INVESTIGATION: Xi in Pyongyang — China Reasserts Its Grip, but Kim Still Chooses Moscow

Introduction: A Visit Loaded With Symbols and Calculations

June 8–9, 2026: Xi Jinping lands in Pyongyang

On June 8, 2026, a special Air China aircraft landed at Pyongyang International Airport. On board: Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the People's Republic of China. With him: his wife Peng Liyuan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and — notably — Defense Minister Dong Jun. Kim Jong-un was waiting in person on the tarmac. 21 cannon salutes. A military honor guard. Children waving balloons. The pageantry was that of a top-tier state visit — because for Pyongyang, that is exactly what it was.

It was Xi's first trip to North Korea since 2019 — seven years apart. And his first international trip of 2026, which is not trivial: by choosing Pyongyang as his first overseas destination of the year, Xi sent a strong signal about his strategic priorities. The visit also coincided with the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea — the only mutual defense treaty China has ever signed with another country.

The real objective: counterbalancing Russian influence

Behind the ceremonies and banquets lies a specific strategic objective that analysts have unanimously identified: Xi was seeking to counterbalance Russia's growing influence over Kim Jong-un. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea and Russia have built a deep military and economic relationship — North Korean munitions in exchange for Russian oil and technology. This alliance has strengthened Kim's posture toward Beijing: he no longer needs China as desperately as before for his economic survival. Xi came to Pyongyang to remind Kim that Beijing remains his patron, his partner, and his protector — and to renegotiate the terms of that relationship.

Denuclearization: The Glaring Absence

Is Beijing abandoning the denuclearization principle?

The most significant element of the Kim-Xi summit of June 8, 2026 is not what was said — it is what was not said. Official readouts, from both the Chinese side (Xinhua) and the North Korean side (KCNA), contained no mention of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At Xi's previous visit to Pyongyang in 2019, he had explicitly acknowledged North Korea's efforts to promote dialogue and advance the denuclearization process. This time: total silence.

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted that Xi declared that both countries should strengthen strategic coordination and firmly protect each other's "sovereignty, security, and development interests." This phrasing — "sovereignty and security" — is precisely the language North Korea uses to defend its right to a nuclear arsenal. By adopting it without conditions, Xi tacitly recognized Pyongyang's nuclear status. That is a fundamental shift in Chinese policy — or at least in its public framing.

What Kim gained by silencing the nuclear question

For Kim Jong-un, the complete absence of denuclearization language from the summit readouts is a major diplomatic victory. According to Eurasia Group analyst Jeremy Chan, "Beijing has clearly moved past this issue and now implicitly recognizes North Korea as a nuclear power, which probably aligns China more closely with Russia in Pyongyang's perspective." This is not formal recognition — China remains a signatory to UN Security Council resolutions on denuclearization. But it is a practical recognition that reshapes the strategic calculus across the entire region.

What Xi Offered Kim — And What Kim Accepted

Trade, tourism, agriculture, technology

Xi's concrete proposals at the summit covered a broad spectrum of economic engagement: expanded cooperation in trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, healthcare, and public health. He also called for the reopening of border crossings and the resumption of air links and international rail services between the two countries — connections cut or reduced since the COVID-19 pandemic. The return of Chinese tourists to North Korea — still blocked despite various easing measures — was implicitly on the agenda.

China is North Korea's primary trading partner and historically accounts for more than 90% of its external trade. But this dependence has been reduced since Russia became a direct economic partner, supplying oil, grain, and resources in exchange for munitions. Xi wanted to reassert China's centrality in the North Korean economy. Kim received the offers with verbal enthusiasm — but no firm commitments on specifics emerged from the summit.

Military exchanges: the summit's surprise

A statement from Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian surprised analysts: China "stands ready to strengthen exchanges with Pyongyang in the areas of diplomacy, law enforcement and military affairs." This explicit reference to military exchanges between China and North Korea — confirmed by the presence of Defense Minister Dong Jun in Xi's delegation — is the first public mention of bilateral military exchanges since Kim Jong-un effectively inherited power in 2011. For a South Korean political science professor quoted by Kyodo News, this was "surprising."It could mean joint exercises, training exchanges, or intelligence sharing — a significant deepening of military cooperation.

Kim's Response: Surface Loyalty, Real Autonomy

Kim thanks Xi — and keeps his options open

Kim Jong-un's public response to the summit was warm and calculated. He called Xi the "greatest state guest," declared that China-North Korea relations were the "most important strategic priority" of Pyongyang's foreign policy, and affirmed his support for the "one China principle" on Taiwan. KCNA presented the summit as opening a "new chapter" in bilateral relations. These diplomatic formulas are generous. They are also carefully empty of concrete commitments that would limit Kim's freedom of action.

