COLUMN: The Washington-Beijing G2, a Deadly Trap for the West

Introduction: The Axis Making Our Allies Tremble

A Summit That Changes the Geopolitical Game

On September 24, 2026, Xi Jinping will set foot in the White House. This is not a rumor, not a hallway speculation. It is an official invitation extended by Donald Trump during the State dinner in Beijing on May 14, at the end of a two-day summit that stunned the international community. According to Politico Weekly Trade from June 15, the Trump administration is pursuing one-on-one bilateral discussions with Beijing on trade and other issues, and the two presidents have already scheduled a new summit in Washington for September, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. The machinery is in motion. It will not stop.

The whole world is holding its breath, but not for the same reasons. From Washington and Beijing, there is talk of constructive strategic stability, a new framework for the two largest powers on the planet. From Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, Brussels, and Canberra, the talk is of something else: exclusion. Of a visceral fear of being reduced to the rank of spectator in a world redefined by two giants negotiating over our heads. This feeling is not irrational. On the contrary, it is perfectly lucid in the face of what is taking shape.

Trump, Xi, and the Taboo Word

The word exists. It has a name, a history, and it is returning with brutal force in 2026: the G2. The idea of an informal United States–China directorate, of a cohabitation between the two superpowers that would share global governance, was first formulated by economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005. It was rejected, mocked, and buried. Then Trump resurrected the concept in October 2025 in Busan, South Korea, calling his one-on-one with Xi a meeting of the "G2." He repeated it in May 2026 from Beijing in an interview with Fox News: "These are the two big countries. I call it the G2. It’s the G2." These words are not insignificant. They have a strategic weight that Trump himself may not fully measure.

Behind the rhetoric of the businessman who loves spectacular deals and personal relationships with the powerful lies a very concrete geopolitical reality: a Sino-American condominium is taking shape. Not in a formal, institutionalized, or acknowledged way—Beijing officially opposes it out of diplomatic calculation. But in practice, in the logic of bilateral discussions, in the structure of the agreements reached, and in the deliberate marginalization of multilateralism, the G2 is advancing. Masked, but very real.

The History of a Cursed Concept Making a Comeback

From Theoretical Origins to Trumpian Reality

The G2 concept has a respectable intellectual genealogy. In 2005, Bergsten argued for a sharing of responsibilities between Washington and Beijing to stabilize the global economy. In 2009, under Obama, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue cautiously gave body to this idea of structured cooperation between the two giants. But the Obama administration had always been careful never to leave the impression that this partnership would come at the expense of allies. Multilateralism remained the official doctrine. Alliances were the compass. With Trump, the nuance disappears. What was subtext becomes text. What was diplomatically avoided becomes a trademark.

According to Al Jazeera, which analyzed the dynamics before the Beijing summit in May 2026, Trump not only used the term "G2" in Busan in October 2025, but he renewed the concept several times. In doing so, he offered Xi exactly what Beijing has coveted for decades: the symbolic recognition of equal status with the United States. As Dominic Chiu of Eurasia Group explains, Chinese leaders wanted to be treated by the United States as an equal power. And Trump gave it to them, with a generosity that previous American presidents had carefully avoided.

Beijing Says No, but Thinks Yes

Beijing’s official position is clear—and perfectly hypocritical. In March 2026, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly rejected the logic of "great power co-governance," according to The Diplomat. On the surface, China wants to be the champion of multilateralism, the defender of the UN framework, and the spearhead of a multipolar world. The lexicon is carefully chosen: Beijing does not want to be seen as a hegemonic power seeking to co-direct the world with Washington, because that positioning would be diplomatically costly regarding the Global South, ASEAN, and Africa. But behind the scenes? It’s a different story.

The "constructive strategic stability" that Xi proposed to Trump as a new bilateral framework—and which Trump accepted—is actually the polite version of the G2. It institutionalizes the principal-to-principal model, where the two heads of state deal directly with major issues without going through multilateral forums. The Beijing agreements of May 2026—the Board of Trade, the Board of Investment, consultations on AI safeguards—constitute the discreet infrastructure of a bilateral directorate. The G2 in all but name.

