INVESTIGATION: Trump Relaunches the Global Trade War — and His Allies Are in the Crosshairs

Introduction: The Return of the Commercial Bulldozer

A Precision Legal Maneuver

On June 2, 2026, the Trump administration deployed a weapon many thought too complex, too slow, and too cumbersome for a president who governs on instinct: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In a single statement from the USTR — the Office of the United States Trade Representative — Washington notified 60 economies that they would face new additional tariffs of 10% to 12.5% on virtually all of their exports to the United States. The official rationale: forced labor. The actual rationale, more complex, more strategic, and far more troubling for the global economic order.

This is no calendar accident. This trade offensive comes weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down, in February 2026, tariffs imposed under the IEEPA — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The day after that ruling, Trump had already instituted a temporary global tariff of 10% under Section 122, set to expire July 24, 2026. Section 301 is its replacement — on far more solid legal footing. This is not a trade policy improvisation. It is a deliberate architectural reconstruction of the tariff war.

China at the Core, Allies on the Periphery — or Vice Versa?

What is troubling is the list. Among the 60 economies targeted by the investigation, you find, of course, China and Russia. But you also find Canada, Mexico, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Taiwan. Allies. Strategic partners. Liberal democracies that, most of them, share defense treaties, common values, and a shared collective security architecture with Washington.

The forced labor rhetoric is real — the problem exists, and China is its primary global vector. But targeting Beijing and Brussels, Ottawa and Moscow, Tokyo and Pyongyang simultaneously in the same investigation is either a monumental strategic targeting error, or the calculated weaponization of a legitimate problem for purely protectionist ends. I lean toward the second hypothesis, with all the nuance that requires.

Section 301: A Formidable Legal Weapon Resurrected

What the 1974 Law Allows

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate foreign trade practices deemed "unjustifiable," "unreasonable," or "discriminatory," and to impose tariffs or import restrictions as retaliation. This is the same legal basis used under Trump's first administration to impose the famous tariffs on Chinese goods starting in 2018 — duties that, for some products, remain in force today.

The crucial difference from IEEPA, whose tariffs the Supreme Court struck down: Section 301 requires formal investigations, public comment periods, and official determinations. This process is slower — investigations were launched March 12, 2026, findings published June 2, comments expected through July 6, and hearings scheduled for July 7 — but it is far more legally robust. As Atlantic Council analyst Beline Chalecki notes, these tariffs are "much more challenging to modify": they cannot be adjusted or suspended overnight by simple executive decree.

Why "Forced Labor" as the Pretext?

The USTR concluded that 54 economies in the first group had "failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on imports of goods produced with forced labor." The other six — including Canada, the EU, Mexico, and Pakistan — had, according to the report, "failed to effectively enforce" such a prohibition, though they had one on paper. The nuance is legally significant, but politically the result is identical: everyone pays.

The forced labor argument has a considerable tactical advantage: it is morally difficult to contest in the public arena. Who can stand up and say "yes, we support forced labor"? No one. Foreign governments find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to explain why they deserve not to be taxed for a crime they did not commit and are actively combating — while Washington sets the rules of the game, the deadlines, and the penalties. The mechanism is clever. Too clever to be naive.

The US-China Truce: A Fragile Balance Against a Legal War Backdrop

The Busan Agreement: Cold Peace

To understand Section 301, you must understand what it replaces. In October 2025, at the APEC summit in Busan, South Korea, Trump and Xi Jinping struck a one-year trade agreement: the United States suspended its enhanced reciprocal tariffs on Chinese goods through November 10, 2026; China suspended its retaliatory measures, committed to purchasing large quantities of American agricultural products, and agreed to lift restrictions on rare earth exports. A fragile equilibrium, labeled by analysts the "commercial cold peace."

That agreement was "real," according to the Eastern Herald, but "it was not a resolution." Scott Bessent, Trump's economic adviser, told Reuters on May 19 that the United States was "not in a rush to extend" the truce — "things are stable," he said. On the Chinese side, the Commerce Ministry spokesman responded that Beijing hoped Washington would "honor their commitments" and that tariff levels would not exceed what had been agreed at Busan. November 10 is approaching. Neither side says clearly what happens next.

