EDITORIAL: The FORGE Alliance — 54 nations against China's rare earth empire

February 2026: the launch of an economic counteroffensive

In February 2026, the United States launched FORGE — the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement — a coalition of 54 nations co-chaired by South Korea and supported by the European Union. The objective is as ambitious as the assessment that preceded it is brutal: China controls 90 percent of global rare earth refining capacity and 80 percent of tungsten refining. This structural dependency is no longer merely an economic problem — it is a first-order strategic vulnerability, exploitable at any time by Beijing as an economic coercion weapon.

Recent history has provided the proof. When China imposed export controls on critical elements like samarium, dysprosium, and lutetium, prices surged by up to 600 percent outside China. NdPr (neodymium-praseodymium), an essential component for permanent magnets used in electric motors and defense systems, climbed 37 percent in April 2026 to reach approximately $126 per kilogram — 2.4 times January 2026 levels. The dependency is quantified, documented, and now untenable.

More than $30 billion: the price of mineral freedom

To break this dependency, FORGE is mobilizing more than $30 billion in joint American-European financing. In June 2026, at the G7 Summit in Évian, the initiative was formalized at the G7 level with the finalization of a critical minerals crisis platform. The G7 objective is precise: reduce dependence on any non-G7 supplier to below 60 percent by 2030 for rare earths and permanent magnets, with a long-term target of 50 percent.

These figures do not emerge from thin air. They respond to a reality where more than 80 percent of European companies still depend on Chinese supply chains for rare earth components. Building an independent alternative supply chain takes between 20 and 30 years — but the geopolitical window for decisive action is only 12 to 18 months according to analysts. FORGE is the response to this emergency.

Invisible elements that drive 21st-century technology

The term "rare earths" is misleading: these 17 chemical elements are not particularly rare in the Earth's crust. What is rare is their concentration in exploitable deposits and, above all, the refining capacity to process them. Neodymium and praseodymium go into the manufacture of the most powerful permanent magnets in existence, present in every modern electric motor — from electric vehicles to wind turbines, from guided missiles to fighter jets.

Dysprosium and terbium are necessary for these magnets to retain their properties at high temperatures. Without them, NdFeB magnets — used in F-35s, military drones, and submarine motors — lose their effectiveness. China has imposed mandatory export licenses on magnets containing these elements, with processing delays of 10 to 16 weeks at MOFCOM. For a defense industry that plans on an annual basis, this is a potentially catastrophic bottleneck.

Tungsten, antimony, gadolinium: the arsenal of Chinese restrictions

Rare earths are not alone in Beijing's economic coercion arsenal. Tungsten — of which China refines 80 percent of global production — is indispensable for armor-piercing ammunition, industrial cutting tools, and plating. Antimony, critical for batteries and military semiconductors, is also subject to Chinese export controls. The complete mapping of Western dependencies on Chinese critical resources paints the portrait of a systemic vulnerability carefully maintained by Beijing for decades.

China's strategy is coherent and long-standing. Deng Xiaoping said in 1992: "The Middle East has its oil; China has its rare earths." Thirty years later, Beijing is converting this prophecy into concrete geopolitical leverage, at the precise moment when the energy transition and the revolution in autonomous defense systems make these resources more strategic than ever. FORGE is the West's response to a strategy that was never secret — but that the West took three decades to take seriously.

$12 billion for a national strategic reserve

At the heart of the American strategy within FORGE sits Project Vault: a $12 billion program financed by the American public export bank EXIM Bank to build a national strategic reserve of critical minerals. The objective is clear: ensure that American defense and energy industries are never held hostage by a sudden interruption of Chinese exports.

Project Vault complements a series of concrete investments. Since early 2026, 195 projects in the critical minerals and rare earths sectors have been announced, representing 64 billion euros ($74 billion) in investments. These projects cover the entire value chain — from extraction to refining, from magnet manufacturing to recycling. The objective is to rebuild, outside China, a complete supply chain for the most critical components of Western defense and energy transition.

Saudi Arabia and the new strategic actors

One of the most significant aspects of FORGE is its geographic scope. Among the 54 member nations, the presence of Saudi Arabia is particularly noteworthy. The Saudi Kingdom holds what some estimates put at $2.5 trillion in unmined mineral reserves. Riyadh has committed to a partnership with MP Materials and the Pentagon to build a rare earth refinery — an initiative that could transform Saudi Arabia into a major actor in the Western critical minerals supply chain.

