DECODING: The Ankara gamble: from promises to real tanks and missiles

DECODING: The Ankara gamble: from promises to real tanks and missiles

Introduction: a summit under high pressure

Beştepe, palace of an ambiguous ally

On July 7 and 8, 2026, the leaders of the 32 NATO member nations will gather at the presidential palace of Beştepe in Ankara. Turkey, host of this crucial summit, is not the Alliance's easiest partner. Erdoğan has long played both sides, maintaining commercial ties with Russia while technically remaining a member of the Atlantic Alliance. And yet it is in Istanbul, and then in Ankara, that some of the most decisive moments of this war's diplomacy take shape.

Secretary General Mark Rutte has announced that tens of billions in new defense contracts will be formalized at this summit. That is not rhetoric. It is the outcome of an unprecedented transformation of European defense budgets since 2022: +20% in spending in 2025, 1.2 trillion dollars additionally invested by European allies and Canada between 2016 and 2026. Ankara is the public validation of this silent revolution.

The 5% of GDP target: reality or performance?

Mark Rutte has set the bar: 5% of GDP in defense spending for each NATO member. That is a revolutionary figure. For comparison, the previous target was 2% of GDP, and many members were still struggling to reach it in 2022. Moving to 5% means more than doubling the defense effort of nations that have lived under American protection since 1949.

The Gdansk Declaration, signed on June 25, 2026 by several heads of state during a preparatory meeting, reaffirms this 5% of GDP objective as well as the reinforcement of the Eastern Flank. This document sets the stage for Ankara. But between signing a declaration and aligning national budgets, there is a gulf populated by national parliaments, fiscal constraints, and electoral priorities.

Rutte: the man who must keep Trump in NATO

The existential challenge of Rutte's tenure

Mark Rutte, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, took the helm of NATO in the most difficult context the Alliance has faced since its founding. His main mission, unspoken but understood by all: keep Donald Trump's United States within the collective framework of the Alliance while pushing Europeans to stop depending on Washington as they once did.

The tension is real. Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of Defense, launched a six-month review of American military presence in Europe, accompanied by threats to reduce US contributions to NATO. The Guardian reported on June 27, 2026 that Alliance leaders are expressing fears that they can no longer count on American help in the event of a Russian attack on a member state. That is a sentence that would have been unthinkable in 2019. It is spoken openly in 2026.

Rutte's diplomacy: Dutch pragmatism facing Trumpian chaos

Rutte has developed a functional relationship with Trump — pragmatic, non-confrontational, built on logic that the American president understands: deals. If Europeans spend more, if defense contracts benefit American industry, if NATO presents itself as a mutually beneficial partnership rather than a guarantee the United States would offer for free, then Trump can stay in the game.

It is a disenchanted vision of the Atlantic Alliance, but it may be the only realistic one for the years 2026–2028. The tens of billions in defense contracts announced at Ankara will also serve to demonstrate to Washington that NATO is useful to the American economy — that allies are buying F-35s, Patriot missiles, and American command systems. Geopolitics meets commerce, and Rutte has understood that language.

Hegseth and the American threat: six months to convince

The American review: a calculated sword of Damocles

Pete Hegseth has formalized a six-month strategic review of American military presence in Europe. The timing is not innocent: the results of this review will be known around the Ankara summit, or shortly after. It is a calculated pressure on European allies to accelerate their own investments before the conclusions land.

The threat to reduce American contributions to NATO is not new — Trump wielded it during his first term. But the context of 2026 is different: the war in Ukraine is real, the risks on the Eastern Flank are concrete, and European allies have already begun raising their spending. The question is no longer "will you spend?" but "will you spend fast enough?"

What Europeans actually fear

The fear expressed by NATO leaders to The Guardian on June 27, 2026 goes beyond budgets. It touches on the fundamental question of Article 5: if Russia attacks a Baltic state or Poland, will Trump's United States actually activate the collective defense clause? The question is no longer theoretical. Contingency plans are being discussed privately in several European capitals for scenarios where Washington would not respond — or would respond too slowly.

This uncertainty has a direct consequence: it pushes Europeans to rearm faster — not to dispense with the United States, but to avoid being at the mercy of an unpredictable American presidential decision. Rutte knows this and uses it as an argument to convince the hesitant to reach 5% of GDP. The fear of American abandonment is a more powerful political driver than any speech about shared values.

Defense contracts: billions changing hands

What "tens of billions" means concretely

Rutte's announcement of "tens of billions" in new defense contracts at Ankara covers multiple realities. It involves orders for ammunition — notably the much-discussed quadrupling of 155mm shell production mentioned by Deputy General Stringer ahead of the summit. It also includes orders for anti-missile defense systems, armored vehicles, and command and communications systems.

