ESSAY: Hormuz under blackmail — Iran invents itself a planetary veto right

Introduction: When a goodwill clause becomes a weapon of pressure

A memorandum signed in urgency, exploited over time

There is something dizzying in how Iran has turned a simple diplomatic courtesy clause into a sovereignty claim over one of the most strategic waterways on the planet. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed the previous month between Tehran and Washington, according to Al Jazeera, contained an Article 5 meant to guarantee safe passage for commercial vessels. Today, that article has become the legal pretext Iran invokes to claim oversight — even veto power — over who can, or cannot, cross the Strait of Hormuz.

The exact text of the clause, as reported by Al Jazeera, states that Iran "will use its best efforts to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels, free of charge for only 60 days, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa." Nothing in that wording suggests a power of blockage or permanent pricing. And yet, it is precisely this maximalist reading that Iran's regime now champions, in a context where roughly 20 percent of the world's oil and gas passes through this corridor, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

A dispute that far exceeds its legal framing

This semantic slide — from a goodwill clause to a claim of political control — is no drafting accident. It is a deliberate strategy, pushed by the hardest factions within Iranian power, at a moment when the regime is seeking to project strength after months of devastating strikes suffered since the outbreak of the February 28, 2026 war, launched by the United States and Israel according to Britannica. Claiming a veto over Hormuz becomes a symbolic substitute for military power lost on other battlefields.

Let's call this what it is: when a state turns a logistics-cooperation clause into a veto over global trade, that's no longer diplomacy, it's economic blackmail dressed up as legal argument. And the whole world should be worried about it, not just Washington.

The origin of a claim: from cooperation to control

What Article 5 actually says

Let's revisit the text with the rigor it deserves. Article 5 of the MoU has two distinct parts, according to Al Jazeera: a "best efforts" commitment for the safe passage of vessels over a limited period of 60 days, and a softer clause calling on Iran to engage with Oman and other regional states on the future administration and maritime services in the waterway. Nowhere does the text grant Tehran exclusive decision-making power over international shipping traffic.

And yet it is on this fragile basis that the spokesman for parliament's national security committee, Ebrahim Azizi, wrote on X that recognizing a "new Iranian order in the Strait of Hormuz" was "the only way" forward. A statement that, in a single sentence, sums up Tehran's real ambition: turning a best-efforts obligation into an ownership right over an international maritime space.

The near-unanimous rejection by the international community

This attempt at reinterpretation hasn't convinced many. According to RFE/RL, Tehran announced it would impose fees on vessels crossing the strait — a move rejected by nearly every country in the world. This near-unanimous rejection shows just how illegitimate the international community considers this claim, whatever legal justification Tehran offers.

When the entire planet refuses to recognize your claim, it's usually not because the whole world is wrong and you alone are right. It's because your demand was never grounded in law — only in a balance of power you're hoping to impose through fear.

CENTCOM strikes back with numbers, not words

The fact check that dismantles Iranian propaganda

Facing this rhetoric, the American response took an unusual shape for a military power: a fact-check posted directly on social media. On July 9, 2026, CENTCOM stated unambiguously on X: "Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz." The American command backed that claim with concrete data: since early May, U.S. forces have helped move more than 800 commercial vessels and 380 million barrels of crude oil through this vital trade corridor.

CENTCOM explicitly attributed to Iranian state media the claim that "transit through the Strait of Hormuz is only permitted via routes designated by Iran," calling that assertion false. It's a battle of narratives fought with statistics: on one side, an unverifiable political claim; on the other, an operational tally of ships and barrels that refutes, figures in hand, Iran's pretension to exclusive control.

A war of statements that masks a very real escalation

This rhetorical battle is not happening in a vacuum. It comes after a fresh wave of American strikes overnight on July 8 into 9, when CENTCOM claimed to have hit about 90 Iranian military targets, following an earlier operation that struck roughly 80 targets, including more than 60 boats belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to RFE/RL. These strikes were meant to punish Iran for attacking three commercial vessels in the strait, in violation of the ceasefire.

We'd be wrong to smile at this numbers war being waged on social media. Behind every CENTCOM statistic lies a brutal military reality: dozens of targets hit, boats destroyed, a conflict with no real pause despite the words "ceasefire" still used by everyone involved.

Qalibaf and the hardline: the claim as a discourse of political survival

Tough talk masking a position of weakness

Iranian parliament speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf personally carried this hardline message, warning according to RFE/RL that "America still hasn't learned that intimidation and breaking promises are no longer free." He added, in a formula both threatening and defensive: "Let me be clear: if you strike, you will be struck," insisting that the strait would remain open "only under Iranian arrangements, not American threats."

