COLUMN: Retirement at 70 in Germany — Merz Bets His Career on a Reform Nobody Wants

An Aging Country Confronts Its Own Arithmetic

Germany has just been handed a ticking time bomb in the form of 33 recommendations from a government pension commission. Presented on June 23, 2026, the reform proposed by Chancellor Friedrich Merz calls for gradually tying the statutory retirement age to life expectancy, with a projection that leads to 70 years of age by 2092. That is not tomorrow. But the trade unions are screaming today.

The context is brutal: Germany currently counts 21 million retirees against an ever-narrowing working population. The pay-as-you-go system — in which active workers finance retirees' pensions — is buckling under demographic weight. Since 2031, the statutory retirement age will rise to 67, and the commission wants to go further, indexing that age to national life expectancy. It would be the first structural increase since retirement at 67 was introduced two decades ago.

Merz Between the Union Hammer and the Budgetary Anvil

The commission also proposed eliminating early retirement at 63 — the provision that allowed workers who had contributed for 45 years to leave without penalty. The minimum age for early retirement would now rise to 64. In parallel, workers and employers would each contribute an additional 2% of gross wages into a stock-market investment fund, modelled on the Swedish system. A European standard that has proven itself in Stockholm, but one that sends defenders of the status quo in Berlin into a fury.

Friedrich Merz stated without ambiguity: "Failure is not an option." The government is aiming for parliamentary adoption before the end of 2026. But the governing coalition between conservatives (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) is riddled with tension. Labour Minister Bärbel Bas (SPD) insisted the package be adopted in its entirety — no cherry-picking. The signal is clear: all or nothing.

I will be direct: this reform is inevitable. Not pleasant — inevitable. Germany's pension problem is not a political problem; it is an arithmetic problem. And arithmetic does not care about union slogans. Merz is right to push. What worries me more is the pace of the timeline — reaching 70 by 2092 is so gradual it solves nothing in the short term.

Numbers That Do Not Lie

Germany is one of the most rapidly aging countries in Europe. Life expectancy stands at 78.5 years for men and 83.2 years for women, according to the federal statistics office. Meanwhile, the fertility rate stagnates at around 1.5 children per woman, well below the replacement threshold of 2.1. Germany's working-age population will contract dramatically in coming decades. The most pessimistic projections speak of a loss of 7 million active workers by 2040.

This context makes the pay-as-you-go system structurally insolvent. Today, roughly 1.8 workers finance each retiree — compared to more than 4 workers in the 1960s. The commission calculated that without reform, the pension contribution rate could exceed 24% of gross wages by 2040, compared to 18.6% today. That is unsustainable — neither socially nor economically.

The Swedish Precedent as a Compass

Sweden reformed its pension system in the 1990s by introducing a funded pillar alongside the pay-as-you-go system. The result, thirty years later, is a more robust, more flexible system better adapted to demographic shocks. The German commission draws directly on that model, with a collective investment fund where contributions would be managed by the state on financial markets. The commission's co-chair, Constanze Janda, noted that the retirement age increase would be "moderate" — approximately six months every ten years if life expectancy continues rising at its current rate.

The commission estimates that an average retiree could gain approximately 150 euros per month after twenty years of contributions to the new funded pillar. After 45 years of contributions, the increase could reach up to 770 euros per month. These projections, if confirmed, could shift public opinion. For now, however, fear dominates conversations in German kitchens.

The Swedish model is often cited as the example, but let's be honest: it took a major economic crisis in the 1990s before Sweden agreed to reform. Is Germany waiting for its own crisis before acting decisively? I hope not, but I have a serious doubt about democracies' capacity for prevention rather than reaction.

An Entitlement from the Merkel Grand Coalition

Retirement at 63 — officially the "Rente mit 63" — was introduced in 2014 by the grand coalition led by Angela Merkel, under pressure from the SPD. It allowed workers who had contributed for 45 years to leave without a pension reduction at age 63. This provision has cost the public finances billions of euros and encouraged early departures in already strained sectors such as construction, logistics, and nursing.

Its elimination is one of the most controversial points of the reform. Trade unions — notably the powerful DGB (German Confederation of Trade Unions) — immediately labelled this measure a "betrayal of workers." For them, someone who started working at 18 and contributed for 45 years deserves to retire at 63 without penalty. It is a matter of intergenerational justice, they say. The commission responds that it is a matter of the system's viability for future generations.

