INVESTIGATION: How Ukraine Strikes at 1,000 km — 56 Long-Range Drone Systems in 18 Months

INVESTIGATION: How Ukraine Strikes at 1,000 km — 56 Long-Range Drone Systems in 18 Months

Introduction: The Invisible Revolution Changing the War

Zero deep-strike drones in 2024, 56 in June 2026

Eighteen months ago, Ukraine officially possessed not a single long-range strike drone capable of hitting deep targets inside Russia. Today, at the Eurosatory 2026 defense show in Paris — the world's largest land defense event — representatives of Ukraine's defense industry are no longer showcasing fragile prototypes but 56 publicly known deep-strike systems, operational, hitting Russian territory every day. This transformation is described as a "big bang" by Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space, who used those words under the lights of the Paris-Nord Villepinte Exhibition Centre. This is not rhetoric — it is a factual finding backed by battlefield data.

The scale of this buildup is staggering. At the previous Eurosatory edition, only ten Ukrainian companies were present. In June 2026, there were 80 on the exhibition floor. Ukraine's defense production has grown from roughly 1 billion euros in 2022 to 50 billion euros in 2026. That is a fiftyfold increase in four years. "This is not a normal acquisition cycle, it is a transformation," as an article by EU Perspectives dated June 23, 2026 aptly summarizes. A transformation that Europe is still struggling to absorb.

A 10% success rate — and that is enough

Here is the most counter-intuitive figure in this entire investigation: only 10% of long-range deep-strike missions succeed, according to estimates cited at Eurosatory. And yet those 10% have been sufficient to damage approximately 25% of Russia's total oil-refining capacity. At a minimal unit cost — a Russian-type Shahed-136 strike drone costs $20,000 to produce, and Ukrainian equivalents are in a similar range — Ukraine has inflicted economic losses on Russia that Halyna Yanchenko, a Ukrainian member of parliament, estimates at $13 billion. She calls them "Ukraine's deep-strike sanctions." The phrase is as accurate as it is sharp.

Eurosatory 2026 brought together more than 2,100 exhibitors from 68 countries across 185,000 square meters of exhibition space, from June 15 to 19, 2026. For the first time, Ukraine was one of the central actors — not an aid recipient but a technology exporter. The reality of the Ukrainian battlefield has become, in eighteen months, the global reference point for armed drone doctrine.

The 56 Systems: A Lethal Constellation

Technological diversification without precedent

The 56 publicly known Ukrainian deep-strike systems are not a homogeneous family — they are a diverse constellation of drones with varying ranges, payloads and guidance methods. At Eurosatory 2026, Ukrainian company Global Mark unveiled the Sea Trident, a submarine drone with a 10-ton displacement, a range of 2,000 nautical miles, capable of carrying a payload of 1,000 kilograms to a depth of 60 meters. This system alone illustrates the sophistication achieved: not just aerial strike drones, but autonomous naval platforms designed for strategic missions.

On the aerial long-range strike side, systems such as the FP-1 and its derivatives — including the FP-2 developed by Fire Point with a 105 kg warhead over 200 km, and the FP-7 carrying a 150 kg warhead at a maximum speed of 1,500 m/s — illustrate the upward trajectory. The Liutyi (An-196) drones operated by the 14th Regiment of Unmanned Aerial Systems of Ukraine's Ground Forces can strike targets more than 1,700 km from Ukrainian territory. Several of them have hit oil refineries deep inside Russia.

The numbers that hurt Moscow

In March 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledged detecting 7,347 Ukrainian drones in a single month — an absolute record. For context: in August 2024, Ukraine was striking with 1,000 drones per month; by July 2025, that number had risen to 3,000; by March 2026, to 7,000. This exponential curve maps directly to Ukraine's industrial ramp-up and the expansion of its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), the world's first branch dedicated entirely to drone warfare.

The USF — commanded by Major Robert "Madyar" Brovdi — had, in the first 48 days of 2026 alone, struck 240 sensitive targets in Russia and occupied territories, including nine oil refineries distributed across the country. In January 2026, a single week of operations by the 412th Nemesis Brigade destroyed the equivalent of $300 million in Russian air-defense equipment. These figures do not come from Ukrainian propaganda — they come from the Madyar Brigade's reports, corroborated by open-source intelligence data.

The Ukrainian Industrial Model: Supply Created Demand

How an industry is born in wartime

One of the most counter-intuitive lessons from Ukraine's transformation is laid out with clarity in the EU Perspectives report: "Supply changed demand, not the other way around." Ukrainian generals were initially reluctant about drone doctrine. It was industrial production — encouraged by the Zelensky government — that created the capabilities, which then convinced the military to integrate them into doctrine. Ukrainian political and industrial leaders told Commissioner Kubilius the year before: "If we had listened to Ukrainian generals from the start of the invasion, we could not have created the drone army."

