INVESTIGATION: Russia is developing a bomb that could destroy 93% of satellites in orbit

Introduction: The weapon that would switch off the digital sky

A threat of unprecedented scale

In June 2026, information circulated quietly through Western intelligence circles before surfacing in specialist publications: two NATO intelligence services suspect Russia of developing a "area-effect weapon" capable of destroying the Starlink constellation through a cloud of projectiles. According to preliminary analysis published by Ground News on June 20, 2026, if such a weapon were detonated in low Earth orbit, it could destroy up to 93% of all satellites in that orbit — including GPS navigation satellites, communications satellites, weather satellites, and banking infrastructure satellites serving the entire world.

This investigation attempts to untangle what we know, what remains uncertain, and what this information — if accurate — means for the future of global digital civilisation. Because such a weapon would not only be a military threat: it would be an existential threat to humanity's digital infrastructure.

The confirmation from General Traut

On June 25, 2026, the Daily Express reported that German General Michael Traut confirmed the development of a Russian orbital nuclear device. This is a high-ranking military confirmation — a general from a NATO member nation stating publicly that Russia is working on a nuclear weapon intended for orbital deployment. This kind of declaration is not trivial: it puts the credibility of a senior officer and his government on the line.

The White House had already acknowledged in February 2024 the existence of a Russian anti-satellite nuclear weapons programme. That American acknowledgement, followed by General Traut's confirmation in 2026, forms a coherent picture: Russia is actively developing a nuclear capability for space. This information can no longer be relegated to the category of speculative hypotheses.

What we know with certainty

The American confirmation of February 2024

In February 2024, the White House officially acknowledged that Russia was developing an anti-satellite nuclear weapons programme. This acknowledgement followed warnings from the US Congress and intelligence services. At the time, the details remained classified, but the reality of the programme was confirmed at the highest level.

That 2024 confirmation matters because it establishes the continuity of the programme. In 2026, the information from Ground News and General Traut fits the logical progression of a programme the West has been monitoring for at least two years. This is not a rumour — it is a known programme whose development continues despite warnings and diplomatic pressure.

The Kosmos 2021 precedent: Russia has already shot down its own satellites

Russia has a direct precedent with anti-satellite weapons. In November 2021, it tested its A-235 Nudol missile by shooting down its own satellite Kosmos 1408. That test created more than 1,500 pieces of debris that threatened the International Space Station and other satellites. The international community condemned the test as irresponsible — but Russia demonstrated that it possesses and uses direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

According to Innovation Attorney on June 24, 2026, the United States has conducted 33 ASAT tests and Russia 26 tests since early experimentation began. This context of intensive testing on both sides confirms that the militarisation of space is not a new phenomenon — but an area-effect weapon would represent an unprecedented qualitative leap in terms of the scale of potential damage.

The area-effect weapon: how it would work

The principle of destruction by projectile cloud

NATO intelligence services suspect Russia of developing a weapon capable of generating a dense cloud of projectiles or fragments in low Earth orbit, contaminating a vast zone of near-Earth space. Unlike conventional ASAT missiles that destroy satellites one at a time, this weapon would aim to create an orbital exclusion zone — rendering a portion of low Earth orbit unusable for any unshielded satellite.

If this projectile cloud is generated by a nuclear detonation in orbit, the effects are even more devastating. A nuclear explosion in space does not produce an atmospheric shockwave as it would on Earth — but it generates a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and an intensified radiation flux that can "fry" the electronics of any satellite within a radius of 1,200 miles. Modern satellites, whose electronic components are designed for standard radiation conditions, would be destroyed instantly.

The 93%: a preliminary estimate to understand

The figure of 93% of satellites destroyed is a preliminary estimate based on the current distribution of satellites in low Earth orbit. The majority of active satellites — including virtually the entire Starlink constellation, Earth observation satellites, and many weather and communications satellites — are in low Earth orbit (LEO), between 200 and 2,000 km in altitude. An area-effect weapon detonated in this zone of maximum density would affect virtually all of these assets.

This estimate is called preliminary because it depends on multiple variables: the detonation altitude, the weapon's yield, and the type of destruction mechanism (EMP, fragments, radiation). But even a conservative estimate suggests that the damage would be catastrophic and potentially irreversible on a human timescale — the debris created could render low Earth orbit inaccessible for decades.