The Beijing Summit, May 2026: The Historical Turning Point

Imperial Staging for a Universal Message

The images from May 14, 2026, will remain etched in our memories. Hundreds of children waving colorful flags in front of the Great Hall of the People. A lavish State banquet. Trump received as no American president had been in Beijing for over nine years. Xi had curated every detail of this reception for one single objective: to show the whole world, and his own citizens, that China is now treated as an equal to the world’s leading power. The symbol is powerful, deliberate, and irreversible. As the Washington Post noted: "There is no turning back."

The discussions lasted over two hours, double the time initially planned. According to China Briefing, the two presidents addressed trade, rare earths, Taiwan, Iran, North Korea, and Ukraine. A global power agenda, handled one-on-one, without prior consultation with allies. Xi warned that any mistake regarding Taiwan could lead to "conflict." Trump responded by inviting Xi to the White House for September 24. The circle is closing. The G2 architecture is taking shape.

Agreements Institutionalizing Bilateralism

Beyond the symbols, the Beijing agreements lay the foundations for an institutionalized bilateral relationship that bypasses multilateral forums. The Board of Trade and the Board of Investment constitute what the Carnegie Endowment calls "revitalized dialogue mechanisms," designed to manage specific issues and maintain relations at an operational level. Even more significant: the shift from crisis management to a mechanized management of the bilateral relationship. This is no longer emergency diplomacy. It is governance. And it is being done by two people.

Beijing secured American agricultural purchases of $17 billion per year until 2028, an order for 200 Boeing aircraft, consultations on AI safeguards, and the implicit promise that Trump did not wish to engage in escalation over Taiwan as long as their personal relationship holds. Washington secured access to rare earths, the maintenance of the trade truce, and symbolic recognition of its preeminence through the term "G2." Both sides are satisfied. Everyone outside this closed room should be asking questions.

The G7 Confronting the G2: Macron Sounds the Alarm

The Rift Between Trump and His Allies

The G7 summit in Évian in mid-June 2026 should have been an opportunity for the major democracies to present a united front against China. It failed. According to Politico Weekly Trade from June 15, Trump arrived in France with the clear intention of going it alone on China. The White House hadn't even included Beijing in its list of priorities for the summit. Sino-American bilateral trade discussions are continuing outside any multilateral framework, and the Trump administration makes no secret of its conviction that it does not need allies to manage the relationship with Beijing.

Faced with this overt denial, Emmanuel Macron tried to maneuver. According to Fortune from June 16, Macron is seeking to use Sino-American rivalry as leverage to strengthen the European position. He even organized an "unprecedented" call with Xi Jinping before the G7, in hopes of showing Washington that there are other partners besides Europe, and creating a productive tension. The strategy is clever. But is it enough? Matt Pearl of the Center for Strategic and International Studies summarized it this way: "Macron is playing China against the US to create leverage." It’s high-altitude poker. With existential stakes for Europe.

The Double Peril of Cross-Dependencies

The G7 finds itself caught in a formidable pincer: a dependence on American AI on one side, and a dependence on Chinese critical minerals on the other. According to Fortune, the United States and China together represent 90% of global computing power and attract the bulk of investment in artificial intelligence. To top it off, the Trump administration's decision to impose export controls on Anthropic's AI models (Fable 5 and Mythos 5) has infuriated the other six members of the G7, whom analyst Andrea Renda of the Centre for European Policy Studies describes as "quite irritated and upset" by this differential treatment.

Behind the G7’s official theme of "reducing global imbalances," China is indeed the "elephant in the room," as stated by Alisha Chhangani of the Atlantic Council. China controls the critical minerals that underpin clean energy technologies. If critical mineral supply chains collapse, it would be "quite catastrophic," warns Matt Pearl. Europeans find themselves in the most vulnerable position: they depend on American AI for software and Chinese minerals for hardware. A consolidating G2 will only worsen this structural dependence.

