ESSAY: The KN-23 missile — when Ukraine becomes Kim Jong-un's laboratory

From 1–3 kilometers to 1–5 meters: an abyssal technological leap

There is one statistic I want to engrave in the mind of every Western strategist who still thinks the war in Ukraine is purely a European affair. In 2024, the precision of the North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile was in the range of 1 to 3 kilometers of error margin. The overall accuracy rate did not exceed 20%. It was a dangerous but imprecise missile. A weapon of terror, not of surgery.

Today, according to Ukrainian assessments cited by 19FortyFive, that same KN-23 achieves a precision of 1 to 5 meters. Not 1 to 3 kilometers — 1 to 5 meters. That is an improvement by a factor of hundreds. This is no longer a terror weapon. It is a precision weapon. And this qualitative leap was achieved using data collected on Ukrainian battlefields, transmitted by Russia to North Korea. Ukraine is paying in blood for the refinement of Kim Jong-un's ballistic arsenal.

What this precision means in concrete terms

A missile capable of 1 to 5 meters of precision can destroy a target building with near-absolute certainty. It can strike a specific military installation, a command center, an ammunition depot, a naval quay. With a conventional warhead, it is a formidable weapon. With a nuclear warhead — which the KN-23 is designed to carry — it is a weapon of targeted destruction. The combination of precision plus nuclear capability is precisely what non-proliferation sought to prevent.

When I analyze this progression in precision, I must pause. Because behind these numbers are North Korean engineers improving their systems in real time using data generated by their missiles killing Ukrainians. There is something profoundly revolting in this armed learning mechanism.

At least 100 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles fired at Ukraine

The facts are documented: at least 100 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles were used by Russia in Ukraine. These strikes caused more than 170 casualties. Each of these launches was simultaneously a weapon against Ukrainians and a scientific experiment for Pyongyang's engineers. Every recorded impact, every analyzed trajectory, every documented failure contributed to building a dataset that enabled this qualitative leap to metric precision.

Russia began using these missiles from late 2023 — early 2024. Initial results were indeed disappointing. But instead of abandoning these systems, Moscow and Pyongyang opted for continuous improvement. They treated the Ukrainian battlefield as a full-scale laboratory, an accelerated testing program that no normal R&D budget could have funded. Ukrainian casualties involuntarily subsidized the modernization of North Korea's ballistic arsenal.

The characteristics of the revised and improved KN-23

The KN-23 is a short-range ballistic missile whose estimated range varies between 450 and 690 kilometers depending on the payload. This range window is not trivial: at 690 km, the KN-23 covers the entirety of South Korea and reaches part of Japan. At maximum range, with a precision of 1 to 5 meters, this missile can now strike with surgical reliability any military or civilian target in both of those US-allied nations. This is a fundamental change in the threat facing Northeast Asia.

A range of 690 km means Tokyo is theoretically within the KN-23's improved strike envelope. Of course, Japanese and American missile defenses exist. But they do not intercept 100% of missiles. And with the current precision of the KN-23, every missile that gets through represents a potential catastrophe.

From combat data to system improvements

The technology transfer mechanism deserves precise description. Russia fires a KN-23 at Ukraine. Ukrainian air defense systems attempt to intercept it — sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Trajectory data, speed, altitude, radar signature, and impact data are collected from both sides. Russia transmits to Pyongyang a synthesis of this data: what worked, what failed, why, and how to correct it.

Pyongyang integrates this data into its guidance and propulsion systems. Subsequent missiles are adjusted accordingly. And the 8th North Korean missile test of 2026, conducted on May 26, 2026, almost certainly incorporates the lessons of these adjustments. This is an iterative, accelerated improvement cycle that the North Korean nuclear program could never have achieved in international isolation. The war in Ukraine has decisively broken that technological isolation.

The role of artificial intelligence in new systems

North Korea's tests on May 26, 2026 involved systems incorporating artificial intelligence elements. AI in a ballistic missile system can serve to optimize trajectory, improve resistance to electronic countermeasures, and select the impact point with greater precision. If North Korea develops AI-guided missiles with 1-to-5-meter precision and a 690 km range, it possesses a weapon of sophistication comparable to what major nuclear powers developed over decades. Pyongyang has traveled that road in a matter of years, not decades.