This model is now being exported. In May 2026, Ukraine and Germany launched joint production of deep-strike drones with ranges up to 1,500 km. In June 2026, the Netherlands announced the launch of production of Ukrainian long-range drones under the "Build with Ukraine" program, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Defence. At Eurosatory, Ukrainian Armor and Czech manufacturer AviaNera Technologies signed a cooperation agreement covering drone and missile engines. Ukraine's defense industry is now a global supplier, not merely a consumer of aid.

The persistent constraint: jet engines

Ukraine's deep-strike program has a persistent vulnerability that analysts have documented for months: dependence on mini jet engines produced by only three European companies. This supply-chain constraint directly limits the production scale of the most capable long-range drones. This is precisely why the partnerships with AviaNera Technologies (Czech Republic) and other European propulsion manufacturers are strategically critical.

At Eurosatory 2026, DG Industries unveiled the Vyrivniuvach ("Equalizer"), a new glide bomb entering serial production, with a claimed range of 130 km — well beyond industry norms. Military analysts temper that claim, estimating the practical range at between 60 and 90 km. But even within that reduced band, this system represents a significant additional capability for Ukrainian forces, enabling aircraft to strike targets without entering the effective range of Russian air defenses.

Eurosatory: The Show Where Ukraine Took Its Symbolic Revenge

From ten to eighty exhibitors in one cycle

Ukraine's progression at Eurosatory between the last two editions is in itself an indicator of the industrial transformation underway. Going from 10 to 80 companies on the exhibition floor in a few years is a metamorphosis of both image and reality. These 80 companies were not presenting aid requests — they were presenting contracts to sign, technologies to license, partnerships to build. Ukraine's defense industry has moved from beneficiary to full participant in the global ecosystem.

The event itself set an ambitious record: 2,100 exhibitors from 68 countries, 50,000 visitors, 185,000 m² of exhibition space spread across halls entirely redesigned to reflect the reality of modern operations — trench warfare, 3D drone maneuvers, urban combat. Speakers included Commissioner Kubilius, French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin, French Army Chief of Staff General Pierre Schill, and representatives from Poland, Lithuania, Belgium and Britain. The Ukrainian war, its lessons and its technologies dominated the discussions.

What Europe has not yet grasped

Kubilius delivered in Paris a sentence worth preserving: Ukraine's transformation is moving "very slowly by comparison" on the European side. And he identified the cause: "no integrated market, no integrated incentives." Europe of twenty-seven national sovereignties, differing procurement standards, staggered budget cycles and divergent strategic cultures struggles to produce the economies of scale that war demands. Ukraine, with its back against the wall, bypassed those obstacles out of necessity. Europe, not yet in direct conflict, has not yet found the right mechanisms to replicate that agility.

The European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP), backed by a budget of 1.5 billion euros in grants, is a first step. The European Commission proposes 130 billion euros over seven years for defence and space in the next financial framework — four times more than the current one. But even that sum remains marginal relative to actual needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones strike targets every night at more than 1,000 km from their launch positions.

Zelensky and the "Long-Range Sanctions" Doctrine

An economic strategy as much as a military one

Volodymyr Zelensky was among the first to articulate a clear doctrine for Ukrainian long-range strikes: calling them "long-range sanctions." This formula is not merely a communications exercise — it reflects a coherent strategy. By targeting Russian oil refineries, ammunition depots, logistics hubs and weapons factories, Ukraine seeks to degrade Russia's economic and industrial capacity to finance and sustain its war. It is an economic war of attrition, waged by drone proxy.

The results are quantifiable. Ukraine has damaged 25% of Russia's total oil-refining capacity. The total cost inflicted on Russia, by Ukrainian estimates, exceeds $13 billion. These figures are difficult to verify entirely independently, but they are consistent with satellite imagery data, open-source intelligence analysis, and the assessments of analysts such as Clément Molin who tracks the monthly escalation of strikes. The drone-based economic strategy is now one of Ukraine's most effective tools against Putin's war machine.

The "Deep Strike Center": coordination in service of effectiveness

In April 2026, Ukraine formalized a "Deep Strike Center" within its Unmanned Systems Forces to coordinate attacks on high-priority Russian targets. This center operates in coordination with other branches of the defense forces and enables the planning and execution of combined strikes on high-value systems — radars, air-defense systems, fuel depots, command centers. The logic is simple: by systematically destroying Russian radars and air-defense launchers, Ukraine opens up corridors through which its long-range drones can reach the deepest targets.

