze formal cession Ukraine place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The available reporting does not say that accepting a freeze means accepting Russia’s claim to territory. Reading it that way would erase the specific distinction KIIS put before respondents and would misstate the result. The practical consequence is that the wording refuses the shortcut; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The public record is incomplete.

Guarantees are part of the answer, not a footnote.

Guarantees, funding, and weapons were part of the question

The stated exchange

Beyond the headline number, security guarantees funding weapons deliveries define the point at issue. The 59 percent figure is tied to an exchange that includes security guarantees, financing, and weapons. The survey therefore does not measure an abstract appetite for a ceasefire without outside support or defensive capacity. The date changes the reading: the available material supports the conditions are not decoration, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. No authority has closed the issue.

No larger conclusion follows automatically, security guarantees funding weapons deliveries place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The 59 percent figure is tied to an exchange that includes security guarantees, financing, and weapons. The survey therefore does not measure an abstract appetite for a ceasefire without outside support or defensive capacity. The practical consequence is that the conditions are not decoration; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The timeline is not proof of cause.

What the condition does not promise

For the next decision, guarantees future delivery negotiated outcome define the point at issue. A respondent’s stated willingness under conditions does not prove that those conditions can be delivered, enforced, or accepted in real negotiations. The poll measures preferences under a proposition, not the feasibility of an eventual settlement. A number alone cannot settle it: the available material supports a survey cannot manufacture a guarantee, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The event demands a careful verb.

The next test lies outside the announcement, guarantees future delivery negotiated outcome place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. A respondent’s stated willingness under conditions does not prove that those conditions can be delivered, enforced, or accepted in real negotiations. The poll measures preferences under a proposition, not the feasibility of an eventual settlement. The practical consequence is that a survey cannot manufacture a guarantee; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The evidence must carry the weight.

A sample has a boundary before it has authority.

The sample was 974 adults

The reported size

At the centre of the record, 974 respondents adults aged 18 and over KIIS define the point at issue. KIIS surveyed 974 adults aged 18 and over. The figure gives the poll a defined methodological frame, but it does not eliminate the need to read subgroup movements with caution when detailed statistical uncertainty is absent from the consulted articles. That is a boundary, not an excuse: the available material supports sample size explains the study; it does not settle every inference, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The record stops there.

The distinction carries weight, 974 respondents adults aged 18 and over KIIS place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. KIIS surveyed 974 adults aged 18 and over. The figure gives the poll a defined methodological frame, but it does not eliminate the need to read subgroup movements with caution when detailed statistical uncertainty is absent from the consulted articles. The practical consequence is that sample size explains the study; it does not settle every inference; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. That is not a conviction.

The territory covered

The documented starting point, government-controlled regions Ukraine fieldwork define the point at issue. The survey covered regions under Ukrainian government control. That scope is relevant in a country at war, because it sets a boundary around whom the poll could reach and what population its results describe. The wording matters here: the available material supports methodology is part of the finding, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The figure needs its source.

The date changes the reading, government-controlled regions Ukraine fieldwork place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The survey covered regions under Ukrainian government control. That scope is relevant in a country at war, because it sets a boundary around whom the poll could reach and what population its results describe. The practical consequence is that methodology is part of the finding; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The video is not a verdict.

Opinion comes with dates.

Fieldwork ran from 20 July to 3 August

The date window

Inside the stated case, 20 July 2026 3 August 2026 KIIS fieldwork define the point at issue. The fieldwork occurred from 20 July to 3 August, before the results were reported on 7 August. It captures views during that period and should not be used as a claim about attitudes after later events or future negotiations. That restraint belongs in the conclusion: the available material supports opinion has a date stamp, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The claim remains attributed.

A number alone cannot settle it, 20 July 2026 3 August 2026 KIIS fieldwork place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The fieldwork occurred from 20 July to 3 August, before the results were reported on 7 August. It captures views during that period and should not be used as a claim about attitudes after later events or future negotiations. The practical consequence is that opinion has a date stamp; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. A court has not ended the case.

A snapshot, not a prediction

On the investigators' account, field dates survey responses future talks define the point at issue. The dates make the polling a snapshot rather than a forecast. Public views may shift with battlefield developments, diplomacy, or the credibility of proposed guarantees, none of which this single reported wave can settle in advance. The record separates allegation from outcome: the available material supports the poll describes a moment, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The caveat changes the headline.

That is a boundary, not an excuse, field dates survey responses future talks place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The dates make the polling a snapshot rather than a forecast. Public views may shift with battlefield developments, diplomacy, or the credibility of proposed guarantees, none of which this single reported wave can settle in advance. The practical consequence is that the poll describes a moment; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The number carries a limit.

Missing statistical precision should stay missing.

