COLUMN: Kim Jong-un parades his missiles — while NATO prepares its Ankara summit

COLUMN: Kim Jong-un parades his missiles — while NATO prepares its Ankara summit

Introduction: June 25 — a date Kim chooses with care

The calendar is never incidental in Pyongyang

June 25, 2026 marks exactly the 76th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War — that day in 1950 when the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel to invade the South, triggering three years of conflict that never officially ended. Kim Jong-un knows his calendar. He works it deliberately. And on June 25, 2026, he chose to personally oversee a series of major weapons tests, which the KCNA (North Korea's official state agency) reported the following day with, as always, the precision of a perfectly calibrated state communiqué.

This is not a symbolic coincidence. It is an intentional political message directed at several audiences simultaneously: Seoul first, which lives under direct threat; Washington, which is preparing to gather its allies at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026; and the rest of the world, which Kim is reminding that he is still there, that he has not slowed down, and that he has new hardware to show off.

What was tested: capabilities not to be underestimated

The June 25 tests covered three distinct systems. First, a 24-tube 240mm multiple launch rocket system whose range has been extended to 90 kilometers through a new autonomous precision guidance system. Second, a "special mission" warhead for a tactical ballistic missile, designed to "inflict lethal damage" on airfields, ports, and electrical infrastructure. Third, a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with extended-range shells now reaching 65 kilometers — far enough to threaten parts of greater Seoul metropolitan area.

These figures do not come from a Western satellite analysis — they come from Pyongyang itself. North Korea proudly announces its capacity to destroy civilian and military infrastructure. This is not bluster. It is deterrence through transparency: look at what we can do, decide whether you want to provoke us.

The political timing: the NATO Ankara summit in the crosshairs

July 7 and 8, 2026: NATO convenes, Kim warms up the engines

The NATO summit scheduled in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 is the first major gathering of Atlantic allies since the The Hague summit. The agenda is packed: defense spending, support for Ukraine, Indo-Pacific cooperation, Turkey's role in the Western security architecture. And, inevitably, the North Korean question — because the North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia have made Kim Jong-un a direct actor in the European conflict.

The CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), in its June 9, 2026 analysis of the Ankara summit, underlines that NATO 30 — with its new members — must demonstrate both internal cohesion and the capacity to think about security beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic space. The North Korean tests, deliberately timed just under a fortnight before the summit, are a calculated disruption: Kim is forcing NATO to talk about him, even if that was not on the agenda.

The strategy of permanent background noise

Analyzing Kim Jong-un requires understanding his core doctrine: North Korea cannot win a conventional war. What it can do is make the cost of starting a conflict high enough to deter anyone from triggering one. The regular tests are not invasion preparations. They are deterrence insurance premiums paid in rockets and media-covered launches. Each launch reminds the world that Pyongyang exists, that it has real capabilities, and that it is ready to use them if provoked.

This strategy works precisely because it generates a permanent background noise that eventually gets absorbed as "normal." Analyst Yang Moo-jin was among the first to characterize the June 25 tests as a "show of force against the South Korean capital" — not an imminent invasion threat, but a constant territorial reminder that Seoul is within range.

What Kim tested in May: the escalation before the escalation

Tactical ballistic missiles and AI-guided drones in May 2026

The June 25 tests did not come from nowhere. In May 2026, North Korea had already tested tactical ballistic missiles with enhanced precision guidance and cruise missiles guided by artificial intelligence. The integration of AI into North Korean weapons systems is a troubling development suggesting either accelerated domestic technological advancement, or a technology transfer from Russia or other partners — in exchange for the deployment of North Korean soldiers in the Donbas.

This context is essential for understanding why the June tests concern analysts well beyond the Korean peninsula. If North Korea is receiving guidance, propulsion, or military AI technology from Russia in exchange for its human and material contributions to the war in Ukraine, then the Pyongyang-Moscow axis is no longer merely political — it is technological. And that is an escalation of an entirely different nature.

The "special mission" warhead: a new category of threat

The announcement of a "special mission" warhead for a tactical ballistic missile is the most alarming detail from the June 25 tests. That designation — "special mission" — implies a capacity for precise targeting of critical infrastructure: airfields, port facilities, electrical grids. In other words, not entire cities bombed indiscriminately, but the vital nodes of the South Korean and American civilian and military system in the region.

This evolution toward surgical strike capability against infrastructure replicates exactly the doctrine Russia applied in Ukraine: neutralize the electrical grid, communications, and transport networks to create confusion and demoralize the population before or during an offensive. If North Korea has learned this lesson from the Ukrainian conflict — and all indications suggest it is watching closely — it is building an even more precise and formidable capability.

Lee Jae Myung, Trump, and the G7 signal

What the South Korean president reported from Trump

On the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung reported that Donald Trump had told him to "pay attention to North Korea" — a deliberately vague formulation that can mean many things. Is it a warning of imminent escalation that US intelligence services have detected? Is it an invitation to direct bilateral diplomacy, in the spirit of the Trump-Kim meetings of 2018-2019? Is it simply a reminder that the North Korean question remains a priority on the American Indo-Pacific agenda?

This ambiguity is characteristic of Trumpian diplomacy — and it is devastatingly effective at sustaining strategic uncertainty. Pyongyang, Seoul, and Beijing all read this signal differently. Each sees what it wants to see. But the formulation itself — "pay attention" — suggests genuine concern, not a perfunctory protocol phrase.

