EDITORIAL: Taiwan — when Chinese coast guards invent a "jurisdiction" that does not exist

Introduction: the sea as the terrain of legal fiction

June 7, 2026 in the waters east of Taiwan

On June 7, 2026, Chinese vessels launched what they called a "maritime law enforcement operation" in the waters east of Taiwan. That vocabulary is precise and deliberate. This is not a "military operation" — that would be too openly aggressive. It is not a "patrol" — that would be too mundane. It is a "law enforcement operation," which assumes the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction over waters where China has none under international law.

That is the heart of this editorial: China is constructing a legal fiction of maritime sovereignty around Taiwan, repeating gray-zone operations until they are considered normal. And the West, too often, looks the other way.

The incident's numbers

The facts are documented. 4 Chinese vessels were expelled by Taiwan's coast guard. 7 Taiwanese patrol vessels were deployed. The vessels remained in a standoff at 33 nautical miles southeast of the island. For the first time, a Chinese surveillance ship and a coast guard vessel operated jointly in the area — something Taiwan's authorities described as "unprecedented coordination designed to provoke Taiwan." And all of this occurs against the backdrop of a daily deployment of 40 to 50 Chinese vessels in the South China Sea.

The "gray zone" doctrine: what Beijing is building

Definition and mechanics

The gray-zone strategy consists of exerting pressure and extending influence through means that remain below the threshold that would trigger a formal military response. Coast guard vessels rather than warships. "Law enforcement operations" rather than military maneuvers. Access barriers rather than formal blockades. This strategy is both effective and difficult to counter: it forces the adversary either to respond with disproportionate force that can be presented as aggression, or to let the incident pass, which validates Beijing's sovereignty claim.

China refined this strategy in the South China Sea — in the Spratly Islands, at Scarborough Reef — with success. It is now applying it east of Taiwan, in even more strategically significant waters.

The invocation of Japan-Philippines negotiations as a pretext

The June 7 operation cited Japan-Philippines negotiations as its contextual justification. This is pure geopolitical cynicism: using a regional diplomatic dynamic as a pretext for an action that has no direct connection to it. The real objective is to assert that China exercises surveillance and jurisdiction over these waters, independently of what is happening elsewhere. The pretext changes — the strategy remains constant.

UNCLOS: the rule China chooses to ignore

A signatory that does not respect the treaty

China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention defines the rights and obligations of states in their exclusive economic zones, their territorial waters and international waters. It precisely fixes the limits of each state's maritime jurisdiction.

And yet, according to an analysis published in the Taipei Times on June 21, 2026, China "does not fully adhere to UNCLOS despite being a signatory." That is legal diplomatic language for: China uses international law when it suits its interests, and ignores or unilaterally reinterprets it when it contradicts its territorial ambitions.

The 2016 precedent: the Hague Arbitration Court

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague delivered an unambiguous ruling: Chinese claims in the South China Sea based on the "nine-dash line" are incompatible with UNCLOS. China simply refused to acknowledge the decision. It declared the tribunal incompetent, denied the validity of the proceedings, and continued its activities in the South China Sea as if the ruling did not exist.

The first coast guard + surveillance ship coordination

A significant tactical novelty

One of the most troubling elements of the June 7, 2026 incident is the first documented coordination between a Chinese surveillance vessel and a coast guard ship during an operation around Taiwan. Coast guard vessels are para-military actors — they carry light weapons, they operate under a law-enforcement rather than naval combat doctrine. Surveillance vessels are intelligence-gathering actors.

Operating together around Taiwan combines the intelligence function (mapping Taiwan's responses, testing procedures) with the presence function (asserting claimed sovereignty). It is also harder to respond to militarily: opening fire on a coast guard vessel would be interpreted very differently than responding to a warship.

What this signals for the future

This unprecedented coordination is likely the first of many. China methodically tests new configurations, observes responses and adjusts its methods. The June 7, 2026 operation is a rehearsal — not necessarily for an imminent conflict, but for sustained and growing pressure that aims to normalize Chinese presence in waters Beijing is unilaterally claiming.

Taiwan's response: firm and controlled

7 patrol vessels and the expulsion of intruders

Taiwan's coast guard responded rapidly and firmly: deploying 7 patrol vessels and expelling the 4 Chinese vessels. This is a proportionate and professional response. Taiwan did not escalate — it simply exercised its sovereign rights in its own waters and expelled intruders.

But Taiwan also knows that each such incident tests not only its own response capabilities but also the international reaction — and most crucially, the American reaction. The security arrangement between the United States and Taiwan, though ambiguous in its details, remains the fundamental underpinning of Taiwan's security. Has Washington responded? With what firmness? These reactions are watched from Beijing with the closest attention.

The combat readiness exercises

Taiwan announced combat exercises lasting five days in June 2026 — a signal of readiness and determination sent to Beijing. These exercises are a direct response to the accumulated pressure of maritime incidents and Chinese shows of force. They say: we will not be intimidated; we are preparing.

