COMMENTARY: China, the Greatest Threat to the West — Decoupling Is Inevitable

Introduction: The Moment of Truth Has Arrived

The Illusion of Chinese Neutrality Collapses

For years, the West told itself a reassuring story: China is certainly an aggressive competitor, but a rational trading partner. A country that calculates, weighs pros and cons, and will never cross the red line. This comfortable fiction was just shattered by several simultaneous revelations in June 2026. The Évian G7, held from June 15 to 17, crystallized what many refused to see: the systemic rivalry between China and the West has entered an irreversible phase. Decoupling is no longer just one option among many—it is a strategic necessity.

The High Representative of the European Union Kaja Kallas struck hard on June 15 in Luxembourg, stating that the EU has now verified reports that the Chinese military has trained Russian soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Hundreds of Russian troops trained on Chinese military bases, with some deployed directly to the Ukrainian front. Beijing remains a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, she stated bluntly. This is no longer passive complicity. It is a deliberate choice.

Structural Decoupling, Not a Punishment

During that same summit, G7 leaders adopted a joint declaration imposing a 60% limit on the share of any single supplier in their imports of rare earths and critical minerals by 2030, with a subsequent target of 50%. This figure explicitly targets China, which controls 91% of global rare earth refining and 94% of permanent magnet production, according to the International Energy Agency. The Western world is not punishing Beijing. It is detoxing from a dependency that has proven to be a geopolitical weapon.

The Pentagone, for its part, formalized on June 8, 2026, the addition of 188 Chinese companies to its list of military entities—the so-called “1260H” list—including giants like Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, CATL, Huawei, and China Mobile. Effective June 30, the U.S. Department of Defense will be legally barred from contracting with these companies. This decision, combined with the revelations about military training, confirms that the technological and economic war between the West and China has indeed been declared.

Chinese Military Complicity: The Facts, and Nothing But the Facts

Russian Soldiers Trained on Chinese Soil

The information is explosive, corroborated by independent sources and now attested to by European institutions. Reuters revealed in May 2026, citing European intelligence agencies and internal documents, that China had secretly trained approximately 200 Russian soldiers on its territory at the end of 2025. The training sessions, framed by an agreement signed by senior Russian and Chinese officers in Beijing in July 2025, were held in Beijing, Nanjing, and other military sites. The German newspaper Die Welt specified that the programs covered the use of drones, electronic warfare, and modern combat simulations. Participants included members of the elite Russian Rubikon battalion, which specializes in drones.

These soldiers did not remain on Chinese soil. Some joined combat operations in Ukraine in early 2026, sometimes occupying command positions. The 21st wave of European sanctions, proposed by the Commission on June 9, 2026, specifically targets drone manufacturers in third countries, including China, after Chinese components were systematically found in Russian drones recovered after strikes on Ukrainian cities. The 20th sanctions package, adopted in April, had already designated 16 entities in third countries, including several in China and Hong Kong.

Dual-Use Goods: A Voluntarily Blurred Line

Beijing tirelessly repeats that it does not provide lethal weapons to Russia and that it strictly controls exports of dual-use goods. These claims are contradicted by data. A March 2026 report by the investigative media outlet The Insider identified Chinese companies as the largest group among the 6,000 exporters of restricted dual-use goods to Russian companies and defense contractors. Analytical estimates indicate that Chinese shipments of dual-use goods to Russia again exceeded $4 billion in 2024. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte himself stated on June 17 that the Alliance is closely monitoring Chinese assistance to Russia, emphasizing that Beijing is helping Moscow circumvent sanctions.

The report from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) published in early June 2026 is unequivocal: “Thanks to China’s indispensable support, the Russian regime has sustained its war effort for over four years despite unprecedented international sanctions and fierce Ukrainian resistance.” Chinese exports to Russia include CNC machines, semiconductors, micro-electronics, ball bearings, drones, electronic warfare systems, and logistical equipment—everything a modern army needs to maintain its rate of fire. Beijing’s ostensible neutrality is a state lie.

