EDITORIAL: China Secretly Trains Russian Soldiers in NRBC Warfare — The West Must Act

Introduction: the veil lifts on a very real Sino-Russian military alliance

A Reuters scoop that changes the geopolitical equation

On July 1, 2026, Reuters published an exclusive investigation that sent shockwaves through Western governments: the clandestine military training of Russian forces by the Chinese military, first revealed in May 2026, had been personally approved by Putin's defense minister, Andrei Belousov, and directly involved at least four Russian and Chinese generals. In November 2025, approximately 200 Russian soldiers had completed a three-week training course in Beijing focused on radiological, chemical, and biological protection — NRBC defense. This is not a façade partnership. It is combat training in service of a war that China officially claims not to support.

For those who had followed the evolution of the Beijing-Moscow axis since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this revelation is not a total surprise. But it crosses a major qualitative threshold: for the first time, internal documents, signed agreements, and the presence of senior generals confirm that China is an active participant in the Russian war effort — not a neutral bystander, not a diplomatic mediator, but a decisive enabler. That is the term used by a European official quoted by Reuters, and it deserves to be engraved in the memory of Western decision-makers.

The documents: what Reuters revealed about the Sino-Russian agreement

A decree signed by Belousov in August 2025

According to Reuters sources — two European officials and documents reviewed by the agency — the training rested on a bilateral agreement signed July 2, 2025, whose Russian and Chinese signatories were respectively Major General Rustam Khusainov and Senior Colonel Sun Dayun. This agreement provided for two-way training — Russian soldiers in China and Chinese soldiers in Russia — with an explicit clause prohibiting any media coverage in either country and any disclosure to third parties. The determination to operate in secrecy is thus written into the text of the agreement itself. This is not a partnership anyone claims credit for.

The November 2025 training in Beijing was overseen by two senior figures: on the Russian side, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, deputy commander-in-chief of Russian ground forces — a very senior officer directly involved in operations in Ukraine; on the Chinese side, Major General Li Jinsun, director of the People's Liberation Army's Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense. The presence of these two men in the same program underscores the strategic importance both regimes attached to this cooperation.

What you learn in Beijing in three weeks

Training reports reviewed by Reuters describe sessions covering chemical reconnaissance, radiological reconnaissance, protection of ventilation systems against contamination, and operation of NRBC defense simulators. Russian soldiers were photographed listening to Chinese instructors in front of nuclear reactor models. Other reports mention training sessions in Nanjing on improvised explosive devices, demining, and unexploded ordnance clearance.

These training programs are not inconsequential in the Ukrainian context. The war in Ukraine has produced massive contamination of territory by landmines and unexploded ordnance. NRBC skills, long neglected in a Russian army suffering from deep institutional decay, represent an area where Chinese training can have direct military value. A report by a Russian officer cited by Reuters candidly noted, however, that Chinese instructors "lacked combat experience" — an admission that Chinese forces have not had war as a forge.

The generals involved: mapping who does what

Muradov: the deputy commander-in-chief leading the delegation

The presence of Colonel General Rustam Muradov at the head of the Russian delegation is the strongest signal of the importance attached to this cooperation. Muradov is not a military training bureaucrat — he is the deputy commander-in-chief of Russian ground forces, a man directly involved in planning and executing operations in Ukraine. His presence in Beijing to oversee NRBC training means this cooperation is considered strategically relevant to the ongoing war effort — not for some hypothetical future war.

Russian Major General Vitaly Gerasimov (not to be confused with Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov) also attended a course in Bengbu, in Anhui Province. These provincial training sessions, far from diplomatic spotlights, illustrate the depth of the cooperation: this is not a showcase diplomatic program; it is an operational training program distributed across multiple Chinese military facilities.

