COMMENTARY: NATO Ankara Summit — "tens of billions" and the 5% GDP target

Introduction: The Atlantic Alliance marching toward Ankara

June 25, 2026: the week that sets the stage for everything

On June 25, 2026, Mark Rutte — Secretary General of NATO — took the floor at the Atlantic Council in Washington to announce what the Ankara summit of July 7 and 8, 2026 will produce: "tens of billions of dollars" in new defense contracts, a collective target of 5% of GDP in security spending, and confirmation that Europe is rejoining the United States on the financial terrain of defense. The news was reported by Anadolu Agency the same day.

Rutte's address at the Atlantic Council is not merely a preparatory press conference. It is a first-order political declaration that responds directly to Donald Trump's longstanding demands — that Europeans "pay their share" — while announcing a fundamental paradigm shift in the architecture of Atlantic defense. Europe is no longer content with promises. It is spending.

The Rutte-Trump meeting of June 25

That same day, according to NATO.int, Rutte met President Trump at the White House to deliver a carefully crafted message: "Europeans are now matching American spending." In 2025, European allies and Canada spent $90 billion more than in 2024 — a rise of roughly 20% — reaching $657 billion. Compared to the $980 billion American contribution, Europeans now represent 40% of NATO's total spending of $1.6 trillion.

This Rutte-Trump conversation is symbolically crucial. Trump has used the reproach to European allies as a pressure tool since 2017. Rutte now presents him with figures that answer those demands. Trump's political argument against NATO weakens in direct proportion to rising European spending. This is a major geopolitical shift, made possible by the concrete Russian threat since 2022.

The figures that prove commitment: allies under the microscope

Poland: the model student

Poland has established itself as the undisputed leader in NATO defense spending in Europe. With 4.3% of its GDP devoted to defense, Warsaw far exceeds the 2% target and approaches the new 5% goal. This level of investment, unimaginable a decade ago, is explained by a direct and visceral perception of the Russian threat — Poland shares a border with Russia through the Kaliningrad exclave and a border with Belarus, Moscow's ally.

Poland is not building its defense out of NATO conformism — it does so because it carries the memory of occupation and the awareness that the distance between Russian armies and Warsaw is measured in hours, not days. Nations that feel the threat in their gut spend on their security. Nations that feel protected by geography always lag further behind. Germany, Denmark, France — all have spending curves that were inversely proportional to their sense of immediate threat, until recently.

The Baltic states: champions of deterrence

Lithuania has reached 4% of GDP in defense spending. Latvia stands at 3.74%. These three small Baltic nations — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — have led NATO efforts proportional to their size since 2022. Their motivation is identical to Poland's, amplified by their smaller size and greater geographical vulnerability. These are nations that know that in the event of Russian aggression, they would have little time to hold out before NATO could deploy reinforcements.

The Baltic defense doctrine has been radically transformed since 2022. They have abandoned the "symbolic resistance" doctrine — hold for a few days to signal the triggering of Article 5 — in favor of a total defense doctrine involving fortifications, pre-positioned arms and equipment stockpiles, and a reform of reserve forces. These small countries are preparing a real defense.

Germany: the historic climb toward €150 billion a year

The Sondervermögen and its impact on the defense landscape

Germany has executed one of the most spectacular reversals in its post-1945 foreign policy. After decades of Ostpolitik and strategic restraint, Berlin created a special €100 billion defense fund in 2022 (the Sondervermögen) and committed to a trajectory that must bring it to €150 billion per year by 2029, according to the data in the dossier. That exceeds the total annual defense budget of France or the United Kingdom — a quantitative but also qualitative transformation of Germany's posture.

This change is not merely budgetary — it is cultural and political. Germany is fighting its own historical reluctance toward military power, reluctance rooted in the memory of Nazism and the Second World War. The current political generation, confronted by Russian aggression and American pressure, has decided that these reluctances can no longer serve as an excuse for defensive inaction that threatens collective European security.