In April 2026, Commander Brovdi confirmed the formal expansion of medium and deep-strike operations, with the progressive integration of newly trained units from May onward. The Unmanned Systems Forces were already, by that date, conducting more than 100,000 combat missions per month. That figure is astronomical and illustrates the complete industrialization of Ukraine's drone war — an industrialization that, as Eurosatory demonstrates, is beginning to set global standards.

Implications for European Security

The UK leads the way, Europe follows slowly

The United Kingdom was among the first to draw lessons from Ukraine's drone revolution. In April 2026, London announced its largest drone package for Ukraine: more than 120,000 drones of various types by end of 2026, including thousands of long-range strike, reconnaissance and maritime drones. British companies such as Tekever, Windracers and Malloy Aeronautics are named participants in this industrial mobilization. In September 2025, contracts worth 300 million euros had been signed with Ukrainian companies for several thousand long-range drones.

This co-production model — British funding, Ukrainian technology, benefit to Ukraine's Armed Forces — represents a new aid paradigm that bypasses the usual delays of military procurement. It is more effective, faster and better adapted to the pace of real war than traditional defence budget procedures. NATO approved a common budget of £2.5 billion in 2026 — an annual rise of 25% above inflation through 2030. These investments are beginning to materialize on the ground.

What this means if Russia threatens NATO

The Ukrainian experience with long-range drones has direct implications for NATO defence. It demonstrates that a well-motivated and creatively organized actor can build a significant deep-strike capability in a very short time, using relatively limited resources. It also demonstrates that traditional air-defense systems, however expensive, can be saturated and systematically degraded. These lessons directly concern countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland — which share a border with Russia or its ally Belarus.

Poland has committed 4% of its GDP to defence — an unprecedented level. The Baltic states are following with proportionally high budgets. The Ukrainian lesson demands a complete rethinking of procurement doctrines: fewer large expensive systems, more autonomous drone swarms; less rigid hierarchies, more agile coordination centers. The armies that adapt fastest will be the best prepared for the conflicts ahead.

Ukraine's Allies Facing the Industrial Production Challenge

Bridging the gap between declaratory support and actual delivery

Western support for Ukraine has long run into a fundamental contradiction: political declarations announced firm commitments while industrial production chains struggled to keep up. In 2025, several NATO member states under-delivered relative to their initial commitments on artillery munitions — the Czech Republic, Germany, and France all experienced production-line delays. The European Commission launched the EDIP — European Defence Industry Programme — to try to coordinate a collective production ramp-up, but results remain uneven across member states.

South Korea, paradoxically, has been one of the most reliable suppliers of artillery ammunition to Europe — some of it later redirected toward Ukraine through indirect mechanisms. This reality underscores the importance of building a diversified defence industrial base not dependent solely on European producers. The lesson is clear: European military sovereignty remains an unfinished project, and Ukraine is paying part of the price on its front lines.

Repurposed commercial drones: the low-cost war that unsettles high commands

Alongside the 56 strike systems presented at Eurosatory, Ukraine has developed a parallel capability that is less visible but just as decisive: the use of modified commercial drones — adapted DJI Mavics rigged to drop grenades, quadcopters repurposed as attack vectors for a few hundred dollars. This "low-cost" warfare has destabilized established military doctrines. How do you equip your forces against a $500 drone using countermeasure systems that cost $100,000? The economic equation is unsustainable over time.

The defence manufacturers gathered at Eurosatory are searching for answers to this specific challenge — affordable counter-UAS systems, portable electronic jammers, low-cost defensive lasers. Rafael of Israel, Hensoldt of Germany and Thales of France were all showcasing solutions in this category. The war in Ukraine has created an entirely new military market, and the companies that respond to it will dominate the next generation of land defence.

Training Fighters: The Other Front of Ukraine's Revolution

Zelensky and the doctrine of training rotations in Europe

Volodymyr Zelensky negotiated with several allied countries — notably the United Kingdom, France and Germany — accelerated training programs for Ukrainian soldiers on their territory. Operation Interflex in the United Kingdom has trained more than 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2022. These programs go beyond basic weapons handling — they cover small-unit tactics, urban combat, maintenance of Western equipment and increasingly the use of drone systems showcased at Eurosatory. The training-equipment-deployment chain is becoming the standard model of allied support.

This model has limits: training timelines cannot be compressed indefinitely, the hosting capacity of training countries is finite, and Ukrainian casualties at the front create constant pressure on personnel availability. Zelensky has repeatedly asked that training be accelerated and expanded. Some allies resist — wary of being seen as direct co-belligerents. This hesitation, understandable politically, carries a real cost on the ground that the military maps of eastern Ukraine faithfully reflect.

