INVESTIGATION: 88 F-35s OR SWEDISH GRIPENS? THE FIGHTER FILE PARALYZING OTTAWA

Introduction: The contract of the century trapped in political limbo

A $19-billion contract in limbo since March 2025

In January 2023, Canada signed a contract worth 19 billion Canadian dollars with Lockheed Martin for the acquisition of 88 F-35A Lightning II fighters, intended to replace the aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets. An agreement that put an end to years of political dithering and seemed to finally settle the question of renewing Canada's fighter fleet. First delivery scheduled for 2026. Full operational capability by the early 2030s. Everything seemed settled.

Then came spring 2025. Newly elected as prime minister, Mark Carney ordered a formal review of the F-35 program — not because the aircraft had underperformed, but because the Canada-United States relationship had deteriorated sharply under the Trump administration, and Ottawa no longer wanted to depend so heavily on an American supplier for its air force's most critical weapons system. In April 2026, before the Senate defence committee, Minister David McGuinty confirmed the review was ongoing with no conclusion timeline. In June 2026, the Straits Times reported that Carney had launched the review "shortly after taking office." More than a year later, the file is still open. And in the meantime, Canada keeps paying for F-35 components it may not yet have decided to fully deploy.

16 F-35s confirmed, 72 in limbo

Here is the current state of the file, as documented by multiple sources in 2026: Canada has financially committed to the first 16 F-35s and has begun making payments for long-lead components on 14 additional F-35s — for a total of 30 aircraft on which Ottawa has real financial commitments. The remaining 58 F-35s (or 72, depending on various estimates of the review's final scope) remain in limbo. The review has been underway since March 2025. It has no known end date. And in the meantime, the CF-18 fleet ages, F-35 delivery timelines lengthen, and Saab makes an aggressive, if improbable, pitch to Ottawa with its Gripen E fighter.

The F-35: what the evaluation numbers say

95% vs 33% — a technical gap that cannot be ignored

In November 2025, Radio-Canada obtained classified data from the evaluation of the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) conducted by the Defence Department in 2021. The results were devastating for the Gripen: the F-35A scored 57.1 points out of 60 possible (95%) across all evaluation categories. The Gripen E scored 19.8 points out of 60 (33%). The gap was particularly brutal in the mission performance and upgrade potential categories — two metrics directly linked to pilot survival and long-term platform relevance.

The 20 nations that have chosen the F-35 worldwide were not wrong. It is the only 5th-generation fighter — with stealth, sensor fusion, advanced electronic warfare systems — in production in the Western world. The Gripen E is a solid 4th-generation-plus aircraft, modern and capable for its segment. But in a sophisticated air-threat environment — advanced surface-to-air missiles, 5th-generation Russian Su-57 or Chinese J-20 fighters — the difference between a stealth platform and a non-stealth platform can be the difference between a successful mission and a downed pilot. These data don't disappear because Ottawa has commercial tensions with Washington.

What the evaluation didn't measure

However, the 2021 evaluation had blind spots. It compared both aircraft on raw military capability — which is what it was designed to do. It did not adequately weight political and economic factors that became central in 2025: dependence on United States-controlled software updates for the F-35, the impact on mission-data sovereignty, comparative industrial spinoffs, the ability to operate independently should the Washington-Ottawa relationship deteriorate. These factors are not in the scoring rubric — but they are at the heart of the review Carney ordered. That is where the technical evaluation and political reality diverge, and that is the gap in which the file has been stuck since March 2025.

The F-35 requires, for each sortie, software updates and authorizations that flow through Lockheed Martin and the US Department of Defense. If one day Ottawa decided to send its F-35s on a mission Washington disapproved of — which may seem unlikely but is not impossible in a Trump world — that software dependency becomes a real operational constraint. Saab, which offers access to the source code of the Gripen's mission systems — allowing Canada to integrate its own sensors and weapons without US approval — has a sovereignty argument that carries weight in the context of 2026.

The Saab offer: 72 Gripens, a data centre in Montreal, 12,000 jobs

The Swedish proposal in detail

Saab has proposed to Canada a substantial package to replace the 72 remaining F-35s: 72 Gripen EF fighters, six GlobalEye surveillance aircraft (based on the Bombardier Global 6000 business jet), a sovereign data centre in Montreal to keep mission data on Canadian territory, and a potential assembly line in Canada with a commitment to more than 12,000 Canadian jobs. Saab CEO Micael Johansson stated in March 2026 that the first Gripens could be delivered to Canada within 5 years, potentially as quickly as 3 years under optimal production arrangements.