The European Response: Between Dismay and Swarm Strategy

The ECFR and the Doctrine of the Six Nos

Faced with this dual challenge—a Sino-American G2 marginalizing Europe and a China weakening European industry—some think tanks are starting to propose systemic responses. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) published a major analysis on June 17, 2026, titled "The Art of the Swarm," authored by Andrew Small, which represents the most elaborate response to this challenge to date. The central argument is that Europe cannot and should not try to imitate American brutality or Chinese state capacity. Its weapon is different: the normative power of the single market, regulation, standards, and transparency rules.

The proposed doctrine is that of the "Six Nos": no double standards, no rigged competition, no monopolies, no backdoors, no black boxes, and no actors facilitating threats to European security. These conditions do not explicitly target China, but they directly address the structural problems the Chinese system poses for Europe. The strategy consists of simultaneously deploying many smaller measures—like a swarm—rather than a single large visible gesture that would give Beijing an easy target to counter. It is asymmetric geopolitics. Intelligent. Perhaps indispensable.

Why the European Response Risks Arriving Too Late

The problem with the swarm strategy, however brilliant it may be intellectually, is that it is being deployed within a European institutional framework that is not built for urgency. As the ECFR itself notes, Europe has responded to China one tariff at a time, one sector at a time, one security restriction at a time. This piecemeal approach shows Beijing exactly where to apply pressure—and leaves Europe without a credible systemic response. Meanwhile, the G2 consolidates summit after summit, agreement after agreement, bilateral mechanism after bilateral mechanism.

The ECFR also recommends that Europe abandon certain objectives that have become unattainable: convincing China to "open up," and relaunching the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with Beijing. These dreams belong to the past. The reality of 2026 is that China has secured its economy, aligned itself militarily with Russia, and is using its economic weight as a geopolitical weapon. Europe must act in that world, not the one it imagined. And it must do so quickly, before the G2 sets the rules of the game against it for a generation.

Trump’s Fascination with Xi: The Risk of Personal Relationship

A Geopolitically Dangerous Bromance

The relationship between Trump and Xi has now moved beyond simple diplomatic rivalry into something more complex and concerning: a mutual fascination between two strongmen who respect and test each other, and who seem to find a satisfaction in their personal rapport that transcends the national interests they are supposed to defend. Trump has called Xi a "brilliant" man, described their discussions as the "most important ever held," and repeated ad nauseam that their personal relationship is the foundation of Sino-American stability. This "principal-to-principal model," as Carnegie Endowment analysts call it, places crucial decisions in the hands of two individuals rather than institutions, alliances, or multilateral forums.

The risk is twofold. First, a personal relationship is by definition fragile and capricious. If Trump and Xi were to fall out—over Taiwan, rare earths, or Iran—the entire laboriously constructed edifice would collapse instantly, without the usual institutional safeguards. Second, and more importantly, this personal relationship pushes Trump toward major symbolic concessions that none of his predecessors had made: recognizing China as an equal power, using the term G2, and suggesting that Taiwan issues could be "managed" directly between them. These signals, even if rhetorical, have concrete and lasting geopolitical consequences.

What Xi Really Got in Beijing

If we list what Xi Jinping actually obtained from Trump in May 2026, the scope is staggering. According to The Diplomat and China Briefing, Beijing received: symbolic recognition of equality via the publicly repeated term G2; the acceptance of the "constructive strategic stability" framework proposed by China—a framework that Washington, under Biden, would have categorically refused; implicit confirmation that Taiwan would not be an immediate casus belli as long as the Trump-Xi duo functions; and the institutionalization of bilateral mechanisms (Board of Trade, Board of Investment) that short-circuit multilateral forums including allies.

What did Trump get in exchange? Orders for soybeans, 200 Boeing aircraft, vague promises on rare earths, and the satisfaction of a spectacular deal to present to his voters. The asymmetry is striking. Xi got architecture. Trump got transactions. In the long game that Beijing plays, Xi wins every round. Trump’s fascination with the Asian strongman is proving, upon analysis, to be a considerable strategic asset for China.

