COLUMN: $90 billion more, the real price of fear

Introduction

Since 2024, NATO's European allies have raised their defense spending by roughly $90 billion in constant 2021 prices, an increase that reaches $139 billion in nominal terms for 2025 alone, according to data reported by Forbes. Ninety billion dollars is not a figure you carve into a victory statement; it is the price you agree to pay once you have understood, too late, that you underestimated a neighbor.

This column revisits what these numbers really tell us: not a sudden generosity from European capitals, but a budget correction forced by years of underinvestment, accelerated by the war in Ukraine and confirmed collectively at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026.

This column takes a stance that treats the scale of this budget effort seriously, without giving in either to the self-congratulation of official statements or to the easy cynicism of claiming these numbers will change nothing.

Ninety billion, a figure that deserves explaining

An increase measured in constant prices, not nominal illusions

The $90 billion figure corresponds to an increase measured in constant 2021 prices, a method that neutralizes the effect of inflation and allows real budget efforts to be compared year over year, rather than being impressed by artificially inflated nominal numbers. An inflation-adjusted figure is a figure that does not cheat; that alone is, in itself, a form of respect toward readers.

This column treats this methodological detail as essential to understanding the real scale of the effort made by European allies since 2024, beyond the political communication that often accompanies these announcements.

What this figure represents concretely on the ground

Ninety billion dollars represents, concretely, thousands of weapons systems, tens of thousands of industrial jobs, and a deep reorganization of European military production chains, an effort that is not limited to an abstract budget line in a NATO annual report.

This column treats this concrete materiality as the best way to understand what this sum really represents, rather than treating it as a mere political symbol disconnected from the ground.

$139 billion in nominal terms, the year everything accelerated

A 20% increase in a single year

In nominal terms, European allies raised their defense spending by $139 billion in 2025 alone, an increase of roughly 20% compared with the previous year, according to Forbes. A twenty percent increase in a single year is not a budget adjustment; it is the kind of turn you only take when you are afraid, genuinely afraid.

This column treats this 2025 acceleration as the pivotal moment when budget intentions displayed for several years finally translated into concrete, verifiable figures.

What drove this acceleration

This 2025 budget acceleration is not explained by a single isolated factor, but by the convergence of several years of documented war in Ukraine, repeated incidents on NATO's eastern flank, and growing political pressure to honor the Alliance's collective budget commitments.

This column does not claim to isolate a single factor among these multiple causes, but treats their convergence as the most plausible explanation for this sudden acceleration.

Ankara, the summit that turned a trend into a formal commitment

Five percent of GDP by 2035, now a collective goal

The NATO summit in Ankara, on July 7 and 8, 2026, confirmed the collective goal of raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, according to Forbes, turning an already-underway budget trend into a formal commitment binding on all Alliance members. A figure that was once just a trend becomes, once signed collectively, a promise someone can one day hold you to.

This column treats this formalization as an important symbolic turning point, even though it does not, on its own, guarantee that every member country will actually meet this target in the years ahead.

Lithuania, already beyond the target set for 2035

Lithuania, at 5.33% of GDP devoted to defense in 2026 according to Reuters, already exceeds the collective target set for 2035, showing that some Baltic states anticipated, nearly a decade early, a budget trajectory other allies are only now beginning to consider.

This column treats this gap between countries as one of the most revealing elements in this matter: the collective 5% target masks very unequal national realities depending on geographic proximity to the documented threat.

The countries pulling the average up

Five allies already above 3.5% of GDP in 2026

According to Reuters, on July 7, 2026, five NATO members are expected to exceed 3.5% of GDP in defense spending this year, a narrow group that, in effect, carries a disproportionate share of the Alliance's collective displayed effort. Five countries already above 3.5% while others are still debating the trajectory is not a balanced average; it is an effort carried by a committed minority.

This column treats this concentration of budget effort as a reality the Alliance's collective statements tend to smooth over, without always explicitly naming the real gaps between member countries.

What this concentration reveals about the Alliance's solidarity

This concentration of budget effort among a narrow group of countries, often the ones geographically closest to the documented threat, raises a fundamental question about real solidarity within NATO, beyond the collective commitments displayed at summits.

This column treats this question as central to understanding the internal tensions that accompany, in practice, the implementation of the 5% of GDP target set collectively in Ankara.