This expansion toward Gulf producer countries represents a paradigm shift: FORGE is not merely an alliance of Western consumers seeking to diversify their suppliers. It is an economic architecture that repositions intermediate powers around an axis of strategic mineral cooperation, outside China's economic sphere of influence. The replacement of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) by FORGE marks this qualitative leap.

Tightening export controls as a response

Beijing's reaction to the emergence of FORGE and Western diversification initiatives was predictable: tighten export controls to penalize Western industries before they have had time to develop their own refining capabilities. Mandatory export licenses for magnets containing dysprosium and terbium remained in effect throughout 2026. In Japan, reports indicate zero shipments of terbium or dysprosium since November 2025, and only minimal shipments of yttrium oxide since December.

This strategy of preemptive contraction aims to create sufficient economic pressure to discourage investments in alternatives — or, failing that, to extract diplomatic concessions from dependent Western industrial partners. The G7 and its FORGE partners anticipated this maneuver: it is precisely why Project Vault, the 195 investment projects, and partnerships with alternative refiners like Australia and Canada are being implemented with heightened urgency.

Myanmar: the flaw in the diversification chain

Building an alternative to China collides with complex geopolitical realities. Myanmar, whose mining deposits supply roughly half of global heavy rare earth production, remains profoundly unstable following the military coup of 2021. The most important extraction zones are controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and other armed groups — making any Western investment in these zones extremely risky on political and security grounds.

This reality illustrates the complexity of rare earth diversification. It is not enough to find deposits outside China: those deposits must also be located in politically stable countries, accessible to Western investment, and possessing or able to develop refining capabilities. These conditions are not always met, which explains why the 20 to 30-year timeline to rebuild an independent chain is not an exaggeration.

More than 80 percent of European companies dependent on Beijing

In Europe, dependence on Chinese rare earths is particularly acute. More than 80 percent of European companies involved in strategic sectors — electric vehicles, wind power, defense, electronics — depend directly or indirectly on Chinese supply chains for rare earth components. This dependence is not only economic: it exposes Europe to supply disruption risks that could paralyze entire industrial sectors.

The European Commission responded to this challenge with the Critical Raw Materials Act, which came into force in 2024, setting legally binding diversification targets. But legislative objectives and real industrial capabilities do not automatically coincide. Building a rare earth refinery in Europe requires investments of billions of euros, years of construction, and the resolution of complex environmental issues related to rare earth chemical processing. The political urgency is there; the industrial reality takes time.

Concrete initiatives in 2026: a response accelerating

Despite these obstacles, 2026 is seeing concrete projects emerge outside China. In Australia, Iluka Resources secured an Australian government loan of AU$1.65 billion for its Eneabba refinery. In North America, Ucore produced NdPr oxide at 99.5 percent purity at its RapidSX demonstration plant in Kingston. Energy Fuels announced the acquisition of VAC for $1.9 billion, adding more than 1,000 customers and 400 patents to its critical minerals portfolio.

In the United States, the January 1, 2027 deadline for supplying the Department of Defense with rare earth magnets creates schedule pressure that accelerates investments. American companies know they have less than six months to secure alternative supply sources or face violations of Department of Defense procurement rules. This contractual urgency is a powerful catalyst for investments in the alternative chain.

Rare earths in Ukrainian drones and defense systems

The connection between FORGE and the war in Ukraine is not incidental. Ukrainian drones — of which the country plans to produce 5 to 6 million in 2026 — use permanent rare earth magnets in their motors and control systems. The HIMARS, ATACMS, and Patriot defense systems supplied by Western allies all incorporate rare earth components. The chain that runs from Chinese mines to Ukrainian weapons systems is direct — and its fragility is a real operational concern.

If China decided to use its export controls to interrupt the supply of critical components destined for weapons system production, Ukrainian defense capabilities could be affected over the medium term. This scenario is not hypothetical: Beijing has already shown its willingness to use rare earths as geopolitical leverage. FORGE aims to create supply chain resilience that protects Ukraine and its allies from this type of pressure.

The West cannot support Ukraine with weapon systems dependent on China

The contradiction is glaring. The West supplies weapons to Ukraine to counter the Russian invasion — an invasion that China supports diplomatically and economically, even if it avoids direct weapons deliveries. But the components of these Western weapons are partly manufactured from rare earths supplied by China. This structural dependency ultimately compromises the strategic coherence of Western support for Ukraine.

