COMMENTARY: The BIOSECURE Act, WuXi AppTec, and the Technological War Against the CRINK Axis

When biotechnology becomes a geopolitical battlefield

While the world was watching the Strait of Hormuz and the Versailles USA-Iran negotiations, another war was unfolding silently in laboratories, American federal registers, and the boardrooms of global biotechnology companies. The BIOSECURE Act 2026, incorporated into the NDAA 2026, added WuXi AppTec to restricted federal contract lists — according to the Claw Street Journal. The Trump administration simultaneously extended export controls to the biotech subsidiaries of the BGI group. And in retaliation, China sanctioned 46 American companies in defense and rare earths on June 22, 2026.

These events, less spectacular than ballistic missiles or declarations of Strait of Hormuz closure, nonetheless represent one of the most decisive battlefields of the competition between Western democracies and the authoritarian axis. The technological war — for control of genomic data, pharmaceutical supply chains, semiconductors, and rare earths — is a war won or lost not over a few days of diplomatic negotiation, but over decades of strategic investments, regulatory decisions, and industrial choices.

This commentary: taking a position in a war few understand

I am a generalist columnist-analyst, not a biotechnology expert. But I am someone who observes global geopolitics with the attention of a trend specialist — and the clearest underlying trend of the 2020–2030 decade is this: technology has become the new oil, and control of technological supply chains is the new central issue in the rivalry between great powers. The BIOSECURE Act and its implications are not technical details — they are the symbol of a fundamental transformation in the nature of global geopolitical competition.

This commentary aims to explain why these apparently technical decisions are in reality of major strategic importance, how they fit into the broader technological war against the CRINK axis, and what the West must do to win this war — not merely react to Chinese initiatives, but proactively build a technological sovereignty that reduces the vulnerabilities that WuXi AppTec and BGI illustrate so perfectly.

WuXi AppTec and BGI: two names that most Western citizens do not know, yet whose activities directly touch the national security of their countries. The technological war is won in the obscurity of federal registers and boardrooms. Less photogenic than an intercepted tanker — but just as decisive.

The Chinese pharmaceutical outsourcing giant

WuXi AppTec is one of the world's largest pharmaceutical and biotechnology outsourcing companies. It provides research, development, and manufacturing services to hundreds of global pharmaceutical companies — including American and European giants. Its service platform covers the entire drug development chain, from initial molecules to clinical trials through large-scale manufacturing.

This central position in the global pharmaceutical supply chain is precisely what makes it a national security concern. American pharmaceutical companies that used WuXi AppTec for R&D and manufacturing activities potentially transmitted sensitive data about their development programs — data on new molecules, proprietary manufacturing methods, therapeutic strategies. This data, in the hands of a company under potential Chinese control, represents a risk of industrial espionage and transfer of intellectual property to Chinese competitors.

Integration into the NDAA 2026: a strong political signal

The integration of the BIOSECURE Act into the NDAA 2026 — the annual national defense authorization act — is a strong political signal from the US Congress. It means that the question of WuXi AppTec is no longer merely a concern of regulatory agencies or the business world: it is now formally linked to American national security. Federal agencies, defense contractors, and any company working with the American government are now formally prohibited from working with WuXi AppTec under federal contracts.

This is a decision with significant consequences for the American pharmaceutical industry. WuXi AppTec was a sought-after subcontractor for its production capacity, competitive costs, and service quality. Its exclusion from federal contracts forces American companies to find alternatives — which will take time, cost money, and disrupt some supply chains. But this is the price to be paid to reduce a strategic dependency on an entity potentially linked to a geopolitical adversary.

WuXi AppTec is a brilliant example of what strategists call a hidden strategic dependency. No one thought of a pharmaceutical supply chain as a national security risk vector. And yet, it is — and it took the NDAA 2026 for this risk to be officially recognized and addressed.

BGI and its global genomic databases

The BGI group (Beijing Genomics Institute) is the world's largest genomics player — the study and sequencing of human and other organism genomes. BGI has sequenced millions of genomes worldwide, accumulating genomic databases of unprecedented scale. These databases represent an extraordinarily valuable strategic asset for medical research — but also potentially for military and security applications that defense biology experts are raising with growing concern.