Western Allies: Between Anxiety and Impotence

Australia, Japan, Philippines: The G2 Viewed from the Pacific

The perspective of Indo-Pacific countries on the emerging G2 is telling—and alarming. According to a Brookings Institution analysis from March 2026, which compiled regional views on the phenomenon, concerns are converging despite different geographical situations. For Australia, a G2 "would significantly reduce the value of its alliance with the United States," which currently offers protection against Chinese coercion. Canberra is worried about the "lack of visibility and input" given to regional allies in the way Washington conducts its relationship with Beijing.

For Japan, warnings from senior officials are explicit: Tokyo risks "losing its strategic presence" if it is eclipsed by the bargaining of the great powers. For Taiwan, the concern is even more existential: the island fears being treated as a "bargaining chip" in Trump-Xi negotiations. This is not an abstract fear. The South China Morning Post from June 19, 2026, reveals that Trump does not plan a phone call with Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te, for fear that it would derail the September summit with Xi. The sequence is revealing: the democratic ally is sacrificed on the altar of the personal relationship with the autocrat.

Europe Between Two Stools

For European nations, the anxiety is of a particular nature. As ECFR analyst Gu Mingqing explains in Al Jazeera's analysis, Europe does not want to "become a mere policy-taker in a world where Washington and Beijing dictate the terms of technology, climate, finance, AI governance, and industrial policy." European concerns do not just stem from rivalry, but from exclusion. This is a crucial nuance. Europe does not fear competition between great powers. It fears being absent from it.

The situation is made even more delicate by pre-existing transatlantic tensions: Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO, his assertions about Greenland, his ambiguous support for Ukraine against Russia. Europe is therefore navigating troubled waters: it cannot count unconditionally on Washington, it must be structurally suspicious of Beijing, and it risks being marginalized by both at once. This is a geopolitical situation unprecedented since the Cold War—and far more complex than the binary confrontation of that era.

China, Threat #1: Why the G2 Would Be a Capitulation

The Systemic Nature of the Chinese Threat

It is fundamental not to be lulled by Beijing’s friendly choreography and the soothing speeches about "constructive stability." China remains the greatest structural threat to the West—not because it is intrinsically evil, but because its economic, political, and technological model is incompatible with the liberal order that the West has built since 1945. The ECFR states this bluntly in its June 17 report: Chinese economic policies contribute to the deindustrialization of Europe, deepening dependencies in supply chains, coercive vulnerability, and debilitating shocks.

Added to this is a reality that the G2 carefully sweeps under the rug: China actively supports Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. It provides military components, absorbs sanctioned Russian oil, and offers an economic lifeline to Moscow. Accepting a Sino-American condominium therefore implicitly means accepting that one member of the world directorate is the primary enabler of Russian military power—the same military power that bombs Ukrainian civilians and threatens European security. The contradiction is abyssal. And yet, Trump steps over it as if it doesn't exist.

The Dangerous Precedent of Appeasement

The history of the 1930s taught us the price of complacency toward revisionist powers. The appeasement policy of Munich did not bring peace: it strengthened Hitler’s conviction that the West lacked the courage to defend its principles. The comparison is not perfect—it never is. But the cognitive pattern is there: when you treat a revisionist power as a reliable partner without demanding concrete behavioral changes, you don’t appease it. You send it a signal of impunity.

The China Briefing from June 17, 2026, documents precisely how China has used every negotiation cycle to gain time, consolidate its positions, and obtain American concessions without necessarily respecting its commitments—on rare earths, on soybeans, on fentanyl export controls. Every summit produces spectacular announcements and vague commitments. Every assessment reveals partially kept promises, details that diverge between American and Chinese communiqués, and a growing asymmetry in favor of Beijing. A formal G2 would not change this dynamic. It would crystallize it.

Trump: Necessary Evil or Poisoned Gift for the West?