FORGE responds directly to this contradiction. By developing alternative supply chains for critical components, Western democracies are seeking to dismantle Beijing's ability to indirectly intervene in conflicts it does not openly fight. It is an economic war running parallel to the military war — and it is just as important for the long-term security of Ukraine and the West.

Australia: a deposit, a loan, an industrial reality

Australia is one of the most important pivots of the Western diversification strategy. Rich in light and heavy rare earths, it holds some of the best-documented deposits outside China. In 2026, the Australian government granted Iluka Resources a loan of AU$1.65 billion to finance the construction of the Eneabba refinery in Western Australia — a project that could produce separated rare earth oxides for defense and clean energy markets.

This direct government financing is significant: it acknowledges that the market alone is not capable of funding refining infrastructure this costly within the necessary timeframes. Australia's public investment in Eneabba constitutes a model that other countries — Canada, Brazil, India — are watching closely for their own strategies for valorizing national deposits. The race for refining capacity outside China is underway.

The United States accelerates across the entire value chain

In the United States, the urgency is immediate. The January 1, 2027 deadline for the Department of Defense to source rare earth magnets from non-Chinese sources creates massive contractual pressure. USA Rare Earth received federal funding of up to $1.6 billion. Energy Fuels acquired VAC for $1.9 billion, adding to its portfolio more than 1,000 industrial customers and 400 patents linked to rare earths and permanent magnets.

These investments form an American rare earth ecosystem that did not exist five years ago. Ucore produces NdPr oxide at a purity of 99.5 percent at its RapidSX demonstration plant in Kingston, Ontario. The building blocks of a complete American chain — from mine to finished magnet — are assembling. The road ahead remains long, but the direction is clear and the investments are real.

The crisis platform: an unprecedented coordination tool

The G7 Summit in Évian in June 2026 marked a qualitative step in Western coordination on rare earths. The critical minerals crisis platform, finalized at this summit and operated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), allows G7 members for the first time to share real-time data, monitor markets together, and coordinate responses in the event of a supply crisis. This is not an empty shell — it is an operational mechanism.

The objectives include strengthening national strategic stockpiles, increasing recycling capacities, and exploring joint purchasing instruments. The platform launched with lithium and nickel and is expanding to five new minerals per year. This sequential broadening shows that the G7 has learned from its own insufficiencies: it is better to advance methodically than to promise an impossible program.

From declaration to implementation: the risks of dilution

Every international summit produces declarations. The test of the G7 platform will be its capacity to sustain itself over time, to survive changes of government and the temptation to resume cheap Chinese purchases as soon as geopolitical pressure eases. The history of multilateral initiatives on strategic resources is littered with enthusiastic platforms that emptied of their substance the moment Chinese prices fell again.

The difference with previous initiatives lies in the intensity of the systemic pressure Beijing is exerting with its export controls. An NdPr at $126 per kilogram, zero terbium and dysprosium shipments to Japan since November, an American defense deadline in January 2027 — so many realities that make returning to Chinese dependency more and more costly. FORGE and the G7 platform are supported, for the first time, by an economic urgency as real as the strategic urgency.

The scale of the challenge allows no complacency

FORGE is the most ambitious response the West has ever brought to the challenge of mineral dependency on China. 54 nations, $30 billion, 195 projects, a G7 platform — the figures are impressive. But they must be measured against the challenge: 90 percent of global refining capacity concentrated in China, a reconstruction timeline of 20 to 30 years, alternative deposits often located in unstable countries, and a China that is tightening the taps precisely as alternatives begin to emerge.

FORGE is a beginning. A necessary, courageous, long-overdue beginning. But no one should wake up in 2027 thinking the problem is solved. The G7 objective of reaching less than 60 percent dependency on a single non-G7 supplier by 2030 is realistic only if the announced investments materialize, if environmental permits do not block projects, and if China does not succeed in undermining alternative coalitions before they reach critical mass.

What FORGE means for collective security

Beyond economics, FORGE represents a fundamental political choice: the West decides to treat mineral dependency on China as a matter of national and collective security, not merely economic competitiveness. This reframing matters. It allows the justification of massive public investments, partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia that do not fit the usual categories of allies, and industrial coordination that the market alone would not have produced.

For Ukraine, for Taiwan, for every country that depends on Western defense capacity, FORGE is a new layer of resilience in a security system that desperately needs it. China is not only an abstract military threat — it is a power that controls the raw materials of our armies. Confronting it seriously requires exactly what FORGE is attempting: replacing dependency with strategic diversification built over time, with the resources and the urgency the situation demands.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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