EDITORIAL: Merz, €90 Billion and the Phantom Status — Europe Patches Together Ukraine's Future

EDITORIAL: Merz, €90 Billion and the Phantom Status — Europe Patches Together Ukraine's Future

Introduction: Europe's Grand Bargaining Around Ukraine

A historic loan and a controversial proposal

There is in European policy toward Ukraine a painful paradox that few leaders dare name clearly: we are ready to lend €90 billion to a country at war, to supply it with weapons, to welcome millions of its refugees — but we still hesitate to give it a date for accession to the European Union, and we even propose, as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did on May 21, 2026, a status of "associate member" — a category that does not exist in the treaties, has never been defined, and resembles a great deal of promises and very few real rights. Ukraine has been fighting for Europe for more than four years. And Europe offers it a seat at the table without the right to vote.

The reaction of Volodymyr Zelensky was not long in coming. As early as May 23, 2026, he rejected the proposal with a clarity that surprised some chancelleries: "Ukraine has defended Europe with full measures, not half measures — and must have the right to vote in the EU." That is a dignified and clear-sighted response. A country dying for European values cannot accept in exchange a half-member status, a fold-out chair in an institution it is helping to defend with its blood.

The context of the €90 billion loan

To understand this debate, one must first understand the loan. On December 19, 2025, European Union leaders approved a zero-interest €90 billion loan to Ukraine. This loan, backed by the proceeds from frozen Russian assets in Europe — approximately €300 billion — is presented as a long-term financing mechanism for Ukrainian reconstruction. It is distinct from military aid. It is intended to rebuild infrastructure, maintain public services, and stabilize the Ukrainian economy during and after the war.

Of the 27 EU members, 24 approved the loan. Three notable absentees: Orbán's Hungary, Fico's Slovakia, and the Czech Republic — three countries whose governments maintain ambiguous relationships with Moscow and have systematically resisted the most ambitious measures of support for Ukraine. On June 26, 2026, the first tranche of €3 billion was actually disbursed — a concrete signal that the mechanism works.

The €90 Billion: What the Number Says and Does Not Say

A loan, not a grant — the crucial distinction

The first thing to understand about the €90 billion loan: it is a loan, not a grant. Ukraine will have to repay it — with frozen Russian asset proceeds as a safety net, but the repayment principle remains. In a country at war, with a significant portion of its industrial infrastructure destroyed or damaged, with a GDP that contracted considerably since 2022, and where the best years for repaying this debt will depend entirely on the post-war trajectory, this loan creates a financial obligation that future generations of Ukrainians will carry.

This is not a criticism of the loan — it is necessary contextualization. The alternatives were worse: no financing means the collapse of Ukrainian public services, mass exodus of the working population, the impossibility of maintaining a functioning state during the war. The loan is indispensable. It is also imperfect. And intellectual honesty requires saying so — especially if we demand that Ukraine be transparent about its own institutions as a condition of its European path.

Frozen Russian assets: a legally fragile mechanism

The guarantee mechanism on frozen Russian assets is technically ingenious — and legally contested. By using revenues generated by the approximately €300 billion in Russian assets frozen in Europe as collateral for the loan to Ukraine, the EU created a mechanism that makes the country causing the destruction pay for Ukrainian reconstruction. That is morally satisfying. It is also legally complex.

Russia has challenged the freeze of these assets before several international jurisdictions. Third-party governments — notably some Gulf and Asian countries — have expressed concerns about the precedent this sets for the security of foreign sovereign assets held in Western financial institutions. These concerns are not without foundation. If Western states can freeze and use foreign sovereign assets without a definitive ruling from an international jurisdiction, the legal security of all states' assets in those institutions is affected. This is an international law debate that will last for years — and whose consequences reach far beyond the Ukrainian case.

Merz and the Proposal for Associate Membership: A Decoding

What is an EU "associate member"?

The proposal by Friedrich Merz on May 21, 2026 deserves precise analysis. He proposed that Ukraine obtain a status of "associate member" of the European Union — allowing it to participate in European summits and meetings, to be consulted on decisions affecting it, but without holding the right to vote. This status does not exist in the current EU treaties. Creating a new category of institutional relationship would require a treaty revision — a process that involves ratification by all 27 member states, some of them by referendum. This is not a simple or fast undertaking.