The Kessler Syndrome: the threat of irreversibility

When debris creates more debris

The Kessler Syndrome, theorised by NASA scientist Donald Kessler in 1978, describes a scenario where the density of objects in low Earth orbit reaches a critical threshold beyond which collisions generate debris that triggers further collisions, in a self-sustaining cascade. A Russian area-effect weapon could trigger precisely this syndrome.

The terrifying peculiarity of the Kessler Syndrome is its irreversibility on a human timescale. Once the cascade is triggered, no technology exists for rapidly clearing the debris from low Earth orbit. Some scenarios envision low Earth orbit remaining inaccessible for hundreds of years after a Kessler Syndrome event. That would mean the end of modern space-dependent society as we know it.

The implications for GPS, banks, and communications

To grasp the potential scale of the catastrophe, one must understand how deeply contemporary civilisation depends on satellites in low Earth orbit and higher orbits. GPS not only guides our cars but synchronises electrical grids, financial transactions, and mobile communications. Communications satellites provide internet access in rural areas, emergency communications, and international banking networks. Weather satellites enable forecasts that save thousands of lives every year.

A massive destruction of these assets does not merely mean inconvenience. It means electrical grids losing synchronisation, global financial transactions interrupted, and air and maritime navigation systems failing. Innovation Attorney from June 24 puts it plainly: "GPS, communications, banking paralysed." That is a description of the systemic collapse of the global digital economy.

NATO facing this threat: the available intelligence

What the two NATO intelligence services found

According to Ground News on June 20, 2026, two NATO intelligence services — whose identities are not specified in the available sources — provided independent assessments of the threat. This confirmation by two separate agencies considerably increases the credibility of the information — in intelligence work, independent corroboration is the minimum standard for validation.

NATO intelligence services have been tracking Russia's anti-satellite weapons programme for years. Confirmation from two separate agencies on the specific nature of the weapon — area-effect, targeting Starlink — suggests that precise technical information was gathered about the programme. This goes beyond general speculation about Russian intentions: it is an assessment grounded in actual intelligence data.

Defense Express evaluates Russian capabilities

UA.News on June 20, 2026 reports that Defense Express — a recognised Ukrainian military analysis firm — assessed Russia's real space capabilities against orbital threats. That assessment adds nuance to the picture: while Russia is developing formidable capabilities, its technical and industrial means are suffering the effects of sanctions. The question is not only "can it develop this weapon?" but "on what timeline?".

The Russian space industry has been under pressure since 2022. Sanctions cut off access to advanced electronic components, high-performance semiconductors, and Western technologies that went into the construction of many satellites and precision systems. This technological degradation may slow the weapon's development — but it does not stop it. It may buy time — and that time must be used by the West to develop countermeasures.

The satellites targeted: Starlink in the crosshairs

Why Starlink is the primary target

The SpaceX Starlink constellation is explicitly named as a target in the available intelligence. The logic is military and straightforward: Starlink is the backbone of Ukrainian military communications. Destroying most of it in a single strike would leave Ukraine nearly blind and silent in terms of tactical communications. It is the orbital equivalent of cutting the phone lines of a military headquarters before an offensive.

Starlink also poses a specific challenge for adversaries: with more than 6,000 satellites in operation and high launch rates, it is extraordinarily difficult to destroy with conventional one-by-one ASAT missiles. An area-effect weapon is precisely the answer to that problem: instead of targeting satellites individually, one destroys them all at once. Starlink's resilience against conventional weapons may have accelerated the development of this new weapon.

Collateral damage: the entire world as victim

The problem with an area-effect weapon in orbit is that it does not discriminate. It cannot destroy only Ukrainian satellites or even only military satellites. By destroying low Earth orbit, it would destroy the satellites of every nation — including Russia's own, China's, India's, Japan's, and all nations that depend on space services.

This reality is either strategic madness on Russia's part, or the demonstration of an ultimate deterrence doctrine — the message being "if we cannot win, no one will." This spatial Armageddon doctrine is the orbital version of mutual assured nuclear destruction. It represents a threat not only to Ukraine but to the entirety of humanity's digital civilisation.