What the West must do

More frequent Taiwan Strait transits

One of the most effective Western responses to Chinese maneuvers around Taiwan is freedom of navigation — regular transits by American, British, French and Canadian warships through the Taiwan Strait and the waters east of the island. These transits send a clear message: the democracies recognize freedom of navigation in these waters and refuse the fictitious jurisdiction Beijing is trying to impose.

France in particular has conducted several Taiwan Strait transits in recent years — a diplomatically courageous position that deserves to be sustained and amplified. The Taipei Times editorial of June 21, 2026 is explicit: allies must counter China at sea. This is not optional — it is a strategic necessity.

Direct support for Taiwan

Beyond freedom of navigation, the West must reinforce its direct support for Taiwan — defensive arms sales, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, additional diplomatic recognitions that strengthen Taipei's international legitimacy. Every act of support for Taiwan is a cost to China's gray-zone strategy. And cumulative costs can deter escalation.

The risk of habituation: when the gray zone becomes the norm

The normalization spiral

The deepest danger of China's gray-zone strategy is not any single incident — it is progressive habituation. When Chinese vessels regularly operate in the waters east of Taiwan, when incidents are reported and then forgotten, when the international response becomes less firm because "this is normal now," Beijing's legal fiction begins to look like reality.

This is the logic of cumulative facts on the ground. In the South China Sea, China built artificial islands, installed missiles, created military bases — and today these installations are there, permanent, de facto accepted by an international community that chose at each stage not to respond firmly enough. The waters east of Taiwan must not meet the same fate.

The credibility of deterrence

Deterrence only works if it is credible. China constantly tests the credibility of Western deterrence around Taiwan — and each time the response is insufficient, deterrence weakens a little more. This is a dangerous cycle. Restoring it requires firm, consistent and sustained responses over time — not solemn declarations followed by inaction.

Taiwan's allies: between formal commitment and real presence on the ground

What freedom of navigation means in practice

Taiwan Strait transits by allied warships — American, British, French, Canadian — are more than diplomatic symbols. They are concrete demonstrations that the democracies refuse to recognize Chinese sovereignty claims over these international waters. Every passage through the Strait, every naval exercise in the waters east of Taiwan, is a practical refutation of the legal fiction that Beijing is incrementally trying to impose.

France has conducted several transits through these waters in recent years, often with French Navy vessels. Germany has begun deploying frigates in the Indo-Pacific region. These gestures carry strategic importance that exceeds their direct military value: they signal that freedom of navigation is a European interest, not solely an American one. And they complicate China's strategy of progressive maritime fait accompli.

Supporting Taiwan's autonomous defense capability

Beyond arms sales and military exercises, the West can support Taiwan by strengthening its autonomous defense industrial capacity. Defense technologies, anti-ship missile systems, surveillance and strike drones, conventional submarines — helping Taiwan produce its own armaments is strategically more robust than depending on external deliveries that can be interrupted by a crisis or a naval blockade.

Defense industrial cooperation between democratic allies and Taiwan is one of the most important and most underdeveloped work streams in Indo-Pacific security. The diplomatic constraints are real, but they cannot be a permanent excuse for inaction in the face of a Chinese threat that does not pause to observe diplomatic niceties.

Conclusion: international law, the last bulwark

What is at stake goes beyond Taiwan

What is happening in the waters east of Taiwan in June 2026 goes far beyond the question of Taiwanese sovereignty. It is a test of the solidity of international law, of the credibility of Western deterrence, and of the willingness of democracies to defend the principles they proclaim. If China can with impunity construct a legal fiction of maritime jurisdiction around Taiwan, it can do the same anywhere in the Indo-Pacific — and potentially beyond.

The hour of choice

The democratic West must choose: allow the gray zone to become the norm and watch the geopolitical reality gradually redrawn in Beijing's favor, or respond with the firmness and coherence necessary to ensure that international law remains a binding reality rather than a suggestion that authoritarian powers ignore at their convenience. This is a civilizational question, not merely a maritime strategy question. And that response begins now, in the waters 33 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

This editorial is grounded in facts documented in the lot file and drawn from dated, identifiable sources. The positions expressed — support for Taiwan, opposition to Chinese gray-zone maneuvers, a call for a firm Western response — are the columnist's stated and acknowledged positions. No direct testimony was invented. The editorial line is pro-democracy and considers China a revisionist power threatening the rules-based international order.

Sources

Primary sources

Ahram Online: Taiwanese coast guard standoff with Chinese vessels — June 24, 2026

Taipei Times: Expert warning on expanding Chinese hybrid warfare — June 20, 2026

Taipei Times editorial: Allies must counter China at sea — June 21, 2026

Secondary sources

Geopolitical Daily: PLA exercises and coercion around Taiwan — June 22, 2026

Semafor: Taiwan announces combat readiness exercises — June 21, 2026

Washington Post: Taiwan begins five-day military exercises — June 22, 2026