The Impossible Dialectic of the Chaos Conductor

The position on Trump is one of the most difficult to hold intellectually. It requires holding two truths at once, without reconciling them: Trump is a necessary evil to the extent that his initial trade firmness toward China—tariffs, technological controls, pressure on rare earths—established a power balance that Biden had not maintained with as much vigor. His ability to speak the language of deals with Beijing, to command respect where his predecessors garnered contempt, is a reality that it would be intellectually dishonest to deny. For this part of his actions, the West is, paradoxically, indebted to him.

But—and it is a massive but—his personal fascination with Xi, his use of the term G2, his treatment of the Atlantic Alliance as an optional extra, and his progressive disengagement from multilateralism: all of this creates precedents that permanently weaken the Western security architecture. The Atlantic Council had already noted in November 2025 that American and European approaches to China diverge so sharply—one based on brutal decoupling, the other on gradual "de-risking"—that any coordination has become practically impossible. Trump has worsened this rift. He has turned it into policy.

When the Remedy Threatens to Kill the Patient

There is a striking paradox at the heart of Trumpian policy toward China: the tools he uses to "manage" Beijing are precisely those that weaken the Western coalition intended to counter Beijing. Export controls on Anthropic's AI irritate G7 allies. Bilateral trade negotiations bypass the G7 and the WTO. The personal relationship with Xi marginalizes ambassadors, foreign ministers, and multilateral institutions. Result: Trump confronts China solo, but by weakening the Western collective that constitutes the only credible counterweight to Chinese power.

According to Politico, a senior US administration official stated that the United States is "not waiting for the world to hold hands and find a coordinated way to respond to China’s behavior." This is the heart of the problem. Western power against China does not lie in the brute strength of each individual member. It lies in coordination, coherence, and the critical mass of a united democratic bloc. By breaking this coordination, Trump is not managing China. He is weakening the only collective instrument that could truly contain it.

The Question of Taiwan: The G2’s Real Test

A Red Line Discreetly Fading

The question of Taiwan is the true barometer of what the G2 means for the world order. Xi repeated to Trump, in both Busan and Beijing, that Taiwan is "the most important issue in Sino-American relations" and that any misstep could plunge the two countries into "conflict." These warnings are serious. But Trump’s response is revealing: instead of forcefully reaffirming the American commitment to Taiwan's security, he suggested—in his Fox News interview from Beijing—that China would probably not make an aggressive move "as long as he is in office." This semantic shift is major. It subordinates Taiwan's security to the duration of a presidency.

The South China Morning Post from June 19 reveals that Trump carefully avoids any contact with Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, for fear of compromising the September summit. In concrete terms, this means that the American administration is restricting its own diplomatic maneuvering room with a democratic ally so as not to irritate a dictatorship. This is precisely the logic of the G2 in action: when the interests of the Sino-American condominium take precedence over those of third-party allies. Taiwan is not in the room when Trump and Xi negotiate. But Taiwan will be in the consequences.

The Risk of a Secret Agreement on the Status Quo

The most attentive observers of Sino-American diplomacy point out a particularly serious risk: that of a tacit, or even explicit, agreement on maintaining the status quo in Taiwan in exchange for economic concessions. The logic is simple: Xi gets from Trump the implicit promise not to sell new weapons to Taipei and not to support any movement toward formal independence. Trump gets in exchange trade deals he can value politically. Taiwan becomes a bargaining chip. The American commitment to defending Taiwanese democracy becomes conditional on the good health of the Trump-Xi relationship.

The Brookings Institution confirms that this concern is shared in Taiwan and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The fear that Washington will treat Taipei as a "bargaining chip" in its negotiations with Beijing is not paranoia. It is a logical extrapolation of the ongoing G2 dynamic. And if this scenario comes to pass, even partially, it will constitute the most significant setback for democracy in the region in decades—caused not by Chinese military force, but by American transactional diplomacy.