The Fracture Within the SPD

The fracture is particularly visible inside the SPD. Several local party figures have expressed discomfort with abolishing retirement at 63. Secretary General Tim Klüssendorf had declared in 2025 that any rise in the retirement age was "absolutely out of the question" for Social Democrats. Yet Minister Bas ultimately accepted the global package — a form of pragmatic capitulation in the face of the inevitable.

This internal tension inside the SPD weakens the coalition. Younger conservative members, who had themselves threatened to vote against certain pension protection measures in 2025, now applaud the reform. The fault line no longer follows traditional partisan boundaries — it follows the line of generations. Those under 40, active net contributors to the system, increasingly support the reform. Those over 55, who will see their access to early retirement curtailed, oppose it.

Pension politics is always a politics of fear. Fear of falling short, fear of working too long, fear of the market. But the real fear should be of a system that collapses under its own weight. I understand the unions' anger — defending entitlements is their role. What troubles me is that no major political actor is speaking plainly to Germans about what happens if nothing is done.

A Cultural Shock for German Savings

Germany is a country where traditional savings reign. Savings accounts (Sparkasse), passbooks, guaranteed-return life insurance — these are the instruments of the German homo economicus. The idea of investing pension contributions in the stock market represents a profound cultural shock. German collective memory carries the scars of the 1923 hyperinflation and the erasure of wealth after World War II. Distrust of financial markets runs viscerally deep.

Yet the data speak for themselves. Over the past thirty years, the average annual return of global equity markets has been approximately 7%, compared to less than 2% for traditional savings accounts. The commission proposes a state-managed fund, similar to the Swedish sovereign fund AP-fonderna, investing in a diversified and carefully regulated manner. This is not speculation — it is long-term asset management. But convincing unions and a portion of public opinion of that distinction will be a major political battle.

Markets as a Social Shield

The commission estimates that this new funded pillar, beginning in 2031, would allow the pension system to better absorb future economic shocks. In a scenario of a major financial crisis, automatic stabilizers would be activated to protect retirees. The fund's international diversification would also reduce exposure to the vagaries of the German economy. Ultimately, this would also reduce the fiscal burden on workers — the stated objective is to keep pension contributions below 22% of gross wages through 2040.

The government also announced a 4.24% pension increase effective July 1, 2026, raising the value of each pension point to 42.52 euros. This revaluation, fully taxable for income above the basic allowance of 12,348 euros, is presented as a goodwill gesture toward current retirees. Merz's implicit message: I protect you today, and I reform so your children are equally protected tomorrow.

Stock market investment for retirement is no longer taboo in most Nordic countries, the UK, Canada, or the Netherlands. But in Germany, the subject is still treated as heresy. The real heresy is pretending that a pay-as-you-go system alone can survive the ongoing demographic transition. Markets are not casinos — they are long-term financing instruments. That truth must be explained, tirelessly.

The Strategy of Total Rejection

The DGB, Germany's main trade union federation, rejected the commission's proposals in their entirety. For its leadership, this is not a reform but a "progressive dismantling of the welfare state." The unions denounce especially the elimination of retirement at 63, which they regard as a penalty on manual workers — those who start working young, under physically demanding conditions, and whose bodies often cannot hold out until 67, let alone 70.

The argument has merit. A 60-year-old bricklayer who has spent 42 years on construction sites is not in the same situation as a civil servant or consultant who can comfortably work until 70 from an air-conditioned office. The commission tried to address this criticism by preserving special provisions for "physically strained workers," but the details of these exceptions remain vague — and it is precisely that vagueness that unions exploit to stoke social anxiety.

Parliamentary Timetable Under Pressure

The government hopes to pass the reform before the Bundestag summer recess, set for July 10, 2026. But Friedrich Merz himself admitted, during a Bundestag question-and-answer session on June 24, that if things "go well," the parliamentary process would run from autumn through year-end. This means the trade union mobilization can organize throughout the summer — a prospect that worries reform supporters.

Internal coalition polling shows real fragility in the majority on certain measures. The conservative youth wing (Junge Union), though generally more favorable to the reform, sometimes holds contradictory positions depending on the constituency. Regional elections in Bavaria and Saxony in autumn 2026 add pressure on local legislators who would rather not be seen as those who "abolished retirement at 63."