The context is one of a Europe that realized, since 2022, that its ammunition stocks were dangerously low, that its production lines had been scaled back since the end of the Cold War, and that in the event of a direct conflict with Russia, it could not sustain a war effort beyond a few weeks. The contracts announced at Ankara are the industrial response to this awakening.

The 155mm shell: the caliber of modern war

The objective of quadrupling 155mm shell production is one of the most concrete commitments likely to emerge from the Ankara summit, according to Deputy General Stringer, cited by the AP on June 26, 2026. The 155mm caliber has become the symbol of modern artillery warfare — Ukraine consumes tens of thousands per month, and Western allies have struggled to keep pace since 2022.

Quadrupling production requires massive investment in manufacturing lines, training specialized workers, and securing propellant powder and explosive supplies. These investments are not made in a matter of months. They unfold over a three-to-five-year horizon. The decision taken at Ankara in 2026 will therefore have concrete effects in 2028–2030 — a horizon that may seem distant but that conditions the West's capacity to support Ukraine and deter Russia over the long term.

The Eastern Flank: the absolute geopolitical priority

From theory to real presence on the ground

The Gdansk Declaration of June 25, 2026 reaffirms the reinforcement of the Eastern Flank as the Alliance's absolute priority. This is not new in the discourse — since 2022, every NATO summit has included commitments to that effect. But the reality on the ground has evolved: multinational battle groups have been deployed in the Baltic states, in Poland, in Romania, in Slovakia.

These deployments are not yet at the level that robust defense against a large-scale Russian attack would require. Military experts estimate that entire army corps would be needed to effectively defend the Eastern Flank, not battle groups of a few thousand soldiers. But the direction is right, and the Ankara summit could announce substantial reinforcements — full brigades rather than mere battle groups.

Finland and Sweden change the Baltic equation

Finland's accession in 2023 and Sweden's in 2024 to NATO radically transformed the Alliance's geography in Northern Europe. The Baltic Sea is now surrounded by NATO member nations, except for Russia and the Kaliningrad enclave. Finland brings to the Alliance its 1,340 km border with Russia and a trained, motivated reserve army.

This geographic transformation makes the Northern Flank far more defensible than it was before 2023. But it also requires a rethinking of collective defense plans. The Ankara summit will need to integrate these new realities into the Alliance's operational plans — a substantive undertaking done quietly, but whose broad outlines emerge at every summit.

Ukraine and NATO: the question that poisons Ankara

Membership: always promised, always postponed

The question of Ukraine's membership in NATO will be present at Ankara as it has been at every summit since 2023. And as every time, the answer will likely be an ambiguous formula reaffirming Ukraine's "vocation" to join the Alliance without setting a timetable. The United States — Trump or his successor — is not ready to activate Article 5 for Ukraine while the war is ongoing.

This ambiguity is frustrating for Kyiv. It is understandable for NATO's legal teams — accepting a country at war would automatically mean going to war against Russia. But the ambiguity itself carries a cost: it does not provide Ukraine with the security it needs to accept a potential negotiated ceasefire, and it leaves Zelensky in a position of permanent vulnerability.

Security guarantees: the middle path

The solution taking shape — imperfect but pragmatic — is that of bilateral security guarantees. Several NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have signed security agreements with Ukraine that commit to supporting it militarily in the event of new aggression, without triggering Article 5. These agreements do not replace membership, but they create an intermediate safety net.

Ankara could further formalize this framework of bilateral guarantees, collectivizing it into an agreement from the entire Alliance. This is the most realistic path for now — giving Ukraine enough security to consider a negotiated peace without being left entirely exposed after a ceasefire.

The defense industry: the silent industrial revolution

From orders to production lines

The political commitments made since 2022 are gradually translating into real industrial capacity. European defense industry is running at a pace it has not seen since the Cold War. Ammunition plants in Germany, Czechia, Finland, and Poland have dramatically ramped up their production rates. 155mm shells, military drones, portable anti-missile defense systems — all of this is being manufactured in greater quantities than two years ago.

This industrial ramp-up is visible in the order books of equipment manufacturers, in newly opened production lines, in the thousands of jobs created in the defense sector. Ankara's task will be to accelerate this momentum — by coordinating bulk orders that allow economies of scale, harmonizing technical standards that facilitate interoperability, and creating shared financing mechanisms.

The bottlenecks that persist

Despite this ramp-up, bottlenecks persist. Propellant powder for artillery ammunition is a critical pressure point: few plants in Europe produce it, and the lead times for expanding capacity are long. Critical materials — certain rare metals needed for electronic components in weapons systems — still come predominantly from China. This dependency creates a strategic vulnerability that the summit must acknowledge.