The Évian G7: A Historic Break on Critical Minerals

The Rare Earths Lock Is Broken

The G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, concluded on June 17, 2026, will go down in history as the moment when major industrial democracies formally decided to wean themselves off their dependency on Chinese critical minerals. The final declaration commits members to ensuring that no single supplier represents more than 60% of their rare earth and permanent magnet imports by 2030, with a goal of further reduction to 50%. Lithium and nickel have been designated as the two pilot metals for initial coordinated stockpiling efforts. A new coordination platform has been created, integrating an expanded role for the International Energy Agency to monitor markets and flag supply risks.

The urgency is real. Last year, China held a 59% share in rare earth mining, 91% in refining, and 94% in magnet production. According to a 2026 IEA study, if Chinese export controls were “fully implemented,” up to $6.5 trillion in economic activity outside China could be threatened annually. China has imposed 16 trade restrictions on these materials since 2020. In response to the G7 declaration, Beijing immediately labeled the initiative an attempt by a “small circle” to undermine the international trade order—diplomatic language for a threat of retaliation.

Japan Leads the Charge, Europe Follows

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, at the Évian summit, brought forward the most concrete proposal: a price floor mechanism for critical mineral contracts, ensuring that allied miners and refiners can recover their costs regardless of Chinese price aggression. The benchmark contract—the Lynas-JARE agreement providing a price floor of $110 per kilogram for neodymium and praseodymium—is being presented as a model. This approach represents a paradigm shift: no longer suffering under Chinese domination, but architecturally building an alternative.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on June 22 that Brussels will propose a new law requiring European companies to diversify their sources for key raw materials, estimating that businesses are de-risking at a pace that is too slow. Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom signed a parallel agreement to accelerate the development of sodium-ion and solid-state battery technologies, reducing dependence on cobalt reserves controlled by Beijing. The G7 Critical Minerals Alliance, equipped with a crisis response platform, is operational immediately.

The Pentagon Drops the Unthinkable: BYD, Alibaba, and Baidu Are Military Threats

188 Chinese Companies in the Crosshairs

On June 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of Defense published the annual update to its “Section 1260H” list—now populated by 188 entities, up from 134 in 2025. Among the newcomers are names that would have seemed unthinkable in this context a decade ago: Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, CATL, NIO, Huawei, Unitree Robotics, WuXi AppTec, YMTC, JA Solar, Trina Solar, China Three Gorges. Effective June 30, 2026, the Pentagon is legally barred from entering into or renewing any direct contract with these entities. Starting in June 2027, the ban extends to indirect procurement through supply chain intermediaries.

The implications are staggering. These companies are not marginal. They manufacture the electric vehicles the world buys, the solar panels that power the energy transition, the batteries that store renewable energy, and the semiconductors that run smartphones. By designating them as Chinese military companies operating directly or indirectly in the United States, the Pentagon is asserting that the border between the civilian economy and the Chinese military-industrial complex no longer exists—or perhaps never significantly did. The designation does not yet block the American private sector, but it creates massive reputational and regulatory pressure, a precursor to more punitive restrictions.

Beijing’s Reaction: Between Anger and Denial

The Chinese reaction was immediate and predictable. A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, on June 13, stated that the United States had “ignored the consensus reached during the meeting of the two countries' heads of state in Beijing” and had “unreasonably suppressed Chinese companies.” BYD, Alibaba, and Baidu each claimed to see no basis for their inclusion. Beijing threatened retaliation, warning that China would “respond in a resolute and firm manner.” But the question isn’t whether Beijing is furious—the question is whether Washington can afford to continue ignoring the deliberate fusion of commercial and military interests in China.

The Pentagon’s show of force comes amid persistent trade tensions, just weeks after the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing where the two presidents attempted to stabilize the bilateral relationship. This timing reveals a fundamental tension within American strategy itself: on one hand, the Trump administration seeks to negotiate a trade truce with Beijing before November 2026; on the other, its own Department of Defense is methodically classifying Chinese industrial flagships as risks to national security. This tension is not a bug—it is an illustration of Western strategic schizophrenia.