Technological cooperation: when Ukraine also trains its allies

The flow of knowledge does not run only West to Ukraine — it also runs in reverse. NATO officers and American, British and French defence engineers are studying Ukrainian after-action reports on the use of equipment in real combat conditions. The deep-strike drone doctrine, the adaptations of CAESAR artillery to Ukrainian terrain conditions, the lessons on the vulnerability of armored vehicles to modern anti-tank missiles — all of this is feeding doctrinal revisions in Western general staffs. Ukraine is training its own trainers.

This process of mutual learning represents one of the least visible but most enduring contributions of Ukrainian resistance to the collective security of the West. Future NATO exercises will incorporate doctrinal elements drawn directly from combat in the Donbas and along the eastern Ukrainian front line. It is a tragic legacy — born of war — but a real one. Zelensky has transformed the necessity of resistance into added value for the alliance that backs him.

Conclusion: A Revolution That Changed the War

From zero to 56: the balance sheet in eighteen months

In eighteen months, Ukraine has turned its utter void in long-range drone capability into a deep-strike force of 56 systems — classified programs not counted. It has industrialized production that grew from 1 billion to 50 billion euros annually. It has struck Russia every day, degrading its oil capacity, its air-defense systems, its ammunition depots. In two years, it has become the global reference for combat drone doctrine and technology.

This achievement belongs first to the Ukrainian people, its engineers, its drone operators, its soldiers. It is also a victory for the political vision of Zelensky, who understood before most that technological sovereignty and industrial defence production were as important as troop morale or foreign weapons deliveries. Free Ukraine has shown the world what a people fighting for its survival can accomplish with intelligence and determination. Europe would do well to take note — before necessity forces it to as well.

The future: toward a Ukrainian drone-industrial complex

At Eurosatory 2026, the Ukrainians were not only selling technologies — they were selling a model. One of a defence industry that can be born, grow and exported in wartime. The partnerships with Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Britain are only the first signs of a transnational industrial ecosystem forming around Ukrainian innovations. If Ukraine wins this war — and it now has the tools to contemplate that outcome — it will emerge as one of the major players in the global defence industry. Putin sought to erase Ukraine from the map — he created one of the most innovative military-industrial powers in Europe.

The near-term future depends on resolving the jet engine constraint, expanding the AI-guided capabilities of autonomous systems, and sustaining the production tempo against the wear on teams and the cost of raw materials. But the trajectory is set. And for the first time since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, one can say with supporting data that the technological balance is tipping in Ukraine's favor.

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning and biases

Maxime Marquette is firmly pro-Ukraine in this conflict. He considers Zelensky to be a courageous leader defending fundamental democratic values in the face of illegal Russian aggression. This positioning inevitably shapes the tone of his analysis, even though the facts cited are verifiable. He has never been on the ground in Ukraine and makes no claim to deep technical military expertise. Data on specific weapons systems has been cross-referenced against multiple independent sources.

The production and casualty figures cited in this article come from official Ukrainian sources, satellite imagery data corroborated by independent analysts, and specialized press reports. Information on weapons systems displayed at Eurosatory 2026 has been verified against primary sources covering the show. The author acknowledges that some Ukrainian figures on damages inflicted on Russia cannot be fully independently verified — he presents them as estimates.

Sources and method

This investigation draws on the direct coverage of Eurosatory 2026 by EU Perspectives, on operational data published by the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, on analysis by Euromaidan Press and Militarnyi, and on economic data from Shephard's Defence Insight. Statements attributed to specific individuals — Kubilius, Yanchenko, Brovdi — are drawn from their documented public communications. The author has made every effort to distinguish verified facts from estimates.

This article was written on June 27, 2026, based on information available at that date. With military operations ongoing, some data may evolve.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary sources

EU Perspectives — Paris saw the future of defence. Can Europe keep pace? — June 23, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Ukraine unveiled Sea Trident at Eurosatory 2026 — June 15, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Ukraine is building a bigger deep-strike drone machine — April 22, 2026

Secondary sources

Militarnyi — Ukraine Surpasses Russia in Deep-Strike Drone Attacks — April 7, 2026

Militarnyi — Ukrainian Deep-Strike Drone Production to Launch in the Netherlands — June 18, 2026

Kyiv Independent — UK pledges to send record number of drones to Ukraine by end 2026 — April 15, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Ukrainian glide bombs join the fray at Eurosatory 2026 — June 24, 2026