The window of opportunity for a genuine pension reform is always short in a democracy. It takes political courage — and often that courage only manifests when the crisis has already arrived. Merz has that window today. If he misses it, his successor inherits a more fragile system. I am not naive: political compromises will dilute the reform. But even an imperfect compromise beats the status quo.

France and Italy: Two Counter-Examples to Avoid

France lived through its own pension trauma in 2023, when the Macron government tried to push the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64 — far less than what Germany proposes. The result: months of strikes, historic protests, and a reform ultimately passed by decree in a climate of profound social distrust. If France burned for +2 years, what can be expected from the German reaction to an even more ambitious reform?

Italy, for its part, remains the quintessential cautionary tale. The country has repeatedly reversed its pension reforms since the 2000s, backtracking multiple times under political pressure. The result is a fragmented, inequitable, and financially unsustainable system in which entire generations of young Italians already know they will never receive pensions equivalent to those of their parents. Germany looks into this mirror and understands what it risks if it fails to act.

The Netherlands and Denmark as the Horizon

The Netherlands and Denmark have already linked their retirement age to life expectancy — precisely what the German commission proposes. In Denmark, the statutory age is currently 67 and will rise to 68 in 2030. In the Netherlands, the same logic has prevailed since 2013. These countries experienced no social cataclysm — but they had reformed before demography became an emergency, and they had a more solid social consensus.

The European Commission is watching these dynamics closely. The German reform, if it succeeds, could send a powerful signal to other reluctant member states yet to undertake their own revisions. Germany is the largest economy in the euro zone — what it does shapes the continent's policy norms. A failure by Merz would, conversely, send a disastrous signal about the credibility of structural reforms across Europe.

Europe has a problem of political will, not of economic clarity. Every serious economist has known for thirty years that pay-as-you-go pension systems cannot survive unchanged. The real question is not whether reforms are necessary — they are — but whether political leaders have the courage to carry them before their electorates. Merz is trying. That alone is remarkable in today's political landscape.

Civil Servants and the Self-Employed Finally in the Common Pool

One of the most significant proposals — paradoxically among the least contested — concerns the extension of mandatory contributions to civil servants, the self-employed, members of parliament, and corporate executives. In Germany, civil servants have their own retirement system, funded directly by the state and separate from the general regime. This dualism creates deep inequality and costs the public budgets billions of euros annually.

Integrating these categories into the general regime would broaden the contributor base and improve the system's long-term viability. The commission rated this expansion as one of the most impactful measures for financial sustainability. But institutional resistance exists here too — German civil servants jealously guard their special regime, which is often more generous than the general one.

Mini-Jobs Soon to Be Integrated

The commission also recommends integrating mini-jobs — capped-income employment positions currently exempt from social contributions — into the mandatory pension system. Approximately 7 million Germans hold mini-jobs, the large majority of them women. These workers currently accumulate very few pension rights, exposing them to a high risk of poverty in retirement.

This measure, if adopted, would represent a genuine social advance for millions of precarious working women. It would also generate additional revenue for the system. Its political cost remains limited — employers who currently benefit from the payroll exemptions on mini-jobs will oppose it, but the equity argument is hard to fight publicly in a country that considers itself socially just.

Mini-jobs are one of the great hypocrisies of the German social model. A two-speed labour market was created under the pretext of flexibility, and it produced millions of women who will arrive at retirement with almost nothing. Integrating these workers into the general regime is an elementary matter of social justice. I am surprised the unions are not screaming louder for this — and screaming very loudly against retirement at 63.

A Chancellor Who Stakes Everything on His Economic Credibility

Friedrich Merz, who came to power in May 2025, built his leadership on a promise of fiscal discipline and deep structural reform. The pension reform is the major test of his credibility. If he succeeds in passing it intact, he will enter history as the chancellor who reformed Germany's pension system for the decades ahead. If he fails or yields to union and political pressure by watering the reform down, he will have squandered a historic window of opportunity.

The message he hammered on June 23, 2026 is clear: "All elements of this reform package must now be implemented quickly. Failure is not an option." That is not the language of compromise — it is the language of someone who knows his political future is bound to this reform. Minister Bas, for her part, repeated that she would allow no "à la carte" approach — the whole package or nothing. This united front between conservatives and Social Democrats is fragile but, for now, holds.