Li Jinsun: the director of the PLA NRBC academy

On the Chinese side, the presence of Major General Li Jinsun — director of the PLA's Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense — at the opening of one of the courses is particularly revealing. This academy is China's principal institution for NRBC warfare training. The fact that a general of this stature presided over the opening ceremony for a program training Russian soldiers demonstrates that the decision to cooperate did not originate at intermediate levels — it was validated at the top of the military hierarchy.

These generals do not act on their own initiative. In China, where the Communist Party controls the People's Liberation Army directly under the authority of President Xi Jinping, cooperation of this nature can only exist with the approval of the highest level of power. The question of Beijing's responsibility for this cooperation therefore admits no ambiguity.

The EU's response: Kallas sounds the alarm on June 15

Brussels's confirmation and its implications

On June 15, 2026, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas declared that Brussels had confirmed through its own channels that the training had indeed taken place. This statement is important for several reasons. First, it indicates that European intelligence services — working both individually and collectively — had access to independent information corroborating Reuters' findings. Second, Kallas's decision to publicly confirm this information is a deliberate political act: it signals to Beijing that the EU has seen what is happening and will draw consequences from it.

Kallas added that the EU was now assessing the implications of these revelations. This assessment, at the time of writing, was still under way. But a Brussels official quoted by Reuters had been particularly direct: the EU needed to stop viewing China primarily through an economic lens and acknowledge its role as a "decisive enabler" of the war in Ukraine. This is a major conceptual break from the way Brussels had traditionally framed its relationship with Beijing — as commercial partner, systemic competitor, and rival all at once.

The EU and existing Chinese sanctions

The European Union had already, before these revelations, imposed sanctions on Chinese companies suspected of supporting the Russian war effort — notably manufacturers of dual-use electronic components used in Russian missiles and drones. These sanctions had prompted diplomatic protests from China but produced little concrete impact on trade flows. The revelation of direct military training adds a qualitatively different dimension: this is no longer about electronic components — it is about soldiers.

The question now facing Brussels is how to calibrate its response. Sweeping economic sanctions on China would carry considerable economic costs for European economies — China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner. But failing to respond substantively would signal that Sino-Russian military cooperation can continue with impunity, in contempt of the rules of the international order.

Beijing's response: denial and rhetorical counter-offensive

"Completely unfounded" — China's official denial

Beijing's official response to the revelations from Reuters and Kallas followed a well-worn script. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the allegations were "completely unfounded" and that China's position on the Ukrainian crisis "had remained consistent."Beijing called Kallas's remarks "pure slander." This is the language of systematic denial that characterizes Chinese public diplomacy when faced with accusations — neither a documented rebuttal nor an implicit confirmation, but a categorical refutation combined with a counter-accusation of bad faith.

This denial is all the more untenable because Reuters published documents, names, dates, and signatures. This is not an anonymous allegation — it is a dossier. Faced with a dossier, political denial may work in the short term at diplomatic forums, but it does not withstand scrutiny by international security experts who now have documentary evidence of the cooperation.

China, self-proclaimed peace mediator

Beijing continues to officially present itself as a potential peace mediator in the Ukrainian conflict. This posture — maintained partly through a 12-point "peace plan" published in 2023 that neither Ukraine nor the West took seriously — has become difficult to sustain in the face of evidence of direct military cooperation. A credible mediator does not secretly train soldiers for one of the parties to the conflict while ensuring no media traces are left.

This contradiction between the diplomatic rhetoric and the military actions is precisely what Western capitals must point to persistently. Beijing cannot simultaneously be a good-faith mediator and a military facilitator for Russia. That choice is theirs to make. But the consequences of that choice must also be theirs — and they must be made visible, tangible, and costly.

Moscow's response: a revealing non-sequitur

Kartapolov: "complete nonsense"

On the Russian side, the reaction was even more inept than the Chinese denial. Deputy Andrei Kartapolov, chairman of the Russian parliament's defense committee, told RTVI that the training report was "complete nonsense" and that the Russian army had "nothing to learn from China." This statement is doubly revealing: first, it carries the mark of wounded pride from a power that dislikes admitting dependence on another. Second, it does not formally deny the training took place — it merely asserts it would be useless.