In substance, Merz's idea addressed a real concern: Ukraine cannot join the EU as a full member while it is at war — the accession rules require it, the necessary institutional and economic reforms take time, and several member states have legitimate concerns about absorbing an economy as large and as damaged into the European space. While waiting for full membership, how can we ensure that Ukraine is integrated into the European decision-making process, informed of discussions concerning it, and treated as a privileged partner?

Why Zelensky said no

Zelensky's response is clear in principle: a status without voting rights is a second-tier status. Ukraine is dying for the EU's values — for democracy, the rule of law, freedom. To offer it a seat at the table without a voice is to say that its sacrifice merits recognition but not equality. Symbolically, it is the same logic as inviting someone to dinner but asking them to remain in the hallway while others eat.

Moreover, Zelensky and his advisers see a strategic risk in the Merz proposal: if Ukraine accepts associate member status, it could find itself indefinitely in that intermediate category — neither formally in the EU, nor clearly on the path to full membership. Associate status could become a comfortable exit for member countries that do not want to accelerate Ukrainian accession — a compromise that relieves the hesitant without resolving anything for Kyiv. Zelensky refuses to be the adjustment variable for European ambivalences.

Merz After the Rejection: He Held His Position

Unusual firmness

What is remarkable about Merz's reaction to Zelensky's rejection is that he did not back down. After the Brussels European Council summit of June 19, 2026, asked about the Ukrainian response to his proposal, Merz maintained that Ukraine could not become a full EU member while it was at war — and that his idea of associate status remained an option on the table. This firmness is unusual in the European political landscape, where leaders tend to quickly withdraw proposals that create friction.

It also says something about Merz's position on substance: he is not opposed to Ukrainian accession. He is convinced that this accession cannot be rushed — that the institutional, economic, and security conditions necessary for a successful integration are not yet in place and will not be before the end of the war. His associate status proposal is therefore sincere in its intention — to create a bridge between now and the moment when full membership will be possible. The problem is that Zelensky sees no reason why accession should be conditional on the end of the war.

The argument for wartime accession

The substantive debate over Ukrainian accession to the EU during the war is real and complex. The European treaties do not explicitly prohibit it. But joining the EU also triggers a series of solidarity obligations between members — notably within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. A EU member state at war would implicate the entire Union in a conflict that would change the very nature of the institution. Countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and even some more cautious members would block a wartime accession by invoking precisely these implications.

There is therefore a real lock. But it is not insurmountable if the political will were there. The truth few leaders state clearly is that the main obstacle to Ukrainian accession is not legal or institutional — it is political. Some member states simply do not want it, for reasons ranging from fears about migration flows to concerns about agricultural subsidies, by way of economic relationships with Russia that some never truly wanted to sever.

The Total: €200 Billion Given, €90 Billion Loaned

The full scale of European support since 2022

To understand the scope of European commitment, the numbers are necessary. Since February 24, 2022, the European Union and its member states have provided Ukraine with total assistance estimated at more than €200 billion — encompassing military aid (weapons, ammunition, training), humanitarian aid (food, medicine, shelter), macro-financial aid (support for the Ukrainian state budget), and the reception of refugees (which represents a real economic cost for host countries). The €90 billion loan is on top of this already-provided assistance.

This is an unprecedented financial and human commitment in the history of European integration. By comparison, the American Marshall Plan that financed the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War represented approximately $13 billion of the time, equivalent to roughly €150 billion in today's value. Europe has therefore already devoted to Ukraine the equivalent of a Marshall Plan — and has committed to doing as much again in the next two years with the new loan.

The paradox of generosity without belonging

This paradox deserves to be stated clearly: Europe already treats Ukraine as a beneficiary of community solidarity — with amounts that exceed what some members receive from structural funds. It has opened its borders to Ukrainian refugees with unprecedented generosity. It has supplied weapons, trainers, and strategic advice. It has imposed massive sanctions on Russia partly to protect Ukraine. And at the same time, it hesitates to give this same Ukraine the institutional status that would make these commitments permanent and structural — rather than voluntary and revisable.