The Coalition Holds — But for How Long?

The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition is not new to tests. Since taking office, Merz has navigated between the demands of the conservatives' economic wing and the SPD's social red lines. The pension reform concentrates all these tensions. Voices within the SPD are calling for additional social compensations — for instance, specific measures for manual workers exposed to difficult physical conditions, or enhanced support for women who interrupted their careers to raise children.

These compromise demands are not unreasonable — they are even politically necessary for the reform to pass. The risk is multiplying them to the point of hollowing out the reform's substance. Merz's challenge is precisely to concede on the veneer without giving up on the structure. It is a high-wire political act for which the chancellor appears, for now, adequately equipped.

Merz is a liberal conservative who waited a long time for power. He knows coalitions in Germany are complicated political animals. What I observe is that he chose to carry this reform himself rather than delegate it to a commission he could have conveniently betrayed later. That is a form of courage worth noting — even if I remain skeptical about consensus democracies' ability to go all the way on hard reforms.

From Bismarck to Modernity

The German pension system is one of the oldest in the world. It was created by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1889 — for political as much as social reasons. At the time, the retirement age was set at 70, a threshold that very few workers reached in a country where life expectancy was below 50. More than 130 years later, the wheel has turned: Germany is considering returning to that emblematic age of 70 — not because no one will reach it, but because almost everyone now lives to 80 and beyond.

The statutory retirement age fell progressively through the 20th century, settling at 65 for most postwar decades. The 2006 reform pushed it to 67 by 2031 — a decision that also generated protests. Today the commission proposes linking that age to life expectancy from 2031 onward. History suggests this reform, if it succeeds, will be viewed in hindsight as a necessary step — however painful in the immediate.

The Memory of the Great Pension Crisis of 2003

The summer heatwave of 2003 killed approximately 70,000 Europeans, including nearly 15,000 in France. Simultaneously, Germany was living through its own crisis with the Hartz IV reforms — the most painful it had experienced since reunification. These reforms, driven by Chancellor Schröder and his SPD-Greens government, transformed the German labour market at the cost of a profound social rupture. They cost the SPD power for more than a decade. But they enabled Germany to become the dominant economic power of Europe through the 2000s and 2010s.

Merz knows this. He also knows that Schröder was long mocked and then recognized as visionary. The history of painful but necessary reforms is a constant in German politics. The question is whether the current coalition has the solidity and the time to withstand the pressure and go all the way — or whether it will capitulate as so many others before it.

I remember the media coverage of the Hartz IV reforms in the early 2000s. The word "Schröder" was synonymous with betrayal in much of the German left. Today, the positive impact of those reforms on Germany's competitiveness is widely acknowledged. The problem with structural reforms in democracies is that they are rarely celebrated at the moment of adoption. Political courage is usually recognized with a twenty-year delay.

Who Speaks for Those Who Will Contribute in 2050?

In all this debate about pensions, one voice is strangely absent: that of young generations. Those under 30 — those who will contribute through the crucial decades of the demographic transition — are rarely at the centre of discussions. Political parties focus on the 55-70 electorate, which votes heavily and whose immediate interests lie in preserving entitlements. The paradox of representative democracy: it tends to overrepresent older generations because they vote more.

Yet German youth organizations — notably the Junge Union (CDU's youth wing) and student associations — have expressed measured support for the reform. They consider that without adjustment, today's young people will pay astronomical contributions to finance pensions they will never themselves receive at the same level. This intergenerational dimension of the pension crisis is politically explosive — yet curiously underexploited by Merz in his messaging.

Retirement as a Mirror of Inequality

The pension reform also reveals deep fractures in German society. Income inequality translates directly into pension inequality: a Berlin engineer earning 80,000 euros per year will have a comfortable pension; a mini-job worker earning 530 euros per month will have a pension barely above subsistence level. The new funded pillar will only amplify these inequalities over time, since higher contributions by higher earners will generate larger returns.

The commission proposed a few solidarity measures — notably an improvement to the "mothers' pension" to recognize career interruptions due to child-rearing. This measure, which will benefit approximately 10 million parents, predominantly women, represents a gesture of social justice. But it does not erase the structural reality: the new system, if adopted, will be more equitable for those who contributed steadily throughout their careers, and less protective for those whose trajectories were irregular.