Artificial intelligence in North Korean missiles. Five years ago, that sentence would have sounded like science fiction. Today, it is documented. And there is something vertiginous about the speed at which military technologies spread when real wars serve as test benches.

170 direct casualties from North Korean missiles in Ukraine

The more than 170 casualties caused by KN-23 and KN-24 missiles in Ukraine are individuals who probably did not know they were dying under missiles manufactured in North Korea. They were dying under Russian strikes, in their own country, in a war of aggression. But the weapon that killed them bore the mark of Pyongyang. This reality must be named.

These victims stand at the intersection of two conflicts that should never have crossed: Putin's war against Ukraine and Kim Jong-un's nuclear ambition. The NK-Russia alliance has fused these two realities into a single mechanism of death. And every Ukrainian death by KN-23 represents both a direct human tragedy and an additional data point for Pyongyang's engineers. It is the coldest and most inhumane logic of this war.

What Ukraine proved about the interoperability of threats

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated a truth that Cold War strategists had not fully anticipated: regional conflicts feed global threats. Iranian drones tested in Ukraine improve Iran's arsenal. North Korean missiles tested in Ukraine improve North Korea's arsenal. Russian tactics proven in Ukraine inform Chinese doctrines regarding Taiwan. Every local war becomes a node in a global network of shared military learning among the West's adversaries.

The West must understand this: supporting Ukraine is not only a matter of justice for Ukrainians. It is also about putting an end to this full-scale ballistic laboratory that Putin has opened for the benefit of Pyongyang and Tehran. Every additional day this war continues without a Ukrainian victory is another day of data for the enemies of our democracies.

South Korea and Japan under a renewed threat

For South Korea and Japan, the improved precision of the KN-23 represents a qualitative change in the threat requiring an adapted defensive response. Current interception systems — THAAD in South Korea, Patriot and SM-3 in Japan — were designed to handle less precise missiles with more predictable trajectories. A KN-23 with AI guidance and metric precision is a different challenge.

It is in this context that South Korea is examining the acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine. This is no coincidence. It is a direct strategic response to the improvement of North Korean ballistic capabilities. The armament spiral in Northeast Asia is accelerating precisely because the KN-23 is improving.

The 690 km range: Seoul, Busan, and beyond

At 450 km, the KN-23 covers the entire Korean Peninsula. At 690 km, it reaches targets in the Sea of Japan and on some Japanese islands. This range, combined with 1-to-5-meter precision, means that virtually all American military installations in South Korea and nearby Japanese islands fall within Pyongyang's precise strike envelope. This is no longer merely a terror threat — it is a precise military degradation capability.

When a missile can strike within a 5-meter radius of a target 690 km away, it can destroy a runway, sink a ship in port, hit a bunker. The difference between 2024 precision and 2026 precision is not quantitative. It is qualitative. It fundamentally shifts the balance of forces in the region.

Ukraine as a global threat accelerator: the central lesson

The essay I wish to defend in these pages rests on the following argument: the war in Ukraine is not a regional conflict with localized management. It is a catalyst for global threats. Russia is using this conflict to test weapons — its own and those of its partners. It is collecting operational data of inestimable value. And it is redistributing that data to its allies as part of transactions that improve their offensive capabilities.

The KN-23 is the most thoroughly documented proof of this phenomenon. But the same mechanisms apply to Iranian Shahed drones, which improve with each new version tested above Ukraine. The West is financing its own future threat by failing to crush the Russian war machine quickly enough. Every additional month of war is another month of learning for Pyongyang and Tehran.

Why Ukrainian victory is a global strategic imperative

In this context, Ukrainian victory is not only a matter of geopolitical justice or respect for international law. It is a strategic imperative for the security of Northeast Asia. Ending the Russian war machine in Ukraine means cutting the channel through which Pyongyang receives its combat data. It interrupts the KN-23 improvement cycle. It reduces the speed at which Kim Jong-un can refine his missiles. Helping Ukraine means protecting Tokyo and Seoul too.

I sometimes hear voices in the West saying that aid to Ukraine costs too much. My simple reply: how much will missile defense for Tokyo cost when the KN-23 is twice as accurate again in two years? The calculus is harsh, but it is real.

170 casualties as evidence of international complicity

The more than 170 casualties from KN-23 and KN-24 missiles in Ukraine are living proof of this armed technology transfer. Each of those victims died under a missile manufactured in North Korea, fired by Russia, improved through data generated by previous strikes. This chain of causation must be clearly named in international forums. This is not only a Russian aggression — it is a Russo-North Korean aggression, with a technological third-party beneficiary: Pyongyang.