This nuance did not escape analysts. If the training had not occurred, the obvious response would have been to deny the facts. Instead, Kartapolov denied its utility. This semantic shift resembles an implicit confirmation more than a solid rebuttal. The Russian and Chinese defense ministries themselves declined to comment — that eloquent silence completing the picture.

Russian logic: necessary partners despite the humiliation

Russia's position in this cooperation is paradoxical. Moscow, which sees itself as a major military power, must accept receiving training from China — a country with which it has historically maintained a relationship marked by suspicion, even hostility. Kartapolov's assertion that Russia has "nothing to learn" from China betrays precisely this discomfort. But the pressure of the war, the degradation of Russian forces after four years of high-intensity conflict, and capability gaps in the NRBC domain have made this cooperation necessary in the eyes of Belousov's ministry.

This is a silent humiliation that Putin must manage internally. A regime that built its legitimacy on Russian military power and national pride — repeatedly insisting that Russia is the second army in the world — is in an uncomfortable position when it must send its officers abroad to be trained by an Asian power on basic protection skills.

Sino-Russian military cooperation in its global context

A Beijing-Moscow axis that extends beyond Ukraine

The NRBC training is only the visible tip of an iceberg of Sino-Russian military cooperation that has accelerated since 2022. The two countries have intensified their joint military exercises — notably strategic air patrols with nuclear bombers in the Western Pacific and over the Sea of Japan. They have deepened cooperation in reconnaissance satellites, in navigation using GLONASS and BeiDou respectively, and in certain sectors of missile defense.

This strategic convergence is not a formal alliance — both countries officially maintain they are not allies. But it produces concrete effects that increasingly resemble a functional alliance: coordination of diplomatic operations in international forums, synchronization of rhetoric on "multipolarity" and the decline of American hegemony, and now direct military cooperation on combat capabilities.

North Korea and Iran complete the picture

Sino-Russian cooperation fits within a broader dynamic that some analysts describe as an "axis of autocrats."North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery shells and, according to Western assessments, soldiers to fight in Ukraine — receiving in return oil, technology, and diplomatic protection in international forums. Iran supplied the designs for Shahed drones and components essential to Russian drone production.

These four actors — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea — collectively represent a structural challenge to the liberal international order built since the end of World War II. Ukraine is the first battlefield of this systemic confrontation. How the West responds to this Chinese revelation will partly determine whether other confrontations follow elsewhere in the world.

What this means for the war in Ukraine

Better NRBC-trained Russian soldiers: a concrete threat

The direct military value of the NRBC training provided by China for operations in Ukraine is real but must be nuanced. In Ukraine, the war is fought primarily through infantry combat, artillery, drones, and air defense — not large-scale chemical or biological warfare. NRBC defense training does, however, allow Russian forces to better protect themselves in contaminated environments, to operate more effectively in industrial zones hit by explosions releasing chemical substances, and to be theoretically better prepared should escalation toward unconventional weapons occur.

This last point is the most concerning. Putin's nuclear rhetoric, the chemical capabilities Russia has historically used — notably against Alexei Navalny and other opponents — and the NRBC training received from China combine to sketch an escalation profile that NATO planners cannot ignore.

Beijing's military assistance: below the lethal threshold, for now

Until the Reuters report, China had carefully kept its support for Russia below a "lethal threshold" — meaning it was not supplying weapons directly used to kill Ukrainians. It provided dual-use electronic components, dual-purpose technologies, financing through unsanctioned banks, and commercial flows that offset the effects of Western sanctions. The NRBC training comes dangerously close to that threshold: training soldiers who will fight in Ukraine is a direct contribution to Russian combat capability even without supplying weapons.

