COLUMN: The EU's 21st Sanctions Package — Bulgaria's veto and the oil-price compromise

Introduction: When European unity fractures at the worst possible moment

A deadline that concentrates everything

July 15, 2026 is not just a date on a diplomatic calendar. It is a dividing line between two realities: either the European Union adopts its 21st sanctions package against Russia before that deadline, or an automatic mechanism kicks in — a review of the oil price cap set at $44 per barrel — that risks offering significant economic relief to Moscow. The pressure is real. The countdown, inexorable.

Since June 26, 2026, the ambassadors of the member states have been meeting behind closed doors on a revised text proposed by the European Commission. No consensus has yet been reached. The Irish Presidency of the Council, which took over from Cyprus on July 1, says it is confident but cautious. Ambassador Aingeal O'Donoghue stated that the July 15 deadline remained achievable. The reality of the negotiations says otherwise.

The mechanics of the oil price cap, explained

The oil price cap works according to a simple rule: the price of a barrel of Russian oil transported by sea cannot exceed a threshold set at 15% below the average market price. This mechanism, designed to deprive Moscow of oil revenues while maintaining global supply flows, must be reviewed every six months. The problem: Urals crude is currently trading at around $58 per barrel, well above the $44 cap. An automatic upward revision of the cap — without adopting the 21st package — would mechanically improve Russian revenues. That is precisely what the sanctions sought to prevent.

The Commission therefore proposed freezing the cap at $44 until January 2027, avoiding any upward revision and preserving the restrictive effect. This is a sensible position. But to adopt it, an agreement on the entire 21st package is needed first — and that is where the friction accumulates.

Sofia vs. Brussels: the Bulgarian veto over Patriarch Kirill

A churchman at the heart of a diplomatic conflict

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, has been one of the most active spiritual supporters of Vladimir Putin's regime since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. His rhetoric of a «holy war» against the West, his refusal to condemn military operations against a predominantly Orthodox people, have made him a central figure in Russian revisionist propaganda. The European Union knows this. It had in fact attempted to sanction him back in 2022, but Viktor Orbán's Hungary blocked the measure in the name of religious freedom.

In May 2026, with the arrival of Péter Magyar's new Hungarian government, Budapest indicated it was ready to include Kirill on a blacklist. His name was therefore reintegrated into the draft of the 21st package: a travel ban and asset freeze. But a new obstacle emerged. This time, it is Sofia that objects.

Rumen Radev, the unexpected spoiler

Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev publicly announced his opposition to sanctioning the patriarch, citing «religious, historical and cultural» reasons. His declaration was blunt: «We will not approve the sanctions package in this form. We have a right of veto, and we will use it», he said after the EU summit in Brussels at the end of June. Radev also wants the name of Vagit Alekperov, the billionaire founder of Lukoil, removed from the list — invoking a €3 billion compensation claim that Lukoil allegedly filed against the nationalization of the Neftohim Burgas refinery.

This is not just an ideological blockade. The Neftohim Burgas refinery, for which the Bulgarian state appointed a special administrator in November 2025 following severe American sanctions against Lukoil, generates billions in revenue. Bulgaria has economic interests deeply entangled with these Russian actors. This conflict of interest, which is real and documented, does not make Radev's position morally defensible.

The Russian shadow fleet: 30 more vessels in the crosshairs

A well-documented circumvention infrastructure

Among the least publicized but most significant measures in the 21st package is the blacklisting of 30 additional vessels from what experts call the «shadow fleet» — the tankers that transport Russian oil without Western insurance, without traceable flags, without regard for international maritime safety regulations. Since the imposition of the oil price cap in December 2022, Moscow has systematically built this circumvention infrastructure, composed of aging vessels purchased cheaply through intermediaries and often sailing under flags of convenience.

The objective of these listings is not symbolic: a blacklisted vessel can no longer call at European ports, obtain insurance from Lloyd's of London or other Western insurers, or access the banking services of Western institutions. Each addition to the list tightens the net around the Russian oil economy — provided the member states agree to adopt the package.