The pension debate is, at its core, a debate about the kind of society we want to build. Do we want a system where each person funds their own retirement through capitalization, or a system where intergenerational solidarity remains the central pillar? The German answer — a hybrid of both — is probably the most politically reasonable, but it will never fully satisfy either liberals or socialists.

2026–2031: The Preparation Phase

If the Bundestag passes the reform by end of 2026, the first phase will be one of transition and preparation. The minimum age for early retirement will rise from 63 to 64. The eligibility age for gradual work-time reduction will be raised from 55 to 58. These changes are relatively modest and will only marginally affect workers close to retirement. Their purpose is to gradually adapt worker behaviour and retirement planning.

The new funded pillar will launch in 2031, with an initial contribution of 0.5% of each worker's and employer's gross wages, rising to 2%. This fund will be managed by an independent state body, invested on global financial markets according to strict diversification criteria. The governance of this fund — its independence from day-to-day political decisions — will be critical to its long-term credibility.

2031–2092: Continuous Adjustment to Life Expectancy

From 2031, the statutory retirement age will be linked to life expectancy. Under current projections, it would rise to 67.5 in 2041, 68 in 2051, and reach 70 around 2092. These projections are based on current trends of rising life expectancy — approximately 0.2 years per year for men and women combined. If life expectancy rises faster (due to medical advances, notably in cancer and cardiovascular therapies), the retirement age will adjust accordingly.

This automatic indexation mechanism is both its political strength and its weakness. Its strength: it depoliticizes future decisions on retirement age, removing this inflammatory subject from recurring electoral debates. Its weakness: it creates uncertainty for individual planning. Who can predict their exact retirement age in 2060? The commission has built in transparent communication mechanisms so each worker can track the projected evolution of their retirement date.

Automatic indexation to life expectancy is intellectually elegant and politically difficult to contest. But it carries an implicit assumption: that life expectancy will continue to rise. If pandemics, climate crises, or major social disruptions reduce life expectancy in certain regions or social classes, the mechanism will need to adapt. These are technical details that may seem abstract — but they will have concrete consequences for millions of lives.

Financial Markets Approve

Financial markets reacted positively to the reform announcement. The DAX index, the Frankfurt stock exchange, rose on June 23, 2026 after the recommendations were presented. Institutional investors welcomed the prospect of a massive new flow of capital — potentially more than 30 billion euros per year — into equity markets via the new funded pension. For European and global asset managers, this reform represents a considerable commercial opportunity.

The ECB informally indicated that this structural reform would be favourable to the long-term credibility of German public finances. Reducing future liabilities of the pay-as-you-go pension system lowers the implicit sovereign risk carried by the German state. It is an argument that will resonate in Brussels and Frankfurt, even if politicians avoid phrasing it that way before their electorates.

The United States and the Social Security Debate

Beyond Europe, the German reform is being watched in the United States, where the debate over the viability of Social Security rages. The American pension fund also faces deficit projections from the 2030s onward. The German solution — combining age indexation to life expectancy with a funded pillar — is being studied with interest by some Republican think tanks, but rejected by American progressives who see it as disguised pension privatization.

The debate is similar: how to balance collective solidarity and individual responsibility? How to reform systems designed for 20th-century demographics when we are already living the reality of the 21st? Answers diverge according to political cultures, but the arithmetic constraints are universal.

I find it fascinating that the United States and Germany — two of the world's greatest democracies — face the same pension problems yet are politically incapable of solving them in the same way. The difference is that Germany has a tradition of social concertation — even contentious — that generally ends in workable compromises. In the United States, political polarization makes those compromises nearly impossible. It is a lesson about institutions as much as about policies.

The Winners: The Young, Workers With Linear Careers, Integrated Women

The long-term winners of this reform are workers under 40 who will contribute into the new funded system for decades. They will benefit from a composite retirement — pay-as-you-go and funded — potentially more generous and more stable than the current system. Women who held mini-jobs with no pension rights will also win if the mandatory integration of these jobs into the general regime is adopted.