The potential military applications of genomic data are multiple and troubling. First, analysis of large genomic populations could allow identification of biological vulnerabilities specific to certain ethnic groups — a potential tool for developing targeted biological weapons. Second, genomic data can reveal information about health, medical predispositions, and even certain behavioral characteristics of a population — valuable intelligence for intelligence services or manipulation programs. Third, BGI's dominance in global genomics gives it a leverage over a global scientific infrastructure whose strategic implications are still poorly understood.

Export controls extended to BGI subsidiaries

The extension by the Trump administration of export controls to the biotech subsidiaries of the BGI group represents a significant escalation in the USA-China technological war. These controls limit transfers of American technology to BGI group entities — potentially reducing their access to equipment, software, and biotechnological expertise developed in the United States or by American partners.

The logic is similar to semiconductor controls: preventing China from using technologies developed with Western research funding and innovative ecosystems to build military or security capabilities that would be turned against the West. It is a strategy of selective technological decoupling — not a total economic decoupling from China, but a targeted reduction of dependencies in domains considered sensitive from a national security standpoint.

Genomic data as a national security tool. This is the 21st century in all its troubling complexity. When millions of human genomes end up in the servers of a company linked to an authoritarian regime, the question is no longer merely medical — it is profoundly geopolitical. BGI understood this before we did. Time to act.

Beijing's response: immediate and targeted

China's response to the BIOSECURE measures and export controls against BGI was immediate, targeted, and of significant scope. On June 22, 2026, China banned 46 American companies — primarily in the defense sector — from Chinese public procurement, according to CNBC. Simultaneously, it imposed targeted sanctions on 10 American companies in defense and rare earths, including players such as MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, and Teal Drones.

This targeted response on rare earths and defense companies is revealing of Chinese strategy: strike where the West is most vulnerable — in its dependencies on critical raw materials and its defense supply chains. MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are companies working precisely to reduce American dependence on Chinese rare earths. Sanctioning them sends a message: if you try to reduce your dependence on our raw materials, we will make that process as painful as possible.

Rare earths: the Western Achilles heel

Rare earths — a group of 17 chemical elements with exceptional magnetic and electronic properties — are indispensable to the production of a wide range of advanced technologies: military aircraft engines, missile guidance systems, electric vehicle batteries, mobile phones, wind turbines, and much more. China controls approximately 60% of global rare earth production and an even larger share of their processing and refining. This is a de facto monopoly position that gives Beijing extraordinary geopolitical leverage.

Chinese counter-sanctions on MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are a warning shot: China is prepared to use its rare earth monopoly as a geopolitical weapon if the technological war with Washington intensifies. This is a credible and serious threat — and it is why investments in rare earth extraction and processing capabilities outside China are an urgent strategic priority for the United States and its allies. The Chinese counter-sanctions of June 22 accelerate the urgency of this diversification.

MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Teal Drones: three names that say everything about the new geography of the technological war. China sanctions precisely the companies seeking to reduce its dominance over critical raw materials. This is a coherent and dangerous counter-strategy — and the West cannot afford to underestimate it.

Legislation that reflects a paradigm shift

The BIOSECURE Act incorporated in the NDAA 2026 is not an isolated initiative — it is the expression of a profound paradigm shift in American policy toward China. Since 2017–2018, the bipartisan consensus in Washington has progressively shifted from a view of China as a difficult economic partner to manage toward a view of China as a systemic adversary whose geopolitical ambitions threaten the American international order. This paradigm shift translates into a series of legislative and regulatory measures seeking to reduce American strategic dependencies on China in key domains.

The NDAA 2026 fits into this trend. It provides not only restrictions on WuXi AppTec, but also other measures aimed at strengthening American defense industrial capacity, reducing Chinese dependencies in military supply chains, and developing national capabilities in critical technologies. It is legislation that reflects an awareness that competition with China cannot be won solely with conventional weapons — it also requires a technological and industrial sovereignty that decades of globalization have progressively eroded.

The implementation challenge

Adopting the BIOSECURE Act is one thing — implementing it is another. Pharmaceutical companies that worked with WuXi AppTec now need to find alternatives — which takes time, costs money, and can create disruptions in drug development timelines. Pharmaceutical outsourcing capacity in the United States and allied countries must be rapidly developed to absorb the activities that WuXi AppTec previously performed.

This implementation challenge is similar to that posed by semiconductor decoupling. Europe and the United States have massively invested in increasing their chip production capacity through the American CHIPS Act and equivalent European initiatives. Comparable investment will be needed in pharmaceutical and biotech outsourcing capacity to prevent the BIOSECURE Act from being merely a symbolic measure. This is an industrial opportunity — but also a considerable undertaking.