The package as a whole: 170 individuals, 90 banks

Beyond the tankers, the 21st sanctions package also proposes listing 170 individuals and entities, including 90 banks. This is one of the most extensive lists ever proposed within the framework of these sanctions. It primarily targets the financial institutions enabling Russia to circumvent restrictions already in force, notably via networks in India, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and China. The package also includes a first-ever import ban on Russian cod and haddock — a measure that has caused grumbling among several member states that import these fish in large volumes.

It should be noted that the general economic sanctions against Russia, in place since 2014 and massively reinforced since February 2022, were extended by the EU Council on June 25, 2026 for one additional year, through July 31, 2027. This decision was separate and uncontroversial. It is the 21st package, with its new specific measures, that is generating friction.

France and Italy: resistance on Russian soldiers

An unprecedented proposed entry ban

One of the most ambitious — and controversial — measures in the 21st package is the draft ban on entry into the European Union for current and former Russian soldiers who participated in the invasion of Ukraine. The logic is clear: it is incoherent to sanction the Russian military while allowing its fighters to move freely across European territory. The measure, backed by a coalition of 11 European countries, is presented as a national security imperative — its supporters citing in parallel the earlier ban targeting former Islamic State fighters.

In 2025, France received nearly 180,000 Russian visa applications, and Italy approximately 160,000. Together, these two countries process nearly a third of all Russian visas granted within the EU. Their reluctance is therefore partly pragmatic: the administrative implications of such a measure would be considerable, and the legal basis — visa policy, a competence shared between the EU and member states — is contested.

The legal argument and its limits

The European Commission is exploring several options: updating guidance on the granting of Russian visas, making it mandatory for men of military age to produce their military booklets, and preparing a revision of the EU Visa Code for introduction in 2027. Paris and Rome maintain that the measure falls more under visa policy than sanctions strictly speaking — and therefore requires separate treatment. The argument is legally defensible, but politically it gives the impression of protecting consular and tourism interests rather than collective security.

What is troubling about this Franco-Italian resistance is that it comes at the very moment when Ukraine is asking its allies for concrete, visible gestures. Barring invasion soldiers from visiting Italy or sitting in Parisian cafés carries powerful symbolic weight. Refusing to do so sends a signal of tepidness that Moscow knows how to read.

The LNG tanker ban: ships as both weapon and dilemma

A dependence that is slow to unwind

The proposal to ban the sale of LNG tankers to Russia — or their passage through European waters bound for Russia — is another measure in the 21st package that faces resistance. Since the start of the war, Europe has spectacularly reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas, dropping from 40% of its supply to a fraction of that. But Russian LNG, transported by tankers from terminals such as Arctic LNG 2 and the Sabetta terminal, continues to supply several member states, notably Belgium, France and Spain.

Banning the sale of specialized tankers — the ice-breaking LNG-powered vessels essential for Arctic routes — would effectively cut Russia's future export capacity. But it would entail immediate economic losses for the European shipyards and shipping companies that still have contracts in progress. The measure is delicate. It is necessary. And it once again illustrates the central paradox of sanctions policy: the more effective a measure, the more painful it is to adopt.

The Arctic fleet and Moscow's ambitions

Russia has invested heavily in its Arctic LNG infrastructure, considered a pillar of its export economy for decades to come. The Arctic LNG 2 project, already under American sanctions since late 2023, is struggling to operate for lack of Western equipment. European sanctions on LNG tankers would deliver a second blow. Moscow would then seek to source from China or North Korea — technically inferior and logistically complex alternatives. Time matters here: every month of delay in adopting this measure is additional time gifted to Putin to consolidate his alternatives.

The package in context: an instrument under pressure

Twenty packages before, tens of trillions at stake

To understand what the 21st package means, one must recall what the previous twenty accomplished. Since 2022, the European Union has sanctioned more than 2,200 individuals and entities, frozen assets estimated at several tens of billions of euros, excluded the main Russian banks from SWIFT, banned exports of military components and dual-use technologies, and significantly reduced Russian oil revenues. That is no small thing. It is, historically, the most extensive sanctions regime ever applied by the EU.