Analysts noted a significant divergence between the Chinese and North Korean readouts of the summit. Xinhua emphasized China's concrete proposals on economic cooperation and exchanges "at all levels."KCNA presented both countries as equal partners, stressing mutual respect for "sovereignty."This narrative gap is telling: China saw the summit as a rapprochement under its leadership, while North Korea saw it as validation of equal status.

Kim wanted recognition — not direction

Since the beginning of his strengthened relationship with Russia, Kim Jong-un has acquired new strategic confidence. He no longer depends solely on China for his economic survival. He has Russian oil, Russian grain, Russian military technology. He has income from ammunition exports to Russia. This relative autonomy has changed the terms of his relationship with Beijing. Kim welcomed Xi not as a protégé welcoming his patron, but as a sovereign leader receiving a peer. The difference in register is subtle but fundamental. Beijing wanted a return to the old relationship of dependency. Kim offered a partnership relationship — on his own terms.

The Kim-Putin Relationship: The Real Context of Xi's Visit

A mutual defense treaty that changes everything

To understand why Xi made the trip to Pyongyang in 2026, we must go back to 2024: that year, Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty. This treaty binds both countries in a military alliance requiring each to come to the other's aid in the event of an attack. For Kim, it provides additional strategic cover beyond what the theoretical 1961 Sino-North Korean treaty offers. For Beijing, it represents direct competition for influence over Pyongyang — a new and uncomfortable situation.

Since that treaty, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles used in Ukraine. In return, Russia has provided North Korea with oil, satellite technology, missile propulsion technology, and potentially nuclear-powered submarine technology. This technology transfer represents a qualitative enhancement of the North Korean military program that directly concerns North Korea's neighbors — including China itself.

Russian technology toward North Korea — the risks for Beijing

One of Beijing's unspoken concerns in this relationship is that Russia is transferring military technologies to North Korea that could, over time, be used against Chinese interests or destabilize a region China considers its sphere of influence. A more advanced North Korean ballistic program — potentially with improved intercontinental missile range — is also a threat to China, which has its own reasons not to want an uncontrollable Kim Jong-un possessing an even more powerful nuclear arsenal. Xi went to Pyongyang to regain control of an ally who was drifting toward Moscow. The result is mixed.

What the Analysts Say — And What Remains Uncertain

The fault line between KCNA and Xinhua

A comparative analysis of the summit's official readouts from both state agencies — North Korean KCNA and Chinese Xinhua — reveals telling differences. Xinhua cited detailed Chinese proposals: trade, agriculture, science, tourism, healthcare. Xinhua mentioned military and diplomatic exchanges. KCNA, by contrast, emphasized the vision of two equal partners, respect for sovereignty, and North Korea as the initiator of proposals, not their recipient. This narrative divergence, noted by analysts at Reuters, suggests that each side was presenting the summit to its domestic audience as a different kind of victory.

South Korean professor Park Jong Chol of Gyeongsang National University advanced the hypothesis that Xi and Kim may have reached an informal agreement: China no longer opposes the nuclear weapons North Korea has already produced, and Pyongyang freezes further production of its arsenal. If this interpretation is correct, it is an extraordinarily favorable deal for Kim — he keeps his existing arsenal in exchange for a commitment that is barely verifiable. But nothing in the official communiqués confirms or refutes this hypothesis.

The unanswered questions

Several crucial questions remain unanswered after the June 2026 summit. Will North Korea actually redirect a portion of its trade toward China at the expense of Russia? Will the announced military exchanges materialize into operational cooperation? Will China exert effective pressure on Kim to stop supplying Russia with ammunition for use in Ukraine — which both Seoul and Washington are demanding? And more fundamentally: did this visit genuinely redefine the terms of the China-North Korea relationship, or was it merely symbolic? The coming months will tell.

Implications for the International Community

Washington, Seoul and Tokyo watching with unease

Xi's visit to Pyongyang was scrutinized closely by three capitals: Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. For the United States, Xi's silence on denuclearization is a diplomatic defeat that weakens non-proliferation efforts. The White House had indicated, following the Trump-Xi summit in May 2026, that both presidents had reaffirmed their "shared goal" of denuclearizing North Korea. Two weeks later, Xi went to Pyongyang without saying a word on the subject. The implicit message is that denuclearization remains an American objective, not a practical priority of Chinese foreign policy.

For South Korea, which lives under the direct threat of North Korean missiles, this summit means its northern neighbor is simultaneously strengthening alliances with both of its major partners. South Korea's diplomatic room for maneuver is shrinking. For Japan, confronted with North Korean missile tests that regularly overfly its territory, the enhancement of Pyongyang's technological capabilities through Russia — with China's implicit blessing — is a direct security concern. The Pyongyang summit of June 2026 reinforced the authoritarian axis and complicated the task of regional democracies.