The G7 Tightens the Noose on Russia: China in the Crosshairs

Energy Sanctions Strengthened After the Iran Truce

The G7 geopolitical declaration of June 17, 2026, published on the official Élysée website, is unambiguous regarding Russia. “We commit to increasing pressure on the Russian war economy. In this context, we will strengthen our sanctions, particularly those on the oil and gas sectors.” The opening of the Strait of Hormuz, secured by Trump in his deal with Iran, has freed up precious political maneuvering room: global energy markets can now absorb a reduction in Russian exports without a catastrophic price spike. On June 16, the UK added four Russia-linked tankers to its sanctions list, as the vessels had recently begun serving Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project, which has been exporting to the Chinese port of Beihai since last summer.

The European Commission, in its 21st sanctions package announced on June 9, proposed restricting the resale of LNG carriers to Russia and targeted 20 entities in third countries—including banks, crypto-asset platforms, and oil traders accused of facilitating sanctions evasion. Canada, during its bilateral with Zelensky in Évian, announced new sanctions targeting 162 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to the Russian war against Ukraine. The pressure is coordinated and systematic. And China is central to this equation—as the primary escape valve allowing Moscow to breathe under the weight of sanctions.

China as the Lifeline of the Russian War Economy

The CEPA report on the meta-authoritarian threat, published in early June 2026, documents with precision how Beijing functions as an economic buffer allowing Moscow to withstand sanctions. The use of the Chinese yuan in Russo-Chinese trade transactions has exceeded 90%, according to Putin himself. The BeiDou and GLONASS satellite navigation systems are the subject of a 2026-2030 integration roadmap, signaling long-term cooperation in space infrastructure. Chinese-made microelectronics now constitute, according to American officials, 90% of Russian supplies in this crucial field. China does not support Russia despite sanctions—it supports Russia specifically to help it circumvent them.

This reality creates an implacable logic: every new Western sanction against Russia increases Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, which strategically strengthens China against the West. The “No Limits Partnership” signed in 2022 was not rhetorical posturing—it was an operational roadmap. The Xi-Putin summit of May 2026 in Moscow produced new commitments in AI, satellite navigation, and long-term economic planning. The authoritarian axis is functioning. And the West cannot continue to treat its adversaries in separate silos.

Beijing’s Denial: An Instrumentalized Posture of Neutrality

The Official Chinese Narrative No Longer Holds Up

Beijing’s official position is known by heart: benevolent neutrality, promotion of peace talks, no lethal weapons provided to any party, and strict control of dual-use goods. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, when questioned on June 18 regarding NATO’s accusations, responded that “status-quo-shaking NATO must correct its erroneous perception of China and stop provoking confrontation.” Regarding the training of Russian soldiers, he claimed the “relevant claim has no factual basis and is nothing but defamation and slander.” This categorical denial is itself revealing. A truly neutral power would not need such a defensive and aggressive communications department.

The logic of Beijing’s rhetoric rests on an increasingly fragile distinction between what constitutes “lethal weapons” and what does not. Electronic components that guide a missile, electronic warfare systems that jam Ukrainian radar, simulation software that trains drone operators—all of this is technically “non-lethal” but operationally decisive. The strategic ledger of modern belligerence is no longer calculated solely by counting tanks and shells. It is done by measuring supply chains, technology transfers, and military training. On that scoreboard, Beijing is complicit.

The Strategy of the Double Game and Its Limits

Beijing has, until now, perfectly played the card of the double game. On one hand, it maintains open economic channels with the West—a record global trade surplus in 2025, and foreign investment that is still present. On the other, it supports Russia, Iran, and North Korea in their resistance to the international order. This strategy is brilliant in the short term: it maximizes China’s value as an unavoidable interlocutor. Trump himself thanked Xi for being “totally neutral” during the conflict in the Middle East, perfectly illustrating how Beijing exploits Western divisions to position itself as a global arbiter.

But the double game has its limits. The revelation of military training for Russian soldiers—verified by European services—constitutes a line crossed. The “Chinese military company” labels the Pentagon has placed on BYD and CATL constitute a public declaration that China’s industrial architecture is inseparable from its military project. The Geopolitical Daily of June 14, 2026, observed that three simultaneous movements—the Pentagon’s expanded 1260H list, European summit proposals to toughen policy toward China, and Beijing’s cancellation of high-level meetings with the EU—“indicate a structural deterioration of relations between the West and China, beyond simple trade disputes.”