This is a logically incoherent position that reflects the deep ambivalence of certain member states. We want the benefits of solidarity (stabilization of the eastern border, the demonstration of EU robustness, the strategic advantages of a pro-European Ukraine) without the costs of full membership (agricultural subsidies, cohesion funds, freedom of movement for labor, security risk). This ambivalence is politically understandable. It is morally unacceptable.

European Security: Why Ukraine in the EU Is a Strategic Necessity

Ukraine as a pillar of continental security

Beyond moral considerations, there is a purely strategic argument in favor of Ukrainian accession to the EU — an argument that realists should hear even if they do not like the language of values. A Ukraine integrated into the EU is a stable, democratic, economically dynamic Ukraine aligned with Western institutional structures. It constitutes a permanent and solid barrier to any future expansion of Russian influence toward central and western Europe. It protects NATO's flanks. It reinforces the geopolitical coherence of the continent.

A Ukraine left unintegrated, maintained in a grey zone between the EU and Russia, is structurally vulnerable. It is subject to economic pressures, attempts at political destabilization, and Russian interference in its institutional processes. It remains a theater of competition between Moscow and Brussels — exactly the situation that preceded the 2022 invasion. The lesson of that invasion should be read by all European governments: leaving a country in a grey zone does not protect it. It makes it a target.

NATO and the EU: the two legs of security integration

One must distinguish between NATO accession — on which Ukraine is deadlocked for as long as the war continues — and EU accession, which falls within a different framework and does not entail the same automatic mutual assistance clauses. EU accession would be a demonstration of European commitment that would not automatically trigger NATO's Article 5. It would, however, reinforce the European security architecture through other channels: coordination of foreign policies, integration into European defense industries, participation in the EU's common security programs.

Chancellor Merz said that Ukraine cannot become an EU member during the war. That is a defensible position. But what he did not say — and what Europe has not yet clearly affirmed — is that membership is guaranteed after the war, with a clear and respected timeline and conditions. Without this explicit guarantee, the associate status proposal looks like a maneuver to avoid a commitment Europe is not yet ready to make.

The Three Absentees: Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic

Orbán and the permanent veto

Viktor Orbán's Hungary is the most emblematic case. Since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022, Orbán has systematically resisted every measure of support for Ukraine — blocking aid packages, refusing sanctions, maintaining economic ties with Russia, calling for negotiations that would resemble Ukrainian capitulation. He also received Vladimir Putin in Budapest outside any official EU framework — a violation of European solidarity that his partners have tolerated with few formal consequences.

Orbán's decision not to participate in the €90 billion loan is unsurprising. It is consistent with a political strategy that uses Ukrainian foreign policy as a pressure tool internally and as a demonstration of its difference from the Brussels line. The presence of Hungary in the EU while indirectly financing Putin's war through its gas purchases and institutional blockades is the sharpest contradiction of the current European project.

Fico and Slovak ambivalences

Robert Fico's Slovakia presents a similar profile, though more nuanced. Fico has pro-Russian rhetoric in European forums and maintains significant commercial ties with Moscow. But Slovakia is a smaller country, more vulnerable to pressure from its partners, and whose civil society is deeply pro-Ukrainian — creating a tension between the government's political line and the expectations of the population. Non-participation in the €90 billion loan is a decision by the Fico government, not a national consensus.

As for the Czech Republic, its absence is more surprising — the government of Petr Fiala has been generally pro-Ukrainian, going so far as to organize an ammunition supply program with other partners to circumvent blockades by certain NATO members. Its failure to join the €90 billion loan is more likely linked to internal budget or coalition political constraints than to a fundamental disagreement over support for Ukraine.

The First €3 Billion Disbursement: A Strong Signal

The machinery coming into motion

On June 26, 2026, the European Commission made the first disbursement of the loan: €3 billion sent to Kyiv. That is only 3.3% of the total approved amount, but its symbolic and practical importance is considerable. It demonstrates that the mechanism works — that the agreement of December 19, 2025 was not merely a political announcement, but a decision whose implementation follows. It demonstrates that the 24 participating members honored their commitments of contribution to the fund guaranteed by Russian assets. And it injects concrete liquidity into a Ukrainian economy that needs it immediately.

For Kyiv, these €3 billion make it possible to finance part of the salaries of civil servants, pensions, and health and education services that the Ukrainian state cannot finance alone in wartime. They also signal to international markets and private partners that Europe honors its commitments — which facilitates other flows of private financing toward Ukraine.