Banning WuXi AppTec without developing national or allied alternatives means creating a hole in the pharmaceutical supply chain without filling it back in. The law is necessary. But it must be accompanied by massive investments in replacement capacity. Half a solution is sometimes worse than no solution at all.

Critical technologies, the same strategic logic

The BIOSECURE Act and the BGI controls fit into a broader technological war that the United States is waging against China on multiple fronts simultaneously. Restrictions on advanced semiconductors — initiated under Biden and maintained under Trump — aim to prevent China from developing advanced electronic chips that would fuel its artificial intelligence, data processing, and precision weapons capabilities. Restrictions on biotechnology and genomic data aim to prevent China from using global databases and open research infrastructure to develop military biological capabilities.

These two technological wars — semiconductors and biotechnology — share the same strategic logic: reducing Chinese access to dual-use technologies that could strengthen Beijing's military and security capabilities. It is a strategy of selective decoupling that seeks to preserve the benefits of economic interdependence with China in low-strategic-risk domains, while reducing dependencies in high-risk domains.

Artificial intelligence in the equation

Beyond semiconductors and biotechnology, the technological war with China includes a third front of growing importance: artificial intelligence. BGI's genomic data are not merely valuable for traditional biology — they are potential training datasets for AI systems that China is developing at an impressive pace. The combination of large biological databases and advanced AI capabilities could enable breakthroughs in computational biology and defense biology that the West does not yet fully anticipate.

This is why export controls on BGI subsidiaries are not only about sequencing instruments or biological reagents — they are also about the software, algorithms, and AI capabilities that allow genomic data to be exploited. The convergence between biology and AI is one of the most promising — and most dangerous — technological frontiers of the coming decades. And decisions made in 2025–2026 about Chinese access to these technologies could have lasting consequences for global security in the decades ahead.

Genomic data plus artificial intelligence, in the hands of an authoritarian regime that practices mass surveillance of its own population: this is the most troubling combination of the 21st-century technological landscape. Restrictions on BGI are not a minor commercial detail — they are a line of defense in a war playing out on time horizons our brains struggle to grasp.

Europe lagging in the technological war

While the United States adopts the BIOSECURE Act and extends export controls on BGI, Europe remains behind in defining and implementing a coherent policy of technological sovereignty. Certainly, the EU has adopted important regulations — the GDPR on data protection, the Digital Markets Act on digital markets — but it has not yet developed a policy as clear and aggressive as that of the United States on reducing technological dependencies on China.

This asymmetry creates a risk: if Europe maintains critical technological dependencies on China in domains where the United States has begun decoupling, American companies could relocate some of their activities to European countries to circumvent American restrictions — which would create new vulnerabilities in the transatlantic alliance. Harmonizing export control and technological sovereignty policies between the United States and its European allies is a strategic priority that the NATO summit of July 2026 should address explicitly.

Technological sovereignty as a European project

Europe must build its own vision of technological sovereignty — not simply follow American initiatives or Chinese decisions, but define its own priorities and its own instruments. This requires investments in research and production capabilities in strategic sectors — semiconductors, biotechnology, AI, rare earths — that reduce external dependencies and strengthen European industrial capacity.

France, Germany, and the Netherlands — with their respective industrial champions in microelectronics (ASML), pharmaceuticals (Sanofi), and other sectors — are well positioned to contribute to this European technological sovereignty. But this requires closer coordination between national industrial policies and European industrial policy, significant public investment in research and innovation, and a political will to make difficult decisions on the management of commercial relations with China.

Europe lagging in the technological war: this may be the most concerning diagnosis of the geopolitical situation in 2026. The United States acts, China reacts, and Europe observes. It is time for Europe to equip itself with a technological sovereignty strategy commensurate with the stakes. Not in ten years. Now.

WuXi AppTec as a node in the CRINK network

The BIOSECURE Act takes on its full meaning in the context of the CRINK axis. WuXi AppTec and BGI are not simply Chinese technology companies raising commercial concerns — they are potential nodes in an information-gathering and technology-transfer network that feeds the military and security capabilities of China and, indirectly, of its partners in the authoritarian axis. According to the Claw Street Journal, the BIOSECURE Act fits precisely into this logic of dismantling technological supply networks that feed the military-industrial complex of CRINK axis members.