Section 301 as a Parallel Lever Against Beijing

The Section 301 forced labor investigation has a specific utility against China: it maintains tariff pressure where IEEPA can no longer operate. According to the Eastern Herald, the Trump administration thus proposed on June 2 an additional 12.5% tariff on Chinese imports tied to this investigation — on top of Section 232 duties on steel, aluminum, and copper, the Section 122 global tariff, and the Section 301 levies continuously in force since 2018. The effective rate on many Chinese products thus approaches 30%.

What makes the forced labor angle particularly sensitive for Beijing is that it is harder to negotiate than purely economic arguments about fentanyl or reciprocal tariffs. China cannot simply sign an agreement on "forced labor" without implicitly acknowledging the existence of the Xinjiang camps — something Beijing denies with consistency and vehemence. It is a diplomatic trap as much as a trade constraint. Beijing, for now, has announced no new retaliatory measures since the June 2 tariff proposal. It is absorbing the pressure in silence. But that patience has limits.

The Supreme Court: The Obstacle That Changed Everything

February 2026: The Fall of IEEPA Tariffs

To understand why Section 301 was urgently resurrected, you have to go back to February 2026. The U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling: Trump had exceeded his authority by using the IEEPA to impose tariffs. Two major levies were struck down at once: a 10% fentanyl-related tariff and a 10% reciprocal tariff, both imposed under that emergency law. Trump's tariff architecture was legally collapsing.

The very day after the ruling, the administration struck back on two fronts: Trump instituted a temporary global 10% tariff under Section 122, set to expire July 24, 2026, and the USTR simultaneously launched a series of Section 301 investigations covering a broad spectrum — forced labor, industrial overcapacity, pharmaceutical policy, discrimination against American tech companies, digital services taxes, maritime pollution, and trade practices related to seafood, rice, and other commodities. The response was prepared, structured, ready to deploy. It was not improvisation — it was a carefully prepared Plan B.

A Court-Resistant Tariff Architecture 3.0

The stakes of Section 301 go beyond the tariff numbers themselves. The goal is to build a legally bulletproof tariff architecture, impossible to overturn by the Supreme Court. Unlike IEEPA tariffs, Section 301 duties rest on formal investigations, documented evidence, participatory processes — exactly what the courts require. The 60 investigations launched in March produced in three months a 98-page report and detailed tariff proposals. With comments open through July 6 and hearings on July 7, the procedure is, on paper, unimpeachable.

WilmerHale notes in its analysis that these Section 301 tariffs cover an unprecedented range of economic activities. The 60 forced labor investigations alone account for 99.4% of U.S. import volume. When you target 99.4% of your imports in the name of forced labor, you are no longer conducting targeted trade enforcement — you are reconstituting a universal tariff under a social justice cover. The distinction is significant.

Western Allies Taken Hostage

The EU, Canada, the UK: The Innocent in the Line of Fire

The European Union's reaction was immediate and unequivocal. A deputy EU Commission spokesperson declared that tariffs based on these grounds are "unjustified." The EU recalled that it had its own mechanism banning imports tied to forced labor — not entering into force until December 2027, admittedly — and that the trade agreement concluded with Washington last July, including a 15% tariff on most goods, should be fully respected. For Brussels, the new Section 301 tariffs amount to "hidden tariffs" that violate the very essence of that agreement.

Canada finds itself in an even more absurd position. The USTR's own 98-page report acknowledges that Canada has "succeeded in enforcing" a ban on imports tied to forced labor. And yet the White House considers enforcement insufficiently strict. The exercise's good faith is self-evident. The United Kingdom responded through a government spokesman that the Modern Slavery Act already constitutes an adequate response, and that preferential access for British companies remained intact — "no alteration to the UK's tariff rate," he specified, without much enthusiasm.

The Strategic Paradox: Punishing Allies to Discipline an Enemy

Washington's trade logic is understandable on paper: if allied countries import goods produced with Chinese forced labor, they become vectors for circumventing sanctions against China. By taxing them, the United States seeks to close those bypass routes. It is a supply chain enforcement logic extended across the entire planet. But the practical result is disastrous for alliances: punishing the EU for not doing well enough what the United States itself struggles to demonstrate it has done better.