This line that Beijing has been careful to maintain — to avoid massive economic sanctions from the West — is becoming increasingly difficult to hold. And if China continues advancing along this continuum of military support without suffering economic consequences, the temptation to cross the lethal threshold will grow over time.

What the West must do now

Sanction entities involved in military training

The West's response to this revelation must be proportionate to the gravity of the facts. Targeted sanctions on the Chinese military entities directly involved — notably the Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense and its leadership — would be a first clear signal. These sanctions would have limited impact since these entities have no assets in the West, but they would establish an important precedent and send a message to entities that do have economic ties with the West and might be tempted to participate in similar military cooperation.

The second indispensable measure is to strengthen export control mechanisms on dual-use technologies likely to benefit Sino-Russian military cooperation. The United States has already established an extensive framework, but European allies still have gaps that Beijing continues to exploit through third countries and shell companies.

Publicly redefining Beijing's neutrality as a political lie

The most important measure may be symbolic but is politically crucial: Western leaders must stop maintaining the myth of Chinese neutrality in their public communications. Every time a Western leader says "we hope China will play a constructive role" or "we invite China to use its influence," they implicitly validate the mediator image Beijing seeks to project. After the revelations of July 1, 2026, this rhetoric is no longer tenable. Kaja Kallas showed the way by calling China a "decisive enabler." This terminology must be adopted by all NATO and EU leaders.

This change of language is not trivial. In international diplomacy, words define frameworks for action. By maintaining the myth of Chinese neutrality, the West offered Beijing diplomatic cover it used extensively to deepen its cooperation with Moscow. It is time to withdraw that cover.

Implications for Taiwan and Indo-Pacific security

What Sino-Russian cooperation tells Washington's Asian allies

Sino-Russian military cooperation has implications that extend well beyond the European theater. For America's Asian allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and of course Taiwan — it illustrates that China is prepared to violate international norms by supporting a war of aggression, as long as the cost remains bearable. This lesson feeds directly into Beijing's calculations on Taiwan: if the West tolerates Sino-Russian military cooperation over Ukraine without a substantive response, why would it expect a different response in the face of Chinese military action against Taiwan?

Asian allies have paid close attention to the Reuters revelation. Japan, which shares with Ukraine the vulnerability of being a potential target for an authoritarian neighbor with irredentist ambitions, reacted with particular concern. South Korea, which must simultaneously manage North Korean provocations and the Sino-Russian rapprochement, has also intensified consultations with its American and European allies.

The G7 and aligning positions

The G7 summit in France, held in late June 2026, was precisely the occasion for major democracies to align their positions on China's role in the war in Ukraine. The NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7-8, 2026, must go further: adopt common language on China as a facilitator of Russian aggression, and define coordination mechanisms for a collective response. This is not a declaration of war on Beijing. It is clarity — and clarity is the beginning of deterrence.

The revelation of July 1, 2026 is a pivotal moment. It offers democracies the opportunity to adjust their assessment of China before the situation deteriorates further. Missing this opportunity would be a strategic error whose consequences will be felt far beyond Ukraine and far beyond this decade.

The question of economic sanctions: weighing the cost of inaction

Trade versus security: a false dilemma

The argument invoked against severely sanctioning China is economic: China is the European Union's second-largest trading partner, and sweeping sanctions would cost hundreds of billions of euros for European economies already under stress. This argument is real but incomplete. It compares the certain short-term cost of sanctions against the uncertain long-term cost of inaction — an asymmetry that systematically favors cautious decision-makers.

The cost of inaction is nonetheless considerable: if China strengthens Russian military capability to the point where Russia wins in Ukraine, the economic consequences for Europe — massive rearmament, destabilization of eastern borders, refugee flows, humanitarian costs — would far exceed the cost of commercial sanctions against Beijing. This is a strategic calculation that European economists struggle to integrate because it requires reasoning over decades, not quarters.