Quality vs. quantity: Germany's challenges

Raising the budget is not enough if the industrial and military organization does not follow. Germany faces considerable challenges in scaling up its defense industry: bottlenecks in ammunition production, delays in delivering ordered systems (Leopard 2 tanks, IRIS-T systems), skilled-labor shortages in defense factories. These problems are real but addressable with the right level of investment and political will.

The Bundeswehr must simultaneously recruit more soldiers, modernize its aging equipment, and develop new capabilities in cybersecurity and autonomous systems. This triple challenge — recruitment, modernization, innovation — is one faced by all European armies, but it is particularly acute for Germany, whose defense budget had reached an extreme level of degradation in the 2010s.

The 5% GDP target: ambitious, necessary, contested

3.5% defense + 1.5% broader security

The proposed target for 2035 — 5% of GDP broken down into 3.5% for strict defense and 1.5% for infrastructure, cyber, and space — represents a reconception of what national security means. The old 2% target was purely military. The new target integrates the digital, spatial, and infrastructural dimensions of security in an era when cyberattacks, space threats, and critical infrastructure sabotage are documented operational realities.

This broader approach is consistent with the total security doctrine that Nordic nations have developed over decades and that the rest of Europe is now discovering. National security in 2026 is not only about tanks and aircraft — it is also about protected undersea cables, resilient power grids, GPS systems resistant to jamming, elections shielded from foreign interference.

The internal budget debate in each nation

Reaching 5% of GDP in security spending requires painful political trade-offs in every country. For France, that would mean moving from a current 2% to 5% — approximately €75 billion more per year. For Germany, roughly €85 billion more. These sums are considerable and would require either higher taxes, or reductions in other budget lines — pensions, healthcare, education — or more debt.

These trade-offs are not made in heads of state speeches or NATO communiqués — they are made in national parliaments, in budget negotiations, and in political coalitions. The political will expressed at Ankara must be translated into national finance laws to become real. The gap between summit commitments and voted budgets is NATO's true test of credibility.

The common NATO budget: €5.3 billion in 2026

A modest but symbolically important common budget

The common NATO budget in 2026 stands at €5.3 billion, of which €2.42 billion funds the strictly military budget, according to Anadolu Agency data (June 25, 2026). These figures may seem modest compared to the $1.6 trillion in total national spending by members. But the common budget funds essential collective assets: integrated command systems, secure communications networks, shared intelligence centers, and common training infrastructure.

More fundamentally, the common budget finances the institutional architecture that makes operational coordination among 32 national armies possible. Without this institutional cement, national spending would remain 32 incompatible silos. It is a force multiplier whose value far exceeds its absolute budget size.

The "tens of billions" in private contracts

Beyond the common budget, it is above all the "tens of billions" in industrial contracts announced by Rutte that represent the real transformation of the defense landscape. These contracts — in missiles, air defense, munitions, armored vehicles, drone systems — directly feed the national defense industries of member nations. For countries like Poland, Germany, or France, these orders represent a defense reindustrialization that creates jobs, rebuilds lost competencies, and strengthens domestic production capacity.

The industrial dimension of NATO rearmament is frequently underestimated. This is not simply about buying weapons — it is about rebuilding the defense industrial base that was dismantled during the decades of the "peace dividend." That reconstruction takes time, requires investment in machinery, training, and infrastructure, and creates lasting capabilities that future crises will be able to draw on.

Turkey as host: the complicated ally at the center of the game

Why Ankara for this historic summit?

The choice of Ankara as the venue for the July 2026 NATO summit is deliberate and symbolically loaded. Turkey is NATO's most ambivalent ally — the alliance's second largest army by personnel, yet maintaining complex relations with Russia (purchase of Russian S-400 systems), sustaining commercial negotiations with Moscow despite Western sanctions, and playing a mediating role in the Ukraine-Russia war.

Holding the summit in Ankara is a way to confirm Turkey's anchoring within the alliance while requiring it to publicly assume collective positions on Ukraine and collective defense. Turkey cannot simultaneously host the NATO summit and openly oppose its conclusions. It is a form of soft diplomatic pressure — reminding Erdoğan that NATO membership comes with a political price.