Analysts cited by Al Jazeera warn that this new tariff offensive could accelerate the shift of world trade away from the United States and favor regional and sectoral agreements that marginalize Washington. The EU-Mercosur agreement, which entered into force in May 2026, is concrete proof of this. Another major EU free trade agreement, covering two billion people, was signed in January. America's allies are not sitting on their hands while Washington taxes them. They are building alternatives. And that dynamic, long-term, weakens precisely what Trump claims to defend: American economic predominance.

The Mechanics of the Numbers: Who Pays What?

Two Categories, Two Rates

The USTR established a binary tariff grid. Economies that have put in place a ban on forced labor imports, that committed to doing so through a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States, or that have instituted a partial regime, face a proposed additional tariff of 10%. Other economies — those that have made none of these commitments — face a rate of 12.5%. In the first category: Canada, Ecuador, the EU, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. In the second: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Switzerland, and dozens of others.

For Brazil, the case is even harsher: the USTR proposed a cumulative tariff of 37.5%, combining the 12.5% forced labor rate and an additional 25% linked to a separate Section 301 investigation targeting six areas of Brazilian trade practices — digital commerce, unfair preferential tariffs, anti-corruption enforcement, intellectual property protection, ethanol market access, and illegal deforestation. Brasília has everything needed to become the preferred target of this new tariff regime.

Exemptions: A Complex, Politically Negotiable System

The USTR's proposal includes numerous exemptions that considerably reduce the actual scope of the tariffs. Excluded are: goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper; raw materials whose taxation would cause domestic supply shortages; products not growable or producible in sufficient quantities in the United States — covering crude oil, petroleum products, rare earths, certain fruits and vegetables, pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, and aeronautical components; and USMCA-compliant goods from Canada and Mexico.

These exemptions reveal the exercise's true nature: Washington is not seeking to eliminate forced labor in the abstract — it is seeking to maximize tariff pressure on goods competing with American industry, while preserving what the American economy absolutely needs. Chinese rare earths are exempt. Pharmaceuticals too. This is an exercise in surgical protectionism, not global commercial ethics.

Jamieson Greer and the Doctrine of the Uneven Playing Field

The Trade Representative on the Front Line

Jamieson Greer, Trump's U.S. Trade Representative, summarized the doctrine in a single sentence at the June 2 announcement: "The failure of our key trading partners to tackle the importation of goods produced with forced labor is intolerable. This situation creates an environment where American workers must compete on an uneven playing field globally. We will no longer accept this inequity." The phrasing is carefully chosen: it foregrounds American workers, not the victims of forced labor worldwide. It is a competitiveness narrative, not commercial humanism.

That "uneven playing field" rhetoric has been the cornerstone of Trump trade policy since 2017. It presents the United States as the victim of an unjust global system — a country that respects its own rules while others cheat. There is some truth in that observation: trade distortions linked to forced labor are real and documented. But when you simultaneously target Norway and Vietnam, Switzerland and North Korea, you stretch the notion of "uneven field" until it becomes analytically useless.

The Agenda Behind the Agenda

What is at stake beyond the official rhetoric is the reconstruction of a baseline global tariff — the famous "universal 10% tariff" Trump had promised during his campaign. Section 122 was set to expire July 24, 2026. With Section 301 on forced labor, Washington is targeting, according to analysts, a final decision before end of summer, just before that date. The objective would be to ensure tariff continuity without interruption and replace the temporary tariff with something permanent and legally solid. It is a strategy of sequential replacement, executed with a precision that contrasts with the improvised image Trump cultivates.

Nick Marro, analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit, observed that the slowdown in judicial proceedings has not diminished the president's trade agenda — it has simply forced his team to find longer but more durable vectors. He expects new investigations and new tariff announcements, at a cadence designed to maintain negotiating pressure on all trade partners. The trade war is not an episode — it is the permanent regime of American trade policy under Trump 2.0.

The Global Reaction: Between Resistance and Accommodation

Allies Between Protest and Negotiation

Facing this new offensive, the reactions of major trading partners span a spectrum from firm protest to cautious accommodation. The European Union adopted the most frontal posture, calling the tariffs unjustified and recalling its existing commitments. It stressed that its own forced labor regulation is in development — entering into force in December 2027 — and that this legislative path is its own. The fact that the EU simultaneously voted in June to reduce its own tariffs on American goods under the July 2025 agreement makes the American action all the more incomprehensible to Brussels.