For a Canada eager to reduce its dependence on the United States, to create high-quality defence jobs, and to ensure the sovereignty of its mission data — this package is highly attractive. It responds precisely to Carney's anxieties about American dependence. And it offers a solution that, according to its proponents, "doesn't need to be the best military platform to be the best choice for Canada" — a defence-policy argument that makes sense in certain doctrines, but which is contestable in an environment of sophisticated threats.

What an EKOS poll says about Canadians' preferences

An EKOS poll published during the debate showed that a plurality of Canadians favoured acquiring the Gripen over the F-35, with nearly half of respondents supporting the Swedish fighter. This result reveals something important about public perception of the file: for many Canadians, this debate is not about comparative military capability. It is about national independence from the United States. And in that light, the Gripen — a Swedish plane, non-American, with sovereign data — wins hands down.

This political dynamic creates pressure on Carney that goes beyond techno-military rationality. He must deliver a decision that is defensible to Canadian public opinion, to the Canadian Armed Forces and their operational needs, to NATO and NORAD, and financially viable over a 50-year lifecycle. These four imperatives do not point to the same aircraft. That is why the file has been in limbo since March 2025.

The mixed fleet: the road to compromise?

30 F-35s + 60 Gripens — the middle ground

Faced with the impasse between the military imperative (F-35) and the political imperative (Gripen/sovereignty), the solution that has emerged in official discussions is a mixed fleet. According to sources reported by La Presse and confirmed by multiple analyses, the preferred option in Ottawa's corridors would be approximately 30 F-35s + 60 Gripens — or, in a more ambitious scenario reported by CBC in June 2026, an expanded fleet of 140 aircraft in total combining 72 to 88 F-35s and up to 72 Gripens. The review itself, according to MigFlug.com in its June 2026 analysis, "has no decision expected before the American mid-term elections at the end of 2026."

The logic of a mixed fleet is politically understandable: keep the F-35 for the most demanding missions (penetration into contested territory, enemy air defence suppression, high-intensity NORAD missions) and supplement with less expensive-to-operate Gripens for less demanding missions (Arctic patrols, training exercises, surveillance). This simultaneously satisfies the industrialists who want the F-35, the sovereigntists who want the Gripen, and the budget managers seeking operational savings.

The problems a mixed fleet creates

Unfortunately, the mixed fleet has a serious problem its proponents tend to minimize: operational and logistical complexity. Training pilots on two different platforms multiplies training costs. Maintaining two aircraft types in hangars multiplies parts inventories, specialized tools, and technician skill sets. Integrating two different communications and data systems into joint operations creates compatibility risks. Senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) argued internally, according to sources reported in autumn 2025, that Canada should proceed with the full purchase of 88 F-35s. And a letter signed by a dozen retired RCAF officers warned that a fleet centred on 16 F-35s supplemented by Gripens would be "virtually unusable" for high-intensity missions.

The operating costs over the Gripen's lifetime are certainly substantially lower than those of the F-35 — some estimates place them at 40 to 60% cheaper per flight hour depending on mission profile. But these operational savings must be weighed against the additional costs of mixed fleet complexity — and the reduced operational capabilities in the most demanding scenarios.

The real cost of the F-35 program: $73.9 billion over its lifetime

$19 billion for acquisition, $73.9 billion over 50 years

The initial contract worth 19 billion Canadian dollars covers only the acquisition of the 88 fighters. The total cost over the program's lifecycle — including spare engines, munitions, infrastructure (hardened shelters at Cold Lake and Bagotville), software updates, training and in-service support over 50 years — is estimated by the Canadian government itself at 73.9 billion Canadian dollars, according to a June 2026 analysis. This figure, which is not a cost overrun but the official lifecycle estimate, places Canada's real commitment in an entirely different dimension than the acquisition contract.

The Gripen's cost over the same lifetime is substantially lower — per-flight-hour operating costs are markedly cheaper. But one must also factor in the costs of the transition (shutting down the already-underway F-35 training pipeline, setting up the Gripen training pipeline), the costs of the mixed fleet if that is the chosen path, and the costs of reduced operational capability in high-intensity scenarios. The overall arithmetic is complex. What can be said with certainty: the F-35 at 73.9 billion over 50 years is a colossal financial commitment that will weigh on Canadian defence budgets for decades, reducing the capacity to invest in other capabilities.