Systemic Rivalry: Beyond Trade

Two Models of Society in Irreducible Competition

The conflict between China and the West is not, at its core, a trade dispute. It is a systemic rivalry between two governance models, two conceptions of world order. The liberal West rests on the separation of powers, freedom of the press, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law. The Chinese model rests on Party supremacy, mass surveillance, dirigiste state capitalism, and a civilizational vision of Chinese superiority. These two models cannot coexist indefinitely in an integrated world order—one will eventually contaminate or marginalize the other.

The Diplomat put it soberly in a June 2026 analysis: “China and the United States are not at war—but they are already in permanent conflict. Instead of manifesting primarily through military confrontations, competition is increasingly playing out through technological standards, investment networks, supply chains, information systems, and competing claims of legitimacy.” This conflict—diffuse, multi-domain, without a visible front line—is precisely the most dangerous, because it is the easiest to deny.

Economic Dependency as a Vector of Vulnerability

The rare earths crisis perfectly illustrates the mechanism of systemic vulnerability. For decades, the West allowed China to dominate the extraction, refining, and manufacturing of critical materials for its own defense and energy transition. This wasn’t a secret—it was a conscious decision dictated by the logic of the lowest cost. The result: Beijing can now threaten the production of Western missiles, satellites, electric vehicles, and wind turbines simply by pulling the lever of its export controls. China doesn’t need to fire a single missile to inflict devastating economic damage on its adversaries.

It is this reality that makes decoupling not only desirable but existentially necessary. A power that can cut off your defense capabilities with the snap of its fingers is not a trading partner—it is a lever of coercion. Brussels recognized that “the current situation of the trade and investment relationship is not sustainable” during the European Commission’s orientation debate on EU-China relations on May 29. This is not a marginal opinion—it is a finding from the world’s leading trading power.

Trump, a Necessary Evil of Western Decoupling

Erratic Diplomacy, Real Results

One must credit Donald Trump for what his political opponents are loath to concede: he has, despite his unpredictability, helped force the West to look the Chinese threat in the face. The Trump 1.0 era tariffs, imposed starting in 2018, marked the beginning of the end of the Washington consensus on benign engagement with China. His aggressive trade confrontation forced European allies to recalibrate their own relationship with Beijing. His deal with Iran—however opportunistic—freed up the G7’s maneuvering room to tighten sanctions on Russia.

But Trump remains an unpredictable actor in the theater of Sino-Western rivalry. While Macron sought a common G7 approach to China in Évian, Washington had not put China on its list of priorities for the summit. Trump is simultaneously negotiating an extension of the trade truce with Beijing, which expires in November 2026. A “U.S.-China Trade Council” has just been launched to reduce tariffs in strategic sectors. This Trumpian double game—military designation on one hand, trade negotiation on the other—is both contradictory and, in a way, representative of the unresolved tension at the heart of Western strategy regarding Beijing.

The Real G7 Divide: A Borderline on China

Politico described the “the G7 divide” on June 15: Trump arriving in Évian ready to act alone on China, while Macron sought a coordinated approach. This is not an anecdotal detail—it is a reflection of a structural divergence over the speed and method of decoupling. The Europeans, who are already seeing Chinese exports redirected toward their markets because of the American tariff wall, have every interest in coordinated action. The Commission has warned that the dumping of Chinese exports into Europe risks creating a “'China shock' sequel in Europe” similar to the one that destroyed hundreds of thousands of American manufacturing jobs in the 2000s.

The good news from Évian is that despite the divisions, the G7 produced a substantial joint declaration on China—limiting critical mineral dependency to 60%, creating a Critical Minerals Alliance, and committing to enhanced supply chain monitoring. This is not the ultimate reckoning of decoupling. But it is an institutional architecture that, if implemented seriously, can create the conditions for progressive strategic autonomy. Trump, whether a necessary evil or an erratic fraud depending on the day, has at least helped make this conversation unavoidable.