The contrast with Germany's Eurofighter withdrawal

A paradox hard to ignore

This figure of $139 billion in nominal increase in 2025 contrasts with the withdrawal, on March 24, 2026, of German Eurofighter jets from their base in Poland, according to Euronews, a withdrawal that happened during the same period when Baltic defense ministers were demanding a strengthened eastern flank. You cannot spend more money and withdraw aircraft at the same time without someone, eventually, noticing the contradiction.

This column does not claim these two facts stem from the same decision-making logic, but it refuses to treat them as two entirely independent matters.

What this contrast says about the gap between money and capability

This contrast illustrates a broader lesson: increased defense budgets do not automatically, or immediately, translate into an equivalent increase in operational capability deployed on the ground, a gap this column considers essential to name clearly.

This column treats this gap as one of the most important lessons of this period, beyond the sheer spectacular figure of the $90 billion in additional spending.

PURL, proof that money can become real munitions

Six billion dollars mobilized in ten months

The PURL mechanism, launched by the Netherlands in September 2025, had mobilized more than $6 billion by June 2026 according to NATO, financing 75% of the Patriot interceptors delivered to Ukraine. This column treats this mechanism as the most tangible proof that money announced collectively can actually turn into munitions delivered on the ground. PURL is living proof that ninety billion dollars is not condemned to remain a line in a ledger; it can become an interceptor that shoots down a missile.

This column treats this contrast between PURL and the German withdrawal as proof that turning money into capability depends less on overall budget volume than on precise implementation choices.

Twenty-one allies and two partners engaged in this mechanism

The participation of 21 allies and two partners in the PURL mechanism, according to NATO data updated on July 13, 2026, shows a broad collective buy-in that contrasts with the concentration of budget effort observed for national defense spending alone.

This column treats this broad participation as an encouraging sign, even though it does not, on its own, guarantee this mechanism's continuity beyond 2026.

The Baltic drone wall, another billion for detection

A project directly tied to the documented fear of incidents

The Baltic drone wall project, estimated at roughly one billion euros according to Defence Ukraine, concretely illustrates how part of this regional budget effort translates into detection projects responding directly to drone incidents documented since early 2026. One billion euros to watch a sky is the concrete price of a fear that, this time, rests on real incidents rather than hypotheses.

This column treats this project as one example among others of how the overall budget increase breaks down into concrete regional initiatives, each with its own timeline and its own uncertainties.

Full capability pushed back to late 2027

The system's full capability is not expected before the end of 2027, a delay that reminds us that increased budgets do not produce instant operational results, even when funds are actually committed and projects launched.

This column treats this delay as a useful reminder for those legitimately impatient for quick results after the announcement of impressive budget figures.

What these figures do not say

No guarantee of future political consistency

None of these figures, neither the $90 billion in constant prices nor the $139 billion in nominal terms for 2025, guarantees the political consistency of European governments in the years after 2026, in the face of possible shifts in majority or internal budget priorities. A figure voted this year promises nothing for next year; defense budgets, like all political promises, get revised.

This column treats this uncertainty as the most important limit to keep in mind against the enthusiasm these record figures can legitimately generate.

The gap between budget commitment and operational effectiveness

These figures also say nothing about the real operational effectiveness of the equipment purchased with these additional budgets, a question distinct from the sheer financial volume committed by European governments since 2024.

This column treats this distinction between budget volume and real effectiveness as essential to avoid confusing the scale of a financial effort with a guarantee of its operational success.

What these figures nevertheless say, sincerely

A break with decades of documented underinvestment

Despite these limits, this column holds that these figures mark a real break with decades of documented underinvestment in European defense, a break that would probably not have happened without the direct pressure exerted by the war in Ukraine since 2022. It took a war at Europe's doorstep for defense budgets to stop being a theoretical subject at academic conferences.

This column treats this break as sincere, even though it was born of fear rather than a long-term strategic vision anticipated before the crisis.

A lesson Europe did not choose to learn, but learned anyway

This column finally holds that this budget lesson, however costly and late, has indeed been learned by European governments, a lesson that could, if it holds over time, durably change the continent's defense posture.

This column does not claim to know whether this lesson will still be learned past 2035, but treats its actual learning as an already-established fact based on the figures cited.

The comparison with North American budget effort

A European dynamic distinct from that of the United States

This column does not have, in the sources consulted for this batch, a precise numerical comparison between this European increase of $90 billion and the parallel evolution of the United States' defense budget over the same period. Comparing without solid data would betray the rigor this column has held to from the start; better to name the absence than to improvise it.

This column explicitly flags this comparative limit rather than suggesting a convergence or divergence across the Atlantic not documented by the sources available for this specific matter.