No precise margin of error was provided in the reporting

The missing figure

In the operational tally, precise margin of error subgroup comparisons consulted articles define the point at issue. The articles consulted do not state a precise margin of error. That absence limits fine statistical readings of changes between age groups or cities, even though the broad published results remain informative as reported findings. This is a fact with a ceiling: the available material supports precision cannot be invented after publication, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The law has its own timetable.

The wording matters here, precise margin of error subgroup comparisons consulted articles place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The articles consulted do not state a precise margin of error. That absence limits fine statistical readings of changes between age groups or cities, even though the broad published results remain informative as reported findings. The practical consequence is that precision cannot be invented after publication; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The evidence is narrower.

Why it matters

In the financial trail described, sampling uncertainty 42% 54% define the point at issue. Without the exact margin, a change such as 42 percent from 54 percent in a subgroup should be described as reported movement rather than treated as a mathematically settled shift of a known size. The public can see the action; it cannot yet see every consequence: the available material supports a comparison needs its measurement frame, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The agreement still needs action.

That restraint belongs in the conclusion, sampling uncertainty 42% 54% place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Without the exact margin, a change such as 42 percent from 54 percent in a subgroup should be described as reported movement rather than treated as a mathematically settled shift of a known size. The practical consequence is that a comparison needs its measurement frame; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The source does not settle blame.

Age shows difference, not destiny.

Age groups show a documented divide

Older respondents

For any legal reading, 22% people over 60 withdrawal from Donbas define the point at issue. Among respondents over 60, 22 percent were willing to accept a withdrawal from Donbas. The figure identifies one age-group position; it does not establish why those respondents held it or how they would act in an actual vote. The file names a condition rather than a guarantee: the available material supports the poll records an answer, not a motive, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The next step decides more.

The record separates allegation from outcome, 22% people over 60 withdrawal from Donbas place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Among respondents over 60, 22 percent were willing to accept a withdrawal from Donbas. The figure identifies one age-group position; it does not establish why those respondents held it or how they would act in an actual vote. The practical consequence is that the poll records an answer, not a motive; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The finding is procedural.

Younger respondents

In the reporting available, 42% ages 18 to 29 April 2026 define the point at issue. Among people aged 18 to 29, 42 percent expressed that willingness, down from 54 percent in April 2026. The comparison is reported from an earlier KIIS wave, whose full methodological detail is not reproduced in the assigned material. The institutional choice is now visible: the available material supports the change is reported, not explained, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The line between fact and inference holds.

This is a fact with a ceiling, 42% ages 18 to 29 April 2026 place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Among people aged 18 to 29, 42 percent expressed that willingness, down from 54 percent in April 2026. The comparison is reported from an earlier KIIS wave, whose full methodological detail is not reproduced in the assigned material. The practical consequence is that the change is reported, not explained; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The poll does not negotiate.

A city’s movement is not a national command.

Kyiv’s numbers moved in the opposite direction

Willingness in the capital

Within the stated timeline, 34% 26% Kyiv define the point at issue. In Kyiv, willingness to accept a territorial compromise fell from 34 percent to 26 percent. The reported change adds a local dimension to the national poll, while its precise statistical significance cannot be assessed from the margin information available here. No larger conclusion follows automatically: the available material supports the capital’s movement needs its caveat, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The damage remains unmeasured.

The public can see the action; it cannot yet see every consequence, 34% 26% Kyiv place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. In Kyiv, willingness to accept a territorial compromise fell from 34 percent to 26 percent. The reported change adds a local dimension to the national poll, while its precise statistical significance cannot be assessed from the margin information available here. The practical consequence is that the capital’s movement needs its caveat; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The deployment is not peace.

Categorical opposition in Kyiv

On the narrow question, 62% 69% capital respondents define the point at issue. Categorical opposition in the capital rose from 62 percent to 69 percent. The direction is clear in the reported figures, but the poll does not by itself establish a cause for the movement or forecast how durable it will be. The next test lies outside the announcement: the available material supports a percentage shift is not a full explanation, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The source calls for restraint.

The file names a condition rather than a guarantee, 62% 69% capital respondents place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Categorical opposition in the capital rose from 62 percent to 69 percent. The direction is clear in the reported figures, but the poll does not by itself establish a cause for the movement or forecast how durable it will be. The practical consequence is that a percentage shift is not a full explanation; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The claim has not been independently confirmed.

Expectations do not negotiate peace.

Many respondents see the war lasting past 2027

The reported horizon

For the institutions named, second half of 2027 majority of respondents war outlook define the point at issue. A majority of respondents believed the war would not end before the second half of 2027. This is an expectation reported in the survey, not an intelligence estimate and not a timetable that any party can enforce. The distinction carries weight: the available material supports public expectation is not a calendar of peace, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The litigation remains alive.