The Axis of Autocrats: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea

A Consolidating Anti-Western Common Front

The meta-authoritarian threat documented by CEPA in June 2026 precisely describes how four regimes—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—are increasingly coordinating their actions to undermine the Western order. Russian factories built with Iranian drone technology, staffed by North Korean workers, and equipped with Chinese components—this image, evoked during a U.S. Congressional hearing in June, summarizes the nature of the threat. It is not a formal alliance in the sense of mutual defense treaties. It is operational cooperation centered around a shared objective: weakening American power and dismantling the liberal order.

U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, in her testimony before the Senate on June 21, 2026, confirmed that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are “researching and developing a range of advanced nuclear and conventional-capable missile systems” that put American territory within reach. Influence operations—documented in a first-half 2026 report by a counter-interference unit—show Russia, Iran, and China as the three primary global sources of foreign information campaigns, with growing sophistication. The information front is an extension of the military front.

China, the Leading Power of the Axis

Within this axis, China occupies a unique position: it is simultaneously the most economically powerful, the most technologically advanced, and the most diplomatically skillful. Unlike Russia—impoverished, isolated, and engaged in a devastating war of attrition—China still possesses massive economic leverage over its adversaries. It buys American soybeans, sells European solar panels, and finances infrastructure in the Global South. This position allows it to present itself simultaneously as an indispensable partner and as the logistical support for bloody regimes.

The May 2026 Xi-Putin summit in Moscow displayed this architecture with brutal clarity: commitments on AI, satellite navigation, and long-term economic planning—all aimed at “reducing dependence on the West,” according to the joint statement cited by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The joint statement criticized American missile defense initiatives, sanctions, and “certain aspects of the existing international order.” This is not rhetoric—it is a political program. And China is its primary financier.

Semiconductors: The Decisive Battle of the 21st Century

Chip Warfare as a Total Metaphor

If rare earths are the economic sinew of decoupling, semiconductors are its strategic heart. The ability to design and manufacture advanced chips will determine military superiority, sovereign artificial intelligence, and industrial competitiveness in the coming century. This is precisely why U.S. export controls on lithography equipment to China—and particularly restrictions on ASML—have become a major friction point. In June 2026, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick expressed concerns to ASML leadership regarding the possibility that one of its cutting-edge machines reached China in violation of export restrictions. ASML denied any violation.

The designation of YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies) and CXMT on the Pentagon’s military list confirms that Washington views Chinese memory chip manufacturers as instruments of the military-industrial complex. The Chinese law State Council Order No. 839, which came into force on June 15, 2026, codifies a unified legal framework that goes far beyond simple mining regulations—it is a legislative architecture designed to control the entire outward technological flow of the country. Beijing is building its technological fortress at the same time the West is trying to raise its own ramparts.

Dependency in Civilian-Military Technology Matters

The designation of Huawei on the 1260H list is no surprise—Huawei has been on it for several years. But the addition of CATL, the world leader in electric vehicle batteries, illustrates the broadening of the American definition of risk. CATL batteries power Teslas, BMWs, and Fords. They are at the heart of the Western energy transition. If Washington considers CATL a military entity, the implication is clear: the energy transition itself has become a vector of strategic dependence. The entire EV value chain—from Bolivian lithium mines to Chinese graphite anodes to Shenzhen batteries—is falling under the potential control of a hostile power.

China’s response to these pressures has been predictable but revealing: in June 2026, Beijing banned the export of all dual-use goods to Japanese military users, officially to “contain the remilitarization of Japan”—but in reality as a deterrent signal to any allied country that dares to cross red lines. China is using its dominant positions in global supply chains as full-fledged instruments of geopolitical coercion. This is no longer ordinary commercial competition. This is economic warfare.

Ukraine as the Outpost of Western Resistance

Zelensky Facing the Full Authoritarian Axis

It must be stated clearly: Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainians who have been fighting since February 2022 are not just defending their territory. They are defending the proof that resistance to autocratic aggression is possible. Every Ukrainian drone shot down over Kyiv, every counter-offensive that pushes back Russian forces, is a message addressed not only to Moscow but also to Beijing: the cost of military aggression is prohibitive, even with the support of the world’s largest economic power. If Ukraine had folded, the lesson for Taiwan, for Georgia, and for all small democratic states neighboring autocratic powers would have been catastrophic.