The quiet payments for 14 additional F-35s

In mid-February 2026, Carney confirmed that his government had begun payments for long-lead components on 14 additional F-35s — bringing the total commitment to 30 aircraft. The prime minister stated these payments were aimed at "maintaining options" during the review. That is politically astute: by keeping its place in Lockheed Martin's production queue, Canada preserves the ability to return to the full purchase without losing additional years of delay. But it is also a way of paying for an aircraft that has not yet been fully decided upon — which has fuelled criticism of an incoherent acquisition policy.

These payments for 14 additional aircraft, made while the review is officially ongoing, reveal the pragmatic reality behind the political rhetoric. Ottawa knows the F-35 is probably its best military choice. It maintains its options to return to the full purchase while preserving political space to announce a final decision that will include elements of industrial sovereignty (the Gripen or production in Canada). This is complex management of a file with multiple constraints. It may also be procrastination dressed up as strategic prudence.

NORAD interoperability: the constraint Saab cannot erase

NORAD and continental defence

The NORAD — North American Aerospace Defense Command — is a Canada-US binational command that provides surveillance and defence of North American airspace. It is the framework within which the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) operates daily alongside its American counterparts. And within that framework, systems interoperability is absolutely critical — radars, communications, friend-or-foe identification systems, data links must all function seamlessly between Canadian and American aircraft.

The F-35 is designed to operate natively in this environment. It shares communication systems, data links and protocols with American F-35s and US Air Force command systems. The Gripen E, while compatible with NATO standards, does not offer the same level of native integration into the NORAD architecture. Gripen proponents argue this integration can be improved. Sceptics — including US Air Force officials — dispute that the Gripen can achieve the same level of NORAD integration as the F-35.

What Washington has said and what it implies

The United States has been clear, in its official communications, that the Gripen would not be NORAD-compatible at the same level as the F-35. This American position is not necessarily disinterested — Washington has commercial and strategic reasons to prefer that Canada remain in the F-35 program. But it also reflects a real technical reality: in a NORAD crisis, Canadian and American aircraft must be able to share data in real time, coordinate their manoeuvres and communicate securely without friction. Every degree of systemic incompatibility introduces a delay, an ambiguity or a risk in situations where decisions are made in seconds.

This is not a theoretical concern. The defence of North American airspace faces growing threats — Russian hypersonic ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, surveillance drones. In this context, the full compatibility of the Canadian fighter with the American air defence system is not an ideological luxury. It is an operational condition that NORAD pilots and commanders consider non-negotiable.

The Gripen and industrial sovereignty: what Saab really offers

The sovereign data centre in Montreal

Saab's most compelling argument for the Canadian market is its offer of a sovereign data centre in Montreal. Concretely, this means that mission data from Canadian Gripens — flight routes, sensor data, collected intelligence, weapons configurations — would remain on Canadian soil, in facilities controlled by Ottawa, without passing through American servers. This is a direct response to Carney's concern about dependence on the United States for F-35 software updates and mission data.

This argument has real value in a context where confidence in the American bilateral relationship has been eroded by Trump. But it also needs to be put in perspective: within a NORAD framework, Canadian aircraft share data in real time with their American counterparts regardless. The idea that fully sovereign mission data is compatible with full NORAD integration is somewhat contradictory. The sovereign data centre is a sovereignty argument that is symbolic and commercial — it carries political value. Its military value within the context of continental defence is more nuanced.

Bombardier + Saab: the Canadian connection

What distinguishes the Gripen offer from a simple import sale is the involvement of Bombardier. The GlobalEye — which Canada is also seeking to acquire — is based on the Bombardier Global 6000. Saab has proposed assembling Canadian Gripens in Canada, potentially at Mirabel, Quebec, with significant technology transfer. This Canadian industrial component is what makes the Gripen offer politically viable in Ottawa. It allows Carney to present the decision not as a military retreat but as an industrial victory.

If Bombardier secures a role assembling the Gripen in Canada, that represents a direct and tangible economic spinoff for Quebec — a province whose political support is crucial for any Liberal government. This political calculation carries weight. And it is not entirely illegitimate: if we are going to spend 73.9 billion over 50 years on a fighter fleet, we might as well keep the maximum possible in Canada. The question is whether the industrial spinoffs justify the capability trade-offs of a Gripen fleet.