The 65th anniversary — a historic significance

The context of the 65th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is not merely a calendar detail. That treaty, signed in 1961, is the only formal defensive alliance China has ever concluded. It commits China to provide military assistance to North Korea if the latter is attacked. This legal obligation has shaped Chinese foreign policy for 65 years. By marking this anniversary with a first-tier state visit, Xi reaffirmed the solidity of that treaty — while seeking to renew its spirit in a geopolitical context that has been radically transformed. The 1961 treaty was designed for a bipolar Cold War. In 2026, multipolarity has made it both harder to manage and harder to reform.

North Korea's Nuclear Program After the Summit — An Amplified Threat

Kim had already signaled his intentions before Xi arrived

Even before Xi's arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un had sent a clear signal about his nuclear intentions. He had visited a new nuclear materials production facility and called for a rapid increase in the production capacity of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. Experts saw in this site visit a deliberate preparation of the agenda: Kim was arriving at the summit with Xi from a position of strength, having publicly demonstrated his determination to expand his nuclear arsenal regardless of outside objections. This is the reverse sequence from what Beijing had hoped for: North Korea forcing China to adapt, not the other way around.

Recent American intelligence estimates cited by specialized media suggest that North Korea is in its "strongest strategic position in decades." Its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles is more diversified and more reliable. Its KN-23 missiles, upgraded through real-world testing in Ukraine, have demonstrated improved accuracy. Its solid-fuel missile capabilities are accelerating its military alert cycle. The improvement of North Korean missiles through testing in Ukraine is a direct consequence of the Kim-Putin relationship — and there is little Xi can do about it.

What Xi's visit does not change

Despite all the pageantry of the June 2026 summit, several fundamental realities remain unchanged. North Korea continues to supply Russia with munitions. It continues to develop its nuclear arsenal. It maintains its close military relationship with Moscow. It extracted from Xi an implicit recognition of its nuclear status without making any concession. And it continues to represent a direct threat to South Korea, Japan, and ultimately the United States. Xi's trip to Pyongyang may have slowed a total drift of Kim toward Moscow. It has not reversed the fundamental dynamic of a nuclear regime that grows more powerful and more autonomous each year.

Conclusion: A Necessary Journey, An Ambiguous Result

Xi made the trip — but Kim scored the points

On balance, Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang on June 8–9, 2026 did not produce the strategic rebalancing Beijing had hoped for. China reaffirmed its role as protective elder brother. But Kim Jong-un walked away with a major political gain: implicit validation of his nuclear status by his primary historical partner, substantial economic offers without binding commitments, and recognition as an equal partner rather than a dependent client. On the scorecard of this relationship, Kim outpointed Xi.

This summit is part of a broader trend

The Xi-Kim summit of 2026 is just one episode in a deeper trend: the consolidation of the authoritarian axis formed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. These four regimes cooperate increasingly — not out of shared ideology, but out of a shared interest in weakening the democracy-led international order. North Korea supplies munitions to Russia. China provides economic support to Russia. Iran supplies drones. And Kim receives missile technology in return. Every summit visit between members of this axis — like the one in Pyongyang — reinforces this overall architecture. And the West must understand it as such: not as isolated crises, but as a coherent system.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My position and my biases

I am Maxime Marquette, columnist and analyst. I consider North Korea to be a brutal authoritarian regime and a threat to international stability. I consider China to be the greatest long-term strategic threat to democracies. These biases are assumed. The facts reported — dates, quotations, official statements, expert analyses — are drawn from verified sources cited in the Sources section. The visit took place on June 8–9, 2026. Quotations from Kim, Xi, and analysts are authentic.

What I do not know

I do not have knowledge of the private discussions between Xi and Kim. Hypotheses about a possible informal agreement on nuclear issues are expert analyses, not confirmed facts. The actual long-term impact of this summit on the China-North Korea relationship remains uncertain and will depend on developments in the coming months.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Xi and Kim pledge to boost ties at rare Pyongyang summit — June 9, 2026

Reuters — North Korea and China claim wins from Xi visit, but limits remain — June 10, 2026

ISW — Korean Peninsula Update: Xi implicitly legitimizes North Korea's nuclear demands — June 9, 2026

Secondary sources

Foreign Policy — Geopolitical analyses of Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea — June 2026

The Guardian — Xi Jinping meets Kim Jong-un in North Korea — June 8, 2026

19FortyFive — Strategic analyses of Sino-North Korean cooperation — June 2026

Axios — Coverage of China-North Korea geopolitical developments — June 2026