Ukraine has the right to demand that the international community acknowledge this reality and draw the appropriate diplomatic consequences. Tolerance toward the deployment of North Korean missiles on the Ukrainian theater is a form of passive complicity. If additional sanctions against the DPRK and mechanisms to pressure Russia to cease using these missiles are not put in place, the message sent to Kim Jong-un is unambiguous: keep going.

What 2026 demands from the West on the NK dossier

Faced with the KN-23's progression — from 20% accuracy in 2024 to a 1-to-5-meter margin of error in 2026 — the West must acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: the war in Ukraine has become a technological catalyst for all adversaries of the liberal international order. The 8 North Korean missile tests in 2026 directly benefit from data collected on the Ukrainian theater. Every additional day of war is another day of additional learning for Pyongyang.

The Western response must operate on two simultaneous levels: first, accelerate Ukrainian victory to cut off this learning channel; second, reinforce allied missile defenses in Northeast Asia to face the improved threat emerging from this theater of war. The 15 billion USD investment requested by Admiral Paparo for space-based missile warning systems is precisely the correct operational response to the KN-23's precision progression.

I want to name this reality plainly: every KN-23 missile that falls on Ukraine improves the precision of the missiles that could tomorrow strike Tokyo or Seoul. The West that refuses to adequately support Ukraine is not only abandoning Ukrainians. It is paying Kim Jong-un's research and development bill.

450 to 690 km: the range that covers Seoul, Busan, and the Japanese islands

The range of the KN-23 varies from 450 to 690 kilometers depending on the payload carried. At 450 km, it covers the entire Korean Peninsula. At 690 km, it reaches targets in Japan. With precision now documented at 1 to 5 meters, this missile can strike with near-certainty any military installation in that territory. American bases in South Korea, naval ports, ammunition depots — everything falls within its precise strike envelope.

The 8th test salvo of 2026, on May 26, incorporated systems with artificial intelligence elements. These systems further improve the missile's ability to adapt its trajectory in flight. Combined with documented precision and a 690 km range, the AI-augmented KN-23 represents the most concerning regional ballistic weapon in the DPRK's arsenal since the start of its nuclear program.

What this essay proves: local wars manufacture global threats

The essay I have developed in these pages rests on a central thesis: local wars, in the era of cross-cutting military alliances and accelerated technology transfers, manufacture tomorrow's global threats. The war in Ukraine is not isolated. It is feeding North Korea's arsenal. Iranian drones, improved there, are being tested. Russian tactics are being refined there and analyzed by Beijing for Taiwan.

This interconnection is not a theory — it is a documented operational reality. The KN-23 is its most precise and measurable demonstration. From 1–3 km of error margin to 1–5 meters: that is the technological price Ukraine is paying, and that Northeast Asia will bear in the future if nothing changes in the West's strategic approach to this war.

This essay begins with a terrifying figure: from 1–3 km to 1–5 m in precision. It ends with a conviction: helping Ukraine win quickly is also an active non-proliferation policy. Every day this war continues is another day of refinement for the missiles threatening our allies in Asia.In writing this essay, I realized that the KN-23 is more than a missile. It is the symbol of the world's failure to contain the contagion effects of regional wars. We have accepted that the war in Ukraine drags on. We accept that Pyongyang uses it as a laboratory. This double acquiescence will have consequences we will measure in decades, not months.

The KN-23 as symbol of a world interconnected through war

The KN-23 missile has become, despite itself, the most eloquent symbol of the interconnection of global threats in the 21st century. A missile designed in Pyongyang, fired by Russia at Ukraine, improved through data from those strikes, capable tomorrow of hitting Tokyo or Seoul with a few meters of precision. That trajectory — literally and figuratively — is the central geopolitical lesson of 2026.

What we must refuse to normalize

We must refuse to treat the KN-23's improvement as just another technical data point. It is a moral and strategic reality of the first importance. Ukraine is paying the price for the refinement of a weapon that will threaten other nations tomorrow. The West has a dual responsibility: support Ukraine to end this theater of war, and strengthen its defenses in Northeast Asia to face the improved threat emerging from these battlefields. These two responsibilities are inseparable.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.