The GCAP option: the wildcard from the future

McGuinty and the Global Combat Air Programme

There is a third actor in this file that few have mentioned: the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). This 6th-generation fighter project brings together the United Kingdom, Japan and Italy to develop, by 2035, a successor to the European Typhoon and Japan's F-2. During his visit to Tokyo in June 2026, McGuinty expressed explicit interest in GCAP, stating that Canada was "seeking more information" and that the program was "a perfect illustration" of how countries can pool their resources.

The GCAP option is not a short-term prospect — a fighter expected in 2035 cannot replace the CF-18 fleet that must be renewed now. But it opens a longer-term perspective: Canada could buy enough F-35s to cover the transitional period (the 30 already committed, possibly a few more), then join the GCAP program for its next-generation aircraft in the 2030s. This is a strategic option that would allow the F-35/Gripen dilemma to be partially resolved by pushing part of it into the future.

The conditions for joining GCAP

Joining GCAP is not, however, trivial. The program is already well advanced among its three founding members — UK, Japan, Italy. Canadian entry would require complex negotiations on governance, industrial contributions, intellectual property sharing and specific NORAD requirements. Moreover, GCAP has already experienced delays in its own ambitions — the question of assembly in Japan and technology-sharing requirements with Tokyo has created tensions within the existing consortium. Adding a fourth member is not a simple decision for countries already involved.

Despite these obstacles, the GCAP dimension in McGuinty's thinking reveals something important: Ottawa is already thinking about the fleet for the 2035-2050 decade, not just the one replacing the CF-18s in the near term. That is a strategic maturity Canada had not demonstrated in its handling of the fighter file over the past two decades — where every decision was made in reactive urgency rather than proactive planning.

The CF-18s: the urgency of the transition

A fleet that can wait no longer

While Ottawa deliberates, the CF-18 Hornets age. These fighters, which entered service in 1982, are approaching their structural limits. Life-extension programs have kept them flying into the 2020s, but these extensions have limits — physical and economic. Each additional year of CF-18 operations costs more in maintenance, reduces operational availability and diminishes their capabilities against adversaries whose weapons systems have evolved since the 1980s.

The first Canadian F-35s — the initial 16 — are expected to begin delivery in 2026. Their operationalization — pilot training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, infrastructure setup at Cold Lake and Bagotville — will take several more years. Initial operational capability for the 16-aircraft F-35 fleet is expected in the early 2030s. During this period, the CF-18s continue flying with their growing limitations. This is a real window of vulnerability, into which every additional hesitation about purchasing the remaining 72 aircraft drives the knife deeper.

The time pressure on the decision

A decision delayed is not a deferred decision — it is a decision that costs. Every additional month of review is a month when the CF-18s suffer additional wear, when pilots are trained on aircraft that will no longer be in service in ten years, when defence industry partners — whether Lockheed Martin or Saab — adjust their projections. The cost of indecision does not appear in Ottawa's budget ledgers. It is measured in fleet operational readiness, capability currency and credibility in the eyes of allies who have watched for years as Canada fails to close its fighter file.

McGuinty said in April 2026 that the review would "take as long as it takes." That is the response of a politician managing contradictory pressures. It is not the response of a strategist who understands that time is a limited resource in military acquisitions. The final decision on the remaining 72 F-35s — or their replacement with Gripens — will need to come before the end of 2026 if Ottawa wants any chance of meeting its operational capability commitments for the early 2030s.

What the fighter file reveals about Canada

A country that struggles to make big defence decisions

The Canadian fighter file is a brutal mirror of Canada's difficulty making major defence decisions. The acquisition of CF-18 replacements was launched in 2010, cancelled, relaunched, abandoned under Trudeau after the initial F-35 selection controversy, restarted through a competitive tender process, concluded in 2023 with a return to the F-35 — and now questioned again by Carney. This fifteen-year cycle is not a catastrophe — in the end, Canada will probably have new fighters at a reasonable date. It is above all a revelation of a political culture that struggles to maintain a strategic defence vision across electoral cycles.

Every government has wanted to re-examine its predecessor's decisions, inject its own political and economic priorities, and leave its mark on this symbolic file. The result is a fifteen-year process to replace a fleet that had been identified as needing renewal since the early 2000s. The cost of this slowness is measured in billions of CF-18 maintenance for the aging fleet and in degraded operational capabilities during the transition period.