Turkey's mediating role: asset or complication?

Turkey has played a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia since the start of the conflict — facilitating the 2022 grain negotiations (the Black Sea Grain Initiative), maintaining contacts with Moscow, and regularly offering its good offices for peace talks. This role cuts both ways: it gives Ankara unique diplomatic influence, but it also creates tensions with its NATO allies, who sometimes suspect Erdoğan of playing a double game.

At the Ankara summit, Turkey will have to navigate between its role as host — which demands a degree of loyalty to common positions — and its own national interests, which are not always perfectly aligned with those of the alliance as a whole. This tension is inherent to Turkey within NATO and it will not be resolved in two days of summit. But it can be managed with the right diplomacy.

Ukraine: the absent party that shapes everything

Zelensky awaits concrete commitments

Volodymyr Zelensky is not yet a formal NATO member — this membership remains suspended pending the end of the conflict for complex political reasons. But he is the central figure who frames all of the Ankara discussions. Every decision on defense spending, every arms contract, every commitment on GDP targets is measured against an implicit question: is this enough to defend Ukraine, and by extension, member nations?

Ukraine expects from the Ankara summit concrete, quantified commitments on the continuation of military aid — missiles, drones, artillery munitions — but also on a path toward NATO membership and, in the shorter term, on transitional security guarantees. Ukraine's resistance since 2022 has demonstrated its ability to defend itself. What it is asking for now is the certainty that weapons deliveries will not stop, that the West's commitments are durable, and that a diplomatic solution is not purchased at its expense.

NATO without Ukraine: a permanent vulnerability

NATO without Ukraine in its ranks is an alliance with an open flank to the east. A neutralized Ukraine — even without total military defeat — would become an unstable buffer zone whose security would be perpetually threatened by a revanchist Russia. Anchoring Ukraine in Western structures — first economic and political through the EU, then security-related through NATO — is the only durable guarantee of European stability.

This strategic reality should guide the decisions at Ankara. The tens of billions in defense contracts matter. But the most strategic decision NATO can take at Ankara is to send Kyiv — and Moscow — an unambiguous message: Ukraine will be in NATO, Western support is durable, and every meter of occupied Ukrainian territory is a failure the West will never recognize.

The major contracts expected: missiles, drones, and munitions

NATO's capability priorities in 2026

The "tens of billions" announced by Rutte must fill very specific capability gaps identified by NATO planners. First, artillery munitions — whose stockpiles proved catastrophically insufficient against the consumption rates of the Ukrainian war. Europe's target of producing 2 million 155mm shells per year is still far from being met.

Second, air defense systems — Patriot, SAMP/T, IRIS-T — which Eastern European nations sorely lack. Every Patriot battery delivered to Ukraine is one fewer battery available for defending a NATO nation. Ankara's orders must compensate for these transfers while raising the overall level of collective air coverage. Third, military drone systems — a direct response to lessons from Ukraine and the Chinese ambitions documented in lot 8.

Interoperability: the structural challenge

Beyond raw capabilities, Ankara must also address the challenge of interoperability. Thirty-two national armies, with sometimes incompatible weapons systems, different communication standards, and varied operational doctrines, struggle to function as a single integrated force. The standardization of munitions, communications interfaces, and staff procedures is a long-term effort that new contracts must integrate as a condition of their design.

The European SAFE instrument — €15 billion in loans signed by France on June 17 — and the European Defence Fund are important tools for financing this interoperability at the European level. But the complete NATO collective defense architecture requires transatlantic coordination that goes beyond European instruments alone.

Indo-Pacific partners: NATO's expansion beyond the Atlantic

Japan, South Korea, Australia: essential partners

The Ankara summit will in all likelihood welcome representatives from Japan, South Korea, and Australia — NATO's IP4 (Indo-Pacific Four) partners since the Madrid summit of 2022. Their presence is not symbolic: these nations are directly affected by the capability developments documented in this lot — the Chinese Atlas, the Shenlong, Taiwan's drones, the tensions in the South China Sea.