But Russia has adapted. Its circumvention networks are sophisticated. Its partners — China, Iran, North Korea, the United Arab Emirates — fill the gaps. The economic balance of power is not what was hoped for in 2022. That is precisely why each new package must be more targeted, more precise, more effective — and adopted without delay.

The cumulative effect of delays

Every week of diplomatic blockage carries a real cost. If July 15 passes without agreement, the automatic oil price cap review mechanism could activate, raising the ceiling on Russian crude and releasing additional revenues to finance Putin's war machine. According to available estimates, the difference between a $44 cap and a revised higher cap amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars in additional revenues for Russia over six months. This is not an abstract sum: it means shells, drones, soldiers' wages.

Who is truly responsible for the blockage?

Bulgaria, heir to Orbán

It would be too simple to name a single culprit. Rumen Radev's Bulgaria is clearly the main obstacle as I write these lines. But its obstruction fits into an unfortunately familiar pattern: since the beginning of the war, it has always been one or two member states that have concentrated the blockages — Hungary, Slovakia, and now Bulgaria. Radev is not Orbán — his resistance appears driven more by domestic economic interests than by a structured pro-Kremlin ideology — but the practical result is identical: a veto that protects Russian interests.

The Bulgarian civil society has moreover spoken up. Important voices within Bulgarian society are calling on Radev not to isolate their country within the EU by protecting a patriarch whose sermons blessed a war against an Orthodox Slavic people. This internal pressure is an encouraging signal, but it has not yet moved the official position.

France and Italy, timid allies

The resistance of Paris and Rome on Russian soldiers is less dramatic than the Bulgarian veto, but it illustrates a deeper tendency: certain member states of Western Europe remain attached to a conception of their national interests that makes them less combative in sanctions negotiations. France has nonetheless delivered significant weapons to Ukraine; Italy has supported previous packages. But on visas, the logic of consular flows overrides security logic. It is an unstable equilibrium.

The institutional architecture and its limits

Unanimity, a structural handicap

The EU's common foreign and security policy, which governs sanctions, requires the unanimity of all member states. This is not an anomaly — it is a constitutional guarantee of the European construction, designed to protect the sovereignty of smaller states. But in the context of an ongoing war, where speed of decision can have direct military consequences, unanimity becomes a structural brake. Any state can block, negotiate, perform to extract concessions on files entirely unrelated to sanctions.

Several governments and analysts advocate for a revision of this rule, or at least the introduction of a qualified majority mechanism in certain areas of foreign policy. The European Commission has explored this path. But the recalcitrant member states — the very ones that regularly block sanctions — are not favorable to a rule that would strip them of their negotiating leverage. The snake bites its own tail.

The Irish presidency: a window of opportunity

Ireland, which has held the Council of the EU Presidency since July 1, 2026, has a tradition of diplomatic pragmatism and strong solidarity with Ukraine. Ambassador O'Donoghue signaled that Dublin would multiply bilateral contacts to bridge positions before July 15. Two weeks remain. Two weeks to convince Sofia to withdraw its veto, persuade Paris and Rome to show more flexibility on Russian soldiers, and get all 27 to maintain the unity that has been the backbone of the European response since 2022.

Patriarch Kirill: symbol of a war for consciences

The Russian Orthodox Church as a political weapon

Understanding why sanctioning Patriarch Kirill matters so much requires grasping the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in war propaganda. Since 2022, Kirill has described the war in Ukraine as a «metaphysical battle», a fight against «Western decadence», a crusade to preserve Russian «spiritual» values. He refused to hold memorial services for fallen soldiers he could have met in Istanbul. He transformed an illegal military aggression into a divine mission.

This rhetoric is not without effect. It legitimizes the war in the eyes of part of the Russian population, reinforces the ideological cohesion of the Putin regime, and lends the invasion the appearance of a just cause in the eyes of certain Orthodox communities around the world. Sanctioning Kirill officially acknowledges that the war is also ideological and that its instruments — including religious ones — deserve to be targeted.