The Évian G7 reaffirmed its “indefatigable support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Leaders announced increased support in air defense systems, additional missiles, and military production licenses to increase Ukrainian arms production. Zelensky expressed his gratitude, specifically highlighting the importance of increased pressure on Russia. This Western support is not charity—it is an investment in the demonstration that the liberal order can defend its values.

Sanctions Pressure: A Financial War of Attrition

According to the G7 declaration on geopolitical issues of June 17, sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sectors will be significantly strengthened. This hardening is made possible by the agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which reduces dependence on Russian energy exports to compensate for any market disruption. The UK has already reduced the Russian oil price cap to less than $50 a barrel, down from the $60 initially agreed upon. Japan and Canada have followed suit. The United States remains alone in applying the original cap—another illustration of tensions within the coalition.

These sanctions have a documented effect, even if insufficient in the absence of Chinese cooperation. They force Russia to sell its oil at a discount, use a ghost fleet of aging tankers, pay exorbitant insurance premiums, and reroute its exports to less lucrative markets. Every billion dollars missing from Russian state revenues is a billion less to finance Putin’s war machine. The problem is that China compensates—through its massive purchases of discounted Russian oil, its alternative financing lines, and its yuan payment system. Fighting Putin without addressing his Chinese support is like plugging leaks in a dam while ignoring the main sluice gate.

De Facto Decoupling Is Already Underway

Signals from the Field: Companies and Investors Are Repositioning

Independent of grand political declarations, decoupling is already an economic reality in motion. Foreign direct investment in China continued to decline in 2025. Major Western multinationals—who don’t always say it publicly—are duplicating their supply chains: one for the Chinese market, one for the rest of the world. The “China+1” concept—setting up alternative production capacity outside of China—is now standard in the strategic planning of Western executive boards. India, Vietnam, Mexico, and Poland are benefiting from these partial relocations.

Institutional investors, for their part, have begun integrating Chinese geopolitical risk into their valuation models. The Pentagon’s military designation of BYD immediately raised questions about the exposure of American pension funds and index funds to these companies. Risk managers can no longer ignore the possibility that Chinese assets could be subject to targeted sanctions. The divestment movement from Chinese assets in Western institutional portfolios has accelerated since 2022, and the new designations of June 2026 have only heightened it.

The Risk of Overreaction and the Importance of Consistency

Strategic decoupling does not mean a total trade rupture. The West needs China for its cheap solar panels during the energy transition. Beijing remains the second-largest global market for European exporters. Certain areas of cooperation—climate change, nuclear non-proliferation—require engagement with Beijing. The nuance of selective decoupling, focused on strategic sectors—defense, semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and critical infrastructure—is an operational necessity, not a moral capitulation.

What must end is the naivety of thinking that economic dependence automatically creates a soothing interdependence. The theory of peace through trade worked, in part, between liberal democracies with shared values. It does not work with a Leninist-nationalist regime that views interdependence as a vulnerability to be exploited, not a shared responsibility. The EU recognized it: “the current relationship is not sustainable.” The G7 enacted it in Évian. We must now move from declaration to a binding institutional architecture.

What the West Must Do Now

Five Pillars of a Coherent Strategy

A credible strategy of strategic decoupling rests on several simultaneous pillars. The first is autonomy in critical minerals: the Évian G7 commitments—the 60% cap by 2030, the price floor mechanism, and coordinated stockpiling—must be implemented with binding compliance mechanisms, not just declarations of intent. The second is strengthened technological control: 1260H lists must be accompanied by real investment bans for the private sector, not just restrictions for Pentagon contracts. The third is sanctions consistency: allies cannot afford the luxury of divergent approaches to the oil cap or energy sanctions—China profits from every crack in the coalition.