The pace of future disbursements

The €90 billion loan will be disbursed progressively over several years — the exact calendar depends on conditionalities tied to Ukrainian reforms and identified needs. The European Commission applies to Ukraine the same conditionality framework as for its other financing beneficiaries: milestones for institutional reform, governance, anti-corruption efforts, alignment with European standards. These conditions are legitimate — and Ukraine has generally met them better than its detractors predicted.

But the pace of disbursements raises a practical question: will the €3 billion of the first tranche be quickly followed by subsequent ones, or will the conditionality machinery create delays that deprive Ukraine of resources it needs during the most critical months? The history of EU relationships with its financing beneficiaries — notably in the Balkans, but also in Greece and Portugal after the 2010 crisis — shows that administrative delays can be very significant. This is a real risk that the Commission must manage with urgency proportional to the gravity of the situation.

The European Security Architecture in Transformation

Europe's rearmament: a revolution underway

The debate over Ukrainian accession and the €90 billion loan is part of a broader transformation of the European security architecture that has been underway since 2022. Germany, under Merz, has massively increased its defense budget — finally exceeding the 2% of GDP required by NATO, with a Sondervermögen (special fund) of €100 billion dedicated to modernizing the Bundeswehr. France has advanced its military programming law. Poland is devoting 4% of its GDP to defense — a NATO record. The Baltic states are rearming at full speed.

This transformation is irreversible. The war in Ukraine has definitively buried the European illusion that an aggressive power could be appeased by trade and diplomacy. It has forced a generation of European leaders to look reality in the face: security has a cost, and that cost cannot be indefinitely subcontracted to the United States. Ukraine is the catalyst for this transformation. It deserves to be its institutional beneficiary as well.

Ukraine in the future European defense architecture

The question of integrating Ukraine into the future European defense architecture is distinct from the question of EU or NATO accession, but linked to it. The Ukrainian defense industry — which has proven its capacity for innovation and adaptation under extraordinarily difficult conditions — is a strategic asset for Europe. Ukrainian drones, electronic warfare systems, and long-range missiles developed under the pressure of war are technologies that Europe has an interest in integrating into its own defense systems.

Defense industry partnerships between European and Ukrainian companies are already underway. But their scope is still limited by regulatory obstacles, questions of technology transfers, and uncertainties about Ukraine's final status in the European institutional architecture. Clarifying that status — including through the accession path — would resolve these obstacles and allow a far deeper and more mutually beneficial defense industrial integration.

Zelensky's Role: Between Diplomacy and Resolve

A leader who refuses the fold-out chair

Zelensky's response to the Merz proposal reveals something important about his leadership. After more than four years of war, after surviving assassination attempts, after maintaining the political cohesion of his country under extraordinary conditions, Zelensky is not in a position of weakness. He negotiates from the posture of someone who knows what his country has achieved, what it has sacrificed, and what it deserves in return. Refusing a half-member status is not arrogance. It is dignity.

This firmness is also a strategy. By rejecting associate status, Zelensky forces Europe to remain in the discomfort of its own ambivalence — unable to off-load the question of accession onto an intermediate category that would allow it to temporize indefinitely. He keeps the pressure on for a clear answer. That is adult diplomacy — and it is exactly what the moment demands.

Kyiv's credibility on reforms

It is important to note that Zelensky's rejection of associate status does not mean rejecting reforms or alignment with European standards. On the contrary, Ukraine has made remarkable progress on institutional reforms since 2022: judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts (with progress documented by Transparency International), legislative alignment with the EU's acquis communautaire, strengthening of the independence of institutions. These reforms in the context of total war are extraordinary — they testify to a genuine political will to join the EU, not as an economic opportunity but as a civilizational choice.

Zelensky can therefore maintain a coherent dual message: "We are reforming and meeting the conditions for accession. And precisely because we are reforming, we refuse a second-tier status. Give us membership, not the fold-out chair." That is a solid, defensible position — one that deserves the support of European partners who sincerely defend the values they preach.