Russia, Iran, North Korea: The Other Threats Absent from the G2

When the Condominium Turns a Blind Eye to Its Allies

One of the most concerning blind spots of the forming G2 is what it deliberately omits. Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine with documented Chinese support—supply of components, absorption of sanctioned oil, and diplomatic cover. Iran, whose cooperation Trump sought from Xi to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, aligns its positions with those of Moscow and Beijing in what de facto constitutes an axis of revisionist powers. North Korea, protected by its Chinese patron, continues its nuclear and ballistic program. None of these threats are structurally addressed by the Sino-American G2.

According to China Briefing, during the Beijing summit, the two leaders "exchanged views" on Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. Exchanged views—that’s a phrase that hides everything and promises nothing. Xi did not make any concrete commitment to reducing his support for Moscow. He did not accept the American idea of an "international operation" to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. China refused to get militarily involved in the Middle East while maintaining its economic cover for Iran. The G2 doesn't solve these crises. It mutes them.

Ukraine in the G2’s Blind Spot

The Ukrainian situation illustrates with particular clarity the limits of the G2. Zelensky has been fighting for over four years for his country's survival, with a courage that history will remember as exceptional. Ukraine is resisting a Russian aggression that China actively supports. And yet, in the G2 architecture, Ukraine is treated as a secondary variable—one file among others in the Trump-Xi discussions, drowned between soybeans and rare earths. The war in Ukraine has no place in the Sino-American directorate, precisely because one of the two members of this directorate is the ally of the aggressor.

The West must grasp this fundamental contradiction: you cannot build a stable world order with a partner who finances the destabilization of that order. Xi's China is simultaneously Trump's negotiating partner and the primary supporter of Putin's Russia—the same Russia whose missiles are falling on Ukrainian cities and whose drones are leveling civilian infrastructure. A G2 that integrates China into a global directorate without forcing it to stop its support for Moscow is a G2 that validates aggression, even indirectly. It is unacceptable.

What History Teaches About Power Condominiums

Yalta, Kissinger, the Memory of Abandonment

The history of great powers offers several instructive precedents regarding condominiums. The most dramatic remains Yalta in 1945, where Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin redrew Europe without consulting the nations concerned. The Yalta decisions consecrated fifty years of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. The second is Kissinger’s policy toward China in the 1970s, which broke Beijing’s isolation and integrated China into the international system—with the undeniable benefits we know, but also with the strategic blind spots we are painfully discovering today.

In both cases, the logic was one of realism: reaching an agreement with a great power to gain stability in the present, at the cost of ambiguity regarding values and the rights of third parties. This logic has an internal coherence. It also has a cost that third parties pay in full. The difference with 2026 is that the institutional and normative framework that Western democracies have built since 1945—the UN, the G7, NATO, the WTO, security alliances—is precisely what the G2 tends to short-circuit. You don’t unravel seventy years of multilateral architecture without paying the price.

Multilateralism: The Only Shield Against the Law of the Strongest

The central argument against the Sino-American G2 is not idealistic. It is pragmatic. Multilateral institutions—imperfect, slow, and frustrating—constitute the only credible mechanism for imposing rules on more powerful actors. Without the WTO, without UN norms, and without collective security alliances, medium and small countries are at the mercy of great powers. A G2 doesn't solve global problems more effectively than multilateralism: it manages them according to the interests of two actors, to the detriment of everyone else.

The Brookings Institution summarizes it clearly: Indo-Pacific countries do not want a world organized around a hierarchical bipolarity that privileges power-centered mechanisms over inclusive, rules-based processes. This isn’t UN idealism. It’s collective realism: nations understand that their long-term security depends on rules that no one can violate with impunity, not even the great powers. The G2 undermines this foundation. That is why it is dangerous, beyond the rhetoric.

What is to be Done? A Strategy for the West Facing the G2

Refusing Fatalism Without Ignoring Reality

Facing the rise of the G2, the first trap is fatalism: accepting that Washington and Beijing are redefining the world order and resigning oneself to a role as a spectator. This would be a political and historical mistake. The G2 is not inevitable. It is a trend, a trajectory, a risk—not a destiny. Western allies still possess considerable critical mass: the combined GDP of the EU, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth nations exceeds that of China. The normative power of the European single market is immense. Security alliances, even if weakened, remain functional. There are resources to be mobilized.