The same logic guiding European sanctions on Chinese electronic components supplied to Russia (20th sanctions package) applies to the BIOSECURE Act: identify and cut the technological flows that feed adversary capabilities. It is a technological attrition war played out in federal registers and sanctions lists — less visible than an air strike, but potentially more effective in the long term for degrading adversaries' capabilities.

North Korea and biotechnologies: an underappreciated risk

One of the least covered aspects of risks linked to the biotechnology supply chain concerns North Korea. Pyongyang has made significant investments in biological capabilities — a biological warfare program that remains one of the most opaque among states possessing one. Recent research suggests that North Korea exploits outsourcing and technology transfer networks that sometimes involve Chinese intermediaries.

In this context, restricting BGI's access to advanced biotechnological technologies is not only a measure against China directly — it is also a precaution against technology flows that could transit via Beijing to Pyongyang. This is the logic of selective decoupling applied to the entire CRINK chain: cutting technological flows at the source to prevent them from spreading through the military and scientific cooperation networks that authoritarian axis members have developed.

North Korea and biotechnologies: a topic the media avoid, perhaps because it is too technical, perhaps because it is too alarming. Pyongyang is investing in biological weapons. These weapons require technologies that China can supply. Restrictions on BGI target this chain — even if no one says so this directly.

Powerful lobbies against the restrictions

Implementation of the BIOSECURE Act faces organized resistance from the American pharmaceutical industry. Many major players in the sector — Pfizer, Merck, Eli Lilly, and others — had developed significant outsourcing relationships with WuXi AppTec for R&D and manufacturing activities. These companies argue that excluding WuXi AppTec will create disruptions in their supply chains, increase their costs, and slow new drug development.

These arguments are not without foundation — the transition effects are real and costly. But they are insufficient to justify maintaining strategic dependencies in sensitive areas of national security. The American pharmaceutical industry must understand that technological sovereignty and national security have a cost — and that this cost must be borne, with appropriate government support policies to facilitate the transition.

The need for a political transition support program

For the BIOSECURE Act to be effective without creating major disruptions in the American pharmaceutical industry, it must be accompanied by a clear political transition support program. This program should include tax incentives for developing pharmaceutical outsourcing capacity in the United States and allied countries, research funding to accelerate development of alternatives to WuXi AppTec services, and a phased implementation timeline giving companies time to adapt without excessive disruption.

Without this support, the BIOSECURE Act risks producing counterproductive effects: it could push American companies to internalize their activities in China rather than in the United States, to circumvent restrictions on federal contracts while maintaining their access to Chinese outsourcing capabilities. This would be precisely the reverse of the intended objective. Technological sovereignty policy must be intelligent enough to create incentives for relocating activities to allied geographies rather than simply prohibiting without offering alternatives.

Pharmaceutical lobbies against the BIOSECURE Act: a legitimate fight defending real economic interests. But in the geopolitical balance, commercial competitiveness arguments must yield to national security imperatives when the two conflict. This is not protectionism — it is strategic survival.

A Chinese monopoly built over thirty years

China's dominance over rare earths is not a geological accident — it is the result of a deliberate industrial strategy conducted by Beijing over several decades. As early as the 1990s, China massively invested in rare earth extraction and processing capabilities, maintained artificially low prices to eliminate international competitors, and developed a dominant position in refining capabilities that transform raw ores into materials usable by industry. As a result: today, even countries that have rare earth deposits on their territory are often dependent on China for their processing.

Chinese counter-sanctions of June 22, 2026 on MP Materials and USA Rare Earth perfectly illustrate how Beijing uses this monopoly as geopolitical leverage. These American companies are working precisely to build rare earth extraction and processing capabilities outside China — and sanctioning them is an attempt to slow this diversification process. It is a coherent strategy: maintain the monopoly by preventing the emergence of domestic competitors in adversary countries.

The necessary investments for diversification

Diversifying the rare earth supply chain is a strategic necessity for the West — but it is a colossal investment that will take years. New extraction sites need to be developed in Canada, Australia, Africa, and other geologically endowed regions. Processing and refining capacity needs to be built outside China. Substitution technologies need to be developed to reduce the use of critical rare earths in military and civilian applications. And these efforts need to be coordinated between the United States and its allies to avoid duplication and maximize investment effectiveness.

This process has already begun — the Quad (USA, Australia, India, Japan) has established critical mineral cooperation initiatives, and several bilateral agreements have been signed to develop alternative supply chains. But the pace remains insufficient relative to the geopolitical urgency. And Chinese counter-sanctions on American rare earth companies are a painful reminder that Beijing is monitoring and intends to thwart these diversification initiatives.