India is taking a more nuanced approach. Its trade ministry declared that New Delhi remained engaged with Washington on the question and was simultaneously working to finalize a framework agreement announced February 2, 2026. India is playing multiple tables: negotiating with the United States while accelerating its own trade agreements with other partners — a risk diversification strategy. According to Jay Srivastava of the GTRI, Section 301 serves as a new pressure lever to dissuade countries from abandoning existing negotiations, including with India.

China: The Adversary That Observes and Waits

Beijing's reaction to the Section 301 forced labor investigation has been verbally virulent but practically measured. China accused Washington of imposing "unilateral restrictive measures" under the pretext of forced labor. But it has announced no new retaliatory measures since June 2. That restraint is strategic: Beijing does not want to jeopardize the Busan truce running through November 10, 2026, particularly since the agreement includes Chinese commitments on rare earths and agricultural purchases that Washington needs.

According to EIU analyst Nick Marro, China could temporize short-term on retaliatory measures, but its patience could be tested if significant new American tariffs were to actually enter into force. The USTR's parallel investigation into Chinese industrial overcapacity — another ongoing Section 301 investigation — risks producing rates even higher than the forced labor investigation, potentially exceeding the threshold agreed at Busan. That is the real red line. If it is crossed, the truce collapses — and with it, the semblance of global commercial stability.

The Risks of Global Trade Fragmentation

Regional Agreements That Bypass Washington

One of the most structural effects of Trump 2.0 trade policy is the acceleration of regional trade agreements that exclude the United States. The EU-Mercosur agreement, which entered into force May 1, 2026, links Europe to Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in a trade bloc of several hundred million consumers. Another major EU free trade agreement, signed in January 2026 and described by its negotiators as the largest in history, covers two billion people. These signals are not trivial: they reflect a conscious geoeconomic reorientation on the part of partners who have had enough of American unpredictability.

Experts cited by Al Jazeera, such as Shantanu Singh and Vikram Naik, observe that American tariffs are pushing countries to accelerate trade among themselves and seek new markets. If the United States maintains this course for another two or three years, it could find itself in a paradoxical position: having successfully taxed its partners while having definitively pushed them to build a global trade order without it. That is the geoeconomic nightmare that architects of American trade policy should fear far more than a merchandise trade deficit.

The American Economy: Paying to Tax

The economic effects of Section 301 will also be felt inside American borders. Jay Srivastava of the GTRI notes that the overall impact could be limited because the tariffs target "a wide array of trading partners at once" — but that the primary cost risks falling back on the United States via higher import spending, greater uncertainty, and higher prices for American consumers and manufacturers. The global economies of scale that American companies built over two decades of globalization do not disassemble without friction or cost.

The firm WilmerHale notes in its analysis that the tariff list's exceptions are considerable: energy, rare earths, beef, coffee, certain fruits and vegetables, pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, and aeronautical components are all proposed for exemption. These are precisely the sectors where the United States is most dependent on imports. What the rhetoric presents as total war is, in fact, selective war — which makes it economically defensible, but harder to justify morally as an ethical crusade against forced labor.

The Trade War as a Bilateral Negotiation Tool

Nine Bilateral Agreements as the Model

Section 301 is not only a punitive weapon — it is also a negotiating instrument. The Eastern Herald reports that the Trump administration has already concluded bilateral agreements with nine countries, designed to steer these trade partners away from Beijing. These agreements are structured around a simple principle: countries that sign get preferential tariff terms; others face standard Section 301 rates. It is a global carrot-and-stick system, with China as the common repellent.

This commercial "coalition building" approach has a certain geopolitical logic. If Washington manages to bring its allies into a network of bilateral agreements all implying some form of distancing from Beijing, the overall result could effectively serve the strategic objective of containing Chinese commercial power. The USTR also opened a simultaneous public consultation on the scope of a new US-China trade framework, aimed at reducing rates on certain non-sensitive goods. The commercial truce with Beijing and the Section 301 pressure on everyone else are two faces of the same strategy.