The strategy outlined by the ECFR—the swarm of coordinated measures, the Six Nos, the coalition of like-minded nations—is a serious foundation. But it must be supplemented by a reform of European internal governance to speed up decision-making, by a strengthening of transatlantic defense ties independent of Trump’s moods, and by active diplomacy with the Global South to prevent it from siding by default with the Sino-Russian vision of a post-Western world.

Building a Credible Democratic Coalition Against the Duopoly

The response to the G2 requires the reconstruction of democratic solidarity that does not depend on Washington’s goodwill. This means strengthening the European pillar of NATO, developing autonomous defense capabilities, and consolidating partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India—those democracies that share European anxiety regarding the G2 and have as much to lose from a world governed by two powers, one of which supports their regional adversaries. The coalition of democracies is not a romantic ideal. It is a strategic necessity.

We must also invest massively in technological sovereignty—from semiconductors to data, from AI to critical minerals. As long as Europe depends on China for its minerals and the United States for its algorithms, it has no credible leverage. The Atlantic Council had already charted the path: establishing a transatlantic trade defense platform, aligning G7 messages on Chinese industrial overcapacity, and coordinating responses to coercive investments. These recommendations remain valid, but they require a political will that the last summits have struggled to demonstrate. Time is running out.

Conclusion: On September 24, the West Will Be Decided in Washington

A Decisive Summit for the Future of the World

When Xi Jinping steps off his plane in Washington on September 24, 2026, the West will be at a historical crossroads. Either Trump uses this summit to reaffirm, alongside his bilateral deals, a clear commitment to multilateral architecture, alliances, and democratic values—and the G2 remains what it should be: an intense bilateral dialogue between competing great powers, not a global directorate. Or he confirms the trend of the last six months, deepens the institutionalization of the Sino-American condominium, and sends the West and the rest of the world a clear signal: the rules of the game have changed, and allies no longer have a say.

Prudence dictates that we should not pre-judge. Trump is unpredictable. Xi is strategic. Dynamics can shift. The trade truce expires in November. Mid-term elections are approaching. Tensions over AI, rare earths, and Taiwan are not resolved. But the underlying trends—the overt bilateralism, the mutual fascination of the two leaders, the bypassing of allies—are robust. And they all point in the same direction: a world where two empires negotiate the world order, while democracies on the periphery watch, worried, without having a seat at the table. That world would not only be less just. In the long run, it would be less safe for everyone.

The Urgency of a Collective Response

The right response to the G2 is not hysteria or European isolationism. It is a united coalition of allies, capable of speaking with one voice on fundamental issues—the defense of Taiwan, support for Ukraine, technological standards, trade rules—while maintaining a pragmatic dialogue with Beijing on issues where cooperation is indispensable: climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and the stability of global financial markets. This position is not a contradiction. It is geopolitical sophistication. Exactly what the moment requires.

September 24 will be a test. The West will be watching closely. Some will hope for miracles, others will fear disasters. Me, I’m counting the signals. I’m reading the communiqués. I’m watching the omissions as much as the affirmations. And I tell myself that our collective ability not to let ourselves be marginalized depends, in large part, on our lucidity about what is truly at stake in this meeting between two men who believe themselves, each in their own way, to be the masters of the world.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Politico Weekly Trade — Trump, G7 split on China strategy — June 15, 2026

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) — The art of the swarm: Systemic rivalry with China on European terms — June 17, 2026

China Briefing — US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline — June 17, 2026

Secondary Sources

Al Jazeera — Trump-Xi meeting: Could China, US form a 'G2'? — May 12, 2026

South China Morning Post — No call with Taiwan, no new arms sales: how Trump is preparing to welcome Xi — June 19, 2026

Brookings Institution — Indo-Pacific perspectives on the prospect of a US-China G2 — March 13, 2026

Fortune — Making China the elephant in the room: The G7 confronts — June 16, 2026

Politico — Trump invites Xi to Washington in September — May 14, 2026