And the skilled workforce for high-tech defense industries takes years, not weeks, to train. The Ankara summit will need to address these constraints frankly. Commitments on propellant powders, on diversifying supply chains for critical materials — these are the concrete decisions that would make Ankara a summit of substance rather than communication.

Nuclear deterrence: the topic Ankara can no longer avoid

Russian missiles in Belarus — the geography of threat

The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear missiles in Belarus has changed the geography of the nuclear threat in Europe. These missiles can strike any European capital within minutes from Belarusian territory. This is a reality that NATO planners integrate into their calculations, and that they cannot ignore in discussions about the Eastern Flank defense posture.

The Alliance's response to this nuclear threat is delicate: too explicit, and it risks triggering a rhetorical escalation with Moscow; too discreet, and it leaves a void that could be misread. Rutte will need to navigate this terrain carefully during Ankara's discussions. Reinforcing NATO's nuclear posture in Europe is one of the summit's most urgent agenda items.

Extended deterrence and its future

The American tactical nuclear bombs stationed in Europe — notably the B61s being modernized to the B61-12 version — constitute the American extended deterrence on the continent. If the United States reduced its presence in Europe under pressure from Trump, the question of an autonomous European nuclear deterrence would become urgent. France, the only nuclear power in the EU, would then be at the center of that debate.

Ankara will not resolve this question in two days. It is too complex, too sensitive. But the summit can create the conditions for a structured discussion that will unfold in the months ahead — and that may be the most important role it can play in this essential strategic domain for Europe's security.

Conclusion: from promises to concrete realities

What the summit must deliver

The Ankara summit will be judged on its concrete deliverables, not its rhetorical declarations. Tens of billions in defense contracts, quadrupling of 155mm shell production, firm commitments on 5% of GDP from as many members as possible — these are the real indicators. If diplomats return with eloquent communiqués but vague commitments, the summit will be a political failure, even if presented as a communications success.

The transformation of NATO since 2022 is real and significant. The 1.2 trillion dollars additionally spent by Europeans and Canada over ten years is a silent revolution. Ankara must be its public confirmation and institutional accelerator. Not a celebration. A working milestone.

The ultimate test: deterring Putin

The true measure of the Ankara summit's success is not what allies say to one another. It is what Putin concludes from it. If the Kremlin sees a divided, hesitant Alliance haggling over its commitments — then deterrence fails. If the Kremlin sees an Alliance that has quadrupled its shell production, reinforced its Eastern Flank, and maintained its support for Ukraine — then deterrence works.

The Ankara gamble is to transform promises repeated since 2022 into tanks, missiles, shells, and real military presences on the ground. NATO has the money. It has the industries. It has the political will — fragile, but present. The question is whether it has the institutional courage to move from words to action.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My positions on NATO and Trump

I am Maxime Marquette, a geopolitics columnist. I am in favor of the Atlantic Alliance as an instrument of collective security in Europe. I consider the rise in European defense spending necessary and too long delayed. On Trump: I consider him a destabilizing factor whose demands, though brutal, have had the paradoxical effect of pushing Europeans to act.

Data on defense spending and summit commitments come from sources dated between June 24 and 27, 2026: NATO/Atlantic Council transcript, The Guardian, US News/Reuters, AP/Post-Gazette, European Parliament. I do not have access to internal NATO documents and rely on open sources.

What I do not know

I do not know which members will actually reach 5% of GDP or within what timeframe. I do not know the details of the defense contracts that will be signed at Ankara before their official announcement. I do not know whether Trump will keep the United States in NATO for the duration of his term. My analysis is based on available information and may be contradicted by events.

I acknowledge that my reading of Trump as a "necessary evil" is a contestable editorial judgment. Other readers may legitimately consider that the damage caused to the Alliance by his unpredictability outweighs the benefits of the pressure he applies on allies.

Sources

Primary sources

NATO / Atlantic Council — Transcript of conversation with Secretary General Rutte, tens of billions in contracts — June 25, 2026

The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help if Russia attacks — June 27, 2026

European Parliament — Briefing on NATO Ankara summit, July 7–8, 2026 — June 26, 2026

US News / Reuters — Rutte: billions in defense contracts at the Ankara summit — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Post-Gazette / AP — NATO deputy commander wants summit to push spending, quadrupling of 155mm shells — June 26, 2026

Regeringskansliet — Gdansk Declaration: reaffirmation of 5% GDP + Eastern Flank — June 25, 2026

Brookings Institution — Rebalancing NATO: the Alliance gathers in Ankara — June 24, 2026