The German Position: Merz Between Generosity and Prudence

Germany as the pivot of European policy on Ukraine

Merz's Germany occupies a central position in this debate. Europe's largest economy, the main contributor to the €90 billion loan, the main provider of military and financial support in Europe — its role in Ukraine's destiny is decisive. The transformation of German policy toward Ukraine since 2022 is remarkable: from a hesitant Germany bound to Russia by Nordstream and decades of illusions about Wandel durch Handel (change through trade), it has become one of the pillars of Western support for Kyiv.

But this transformation has its limits. Merz is a pragmatist — not an idealist. His support for Ukraine is real, but it is framed by internal political calculations (a German public opinion monitoring the costs of the war) and external ones (managing relations with more hesitant member states). His associate status proposal fits within this pragmatism: finding something that satisfies Kyiv sufficiently without forcing a consensus on full membership that some members will not accept.

The Merz–Zelensky dialogue as a microcosm

The exchange between Merz and Zelensky over associate status is a microcosm of the fundamental tension in the Europe–Ukraine relationship. On one side, a Europe that wants to support Ukraine but is not ready for all the implications of that commitment. On the other, a Ukraine that wants to enter Europe fully but does not want half of Europe. This tension is not soluble in the short term — it will persist until the end of the war, and probably beyond.

What can change is the quality of the dialogue. Instead of a Europe that proposes institutional solutions it did not consult Kyiv about, a sincere dialogue is needed where Ukraine is involved in designing the solutions that concern it. Zelensky did not reject the principle of progressive integration — he rejected a specific proposal that seemed inferior to what Ukraine deserves. The door is not closed. It is poorly framed.

The Balkans as Model and Warning

Twenty years of waiting in the Balkans

There is a nearby model of what the Merz proposal could produce if adopted: the Western Balkans. Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo — all have been accession candidates for years, some for more than twenty years. The accession process in the Balkans has been so slow, so fragmented, so conditional that some experts speak of "enlargement fatigue" — on both the candidates' side and the EU's.

The result of this slowness has been an opening for other powers. Russia, China, and Turkey have all strengthened their influence in the Balkans while Europe prevaricated on accession. Serbia in particular plays several tables at once — maintaining close ties with Moscow and Beijing while formally continuing its EU accession process. European indecision has created exactly the kind of grey zone it sought to avoid. Ukraine must not reproduce this model.

The urgency of clarity

Europe has a historic window to integrate Ukraine in a way that will positively and durably transform the architecture of the continent. This window is not unlimited. If the Ukrainian accession process becomes as slow and fragmented as the Balkan one, post-war Ukraine will find itself in an unstable grey zone — neither fully in the EU, nor at lasting peace with Russia. That scenario is the worst possible: it would create a chronically destabilized Ukraine on Europe's doorstep, a permanent terrain of geopolitical competition between great powers.

Clarity — a date, explicit and reasonable conditions, a clear political commitment from the most important European capitals — is the only way to prevent this scenario. It is not only good for Ukraine. It is indispensable for the long-term security and coherence of the European Union itself.

What the Editorial Demands: A Clear Position

The position this editorial defends

This editorial has a position. It is as follows: the €90 billion loan is a courageous and necessary decision that Europe must honor fully and rapidly. The associate status proposed by Merz is an understandable but insufficient idea if it replaces the accession commitment — it is only acceptable if it comes with a clear date and precise calendar for full post-war membership. Zelensky's rejection of associate status without voting rights is legitimate and deserves the respect of his European allies.

Europe must choose. Not between supporting Ukraine and not supporting it — that choice is already made. But between structural support that integrates Ukraine durably into its institutions, and conditional and reversible support that leaves Ukraine in perpetual ambiguity. The first option is more costly in the short term. The second is catastrophic in the long term. This is not difficult to choose — if one looks at the numbers, history, and values with the same honesty.

The call to European leaders

To the European leaders who still hesitate on Ukrainian accession: look at the numbers. €200 billion already given. €90 billion more loaned. Millions of refugees welcomed. Ukrainian soldiers trained on European soil. If Europe was ready for all those commitments, it can be ready for accession. It already is in practice. What it lacks is only the courage to say it clearly, with a timeline, transparent conditions, and the political will to respect them.

History will judge this generation of European leaders on this moment. Not on the generosity of their announcements — the announcements have been numerous and impressive. But on the coherence between their words and their institutional acts. Giving money and refusing belonging is funding without committing. And funding without committing is exactly what democracies do when they lack conviction.