Targeted and graduated sanctions: the realistic path

The realistic path is not to choose between trade and security but to design targeted and graduated sanctions that raise the cost of Sino-Russian military cooperation without triggering a catastrophic economic decoupling. This means precise sanctions on entities and individuals involved in military cooperation, tightened restrictions on dual-use technologies, and international coordination to ensure these sanctions are not circumvented through third countries.

China, which has considerable economic interests to preserve with the West, is sensitive to this targeted pressure. It is not immune to economic costs. But it will only absorb them if the West imposes them with consistency and unity — not if each member state makes its own short-term calculations to protect its particular commercial interests.

What Zelensky has said about China

A persistent denunciation, largely unheeded

President Zelensky has spent months denouncing Chinese support for Russia. He has repeatedly called on Beijing to stop supplying Moscow with the electronic components and technologies that fuel drone and missile production. These appeals had little resonance in the official statements of European governments, which preferred to maintain their commercial relationships with China rather than follow a wartime head of state into diplomatically uncomfortable confrontations.

The revelation of NRBC training — documented, signed, dated — changes the equation. It no longer leaves Europe and its allies the ability to pretend that Chinese support for Russia is ambiguous, indirect, or below the threshold of the unacceptable. It is now direct, military, approved at the top of the hierarchy, and linked to a war raging a few hundred kilometers from the European Union's eastern borders.

Solidarity with Kyiv as a strategic act

Supporting Zelensky and Ukraine in this context is not only a moral act — it is a strategic act. It reminds China, North Korea, Iran, and all the authoritarian regimes watching closely that military aggression has a cost, that democracies resist, and that the rules-based international order can survive attempts to destroy it. If this lesson registers in Beijing's calculations before it makes an irreversible decision about Taiwan, it may have saved lives far beyond the European continent.

The revelation of July 1, 2026 is a test. A test of the political will of the West to name its enemies clearly, to defend its values coherently, and to act accordingly. Zelensky and Ukraine have done their part. They have held for more than four years against military aggression backed by three powers that wish them no good. It is now time for the West to rise to the moment.

The editorial as political act: why write this text now

Complacency is no longer an option

I am writing this editorial on July 1, 2026, the very day Reuters publishes its investigation. I write it because I believe that Western complacency toward the growing power of the Sino-Russian axis has already cost Ukraine too much. Every month the West hesitated to name China clearly was another month in which Beijing could deepen its cooperation with Moscow without suffering any consequences. This complacency is not diplomatic wisdom. It is cowardice dressed up as pragmatism.

The facts revealed today by Reuters deserve a response proportionate to their gravity. Not declarations of concern, not discreet bilateral consultations, not reports evaluated internally — but visible acts, clear public positions, and tangible costs for the parties involved. That is what the situation demands. That is what history will remember if the West chooses to rise to this moment.

What I ask of those who will read this editorial

To you reading these lines — citizens, elected officials, civil servants, journalists — I ask this: do not let this revelation drown in the flood of July news. Do not treat it as yet another geopolitical news item in a saturated news cycle. Understand what it means: China is actively training Putin's soldiers. This is not geopolitical abstraction. These are men who will return to Ukrainian battlefields better prepared to operate in contaminated environments, better prepared for the war Putin continues to wage against a people who simply want to live free.

Ukraine resists. It intercepts its 130 drones each night, strikes the hangars at Saky, holds the line in the Donbas. It deserves the West to be as courageous, as clear, and as resolute in its meeting rooms as Ukrainian soldiers are in their trenches.

The response democracies must give to the July 1 revelation

A diplomacy of truth against a diplomacy of lies

The most urgent response that Western democracies must give to the Reuters revelation is not a military response. It is a response of transparency. Publish intelligence assessments, share documents with allies, name the entities involved — that undoes the work of concealment that China and Russia invested in this agreement. Every light cast on this cooperation is a cost for the two regimes that wanted it kept secret.