Why this comparison would matter for the Alliance's future

A rigorous comparison between European and North American budget effort would help assess whether the 5% of GDP target set in Ankara really brings European allies closer to a more balanced sharing of the defense burden within NATO, a major strategic question this column cannot settle without additional data.

This column treats this question as a project for future analysis, distinct from the sole European budget finding documented here.

What European public opinion thinks of this effort

Political support still unevenly measured

This column does not have precise, country-by-country public opinion data allowing an assessment of the real level of popular support for these defense budget increases among the European citizens affected by these choices. A budget that grows without the clear support of the citizens who fund it remains, politically, a fragile bet.

This column treats this absence of opinion data as a significant limit for assessing the real political durability of this budget effort, beyond the official commitments of governments alone.

What sustaining this effort will require from European leaders

Sustaining this budget effort through 2035 will require, from European leaders, continuous outreach to their voters, in a context where other internal budget priorities could, at any moment, compete with defense spending.

This column treats this outreach requirement as one of the most underestimated political challenges of the budget trajectory announced in Ankara. A defense budget that holds for ten years is never just a matter of figures; it is a matter of political patience, the rarest resource of all.

What upcoming summits will need to confirm

An annual checkpoint to verify the trajectory

This column holds that the budget trajectory announced in Ankara will need to be verified at upcoming NATO summits, each year bringing its own credibility test for the European governments committed to this effort. A target set for 2035 is checked one year at a time, not all at once at the end of the decade.

This column treats this annual tracking as the only rigorous way to measure whether the commitment made collectively really translates, year after year, into verifiable figures rather than repeated promises.

The risk of a mid-course budget slowdown

This column also flags the risk of a budget slowdown midway through this trajectory toward 2035, a risk documented by the repeated budget history of numerous collective commitments made in the past within the Alliance.

This column treats this risk as a matter of caution, without being able to state it as a certainty specific to the current trajectory under way since 2024.

The provisional verdict these figures impose

A real effort, but still only halfway proven

This column, in summary, holds that the European budget effort documented since 2024 constitutes a real change, but one that remains, halfway to its full operational proof, as long as matters like the German withdrawal or the delays in the Baltic drone wall remain unresolved.

This column treats this provisional verdict as the most honest one possible at this stage, neither premature celebration nor cynical dismissal of a budget effort that is, by all other measures, genuinely under way.

Conclusion

The $90 billion increase in European defense spending since 2024, including $139 billion in nominal terms for 2025 alone according to Forbes, tells a story of forced budget correction, confirmed collectively in Ankara through the 5% of GDP target by 2035. These figures, corroborated by several distinct sources, form a solid factual base for this column.

This column does not claim that this money alone guarantees the continent's security: the German withdrawal of the Eurofighters and the uncertainties weighing on projects like the Baltic drone wall remind us that money is only a necessary condition, never a sufficient one. Ninety billion dollars is not a victory; it is the price of a lesson learned too slowly.

This column treats this finding as its final conclusion, giving in neither to self-congratulation nor to cynicism. You do not celebrate the price you pay for having been afraid too late; you note it, you remember it, and you watch whether, this time, the money actually keeps its promise.

Signature

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's Transparency Box

Editorial positioning

This column takes a critical but favorable view of European defense budget effort, from a declared pro-Western perspective. This positioning is a declared editorial choice, which does not claim absolute neutrality, but rests on figures attributed to their sources rather than on an opinion without factual grounding.

Methodology and sources

This column relies on data reported by Forbes on July 1, 2026 for overall budget figures, put into context using Reuters data from July 7, 2026 on the breakdown among member countries, NATO information on the PURL mechanism, a Defence Ukraine article on the Baltic drone wall, and a Euronews article from March 24, 2026 on the German Eurofighter withdrawal.

Nature of the analysis

This text distinguishes the figures established by the cited sources from the columnist's personal interpretation of the symbolic significance and limits of this budget effort, clearly identified as an editorial judgment. Uncertainties about future political consistency are named explicitly rather than filled with unfounded optimism or pessimism.

Sources

Primary sources

NATO — The 5% of GDP commitment

Reuters — Five allies above 3.5% of GDP, July 7, 2026

Secondary sources

Forbes — Stakes of the Ankara summit, July 1, 2026

Euronews — Eurofighter withdrawal, March 24, 2026

Defence Ukraine — The Baltic drone wall

Latvia's Ministry of Defense — Joint declaration, March 27, 2026