The West took thirty years to become dependent on Chinese rare earths. It may take as many to break free. That is a luxury of time that the current geopolitical competition does not guarantee. The urgency is real — and the investments must be commensurate with that urgency.

Drones in Beijing's crosshairs

The inclusion of Teal Drones in the Chinese counter-sanctions of June 22 reveals an additional dimension of the technological war: military drone systems. Teal Drones is an American company specializing in small military drones — systems that have found important applications in modern combat contexts, including in Ukraine where small reconnaissance and attack drones have played a crucial tactical role.

By sanctioning Teal Drones, Beijing sends several simultaneous messages. To American military drone manufacturers: your activities are in our crosshairs. To potential Asian buyers: companies sourcing from Teal Drones risk complications with China. And to American policymakers: the drone war is not played out only in Ukraine — it is also played out in the commercial and regulatory wars that will determine who has access to these technologies in the coming decades.

Ukrainian drones and the global technological chain

The drones defending Ukraine perfectly illustrate the stakes of the global technological war. The spectacular successes of Ukrainian drones — FPV reconnaissance drones, naval surface drones — have demonstrated that cheap and numerous drone systems can transform the dynamics of a military conflict. But these drones depend on electronic components, sensors, and software of which a significant portion is produced or processed in China.

The technological war between the United States and China therefore directly impacts Ukraine's ability to maintain and develop its drone systems. Restrictions on technology exports to China, and Chinese counter-measures, disrupt global supply chains on which Ukraine partly depends. This is a dimension of the technological war of which Zelensky is perfectly aware — and which reinforces the urgency for the West to develop alternative supply chains for critical components.

The Ukrainian drones defending Kyiv sometimes depend on components transiting through supply chains linked to China. That is the painful irony of technological globalization: our allies are partially dependent on our adversaries for their weapons. Reducing this dependency is a priority — not tomorrow, today.

The concrete numbers of the escalation

According to data published by CNBC on June 22, 2026, China's June 22 measures break down into several categories. First, 46 American companies — primarily in the defense sector — were banned from Chinese public procurement. This is a considerable Chinese government purchasing market from which these companies were either already benefiting or aiming to benefit from future contracts. Second, export controls were imposed on certain materials and components that China was supplying to American companies — reducing American access to these resources.

These targeted measures demonstrate growing sophistication in the Chinese strategy of economic reprisals. Beijing no longer merely employs general tariffs — it uses more precise instruments targeting specifically the supply chains and markets on which the targeted American companies depend on China. This is an adaptation of China's economic strategy to the realities of a trade war where surgical precision is more effective than generalized retaliation.

The escalation and its derailment risks

The USA-China technological escalation raises the specter of a slide toward a major economic conflict affecting both economies and, by extension, the global economy. A total commercial and technological war between the two largest economies in the world would have devastating consequences for global growth, supply chains, and consumers in all countries. This is why managing the escalation is as important as the restrictions policy itself.

The United States and China both have an interest in keeping the escalation at a manageable level — high enough to produce strategic effects, not high enough to trigger mutual economic collapse. This is the delicate balance that both parties are trying to maintain — even if miscalculations or miscommunication can tip the situation. International coordination — in NATO, in the G7, in multilateral commercial bodies — is indispensable for maintaining this balance and preventing derailment.

The USA-China technological escalation is the most underdiscussed systemic risk of 2026. If it degenerates into total economic decoupling, the damage to the global economy would be comparable — or even greater — than those of a major financial recession. Managing this escalation intelligently is a responsibility that leaders on both sides cannot delegate.

A strategy in five axes

Winning the technological war against the CRINK axis requires a coherent multi-pronged strategy. First, reduce critical dependencies: develop national or allied capabilities in strategic domains — rare earths, semiconductors, biotechnology, drones — to reduce vulnerability to counter-sanctions like those of June 22. Second, invest massively in R&D to maintain technological leadership in key domains — artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, quantum systems — where China seeks to catch up with and surpass the West.

Third, harmonize export policies among allies to prevent American restrictions from being circumvented via allied third-party countries. Fourth, develop economically attractive alternatives for countries currently dependent on Chinese technologies or markets — so that the choice to reduce ties with China comes with economic opportunities rather than simply costs. Fifth, invest in institutional resilience — regulatory agencies, verification mechanisms, and counterintelligence capabilities that allow technological threats to be detected and neutralized proactively rather than reactively.