The coming decision

According to MigFlug.com's analysis in June 2026, Ottawa is not expected to make a final decision before the American mid-term elections at year's end — which suggests the American electoral result could influence the Canadian choice. This may be the most revealing signal of all: Canada is waiting to see how American policy evolves before deciding which aircraft to buy. That is strategic sovereignty with an asterisk — national decisions conditioned on the electoral results of a foreign country. Precisely the dependency Carney says he wants to reduce.

Final irony, and a bitter one. The real decision on Canadian fighters might be made not in Ottawa but in American polling stations in November 2026. If Democrats retake Congress and moderate Trump's posture, Ottawa could return to the full F-35 purchase. If Trump consolidates his hold, Ottawa could accelerate the pivot toward Saab. Either way, the decision will be reactive. That is not strategy — it is political survival. And Canada deserves better than that for its next fighter.

The precision-guided munitions file: the void that undermines everything

A fighter without munitions: the strategic gap nobody names

Beyond the F-35 vs Gripen debate, there is a question Canadian defence analysts are raising in hushed tones: what good is the best fighter in the world if Canada doesn't have precision-guided munitions to equip it in sufficient quantity? The Ukrainian experience has brutally demonstrated that stocks of sophisticated munitions are exhausted in weeks during a high-intensity conflict — not years. Canada, in 2026, has no domestic production capability for long-range air-to-air missiles, precision-guided bombs, or cruise missiles. These munitions are all imported — primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom.

This munitions dependency may be the most underestimated strategic risk in the CF-18 replacement program. A Canadian F-35 without sufficient stocks of AMRAAM, JDAM or JSM is a 73.9-billion-dollar investment at reduced capacity. The decision on the fighter type must be accompanied by a parallel decision on munitions — their acquisition, their stockpiling and, ideally, partial production on Canadian territory. Without this dimension, the CF-18 replacement will be a symbolic victory with limited operational impact.

The international comparison: what our allies do and what we should learn from it

Australia, Belgium, Denmark: decisions Canada is watching

Canada is not the only country to have recently chosen the F-35 — and these precedents offer valuable lessons. Australia ordered 72 F-35As with a delivery schedule extending through 2023, and integration into the RAAF revealed training delays and costs higher than initial projections. Belgium, which chose the F-35A to replace its F-16s, encountered difficult discussions with Lockheed Martin over industrial offsets — a file directly relevant to Canada, which insists on Canadian industrial content in any major defence contract. Denmark received its first F-35s in 2023 and reports a demanding but manageable operational learning curve.

These allied experiences suggest that the final decision on Canadian fighters must factor in not only acquisition cost but also long-term maintenance costs, actual delivery timelines, and the quality of industrial support on Canadian territory. The Canadian evaluation score of 57.1/100 for the F-35 against 19.8/100 for the Gripen captures part of this reality — but our allies' experiences suggest initial projections are often optimistic. Caution in timeline and cost planning is a lesson Canada can absorb without having to repeat its partners' mistakes.

The domestic politics: how the fighter file became a partisan issue

When national defence becomes a partisan playground

The CF-18 replacement file has a long history of politicization in Canada. The Harper government announced in 2010 the purchase of 65 F-35s without a competitive tender — a decision that triggered a political storm and contributed to the Conservative defeat in 2015. The Trudeau government then launched a competitive process that dragged on for years. The Carney government inherits this political saga with a decision that was taken but whose execution remains fragile — the 57.1/100 F-35 evaluation score gives the government a legal basis for the choice, but it does not end the debate over the value of that purchase.

Both the Conservative opposition and the New Democratic Party have positions on fighters — the former favouring the F-35 for interoperability with the United States, the latter sceptical of the total costs of 73.9 billion dollars. This partisan dynamic creates uncertainty about the program's continuity beyond the current mandate. The long-term political viability of the F-35 choice depends in part on the Carney government's ability to build a consensus that crosses party lines — or to embed it deeply enough in contracts and industrial obligations that it becomes difficult for a future government to undo.