Internal Orthodox resistance

It is important to note that significant voices within the Orthodox world itself oppose Kirill. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (autocephalous since 2019) broke with the Moscow Patriarchate. Russian priests and bishops — a minority but courageous — have publicly expressed their disagreement with Kirill's position. The European sanction is therefore not an attack on Orthodoxy: it is a precise targeting of a political actor who is instrumentalizing religion for the purposes of war.

The alternatives: can the Bulgarian blockage be worked around?

Derogation mechanisms

Faced with an announced veto, the Commission and the Irish presidency are exploring compromise options. The main one: temporarily removing the contested names — Kirill, Alekperov — from the package to unblock adoption of the other measures, then reintroducing them in a subsequent package. This is a pragmatic approach that has been used in the past. In 2022, some controversial names were removed and later reintroduced after negotiations.

The risk of this approach is twofold. First, it signals that veto threats «work» — encouraging member states to block in order to extract concessions in future negotiations. Second, it delays the listing of Kirill to a moment when consensus may be even harder to find. The logic of the exception can quickly become the norm.

Recourse to bilateral sanctions

Several member states — notably the Baltic states, Poland and Sweden — have national sanctions mechanisms that allow them to act independently if the European framework is blocked. Kirill is already subject to national sanctions in some of these countries. These bilateral measures have limited reach — they cannot freeze assets at European level or apply pan-European travel bans — but they send an important political signal and maintain symbolic pressure on the network.

The economic impact on Russia: a 2022–2026 assessment

What the sanctions have achieved

The economic balance sheet of sanctions on Russia, after four years, is more complex than the simplistic narratives on either side. On one hand, the effects have been real and measurable: Russia has lost access to critical Western technologies, its aviation sector is in crisis for lack of spare parts, its banking system operates in a closed circuit, and its oil exports are priced at a discount. On the other hand, the Russian economy has not collapsed as some hoped in 2022.

Russia compensated through a war economy boosted by military spending, relying on Iran and North Korea for ammunition, China for electronic components, and numerous countries in Central Asia and the Gulf for parallel trade. This finding does not discredit the sanctions — it confirms that they must be broader, better targeted, and better enforced. Blockages like the one surrounding the 21st package work directly against that objective.

The cost of Russia's resistance to economic warfare

It is documented that the Kremlin now devotes more than 30% of its federal budget to military expenditures — a level that cannot be sustained indefinitely without degrading public services and triggering structural inflation. Interest rates in Russia exceed 21% — an emergency monetary policy level. These signals point to an economy under severe stress. Sanctions are not ineffective: they are the primary external factor aggravating that stress. The question is whether Europe will maintain the pressure long enough.

Ukrainians and sanctions: a matter of survival, not of politics

What Kyiv is asking of Brussels

From the Ukrainian side, expectations regarding the 21st package are clear and urgent. Kyiv has been pushing for months for a tightening of the oil price cap — not its maintenance at $44, but its progressive lowering — to further reduce the revenues that finance the missiles and drones falling on its cities. Ukraine also calls for accelerated procedures for listing entities circumventing sanctions and stricter enforcement of existing measures in third countries.

These demands are legitimate and documented by field data. They run up against the reality of European negotiations where short-term national interests frequently prevail over long-term solidarity. This is the permanent paradox of sanctions policy: those who pay the heaviest price — Ukrainians — have no voice in the negotiations.

The human stakes behind the numbers

Sanctions are not merely a conversation among specialists in international economic law. They have direct consequences for Russian military capacity, and therefore for the pace of strikes against Ukrainian cities, and therefore for civilian lives. When Bulgaria blocks the 21st package to protect its refinery interests, when France and Italy protect their visa flows, the causal chain is direct: Moscow retains revenues, Moscow buys weapons, Ukrainians die. This is not an emotional argument. It is a documented chain of causality.

The July calendar: every day counts

From July 3 to July 15: the decision window

The next meeting of the COELA working group (Economic and Logistical Committee for European Affairs) is scheduled for July 3, 2026, under the Irish presidency. That is where the first concessions and counter-proposals will be tested. If a framework agreement emerges, a formal adoption could follow within days. If the blockages persist, the Commission will have to propose more radical compromise solutions — removing certain names, deferring certain measures — to save the core of the package before July 15.