The urgency for Ukraine in this context

For Ukraine, the USA-China technological war is both an opportunity and a risk. An opportunity because the strengthening of Western technological capabilities in drones, semiconductors, and other domains directly relevant to modern military combat reinforces Kyiv's assets. A risk because disruptions in global technological supply chains can affect deliveries of armaments and critical components to Ukraine.

Zelensky needs his Western allies to win the technological war against the CRINK axis — not only for their own strategic interests, but so that Ukraine continues to receive the weapons and technologies that allow it to resist. The war in Ukraine is also a technological war — between Putin's Iranian drones and Zelensky's Western defense systems. Every advance in Western technological sovereignty is an advance for Ukrainian resistance.

Winning the technological war against the CRINK axis is also supporting Zelensky. The connection is direct — even if it runs through less visible paths than sending tanks or missiles. The drones defending Kyiv tomorrow will be built with components no longer dependent on Beijing or WuXi AppTec. That is the world we must build. And we can build it.

The European Union and its vulnerability in the biopharmaceutical chain

The European Union faces a structural vulnerability comparable to that of the United States in the biopharmaceutical sector. Companies like WuXi AppTec and its affiliates have deeply penetrated the outsourcing chain of European laboratories, offering chemistry and molecular biology services at prices that European providers struggle to compete with. This dependency is less visible than semiconductor dependency, but equally strategically risky.

The European Commission launched an initiative in 2025 to map critical dependencies in the biopharmaceutical sector. Preliminary results are alarming: several essential drugs — notably cancer treatments and antivirals — have supply chains that pass entirely or partially through Chinese providers. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis, this dependency could become a weapon of economic coercion with direct human consequences.

European biopharmaceutical sovereignty initiatives

Several European initiatives aim to rebuild sovereign biopharmaceutical capacity. The IPCEI Health program funds pharmaceutical research and production projects on European territory. Significant investments have been announced in France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands to recreate chemical synthesis capabilities that were offshored to Asia over the past two decades. These efforts are real but insufficient given the scale of the challenge.

These initiatives face a fundamental obstacle: production cost. A European chemical synthesis provider costs on average three to five times more than an equivalent Chinese provider. For pharmaceutical laboratories operating in a competitive global market, the economic choice often remains the Chinese option. Reversing this trend requires either massive state subsidies or regulations that incorporate the geopolitical cost into sourcing decisions — a paradigm shift that is difficult to impose.

Europe learned from the COVID-19 pandemic that dependence on Chinese health supply chains was a strategic vulnerability. It drew the lesson — partially. But the American BIOSECURE Act gives Europe an additional opportunity: if the United States withdraws its biopharmaceutical contracts from China, capacity is freed up. Europe can seize this — or let others do so. This is a political choice, not an economic destiny.

A war that cannot be seen but decides the future

This commentary has sought to show that the BIOSECURE Act, the restrictions on BGI, and the Chinese counter-sanctions of June 22, 2026 are far more than technical details of commercial policy — they are the visible expressions of an underground technological war whose stakes are as important as those of traditional military conflicts. This war is won in laboratories, in boardrooms, in the federal registers of the United States and its allies — not on battlefields.

Winning it requires clear-sightedness about the dependencies that decades of globalization have created, political determination to accept the short-term costs of reducing those dependencies, and international coordination among democracies that allows the technological sovereignty to be collectively built that no single country can build alone. This is not an easy program. But it is a necessary program — and an urgent one.

For the West, for democracy, for Zelensky

The technological war is not separable from the military war in Ukraine or from global geopolitical competition. These are dimensions of the same conflict between two visions of the world: that of liberal democracies who believe technology must serve universal human progress, and that of authoritarian regimes that use technology as a tool of control, surveillance, and power projection. In this conflict, every decision — on WuXi AppTec, on BGI, on rare earths, on drones — is a taking of sides. And our side must be that of freedom, democracy, and respect for the sovereignty of peoples. That of Zelensky and of those who, like him, resist with courage the brutality of authoritarianism.

The BIOSECURE Act is not an endpoint — it is a beginning. It signals a paradigm shift: national security now includes biopharmaceutical supply chains. What the United States had the courage to legislate, Europe must now have the courage to implement in its own industrial policies. The post-BIOSECURE biopharmaceutical world will be different — more costly in the short term, safer in the long term. That is the price of sovereignty. And it is a price worth paying.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.