NORAD interoperability and the future of North American continental defence

The modernization of NORAD and the technical requirements it imposes

One of the strongest arguments for the F-35 in the Canadian evaluation is its integration into the surveillance and combat architecture of modernized NORAD. The North American continental defence modernization program — announced by Canada in 2022 with an investment of 38.6 billion dollars over twenty years — rests on an architecture of sensors, command systems and strike vectors that must be fully interoperable with American systems. The F-35, with its APG-81 sensor, its data-fusion system and its stealth-mode communications capability, integrates natively into this architecture. The Gripen, as capable as it may be on other criteria, does not have the same level of native integration into the NORAD systems.

The question of interoperability is not only technical — it is political. In a context where the United States under Trump has questioned the automatic security guarantees toward its allies, Canada's ability to contribute substantially to continental defence is a weighty factor in bilateral relations. A Canada flying aging CF-18s or transitioning to a less capable fighter contributes less to collective defence — and that reality reinforces political pressure in favour of the F-35, independent of its cost. That may be the most decisive argument in the evaluation: not the technical score, but the geopolitical logic of the alliance.

Conclusion: an investigation without a verdict, an urgency without an answer

What this investigation has not resolved

This investigation does not deliver a definitive answer on what Canada should choose. Not because the answer is unknown — militarily, the F-35 is the best aircraft available for the most demanding missions, and the 2021 evaluation data demonstrate this clearly. But because the "right" decision also depends on political, industrial, economic and symbolic factors that each actor weighs differently. What can be stated without ambiguity is this: the status quo — continuing the review indefinitely — is the worst option. It combines the costs of indecision (CF-18s aging, allies questioning, industry waiting) without the benefits of any option.

The final decision on Canadian fighters is probably the most structurally significant that Carney will make in the defence domain. It will commit tens of billions over 50 years, shape Canada's military capabilities for a generation, and send a clear signal about what Canada chooses to be in the security architecture of the West — a fully integrated partner in NATO capabilities, or a country that adjusts its military choices to its domestic political calculations. These two paths are not incompatible. But they must be chosen with eyes wide open.

The stone in the shoe

Canada has CF-18s whose age warranted retirement long ago. It has a contract to replace them with F-35s. It has a political review suspending that contract. It has a Swedish rival offering militarily inferior but industrially more sovereign aircraft. It has allies watching with growing impatience. And it has a prime minister who says he wants to reduce American dependence while continuing to pay for F-35 components "to maintain options."

In this tangle, the only certainty is this: the decision can wait no longer. It has already waited too long. And every additional month of indecision is one more month in which Canadian pilots fly aircraft whose age should have forced their retirement long ago. That is unacceptable. And no political calculation, however sophisticated, changes this reality of metal, fuel and responsibility toward the women and men in uniform.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial positioning

I support Canada having the best possible military capabilities within its real budgetary constraints. In this file, the 2021 evaluation data clearly favour the F-35 on military merits. The question of industrial sovereignty is legitimate and important — but it should not be resolved by compromising the fleet's operational capability. I am not a Lockheed Martin lobbyist. I am an analyst who believes Canadian pilots deserve the best aircraft available for the most dangerous missions.

Methodology and sources

Data on evaluation scores (57.1 vs 19.8 out of 60) come from reliable secondary sources reporting on the 2021 FFCP evaluation data, including Radio-Canada and multiple analyses published between November 2025 and June 2026. Information on payments for 14 additional F-35s is confirmed by Carney's statements in February 2026 and analyses published by AeroTime and 19Fortyfive. Information on GCAP comes from the Straits Times article of June 24, 2026 reporting McGuinty's statements in Tokyo. No facts are invented.

Nature of the analysis

This investigation seeks to go beyond official positions to examine the technical data, political tensions and operational consequences of the Canadian fighter file. The editorials expressed are those of the columnist. The facts cited are verifiable.

Sources

Primary sources

Straits Times — Canada to send warships to Indo-Pacific, defence minister says (including McGuinty's statements on GCAP) — June 24, 2026

AeroTime — Canada's F-35 review drags on with no decision timeline — April 28, 2026

Canada.ca — Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar (NORAD modernization) — official page

Secondary sources

MigFlug — Canada Weighs a Split F-35 and Gripen Fleet — June 20, 2026

19Fortyfive — Canada's 88 F-35s Are Under Review — January 18, 2026

CityNews Toronto — Ottawa won't say if it penalized Gripen jets in 2021 analysis — March 1, 2026

19Fortyfive — Canada Could Buy Stealth F-35 AND JAS 39 Gripen Fighters — February 20, 2026