EDITORIAL: Hormuz reopened: why the West must not let its guard down

EDITORIAL: Hormuz reopened: why the West must not let its guard down

Introduction: a peace that looks like a calculation

Geneva, Islamabad, 60 days — a deal still fragile

For several weeks now, we have been told that the United States and Iran are negotiating. That a «roadmap» has been sketched for a final agreement on Iran's nuclear program, that 60 days will be needed to close the deal. That the Strait of Hormuz — the throat of the global economy — remains open, for now. That the talks in Switzerland produced a memorandum called the «Islamabad MoU», 14 points, mediation by Pakistan and Qatar, promises of $300 billion in reconstruction.

Allow me to be direct: this series of announcements is encouraging in form and deeply uncertain in substance. There is a difference between an agreement that holds and a diplomatic ceasefire dressed up as a victory. Iran has lied about its nuclear program for decades. The International Atomic Energy Agency has discovered undeclared sites, unreported enrichment, inspections circumvented. Why would this 2026 negotiation be any different from the previous ones?

What the roadmap says — and what remains vague

The agreement in principle reported by outlets including WWNO/NPR on June 21, 2026 includes concrete elements: a direct communication line on Hormuz to prevent incidents, a 60-day timeline for final negotiations, and mediation mechanisms through Pakistan and Qatar. The 14-point Islamabad MoU also calls for lifting the blockade and large-scale reconstruction.

What neither side has resolved is precisely what matters most: nuclear inspections. Al Jazeera reported on June 24, 2026 that the United States and Iran are «miles apart» on the inspections question. Rubio was clear: no tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran was equally clear on its nuclear sovereignty. The gap remains enormous.

Hormuz: the geography that holds the world hostage

21 million barrels per day — and the nations that depend on them

The Strait of Hormuz is the most strategically vital energy transit route on the planet. Roughly 21 million barrels of oil pass through it every day — nearly 20% of global oil consumption and approximately 30% of global LNG trade. The primary beneficiaries of this supply are Asia — China, Japan, South Korea, India — but also Europe, which still partially depends on Persian Gulf oil.

If Iran closes or even partially obstructs transit through Hormuz, the economic consequences are immediate and global. The price per barrel spikes — projections point to a potential rise to $150 to $200 in prolonged obstruction scenarios. Europe, still weakened by the energy crisis linked to Russia, would find itself under double pressure. China and Japan, cut off from rapid supply, could be forced into emergency diplomatic maneuvers.

Iran's strategic weapon: the permanent threat

Iran has always used the threat against Hormuz as a diplomatic lever. Military exercises, statements from the Revolutionary Guards, incidents with tankers in the Gulf — all signals reminding Western and Asian powers of their vulnerability. This lever is all the more effective because the alternatives to the Hormuz route — the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, Saudi Arabia's overland routes — have limited capacity and cannot absorb full flow in a closure scenario.

The statement by US Secretary of State Rubio — «no tolls in the strait» — is a red line drawn in red ink. It says the United States will not accept Iranian monetization of the strategic passage. It is a firm position. But the firmness of a statement does not solve a geographic and military problem. If Iran decides to challenge this red line, the American response will involve escalations that no one fully controls.

The dispute over inspections: the nuclear flashpoint

What Tehran accepts and what it refuses

The question of nuclear inspections is the Gordian knot of any negotiation with Iran. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands regular, unannounced access to all Iranian nuclear facilities — including military sites where nuclear activity has been suspected. Tehran has systematically restricted this access, expelled inspectors, and delayed visits until any trace of prohibited activity could be erased.

In the current talks reported by Al Jazeera and the Washington Times in June 2026, Iran is proposing inspections «within a mutually agreed framework» — a formulation that American negotiators and the IAEA read as an Iranian control mechanism over its own verification. The United States demands unannounced inspections covering all sites, including military facilities. Tehran refuses. That is where the 60 days risk falling short.

The enrichment level: the nuclear red line

Iran has enriched uranium to 60% — well beyond the 3.67% permitted under the 2015 agreement (JCPOA), and close to the 90% threshold required to manufacture a nuclear weapon. According to some analysts, Iran already possesses the knowledge and possibly the materials to assemble a weapon within weeks if the political decision were made. This compressed «breakout window» makes every negotiation extremely urgent — and concessions dangerous.

An agreement that would allow Iran to maintain its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% while benefiting from sanctions relief would be an agreement that rewards transgression. The international community — and above all Israel, which watches this file with existential anxiety — cannot accept that outcome. The parameters of an acceptable deal are narrow. The parameters Iran is willing to accept appear equally narrow, but in the opposite direction.

The Islamabad MoU: 14 points between hope and illusion

What the memorandum promises

The document called the «Islamabad MoU», reported by Ground News on June 23, 2026, covers 14 points across broad domains: the reopening of Hormuz as a free passage, the lifting of the blockade, a $300 billion reconstruction program for Iran, and mediation mechanisms involving Pakistan and Qatar. It is an ambitious document — perhaps too ambitious. Its implementation depends on political will from both sides that has not yet been demonstrated on the essential questions.