The fourth pillar is axis diplomacy: we must stop treating Russia’s supporters—China, Iran, North Korea—in separate boxes. Sanctions on circumventing Russia must reach Chinese banks, oil traders, and shipowners who keep Moscow’s war economy afloat. The EU’s 21st sanctions package is a step in this direction—it must be followed by others. The fifth pillar is democratic solidarity: an Alliance of Democracies expanding the G7 to Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, South Korea, Taiwan—to create an economic and security architecture robust enough to counterbalance China’s weight.

The Urgency of a Clear and Bold Doctrine

The hesitation between “de-risking” and “decoupling” is more than a semantic quarrel. It reflects an inability to accept the uncomfortable truth: China under Xi Jinping is a systemic adversary, not a commercial competitor with whom one can find fair rules of the game. This is not a declaration of war. It is a statement of reality. Democracies can maintain trade relations with authoritarian regimes—but they cannot allow themselves to be strategically vulnerable to their whims.

The European Commission’s decision to mandate supply diversification by law, the G7 commitments on critical minerals, and the sanctions targeting Chinese entities that help Russia—all of these elements point in the same direction. They still lack a coherent and publicly assumed doctrine that clearly names what the facts demonstrate: China, under its current leadership, is the greatest threat to the Western liberal order, not despite its economic power, but because of it. The Évian G7 took a giant step. Now ten more must be taken.

Conclusion: Decoupling Is Not War—It Is Clarity

A World Reconfiguring Around a Real Fault Line

The world is recomposing. Not according to the ideal lines of the theorists of happy globalization, nor according to the apocalyptic fantasies of the proponents of total confrontation. It is following a colder, more pragmatic logic: industrial democracies are progressively recognizing that they have outsourced their strategic security to a power whose interests are fundamentally incompatible with their own. The Évian G7 of June 17, 2026, with its commitments on critical minerals, its strengthened support for Ukraine, and its condemnation of Beijing’s role in the Russian war economy, constitutes a milestone in this process of clarity.

The strategic decoupling for which I call is not a call for isolationism, nor a return to a binary Cold War. It is the recognition that certain dependencies—in critical minerals, semiconductors, military technologies, and critical infrastructure—are existential vulnerabilities that democracies can no longer afford. The facts are there: China trains Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, provides components for drones that kill Ukrainian civilians, supports Putin’s war economy by defying sanctions, and brandishes the threat of cutting off the rare earths the West needs for its own armaments. To call this a strategic partnership would be an insult to intelligence.

The Choice of the Present Generation

The generations that preceded us had to choose, as well. In 1938, some were still calling for appeasement and compromise. In 1947, the architects of the Marshall Plan chose to build a collective security architecture capable of resisting Soviet pressure. Those choices defined decades. The choices we make today—on China, on Ukraine, and on the economic and security architecture of the West—will define the generation to come. Strategic decoupling is not Cold War 2.0. It is the precondition for a lasting peace in the face of a power whose project is to reshape the world order to its advantage.

Zelensky and the Ukrainians are fighting on the front lines of this confrontation. They deserve not only our admiration, but our most concrete commitment: weapons, effective sanctions, and a strategy that does not allow China to fill every gap created by the sanctions we impose on Russia. The G7 began to understand this in Évian. We must now stay the course, despite economic pressures, despite threats from Beijing, and despite the trade negotiations that attempt to bring the Sino-Western relationship back to normalcy. There is no longer any possible normalcy with a China that deliberately chooses to be the arsenal of autocrats.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

G7 Leaders' Statement on Geopolitical Issues — Élysée, June 17, 2026

EU finds evidence of China training Russian soldiers for war in Ukraine — Ukrainska Pravda, June 12, 2026

China Bulletin: June 9, 2026 — U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 9, 2026

Secondary Sources

The China-Russia Authoritarian Meta-Threat — CEPA, June 4, 2026

Pentagon Bans Alibaba, Baidu, BYD From Defense Contracts — Tech Times, June 12, 2026

Japan seeks G7 price floors to break China's rare earth grip — Asia Times, June 20, 2026

EU Commission Announces 21st Sanctions Package Against Russia — Baker McKenzie, June 12, 2026

G7 leaders commit to tighten Russian oil, gas sanctions — S&P Global Energy, June 17, 2026