The institutional choice is now visible, second half of 2027 majority of respondents war outlook place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. A majority of respondents believed the war would not end before the second half of 2027. This is an expectation reported in the survey, not an intelligence estimate and not a timetable that any party can enforce. The practical consequence is that public expectation is not a calendar of peace; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The public record is incomplete.

The outlook shapes the choices

Beyond the headline number, war duration survey outlook security debate define the point at issue. A long expected horizon helps explain why questions about a freeze and guarantees carry weight. It does not tell us which negotiating formula will succeed, only that the survey’s respondents were answering under an expectation of continued strain. The date changes the reading: the available material supports the horizon changes the pressure, not the law, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. No authority has closed the issue.

No larger conclusion follows automatically, war duration survey outlook security debate place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. A long expected horizon helps explain why questions about a freeze and guarantees carry weight. It does not tell us which negotiating formula will succeed, only that the survey’s respondents were answering under an expectation of continued strain. The practical consequence is that the horizon changes the pressure, not the law; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The timeline is not proof of cause.

Declared resolve is not a military forecast.

Sixty percent say they are ready to hold on as long as needed

The declared resolve

For the next decision, 60% as long as necessary respondents define the point at issue. Sixty percent said they were prepared to hold on as long as necessary. The phrase measures declared resolve in a poll; it must not be converted into a prediction about individual endurance, policy, or battlefield capacity. A number alone cannot settle it: the available material supports resolve is reported, not guaranteed, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The event demands a careful verb.

The next test lies outside the announcement, 60% as long as necessary respondents place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Sixty percent said they were prepared to hold on as long as necessary. The phrase measures declared resolve in a poll; it must not be converted into a prediction about individual endurance, policy, or battlefield capacity. The practical consequence is that resolve is reported, not guaranteed; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The evidence must carry the weight.

The two views can coexist

At the centre of the record, 60% reject cession 59% accept freeze 60% hold on define the point at issue. Rejection of cession, conditional acceptance of a freeze, and readiness to continue can coexist because they answer different propositions. The poll’s central lesson is not inconsistency; it is the refusal of a false either-or. That is a boundary, not an excuse: the available material supports the public answer is more precise than the slogan, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The record stops there.

The distinction carries weight, 60% reject cession 59% accept freeze 60% hold on place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. Rejection of cession, conditional acceptance of a freeze, and readiness to continue can coexist because they answer different propositions. The poll’s central lesson is not inconsistency; it is the refusal of a false either-or. The practical consequence is that the public answer is more precise than the slogan; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. That is not a conviction.

Polls inform a country; they do not govern it.

Conclusion

The refusal is territorial; the openness is conditional

The documented starting point, 60% 59% 31% define the point at issue. The most defensible reading is clear: the reported KIIS poll finds a majority rejecting cession of Donbas and a different majority conditionally open to freezing the fighting line. It does not find a majority accepting a transfer of sovereignty. The wording matters here: the available material supports the distinction belongs at the center of every account, but it does not establish a broader conclusion that the material never makes. The figure needs its source.

The distinction is the result.

The date changes the reading, 974 respondents 20 July to 3 August margin of error not stated place the claim in a specific chain of decisions. The survey also has boundaries: a defined sample, fixed field dates, and no precise margin of error in the articles reviewed. It is evidence of public sentiment under war, not a substitute for a settlement. The conditions matter. The practical consequence is that the answer cannot be shortened without being changed; that is a consequence of the reported record, not a substitute for missing evidence. The video is not a verdict.

Signature

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's Transparency box

Editorial positioning

This article treats the KIIS poll reported on 7 August 2026 Ukraine’s sovereignty the survey’s methodological limits as a matter of public accountability. It takes no side against a defendant, a combatant, a government, or a respondent beyond what the cited record can support. The argument is for accurate attribution, legal restraint, and a clear account of consequence.

Methodology and sources

The account relies only on the assigned material: Ukrainska Pravda reporting The Kyiv Independent reporting the assigned RBC-Ukraine context. Claims are described as official statements, reported findings, survey responses, or judicial developments according to their stated status. Where the material does not provide an independent confirmation, a final ruling, or a technical assessment, that absence is stated.

Nature of the analysis

This is an analysis of survey questions reported percentages the limits of polling evidence, not an independent investigation or a final adjudication. It distinguishes documented action from allegation, estimate, or projection. New evidence, a court ruling, an official correction, or an independent assessment could change the picture described here.

Sources

Primary sources

• Ukrainska Pravda, KIIS poll report — 7 August 2026
• Ukrainska Pravda, source record — 7 August 2026
• Ukrainska Pravda, source record — 7 August 2026

Secondary sources

• The Kyiv Independent, KIIS poll report — 7 August 2026
• RBC-Ukraine poll context — 7 August 2026
• The Kyiv Independent, source record — 7 August 2026