The $300 billion reconstruction promise implies the commitment of international private investors. Those investors will not go to Iran as long as primary sanctions are not lifted. Those sanctions will not be lifted as long as the nuclear program is not verifiably under control. And that program will not be controlled as long as inspections remain in dispute. The circular logic of this negotiation is a warning sign.

Qatar's and Pakistan's role: fragile mediators

Qatar has played a mediating role in numerous regional conflicts — between Hamas and Israel, between the United States and Iran, in crises across the Sahel. Its relationship with Tehran is functional but not free of tensions. Pakistan, sharing a long border with Iran, has direct economic interests in normalizing the situation. Both mediators carry real regional legitimacy, but their leverage over Iran is limited.

Mediators cannot substitute for a willingness by Iran to make real concessions on nuclear matters. If Tehran uses the 60 days to buy time — enriching further, consolidating its regional positions through Hezbollah and the Houthis, waiting to see how American midterm elections unfold — then mediation will have served Iranian interests without producing a lasting agreement.

Trump, Iran and the revisited deal of the century

The temptation of the grand Trumpian deal

Donald Trump has a particular fondness for spectacular grand deals — the deals that make headlines, that redefine relationships, that let him claim a diplomatic victory his predecessors never achieved. His tearing up of the JCPOA in 2018 during his first term, his policy of «maximum pressure» on Iran, and now this resumption of negotiations in 2026 all reflect an approach rooted in transactional intensity rather than strategic consistency.

The risk of an overly accommodating deal is real. If Trump perceives an opportunity to present a «historic deal» with Iran ahead of an important American political deadline, the temptation to make concessions on inspections or on the permitted enrichment level could override technical rigor. That is precisely what European partners and Israel fear most.

What the West must demand

The West's position in these negotiations must rest on non-negotiable requirements: unannounced inspections of all sites, reduction of the enriched uranium stockpile to near-zero levels, dismantling of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and verification mechanisms whose triggers are automatic — with no possibility of an Iranian veto. These conditions are not unreasonable maximalism. They are the minimum conditions for an agreement to carry real value.

If these conditions are not met, an agreement would be worse than no agreement: it would create the illusion that the Iranian nuclear problem has been resolved, enable sanctions relief, and give Tehran the resources to continue its program. This scenario played out partially with the 2015 JCPOA. The West must not repeat it.

Hormuz and Europe's energy security

The Russian lesson, applied to the Iranian case

Europe learned the hard way, in 2022, the cost of energy dependence on a hostile state. Dependence on Russian gas forced entire nations into impossible choices — supporting Ukraine while struggling to maintain their energy supplies. The lesson was absorbed, painfully, and Europe massively accelerated its energy diversification.

Hormuz security is the next lesson. If a crisis in the Persian Gulf — triggered by Iran, by an Iran-Israel escalation, or by a Houthi-related incident — were to disrupt oil transit, Europe would again be vulnerable. Investments in renewable energy, in American LNG, in electrical interconnections — all of this reduces dependence, but does not eliminate it.

The red line the West must draw

The West — United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia — must be united on an unambiguous message to Tehran: any obstruction of transit in the Strait of Hormuz, even partial, will be considered a major economic act of aggression and will trigger a collective response — diplomatic, economic, and if necessary military. This message must not be left to American rhetoric alone. It must be carried collectively by all nations that depend on free navigation in this strait.

The fact that an agreement is being negotiated does not suspend the need for this clarity. On the contrary: it is precisely when a deal seems possible that red lines must be drawn most clearly. Firmness, in a negotiation, is not the absence of a willingness to compromise. It is the guarantee that any compromise rests on reality, not on hope.

Israel and the Iranian nuclear program: the silent actor in the negotiations

Israel's red line

Israel is the actor watching the US-Iran negotiations with the most existential anxiety. For Tel Aviv, a nuclear Iran is not a geopolitical abstraction — it is a declared threat to national survival. Iranian leaders have in the past made statements about the destruction of Israel that leave no ambiguity about their intentions. That is why every compromise in the nuclear negotiations is scrutinized with particular intensity by Israeli intelligence services.

Israel has in the past conducted clandestine operations to slow the Iranian nuclear program — centrifuge sabotage, eliminations of scientists. These operations had a delaying effect, but did not stop the program. Today, with Iran enriching at 60% and potentially weeks away from a weapons capability, the pressure on American negotiators to hold a firm line on inspections is all the more intense. Tel Aviv will not hesitate to act militarily if it believes negotiations are opening a window for Tehran.

Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran's regional posture

Parallel to the nuclear negotiations, Iran continues to maintain and strengthen its regional proxy networks. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria — all forces serving Iran's strategy of «resistance» and power projection without direct engagement. These networks have not been paused during the nuclear negotiations. They continue to operate, to arm themselves, to maintain constant pressure on American and Israeli interests in the region.

This duality — negotiating on the nuclear track while keeping proxies active — is characteristic of Iranian strategy. It allows Tehran to advance simultaneously on multiple fronts while maintaining a facade of good faith in the official negotiations. The West must insist that nuclear negotiations include discussions on Iranian regional behavior — not just on centrifuges.

Iran and Russia: a convergence that worries

Iranian drones in the Russian war

The delivery of Iranian Shahed drones to Russia for use in Ukraine is one of the most concrete pieces of evidence of the strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow. These drones — cheap, mass-produced — have been used by Russia for saturation strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. They illustrate how Iranian-Russian military cooperation translates directly into Ukrainian lives lost.

This military cooperation creates a bond of mutual dependence. Russia provides Iran with advanced military technologies, diplomatic protection at the Security Council, and a market for its exports. Iran provides Russia with affordable munitions and a demonstration of sanctions circumvention that Moscow seeks to replicate in other domains. Any nuclear negotiation that ignored this military dimension would be incomplete.

What a nuclear deal will not resolve

Even if the 60 days of negotiations were to produce a solid agreement on the nuclear program, the Iranian threat would not disappear. Tehran would continue to fund its proxies. The Revolutionary Guards would continue to operate regionally. Military cooperation with Russia would continue. A nuclear deal reduces one specific dimension of the Iranian danger — the existential dimension for Israel and potentially for the Persian Gulf. It does not resolve Iran's regional policy, which is a permanent source of destabilization.

The West must be honest with itself about this limit. A nuclear deal, even a good one, does not transform Iran into a responsible partner. It reduces a specific threat. The other threats — proxies, Hormuz, military cooperation with Russia, ballistic missiles — remain. And they require a distinct regional policy, more complex and longer to build than any agreement in 60 days.

Conclusion: is an imperfect deal better than no deal?

The paradox of the Iranian nuclear negotiation

The question the West has been asking since 2003 — since the beginning of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program — remains open: is an imperfect deal preferable to no deal? The honest answer is: it depends on the degree of imperfection. A deal that freezes the Iranian program at a verifiable enrichment level and allows for robust inspections — even without total dismantlement — is progress. A deal that gives Iran resources and respectability without real verification is a retreat disguised as progress.

The 60 days now opening are a window — uncertain, but real. If negotiators hold their line on inspections, if the international community maintains its cohesion, if Trump resists the temptation of the spectacular grand deal rather than the good deal, then something viable can emerge. If any one of these conditions fails, the result will be an illusion of stability more dangerous than open confrontation.

Why not to let your guard down

I close with this counsel — addressed to Western leaders as much as to the public: do not let your guard down. Negotiations with Iran have a history of broken promises, incomplete agreements, periods of détente followed by fresh surges of tension. That is not cynicism — it is memory. Hormuz may remain open. Negotiations may advance. But vigilance can never allow itself a pause.

The West has learned enough, in recent years, the cost of strategic naivety — toward Russia, toward China, toward energy dependencies. Applying that vigilance to the Iranian negotiation is not intransigence. It is wisdom earned at great cost.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My positions on Iran and the nuclear negotiations

I am Maxime Marquette, a geopolitics columnist. I am skeptical of the Iranian regime and its past diplomatic commitments. This position is grounded in the documented history of Iranian nuclear negotiations since 2003. I am not opposed to a deal — I am opposed to a bad deal presented as a victory. That distinction matters.

The information on the US-Iran negotiations comes from sources dated June 21 to 24, 2026: WWNO/NPR, Al Jazeera, Washington Times, Ground News. I do not have access to the full texts of the memoranda and I rely on journalistic accounts. The details of the 14 points of the Islamabad MoU are summarized from secondary sources.

What I do not know

I do not know the actual state of the Iranian nuclear program — IAEA data is partial and sometimes contested. I do not know whether Trump will make excessive concessions or hold a firm position. I acknowledge that respected nuclear negotiation experts believe a partial deal is better than no deal at all — and I cannot rule out that position.

My analysis of Iranian intentions is based on past and present behavior. It may be too pessimistic. The future will prove me right or wrong.

Sources

Primary sources

WWNO / NPR — US and Iran: 60-day roadmap for final deal + Hormuz communication line — June 21, 2026

Al Jazeera — US-Iran: disagreement on nuclear inspections and Hormuz after Swiss talks — June 24, 2026

Al Jazeera — What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on during the first day of talks — June 23, 2026

Ground News — Islamabad MoU: 14 points, $300B reconstruction, Hormuz reopening — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Washington Times — US and Iran offer different accounts on nuclear inspections — June 23, 2026

The Guardian — NATO leaders fear US support can no longer be relied upon — June 27, 2026