The Political Calendar: November 2026 as the Horizon

The entire tariff apparatus converges on one date: November 10, 2026, expiration of the China trade truce. Between now and then, Washington must either conclude a more stable trade agreement with Beijing, or let the truce expire and replace it with Section 301 tariffs. The two ongoing Section 301 investigations — forced labor and industrial overcapacity — should according to analysts produce tariffs of roughly 10% each, replicating the IEEPA structure through more legally bulletproof means. The entire tariff system on Chinese goods would thus reform around unassailable legal foundations.

But this architecture assumes that Western allies stay in their lane and continue negotiating within the American framework — while Washington taxes them. That is a risky bet. Several analysts cited by Al Jazeera note that European, Canadian, and Japanese governments are already strengthening ties with other partners to reduce their exposure to American unpredictability. If that movement gathers momentum, Trump risks finding himself alone facing China, in a trade confrontation with allies who, tired of being caught in the crossfire, have decided to build their own playing field.

The Legitimacy of the Forced Labor Dossier: Separating Wheat From Chaff

Xinjiang: A Documented and Indisputable Reality

It would be unjust — and analytically dishonest — to reduce the entire Section 301 investigation to pure protectionist maneuvering. Forced labor is a real, documented, massive problem. In China, the detention camps of Xinjiang have been the subject of decades of reports from international organizations, survivor testimony, and satellite analysis. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million members of the Uyghur minority, have been subjected to forced labor regimes under conditions that meet every legal definition of modern slavery. Goods produced under those conditions circulate through global supply chains — cotton, solar panels, electronic components. The problem exists and deserves a firm response.

The question is one of vector. Targeting imports from China and pressuring countries with insufficient legislation to filter these goods has a logic. Specific instruments — like the American Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 — tackle the problem directly with surgical precision. Section 301 on forced labor, applied to 60 countries including Norway and Australia, dilutes that precision until its ethical impact is virtually zero. You move from a targeted measure against modern slavery to an indiscriminate tax dressed in moral virtue.

The Risk of Discrediting the Cause

The most insidious danger of this approach is the discredit it brings on the cause of fighting forced labor. If governments and public opinion worldwide associate American anti-forced-labor policy with a protectionist pretext — which Beijing consistently argues in its official communications — then the real fight against modern slavery loses global credibility. China can thus present itself as the victim of instrumentalized Western rhetoric, deflecting attention from the documented realities of Xinjiang.

European officials have explicitly expressed this concern. The European Commission, which it says "fully shares" American concerns about forced labor, has carefully distinguished its own regulatory approach — based on product-by-product, company-by-company investigations — from the universal tax proposed by Washington. That distinction is not merely formal: it preserves the credibility of the fight against forced labor by separating it from American protectionist interests. That diplomatic finesse deserves recognition.

Effects on Global Supply Chains

A Forced, Costly Recomposition

Hinrich Foundation trade policy head Deborah Elms warned that substantial changes in Section 301 tariff rates could reshape global supply chains by creating different economic incentives for businesses. This is no theoretical hypothesis: since Trump's first tariffs in 2018, American companies have massively redirected their sourcing — toward Vietnam, India, Mexico, Malaysia — to bypass duties on Chinese goods. Those same countries are now in the crosshairs of the new wave.

The combination of tariffs on 60 countries representing 99.4% of American imports creates a paradoxical situation: there is no longer an easily accessible tariff shelter. Companies that invested in production capacity outside China to circumvent the 2018 duties find themselves exposed again. The cost of this permanent uncertainty — for companies planning investments over five or ten years — is difficult to quantify but probably considerable. It is a tax on long-term industrial planning.

Textiles: A Revealing Special Treatment

One of the most revealing details in the USTR proposal is the textile mechanism included in the Section 301 tariffs. This mechanism would allow a certain volume of apparel and textile imports from certain economies to enter the United States at a reduced rate — calibrated on the volume of American textile exports to that partner country. In plain terms: if a country buys a lot of American cotton, its textile exports to the United States will be taxed less.

This mechanism reveals that the policy is not purely punitive — it is also designed to favor American raw material textile exporters. It is a form of conditional mercantilism: punish the partner who doesn't play by our rules, reward the one who buys our cotton. The trade agenda is transparent for those who know how to read between regulatory lines. Countries in Central America covered by CAFTA-DR benefit from specific exemptions for their textiles — a direct competitive advantage in a sector where Asian competition is fierce.