The convergence of threats — China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea coordinating their actions in increasingly close alignment — justifies a convergence of responses between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners. Deeper intelligence sharing, joint exercises, defense technology exchanges — Ankara should deepen these forms of cooperation by explicitly acknowledging that threats do not respect the geographical boundaries of alliances.

A liberal international order to defend collectively

What is at stake in Ankara is larger than Europe's defense. It is the question of whether the liberal international order — founded on democracy, rule of law, freedom of navigation, and respect for national sovereignty — can be defended collectively against revisionist powers seeking to replace it with an order of spheres of influence, where great powers freely dispose of their neighbors.

The answer at Ankara must be yes. The numbers — $1.6 trillion in NATO spending, a 5% target, tens of billions in contracts — are the material manifestations of that collective commitment. Allied democracies are capable of generating the power necessary for their defense. The question has always been political will. At Ankara, that will be tested.

Conclusion: Ankara as a test of the alliance's solidity

Impressive figures, a test of durability

The figures circulating ahead of the Ankara summit are impressive: $90 billion more spent in 2025, a target of 5% of GDP for 2035, tens of billions in contracts. But NATO's history is punctuated by solemn commitments that were subsequently diluted by national budget realities. The 2% target itself took decades to be taken seriously by the majority of members. The true measure of Ankara's success will come three years from now, when national budgets either reflect or fail to reflect the commitments made.

The difference with previous summits is that the threat is now concrete, continuous, and documented. Putin's Russia no longer conceals its revisionist ambitions. Xi Jinping's China does not hide its plans for regional hegemony. Iran and North Korea contribute to an architecture of interconnected threats. In this context, the cost of inaction is visible and measurable in a way it was not in the 2000s or 2010s.

The alliance's hour

NATO in 2026 is an alliance that has rediscovered its sense of urgency. After years during which some questioned its relevance, the war in Ukraine has reminded everyone why this alliance exists and what it protects. The Ankara summit must capitalize on this momentum of solidarity to turn intentions into capabilities, speeches into signatures, and commitments into real combat power.

Zelensky, fighting for his country's survival 1,500 kilometers from Ankara, deserves a summit worthy of his resistance. NATO's 32 nations, their 940 million citizens, their combined economies representing half of global GDP, have the means to match this ambition. The question posed at Ankara is simple: do they have the will?

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Method and sources

This commentary draws on the dated sources from lot 8: Anadolu Agency (June 25, 2026), NATO.int (June 25, 2026), Washington Times (June 25, 2026), US News (June 25, 2026), Daily Sabah (June 25, 2026). All figures — NATO budget, GDP percentages, spending amounts — are extracted from these sources. No unsourced personal estimates.

This commentary represents an inherently opinionated genre. The position defended — support for NATO, Ukraine, and high defense spending targets — is the columnist's assumed editorial line. Readers who disagree are invited to consult the primary sources and form their own judgment.

Editorial positioning

Maxime Marquette is pro-NATO and pro-Ukraine. He considers the commitment of Western democracies to collective defense a strategic and moral imperative. He acknowledges the alliance's tensions and contradictions — notably Turkey's role — without denying them, choosing realistic engagement over useless doctrinal purity.

Trump is cited as a political actor whose pressures contributed to increasing European defense spending — a positive result, independent of intentions or methods. This observation is not overall support for Trump, whose many other positions the columnist criticizes.

Sources

Primary sources

Anadolu Agency — NATO to announce tens of billions in defense contracts at Ankara summit, Rutte — June 25, 2026

NATO.int — Rutte meets Trump: Europe stepping up defense spending — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO by the numbers ahead of Ankara summit — June 25, 2026

Washington Times — Bigger defense spending top agenda of upcoming NATO summit in Turkey — June 25, 2026

US News — NATO's Rutte says billions in new defense contracts will be announced at summit — June 25, 2026

Daily Sabah — NATO to unveil billions in defense deals at Ankara summit — June 25, 2026