Workers who can extend their professional activity without major physical constraints — liberal professions, teachers, senior civil servants, executives — will also benefit from the new system. Their life expectancy is statistically above the national average, and the indexation mechanism will allow them to accumulate more rights if they continue working past the statutory retirement age.

The Losers: Manual Workers, Aging Middle Classes

The obvious losers are aging manual workers who had planned to retire at 63 after 45 years of contributions. For a 55-year-old bricklayer in 2026, the elimination of the "Rente mit 63" represents a brutal change in the rules of the game less than ten years from retirement. This kind of near-retroactive change — even if technically the reform is prospective — creates a legitimate sense of injustice.

Aging middle-class workers who structured their assets and savings around an expected retirement age of 67 will also need to adjust their plans. If their effective retirement comes at 67.5 in 2041, that may seem marginal — but for someone who has structured their finances on a twenty-year horizon, every half-year counts. The commission has anticipated these difficulties with transitional provisions, but their generosity remains to be defined.

Let us be honest: every pension reform creates winners and losers. The central ethical question is whether the losers are protected by adequate transitional measures. What I ask of Merz is transparency: state clearly who is paying the price of the necessary adjustment, and ensure it is not systematically those least protected who shoulder the burden. That is where I will be watching the details of the legislation closely.

Mathematical Inevitability Against Political Resistance

At its core, the German pension debate illustrates a universal tension between mathematical inevitability and political resistance. The numbers are unambiguous: with an aging demography, a pay-as-you-go system alone cannot survive unchanged. The only question is whether societies make the painful choice of preventive adaptation or face forced adjustment in the agony of crisis.

Germany has the opportunity to choose the first camp. The commission has done serious work. The 33 recommendations form a coherent whole that combines equity, viability, and pragmatism. If Friedrich Merz holds his line and the Bundestag adopts the core of the package before end of 2026, Germany will have achieved what few Western democracies manage: reforming its pension system proactively, before the crisis strikes.

What History Will Remember About Merz

If the reform succeeds, Friedrich Merz can claim a historical legacy comparable to that of Bismarck himself — not in its authoritarian dimension, but in its capacity to reshape a foundational institution of German society to fit the realities of its era. It is a colossal wager for a chancellor who sometimes seemed more comfortable critiquing the opposition than carrying difficult reforms.

If the reform fails or is so diluted it changes nothing structurally, Merz will have squandered a historic window of opportunity and left his successors an even more complex problem to solve. Germany, and with it Europe, cannot afford that failure. Not now. Not with the geopolitical, climate, and technological challenges awaiting the decades ahead.

What strikes me about this reform is that it forces every citizen to ask an uncomfortable question: am I genuinely thinking long-term, or am I only defending what I already have? The history of great social reforms is always a story of courage over comfort. Merz has chosen discomfort. That is rare. That is necessary. That is, I believe, what Germany must do to remain a credible social model in Europe.

A Reform That Crosses Generations

The pension reform proposed by the German commission in June 2026 is one of the most significant social transformations a Western government has attempted in years. It does not concern only the current 21 million German retirees, nor the 40 million active workers of today. It defines the living conditions of all generations to come — those born in 2026 will retire around 2096, and it is for them too that this reform is being constructed.

The stakes extend beyond Germany's borders. On a continent where demographics are aging, social protection systems are under pressure, and new technologies are upending labour markets, the choices Germany makes today will serve as either a reference point or a warning for other democracies. The commission's analytical rigour, Merz's stated will, and even the unions' anger are all part of a healthy democratic process — painful, but healthy.

History Will Judge — But Decisions Are Made Today

In ten years, in twenty years, we will know whether this reform was the necessary turning point or a missed opportunity. For now, the ball is in the Bundestag's court and in the hands of coalition negotiators. What can be said with certainty is that inaction carries a cost — economic, social, and political — far greater than the most ambitious reform Merz could push through. Germany has before it a rare window of opportunity. It must not close it for the sake of short-sighted electoral calculation.

I will end with a confession of humility: I do not know whether this reform will survive the parliamentary process intact. Democracies are compromise machines, and compromises distort reforms. What I hope is that the core of the measure — the life-expectancy indexation and the funded pillar — will withstand the bargaining. If those two pillars hold, Germany will have done something historic. If either gives way, it will be a half-squandered opportunity. And a half-squandered opportunity in politics is often an opportunity lost entirely.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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