This strategic transparency must be coordinated. If each country publishes its information independently, the impact is diluted. If the 27 EU members, NATO allies, and Pacific partners — Japan, Australia, South Korea — align their communications on a common narrative, the message sent to Beijing will carry entirely different weight. This is the kind of coordination that distinguishes a functional alliance from a collection of individual foreign policies.

Strengthening support for Ukraine as a direct response

The most direct response to Sino-Russian cooperation is to increase military and economic support for Ukraine. If China strengthens Russian military capabilities, the logical response is to strengthen Ukrainian capabilities in proportion. The United Kingdom had announced in June 2026 a package of £752 million including 150,000 drones and more than 350 missiles and radars. That is the right direction. The other major allies — notably Germany, France, and the United States — must now follow with comparable commitments.

This escalation in support is not a military escalation toward Russia. It is a proportionate response to the escalation of support that China is providing to Moscow. If the West refuses to increase its assistance when China increases its own, the balance will inevitably tilt in Russia's favor — not because Russia is stronger, but because the West will have chosen to lose.

Conclusion: July 1, 2026, a day that must not pass unnoticed

What Reuters changed

The publication of the Reuters investigation on July 1, 2026 marks a before and after in the public understanding of China's role in the war in Ukraine. Before: we knew China was helping Russia economically, providing components, absorbing Russian exports that the West had sanctioned. After: we know China is militarily training Russian soldiers, that this training was approved by a dated ministerial decree, and that senior generals from both countries participated directly.

This difference of degree is a difference of nature. And it calls for a qualitatively different response from the West. Not the usual "we express our concerns" — but a response that means something to the architects of this cooperation, to Ukrainian soldiers, and to the regimes watching whether the West still has the will to defend the order it built.

The war is not lost. Cowardice can be.

Ukraine is not losing this war. On the battlefields of the Donbas, in the night skies over Kyiv, in the hangars of Saky, in Russian refineries struck by drones — everywhere, the signals are those of a resistance that holds. The Russian advance has slowed by 77% in less than a year. Air defenses intercept more than 86% of nighttime attacks. And Zelensky keeps acting, striking, proposing.

What can make the West lose this war is not Russia or China. It is cowardice. The cowardice of not naming things clearly. The cowardice of preferring good commercial relations over truth. The cowardice of letting Ukrainian soldiers die while diplomats debate what tone to adopt with Beijing. That cowardice, we can choose. But if we choose it, we cannot claim we did not know.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My openly stated biases

This editorial is deliberately partial. I am pro-Ukraine, pro-Western democracies, and deeply suspicious of the authoritarian regimes represented by Xi Jinping's China, Putin's Russia, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Kim Jong-un's North Korea. I believe these regimes represent existential threats to the liberal international order and democratic values. These positions inform my treatment of the facts and my tone.

What I do not know and my method

I do not know whether the targeted sanctions I recommend would produce the desired effects on Chinese behavior. I do not know whether the West has the political will to implement them coherently. I also do not know whether the 200 Russian soldiers trained in Beijing in November 2025 have already returned to Ukraine. What I do know is that the facts reported by Reuters are documented, corroborated by European officials, and indirectly confirmed by Kaja Kallas. My analysis starts from these facts and argues for conclusions I justify explicitly.

Sources

Primary sources

Reuters — EXCLUSIVE: Russia approved secret China military training at top level — July 1, 2026

China Daily — Official Chinese position on the Ukrainian crisis — June 25, 2026

Euromaidan Press — China secretly trained 200 Russian troops in 2025 — May 19, 2026

Secondary sources

Foreign Policy — Geopolitical analyses on Sino-Russian cooperation — July 2026

The Guardian — International coverage of the war in Ukraine — July 2026

Al Jazeera — International reactions to the Reuters revelation — July 2026

Axios — Analysis of American foreign policy and China — July 2026

19FortyFive — Analysis of the military implications of Sino-Russian cooperation — July 2026