The Geopolitical Horizon: What This War Says About Trump's America

The End of American Multilateralism

Trump 2.0 trade policy marks, perhaps definitively, the end of American commercial multilateralism. For decades, the United States was the architect and guardian of a global trading order founded on common rules, multilateral institutions — the WTO, IMF, regional agreements — and a logic of mutual gains. That order was imperfect, often favorable to the United States, sometimes exploited by less scrupulous actors. But it existed.

What Trump 2.0 substitutes for that order is a system of coercive bilateralism: Washington sets the rules, defines who complies and who cheats, and imposes penalties accordingly. There is no appeal, no neutral arbitration, no independent dispute resolution mechanism. The U.S. Trade Representative is simultaneously judge, prosecutor, and sheriff. For some countries, particularly emerging economies lacking the EU's capacity for resistance, this asymmetry is crushing.

What the West Loses and What It Could Regain

The Chinese threat — and to a lesser degree the Russian, Iranian, and North Korean threats — is real. It merits a coordinated, determined, and durable Western response. On that point, Trump is right in the diagnosis. Where his administration disappoints is in the method: treating allies as suspects, weaponizing legitimate causes, multiplying legal procedures to circumvent courts rather than to establish durable rules.

The West still has the assets to resist China's rise: its technological capacity, its institutional cohesion, its democratic values, its economic creativity. But these assets can only be mobilized if the Atlantic alliance remains solid, if Europe and North America advance together rather than trading tariff fire. That is not what we see today. And that — more than any technical Section 301 dossier — is where the real strategic risk for the West's future lies.

Conclusion: Between Necessary Firmness and Dangerous Weaponization

What This Investigation Confirms

The Section 301 forced labor investigation is the perfect illustration of the contradictions of Trump 2.0 trade policy. On one side, real and legitimate firmness against trade practices that distort global competition and, in China's case, finance a mass repression regime. Section 301, with its solid legal foundations and formal procedures, is an instrument suited to that objective. The maintained pressure on Beijing — despite the Busan truce, despite legal uncertainties — reflects a strategic consistency that Europeans would do well to take seriously rather than dismissing as crude protectionism.

On the other side, a risky weaponization that dilutes the moral impact of the cause, weakens Western alliances, sends contradictory signals to partners seeking to draw closer to Washington, and could, ultimately, accelerate precisely the geoeconomic fragmentation the strategy claims to combat. The trade war against China deserves to be waged — but waged with allies, not against them simultaneously.

The Coming Months Will Decide Everything

The July 7, 2026 hearings before the U.S. International Trade Commission will be the first public test of the new tariff regime's durability. Written comments expected before July 6 should be numerous and pointed — from American importing companies, from protesting foreign governments, and from human rights organizations that refuse to be weaponized. The USTR's final decision, expected before end of summer, will draw the contours of the American trade regime for years to come.

And beyond November 10, 2026 — the expiration date of the China truce — the central question: Is Washington prepared to conclude a durable trade agreement with Beijing, or has the permanent trade war become an end in itself? The answer to that question will determine not only the future of US-China trade relations, but also the West's capacity to remain united against the greatest geopolitical threat of our century. This is not a trade question. It is a civilizational one.

Primary Sources

USTR — Findings and Proposed Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations on Forced Labor — June 2, 2026

Al Jazeera — How Trump is relaunching a tariff war citing forced labour concerns — June 15, 2026

Eastern Herald — The US-China Trade Truce Has a Deadline. Neither Side Will Say What Comes Next — June 15, 2026

Secondary Sources

Politico — Trump administration proposes 10 percent tariff on Canada, Mexico and the EU over forced labor — June 3, 2026

The Guardian — Trump threatens tariffs on 60 trading partners including UK and Canada over forced labour — June 3, 2026

CNBC — U.S. proposes fresh tariffs on 60 economies over forced labor trade practices — June 3, 2026

KPMG — USTR findings and proposed Section 301 tariffs on 60 economies — June 3, 2026

WilmerHale — USTR Proposes New Section 301 Tariffs on 60 Economies — June 4, 2026