The worst-case scenario — which nobody truly dares name — is an automatic upward revision of the oil price cap combined with a postponement of the 21st package to autumn. This would send a catastrophic signal, not only to Ukraine, but to the credibility of the EU as a geopolitical actor. After having built its identity as a power on its sanctions policy, seeing that policy blocked by refinery interests would be a major symbolic defeat.

Lessons for future packages

Whatever the outcome of the 21st package, these negotiations highlight systemic flaws that will have to be addressed. The unanimity rule on sanctions must be reexamined. The derogation and compensation mechanisms for member states that bear disproportionate economic costs must be improved. And the collective discipline of the 27 — their capacity to maintain a common position in the face of divergent interests — must be institutionally reinforced.

Prospects: the most important summer since 2022

The NATO summit in Ankara as backdrop

These sanctions negotiations are unfolding in parallel with the NATO summit in Ankara — a pivotal event where the question of European defense, the role of the United States and support for Ukraine will be at the heart of discussions. If Europe arrives at this summit with the 21st sanctions package blocked, it will weaken its negotiating position with Washington. If it arrives with an agreement — even an imperfect one — it demonstrates its capacity to maintain pressure on Moscow autonomously.

The coherence between the defense commitments of NATO's European members and their sanctions policy is fundamental. You cannot ask the United States to remain the guarantor of European security while allowing national economic interests to block the collective instruments of pressure on Russia. These two files are linked. And American partners, whoever occupies the White House, are watching European coherence closely.

The stakes of European credibility

Over the long term, the credibility of European sanctions policy depends on its predictability and continuity. Every new package adopted on time sends a signal to Moscow: Europe is holding course, the pressure will not ease, the economic isolation is real. Every delay, every compromise forced by a veto, emits the opposite signal. Putin has been counting on European exhaustion from the start. The 21st package, if adopted before July 15 with its key measures intact, will be a demonstration that this exhaustion is not arriving.

Conclusion: hold the line or lose it for good

The line that must not be crossed

If the 21st sanctions package is not adopted before July 15, 2026, or if it is adopted in a version so watered down that it loses its effectiveness, it will be a symbolic and economic victory for Vladimir Putin. Not a military victory. Not a decisive one. But a sign that the Western coalition supporting Ukraine is fracturing, that national interests are overriding collective solidarity, that time is working for Moscow. That sign, Putin will interpret, amplify and monetize.

What Europe can still do

Europe still has two weeks. Two weeks for the Irish presidency to find the necessary compromises, for Sofia to understand the diplomatic price of its veto, for Paris and Rome to accept transitional legal solutions on Russian soldiers, and for all 27 to show once more that they can rise above their immediate interests to defend a shared vision. This is not a utopia — Europe has done it twenty times. The task is to do it a twenty-first time. And this time, there is no margin for error.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my declared biases

I am a columnist and analyst specializing in European geopolitics and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. I have covered this file since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. I am openly in favor of Western support for Ukraine and the sanctions policy against Russia. I consider Putin and his war machine a direct threat to the European order. These biases are assumed and explicit in my writing.

What I know and what I do not know

This column is based on public sources available as of June 26, 2026 and in the days following. I do not have access to the closed-door negotiations between European ambassadors. The figures cited — $44 per barrel, $58 for Urals crude, 170 individuals, 30 vessels — come from verified reporting. The evolution of negotiations between June 26 and July 15 may alter some of the analyses presented here. I make no claim to know the outcome of the ongoing discussions.

Sources

Primary sources

Euronews — Oil, cod, Kirill: friction points emerge in new EU sanctions against Russia — June 26, 2026

Euronews My Europe — Newsletter: Temperatures rise over sanctions against Russia — June 26, 2026

Sofia Globe — EU ministers extend economic sanctions against Russia for a further year — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Euronews — EU ban on Russian combatants faces resistance from France and Italy — June 26, 2026

EU Sanctions — June 2026 update — June 2026

Cambios Legales — EU Sanctions Russia 2026, Decision CFSP 2026-1437 — 2026