This posture of firmness must be read against Iran's domestic political backdrop. The country is going through a period of national mourning after the death of Ali Khamenei, killed in the first wave of American-Israeli strikes on February 28, 2026 according to Britannica, and is trying to show its own population that it hasn't capitulated to Washington. Claiming a right over Hormuz becomes, in this context, a tool of internal legitimation as much as an international negotiating position.

Adviser Shakeri and all-or-nothing logic

Chief negotiator's adviser Majid Shakeri put this position in near-martial terms, according to Al Jazeera: "Either we hold on to this strait, or we become martyrs for it, one by one." He added that extracting "revenue is contingent on control" of the strait — implicitly acknowledging that the control claim primarily aims at an economic goal, that of being able to monetize the passage, rather than a legitimate national security objective.

When a senior adviser invokes martyrdom to defend control of a commercial shipping lane, you get a sense of just how far this claim has drifted from any rational legal argument. That's sacrifice being brandished as a bargaining chip — dangerous rhetoric for the entire region.

The April blockade precedent: when the weapon turns on its own wielder

A bitter lesson Tehran seems to have forgotten

Recent history offers a clear lesson about the limits of maritime arm-wrestling. According to Britannica, after the failure of direct talks in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Donald Trump ordered the U.S. Navy to impose a blockade preventing any vessel that had docked at an Iranian port from transiting the strait. That blockade, in effect from April 13, directly threatened Iran's economy, with export-bound oil storage set to hit maximum capacity by May.

Overall commercial traffic through the strait had, from the start of the conflict, fallen by more than 90 percent, causing fuel shortages in Asia and a spike in global oil prices, from roughly 70 dollars a barrel before the war to an average of 103 dollars in March. A situation in which, paradoxically, Iran saw its own oil revenues rise by roughly 25 million dollars a day thanks to higher prices — but at the cost of a logistical stranglehold on its domestic economy.

Operation "Project Freedom" as an American show of force

On May 4, 2026, American forces launched operation "Project Freedom" to guide vessels stranded by the blockade through the strait, allowing two American-flagged commercial ships to cross despite it. That operation was accompanied by deadly clashes between American and Iranian forces, and Iran retaliated by striking oil infrastructure targets in the United Arab Emirates. On May 5, Trump announced the operation's suspension, citing "great progress" toward a deal.

This precedent should serve as a warning to Tehran, not a blueprint. The last time Iran tried to use Hormuz as maximum-pressure leverage, the American response was a blockade that nearly brought Iran's economy to its knees. Replaying that card today is a calculated risk — or a badly calculated one.

The strategic calculation behind the veto claim

Hormuz as the last bargaining chip of a weakened regime

Why does Iran cling so tightly to this claim despite the obvious risk of retaliation? The answer likely lies in the fact that the Strait of Hormuz represents, for Tehran, one of the regime's last significant pressure levers after months of strikes that decapitated much of its political and military leadership. With Ali Khamenei dead, a new supreme leader in Mojtaba Khamenei threatened with assassination by Israel according to RFE/RL, and an economy under a persistent blockade, control — even symbolic control — of the strait becomes a card of political survival.

It is also a way to flip the psychological balance of power: rather than appearing as the party absorbing American and Israeli strikes, Iran is trying to present itself as the one holding the capacity to disrupt the global economy. It's a risky bet, but consistent with the survival logic of a cornered regime.

An internal rift that undermines the claim's credibility

This strategy runs into deep internal divisions, however. President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had backed the April agreement, was criticized by conservatives for that moderate stance, while figures such as Mahmoud Nabavian or former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezaei push for a line of total confrontation. Rezaei said on state television that "the Americans will destroy these talks themselves," explicitly calling for revenge against Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu.

A regime negotiating its survival as much internally as internationally is not in a position of strength to dictate new rules to global maritime trade. The veto claim over Hormuz looks less like a coherent strategy than a cry of distress dressed up as firmness.

Israel, the silent arbiter of an escalation that benefits no one

Military preparations that contradict any hope of de-escalation

In this already explosive context, Israel adds another layer of uncertainty. Defense Minister Israel Katz said, according to RFE/RL, that his country was ready to resume its military campaign against Iran "with even greater force" if necessary, adding that the Israeli military was "ready and on alert to resume fighting… to eliminate threats, including a third time if necessary." Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated for his part that "the Iranian axis is weaker than ever," while acknowledging that "the campaign is not over."

According to Israeli media, including Walla, the Israeli military is actively preparing for a new war with Iran, with direct coordination with CENTCOM and updates to its operational plans. Israel openly opposes the MoU signed between Iran and the United States, making any de-escalation attempt built on that agreement all the more fragile.