The legal implications: the Outer Space Treaty versus reality

The 1967 Treaty bans nuclear weapons in orbit

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space — known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 — explicitly bans the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit. Russia is a signatory of that treaty. Developing and deploying an anti-satellite nuclear weapon would constitute a direct and grave violation of international space law.

But Russia has already violated the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the United Nations Charter, and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed Ukraine's security in exchange for its denuclearisation. Adding violation of the Outer Space Treaty to that list is not a red line Moscow hesitates to cross. Treaties are only constraints on actors operating in good faith — and Putin is not one of them.

What the international community can do

Faced with this threat, the international community has few effective instruments. The UN Security Council is blocked by the Russian veto. The UN Disarmament Committee is paralysed by the same obstacle. The verification mechanisms of the Outer Space Treaty are rudimentary. No effective institutional response mechanism exists for a serious space violation by a permanent member of the Security Council.

The real response will therefore need to come through other channels: developing space resilience capabilities (redundant constellations, rapid-replacement nano-satellites), developing anti-satellite countermeasures to protect critical assets, and building a coalition of nations that collectively declare that an attack on their satellites will be considered an act of war. Deterrence, not treaties, is the only language Moscow understands.

Possible countermeasures for the West

Constellation resilience as the first line of defence

The primary protection against an area-effect weapon is architectural resilience — building constellations whose partial destruction does not compromise the full capability. Starlink is already partially designed with this logic: with thousands of satellites, the destruction of a few hundred is theoretically absorbable if the network can be reconstituted rapidly.

But an area-effect weapon that would destroy 93% of satellites in low Earth orbit far exceeds that partial resilience. A radically different architecture would be needed — EMP-hardened satellites, constellations at varied altitudes, rapid launch systems capable of replacing satellites within hours rather than weeks. These capabilities exist partially — but not at the scale needed to withstand the weapon described.

Nano-satellites and rapid reconstitution

One promising approach is that of rapidly deployable nano-satellites — small, inexpensive satellites that can be launched in massive numbers within days to replace a destroyed constellation. The concept of "rapid reconstitution" of the constellation is central to American and European space defence thinking.

Companies such as Rocket Lab, Firefly Aerospace, and others are developing small launchers with short preparation times precisely with this goal in mind. The idea: if Russia destroys the constellation, rebuild it faster than it can repeat the attack. This reconstitution race is costly and technically demanding — but it represents an asymmetric response that does not require matching Russian offensive weapons. Resilience is sometimes worth more than a direct counterstrike.

China in the equation: observer or accomplice?

China is developing its own ASAT capabilities

China is developing its own anti-satellite capabilities in parallel — ASAT missiles, military-grade blinding lasers, manoeuvring inspector satellites. If Russia demonstrates the viability of an area-effect weapon, Beijing will draw lessons for its own programmes. In a Taiwan crisis scenario, a similar weapon could be used to blind American and allied military communications in the Pacific.

Russia-China technological cooperation in the space domain is documented but remains relatively limited compared to other sectors. The two countries have largely independent military space programmes. But sharing of doctrines and conceptual approaches is possible even without direct technology transfer. If Moscow tests an area-effect weapon, Beijing will study the concept for its own account.

Orbital nuclear escalation: a new arms race domain

Russia's development of an anti-satellite nuclear weapon risks triggering a nuclear space arms race that the United States and its allies would prefer to avoid. The US could feel compelled to develop similar capabilities to maintain parity — which would further weaken the space non-proliferation regime of the 1967 Treaty.

This dynamic is one of the most serious negative externalities of the Russian programme. By developing this weapon, Moscow threatens not only allied military satellites — it creates the conditions for a space arms race whose long-term consequences could be catastrophic for all of humanity. Putin's Russia destabilises not only Europe but the entire global space security architecture.

Military and civilian satellites: a blurred boundary

The dual use of commercial space

One of the fundamental challenges of space security is the blurred boundary between military and civilian satellites. ICEYE-X36 is a Finnish commercial satellite — but it provides military intelligence to Ukraine. Starlink is a commercial internet service — but it is used for Ukrainian military communications. In modern warfare, commercial infrastructure is de facto militarised.

An area-effect weapon makes no such distinction. It would indiscriminately destroy civilian GPS satellites guiding airliners and military satellites guiding missiles. This indiscrimination is a fundamental violation of the principles of the laws of war — the distinction between military and civilian targets is a cardinal principle of international humanitarian law.