Conclusion: Europe at the Threshold of a Historic Decision

The moment when words no longer suffice

The €90 billion loan, the associate status proposal, Zelensky's refusal, the first €3 billion disbursement — all of this says one simple thing: Europe is at the threshold of a decision it can no longer defer indefinitely. The war in Ukraine is not an external event affecting Europe from the outside. It is taking place in Europe, it involves Europe, it concerns the future of Europe. To pretend one can fund this war without drawing its institutional consequences is to deceive oneself.

European integration has never been linear. It has always been driven by successive crises — each crisis forcing an advance that ordinary deliberations would not have produced. The Ukrainian crisis is the greatest European security crisis since 1945. It can — if Europe chooses to make it so — be the greatest advance in European integration since the creation of the euro. The history of institutions is made in these moments. And this moment is now.

What Ukraine awaits and what Europe must offer

Ukraine does not expect Europe to solve all its problems or take over its future. It expects Europe to honor the implicit commitment made since 2014 — when Ukraine chose Europe over Russia, at the cost of the Maidan, at the cost of Crimea, at the cost of war. That commitment cannot be reduced to checks, however large. It must translate into belonging — real, full, with all the rights and all the responsibilities that implies.

The Merz associate status proposal is an imperfect attempt to answer that expectation. The Zelensky rejection is the legitimate response of a people who will not settle for imperfect. This dialogue, uncomfortable but necessary, is the signal Europe must hear and answer with ambition. Not with creative institutional formulas. With a clear political decision: Ukraine is European, it will become a member, and we work now to make that accession possible as soon as possible after the war.

Final Look: The Next Two Years Will Be Decisive

The tightening calendar

The next two years — 2026–2027 — will likely be decisive for Ukraine's institutional future. The €90 billion loan was approved through 2027. The next electoral cycle in several key EU member states could shift political balances. The trajectory of the war itself — toward an armistice, escalation, or stagnation — will determine the conditions under which Ukraine approaches accession negotiations. And the rotating EU presidencies in 2026 and 2027 will offer windows to advance the dossier if the political will is there.

These two years cannot be lost in debates over intermediate institutional categories. They must be used to lay the foundations of an accession that, when it comes, will be solid, legitimate, and beneficial to both parties. That demands preparation, transparency, and coherence — and above all, abandonment of the comfortable ambiguity that has for too long served as European policy toward Ukraine.

The verdict of history

History is sometimes unjust. It forgets sacrifices, magnifies gestures, erases nuances. But on the great institutional decisions of crisis periods, it is generally clear-eyed. It will remember who funded Ukraine when it was necessary. It will also remember who delayed its integration when it was possible. These two memories will coexist. And it is in their balance that the judgment on this generation of European leaders will be rendered.

The €90 billion loan is to Europe's credit. The proposal for associate status without voting rights is to its debit. The truth of this moment lies in this tension — and its resolution depends on decisions that can still be made differently. That is why editorials exist: not to record what has happened, but to influence what can still happen. Europe has a choice. It must make it with the full awareness of what that choice represents.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

This editorial is based on verifiable public sources, cited in the Sources section. I have no direct contact with the governments concerned or with European institutions. All financial and political data cited come from reference journalistic and institutional sources. My analysis is that of an independent columnist who explicitly supports Ukraine's accession to the European Union and considers that Ukraine is fighting for values that Europe must defend. This editorial position is stated, transparent, and does not affect the factual rigor of this text — all facts cited are corroborated by the sources listed.

Sources

Primary sources

Euronews — Merz proposes associate EU membership for Ukraine with mutual assistance — May 21, 2026

Deutsche Welle — Merz proposes associate EU membership for Ukraine — May 21, 2026

Euronews — Zelensky rebuffs Merz proposal, says Ukraine deserves full EU membership — May 23, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Zelensky responds to Merz: Ukraine has been defending Europe fully and has to have right to vote in EU — May 24, 2026

Secondary sources

NBC News — EU leaders agree 90 billion euro loan for Ukraine — December 19, 2025

deutschland.de — EU secures Ukraine funding until 2027 — December 19, 2025

RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine will not become full EU member during the war — June 19, 2026

ABC News — EU releases 3 billion euro loan package for Ukraine — June 26, 2026