Trump-Netanyahu coordination that defines the Western line

On July 9, Netanyahu and Trump spoke by phone, with Trump briefing him on "American movements in the Gulf," according to the Israeli prime minister's office. This close coordination between Washington and Jerusalem illustrates a relatively unified Western line against Iranian claims — even though Trump himself said he had "no personal hope" for a quick negotiated settlement with Tehran.

While Iran brandishes an imaginary veto right over Hormuz, Israel and the United States are quietly coordinating their next military options. The preparedness gap between the two camps alone should convince Tehran that this card is riskier than it thinks.

The global oil price, a silent hostage of Iranian rhetoric

A volatility that weighs on every importing economy

Beyond the diplomatic and military posturing, Iran's claim over Hormuz has a direct and measurable effect on the global economy. The April precedent demonstrated this unambiguously: according to Britannica, the average price of a barrel of oil rose from roughly 70 dollars before the war to an average of 103 dollars in March, a rise directly tied to disruption of traffic through the strait. Every new statement from Tehran about a possible toll or blockage would mechanically reignite that market nervousness, with very real consequences for European and Asian consumers.

This volatility is not just an abstract financial-market phenomenon. It translates concretely into fuel shortages, like those documented in Asia east of the Gulf during the most intense period of the blockage. Iran knows this, and it is precisely this global economic lever it seeks to exploit by claiming even partial control over the strait.

Blackmail that always ends up backfiring on its author

But this economic weapon cuts both ways. The price surge benefits other oil producers as much, if not more, than Iran itself can capitalize on, since its own exports remain subject to sanctions and the 60-day American waivers mentioned by Al Jazeera. In other words, Tehran risks igniting a global market it cannot fully profit from, while exposing itself to new sanctions and diplomatic isolation, already illustrated by the international rejection of its toll demand.

There's a form of strategic blindness in wanting to manipulate the global oil price when you're under sanctions yourself and cut off from full access to export markets. Tehran is playing with a match in a fuel depot that isn't only everyone else's — it's also its own.

Conclusion: International law does not get negotiated under threat

A claim that won't survive the test of reality

Iran's claim to a veto right over the Strait of Hormuz rests on shaky legal ground, a forced reading of a diplomatic clause never designed to grant such power. The facts, backed by figures — 800 vessels, 380 million barrels since early May according to CENTCOM — show that international traffic continues, largely independent of Iranian will. The near-unanimous rejection by the international community of the attempt to charge for passage confirms that this claim finds no echo beyond the regime's hardest-line circles.

But recent history — the American blockade in April, Operation Project Freedom, the destructive strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure — also reminds us that this confrontation will not be settled with words. Every rhetorical escalation comes, in practice, with a very real military escalation, with deaths, destroyed vessels, and weakened regional economies.

The West faces a test of strategic credibility

For the West, even implicitly accepting the idea that a state can grant itself a veto right over an international waterway would open a breach in the rules-based international order — a breach that China, Putin's Russia or North Korea would watch with the greatest interest for their own territorial ambitions. Defending freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is therefore not just an energy question: it is a test of the West's ability to enforce the rules it defends elsewhere, from the South China Sea to the Black Sea.

What's at stake in Hormuz goes beyond the price of a barrel of oil. It's a real-world test of the free world's ability to say no to territorial blackmail, whether it comes from Tehran, Moscow or Beijing. Give ground here, and you send a signal everywhere else.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial stance

This essay takes a clear editorial line: opposition to any attempt by Iran to unilaterally redefine international maritime law, support for the American position defended by CENTCOM on freedom of navigation, and a critical but factual reading of Donald Trump's decisions, presented as a necessary geopolitical actor against Iranian, Russian, Chinese and North Korean threats. This stance reflects the columnist's judgment, not a façade of neutrality.

Methodology and sources

All facts, figures and quotes come from verified sources: Al Jazeera, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Britannica, along with public statements from CENTCOM, the Iranian government and Israeli officials. No fact has been invented or extrapolated. Quotes attributed to Qalibaf, Shakeri, Azizi, Rezaei, Katz and Netanyahu are drawn from their public statements as reported by these outlets.

Factual limits of this file

The record cannot confirm with certainty whether Iran's toll claim on passage has been formally implemented or remains a declaratory threat. The maritime traffic figures cited by CENTCOM cover the period since early May, without equivalent public data for the period before that date.

Sources

Primary sources

U.S. insists Iran "does not control" the Strait of Hormuz — Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 9, 2026

Iran signals defiance as Trump fumes over Strait of Hormuz strikes — Al Jazeera, July 8, 2026

The 2026 Iran war: timeline and context of the ceasefire — Britannica

Secondary sources

Foreign policy analysis on the Gulf crisis — Foreign Policy

International coverage of the Iranian crisis — The Guardian

Regional strategic analysis — Institute for the Study of War (ISW)