The need for a doctrine protecting civilian space infrastructure

Faced with this challenge, the West must develop a clear doctrine on the status and protection of civilian space infrastructure. This doctrine should include defining certain satellites as critical infrastructure protected by international law, establishing mechanisms for rapid attribution of space attacks, and setting clearly defined consequences for any attack against those infrastructures.

The creation of an "orbital humanitarian space" — a legal category protecting satellites of humanitarian or civil-commercial use — is an idea beginning to circulate in diplomatic circles. It will not solve the military problem, but it establishes norms whose violation can be morally and politically costly for the aggressor. The norm matters, even when it cannot be enforced.

What Ukraine must do in the face of this threat

Diversify, distribute, strengthen

For Ukraine, the threat of a Russian area-effect anti-satellite weapon reinforces the urgency of diversifying its space dependencies. Beyond Starlink, Ukraine should accelerate its partnerships with other providers — ICEYE, Planet Labs, OneWeb, and future European systems such as IRIS². The more its communications and intelligence rely on multiple independent constellations, the harder it is for Russia to neutralise them in a single strike.

Ground-based communications systems are also an indispensable complement. Fibre optic networks, HF communications, and high-resilience traditional radio systems form a safety net if space communications are compromised. Ukraine has been developing these alternatives since 2022 — it must accelerate their deployment and harden them against the new threat.

Early warning as a countermeasure

Continuous monitoring of Russian space activity — including satellite movements that could pre-position an area-effect weapon — is an essential countermeasure. NATO's space early-warning systems, if they detect the orbital placement of a suspicious device, would theoretically allow a diplomatic or operational response before activation.

This is precisely why the four Kosmos-2610 through 2613 satellites that were tracking ICEYE-X36 at 13 km distance deserve sustained attention. Every unusual movement in Russian space must be scrutinised — not only for its immediate implications, but to detect behavioural patterns that might foreshadow the deployment of an area-effect weapon. Space surveillance is no longer optional — it is existential.

What is at stake for global democracy

Democratic dependence on satellites

One often-overlooked dimension of the space threat must be highlighted: modern democracies are more dependent on satellites than authoritarian regimes. Open societies have built their economies and infrastructure on the assumption of accessible, stable commercial space. Authoritarian regimes, which directly control their communications and can function with more rudimentary infrastructure, are comparatively less vulnerable.

An area-effect weapon therefore strikes asymmetrically: it would destroy a larger share of Western strategic capability than of Russian capability. This asymmetry of vulnerability is probably factored into Russian doctrine. Putin knows that destroying low Earth orbit would affect interconnected democracies far more severely than Russia itself. It is a form of strategic judo: using the adversary's strength — digital dependency — against itself.

Digital freedom as a security issue

Ultimately, the threat of an area-effect anti-satellite weapon is not only a military question. It is a question of digital freedom. The open internet, secure communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasts — all these services that structure daily life in democracies depend on space. To threaten space is to threaten freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and economic freedom.

The war in Ukraine is not only one country's war. It is a war for a model of the world — a world where democracies can maintain their infrastructure freely, without the threat of an authoritarian regime capable of switching it off from orbit. Defending space is defending democracy at its most fundamental level.

The urgency of a coordinated international response

What NATO must do now

In the face of this documented threat, NATO cannot remain passive. It must develop an explicit collective space defence doctrine, including the definition that an attack on allied satellites can trigger Article 5. It must invest massively in space surveillance to detect any deployment of an area-effect weapon. And it must develop countermeasure capabilities — whether systems for protecting critical satellites, capabilities to neutralise hostile orbital weapons, or accelerated resilience programmes.

These measures are not responses to a hypothesis — they respond to a threat confirmed by the White House in 2024 and by General Traut in 2026. The time for deliberation has passed. The time for action is now.

International coordination as an imperative

Beyond NATO, this threat requires the broadest possible international coalition. China, India, Japan — all these nations have satellites in low Earth orbit that would be destroyed by such a weapon. Building a coalition of nations that explicitly and collectively condemns Russia's orbital nuclear weapons programme, and that mutually commit to defending their orbital assets, is a top-tier diplomatic priority.

This coalition is difficult to build in a world of geopolitical rivalries — but the threat of a weapon that would destroy the satellites of every nation, including those not aligned in the Ukrainian conflict, provides common ground for unusual cooperation. When a weapon threatens everyone, it can unite against it actors who are normally adversaries.

The global anti-satellite nuclear arms race

American programmes and their strategic dilemmas

The United States has been developing its own anti-satellite warfare capabilities since the 1980s. The ASM-135 ASAT programme, successfully tested in 1985, demonstrated the technical feasibility of a direct strike against a satellite. But successive administrations have hesitated to deploy these capabilities, aware that any ASAT test generates orbital debris that threatens all satellites — including their own. That is the fundamental paradox of anti-satellite weapons: they are potentially suicidal for their own user.

The American decision to no longer test direct-ascent ASAT weapons, announced unilaterally in 2022 and adopted as an international norm by several dozen countries, represents a first step toward regulating this form of arms race. But Russia and China have not joined that commitment. The orbital arms race continues — and the war in Ukraine is its most visible testing ground.

The proliferation of ASAT technologies in emerging countries

Beyond the major powers, several emerging countries have developed or are seeking to develop anti-satellite capabilities. India tested an ASAT missile in 2019, generating a debris cloud that threatened the International Space Station. Iran is investing in satellite jamming capabilities. North Korea is developing launchers that could, in time, serve as anti-satellite vectors.

This proliferation of ASAT capabilities makes international regulation even more urgent and even more difficult. The more actors capable of threatening civilian and military satellites there are, the more unstable the space operating environment becomes. The Russia-Ukraine war has normalised certain forms of orbital threat — and that normalisation will have lasting consequences for the security of space for all users.

Conclusion: Space as the final Rubicon

What this investigation has established

This investigation has established the following facts: two NATO intelligence services suspect Russia of developing an area-effect anti-Starlink weapon. German General Michael Traut confirmed the existence of a Russian orbital nuclear weapons programme. The White House acknowledged this programme as early as February 2024. A detonation in low Earth orbit could destroy up to 93% of satellites according to preliminary estimates. Satellites within a radius of 1,200 miles would be rendered non-operational. Russia has an ASAT precedent with the A-235 test of 2021 that created more than 1,500 pieces of debris.

This picture is alarming. It is not certain — technical and intelligence uncertainties remain. But it is sufficiently documented to justify an urgent and coordinated response from the West. The threat is not hypothetical. It is real, in development, and potentially catastrophic on a civilisational scale.

The choice between vigilance and collapse

Humanity has a window to respond to this threat before it becomes operational. That window requires from NATO, the EU, and the international space community concerted action: investments in space resilience, development of countermeasures, building norms and coalitions, enhanced surveillance of Russian space activity.

If this window closes without an adequate response, we will have chosen collapse through inaction. Ukraine, which is fighting today against Russian attempts to blind its satellites, is the vanguard of this battle. Defending it in space means defending the digital world we all inhabit. And that is something no democracy conscious of its own interests can afford to ignore.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning and limitations

This investigation is written by Maxime Marquette, columnist and analyst. I am not a space engineer or an intelligence analyst. The information presented comes exclusively from the sources listed below. Some is based on intelligence assessments whose details remain classified. The technical estimates — notably the 93% of satellites destroyed and the 1,200-mile radius — are preliminary assessments from secondary sources and not scientific certainties. I am pro-Ukrainian and in favour of a strong Western response to Russian space threats.

What we do not know

The precise technical details of the Russian programme remain largely classified. The development timeline is unknown. The weapon's final technical viability has not been confirmed. The Russian political decision to deploy it has not been established. These uncertainties do not minimise the reality of the threat — they underline the importance of acting on what is known rather than waiting for certainty that may come too late.

Sources

Primary sources

Ground News — NATO intelligence: Russia developing area-effect weapon against Starlink — June 20, 2026

Daily Express — General Traut confirms Russian orbital nuclear weapon — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

RBC-Ukraine — Kosmos-2610 through 2613, pursuit of ICEYE-X36 — June 24, 2026

Innovation Attorney — 33 US ASAT tests, 26 Russian, orbital nuclear programme — June 24, 2026

UA.News — Defense Express assesses Russia's real space capabilities — June 20, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine destroys Starlink jammer in Kerch — June 24, 2026