South Korea and its "drone warriors"

Seoul's response to the latest tests has been to confirm acceleration of its "drone warriors" program — specialized military units in drone warfare capable of penetrating North Korean territory for precision strikes. South Korea is not improvising its response; it has been building it methodically for years, with American technological support and a domestic defense industry now recognized worldwide.

This build-up in South Korean drone capabilities is one of the few tangible deterrent developments in a highly concerning regional context. It signals to Kim that South Korea will not be a passive target — that any initial North Korean strike on South Korean infrastructure could be followed by a precise and devastating counterstrike on North Korean targets. This is symmetric deterrence under construction.

NATO and the North Korean question: a broadening agenda

The Korean peninsula enters the Euro-Atlantic agenda

The estimated deployment of 10,000 to 15,000 North Korean soldiers alongside Russian forces in the Donbas has fundamentally changed the nature of the North Korean question for European NATO members. It is no longer solely an Indo-Pacific problem managed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea among themselves. It is an actor directly involved in the war against Ukraine — a country that NATO supports massively.

The presence of Kim's soldiers in Russia links the two theaters — Europe and the Indo-Pacific — in ways that few experts had anticipated. It creates a responsibility for NATO: how to effectively sanction North Korea for its participation in the war in Ukraine? Existing sanctions are already maximal. Additional pressure mechanisms are limited. This is one of the blind spots in Western strategy.

The Ankara summit: between cohesion and fault lines

The choice of Ankara as the NATO summit venue is not without meaning. Turkey remains the Alliance's most complex member — maintaining commercial relations with Russia, managing strategic migration flows, and playing an intermediary role in various negotiations. The summit will have to navigate between asserting Atlantic solidarity and managing the diverging interests of its 32 members.

In this context, the North Korean tests of June 25 arrive as both an unwelcome distraction and a test of consistency: what does NATO say to Pyongyang? What measures does it adopt to respond to North Korea's military support for Russia? The response at the summit will be watched closely by Kim Jong-un himself — and by Beijing, which watches everything.

North Korean soldiers in Russia: the deal that changes everything

What Pyongyang gains in exchange for its soldiers

The Russia-North Korea military agreement — formalized in the strategic partnership treaty signed by Putin during his visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 — is a pragmatic exchange with profound consequences. North Korea provides manpower, artillery shells, and ballistic missiles. Russia provides in return, according to all available indications, advanced military technologies, food aid, hydrocarbons, and potentially intelligence data on Western weapons systems being tested in Ukraine.

That last element is the most alarming. The North Korean soldiers deployed in the Donbas are directly observing and being subjected to NATO weapons systems: surveillance drones, anti-drone systems, guided artillery, anti-armor missiles. Each military engagement is a field lesson that Pyongyang brings home. This is a technological and doctrinal upgrade through real combat experience — the most valuable kind.

Technological proliferation: the long-term risk

Proliferation analysts estimate that if North Korea has acquired significant knowledge of NATO weapons systems through its Russian experience, it will in time become a more dangerous supplier to its own customers — Iran, Yemen, non-state armed groups. North Korean proliferation is not only a problem for South Korea. It is a global problem that contaminates every conflict theater where Western allies are engaged.

There is a word for this dynamic: amplification. Every additional capability that Kim Jong-un acquires ends up, in one form or another, in the hands of the enemies of the West. The June 25 tests do not only concern the Korean peninsula — they concern everyone who will one day be able to buy those technologies from Pyongyang.

What the West can still do

Limited but real options

Let us be honest: Western options against North Korea are limited. Maximum sanctions already exist. Direct diplomatic engagement has produced few lasting results. The pre-emptive military option is off the table because of the catastrophic risk to Seoul. What remains is reinforced deterrence, support for South Korea and Japan, and pressure on China — the only actor with real leverage over Pyongyang.

Beijing holds the economic levers to constrain Kim if it chooses to. It does not choose to, because an unstable or collapsed North Korea is worse for its immediate interests than a nuclear and predictable North Korea. This is the central paradox: the actor that could solve the North Korean problem is also the one with the least interest in solving it. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners must make the cost of Chinese inaction high enough to alter that calculation.

Reinforcing extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

Strengthening American extended deterrence in the region — permanent or rotational deployments of tactical nuclear capabilities, large-scale joint exercises, enhanced intelligence sharing with Seoul and Tokyo — remains the most credible short-term response. The Washington Declaration of 2023 between the United States and South Korea strengthened this framework, but its implementation under the Trump administration is less predictable.

This is where the Ankara summit has a concrete opportunity: to affirm that support for NATO's Indo-Pacific partners — South Korea, Japan, Australia — is an Alliance priority, not one option among many. NATO can no longer afford to treat conflict theaters as sealed silos. The world of 2026 is too interconnected for that kind of strategic fragmentation.

The psychological profile of a regime that does not back down

Kim Jong-un is not mad: he is rational within his own logic

A common error in Western analysis is treating North Korea as an irrational or unpredictable actor. That is wrong, and this error has practical consequences for foreign policy. Kim Jong-un is rational — within the logic of a regime whose primary objective is dynastic survival. Every military decision, every test, every provocation fits within that rationality: maximize deterrence, maintain bargaining leverage, demonstrate to the internal elites that the regime is strong and invulnerable.

This rationality is terrifying precisely because it is coherent. Kim has watched what happened to Gaddafi — who gave up his nuclear program and was killed. He watched Saddam Hussein — eliminated despite his conventional capabilities. The lesson he draws is clear: only nuclear deterrence guarantees the regime's survival. Negotiating in this context means asking Kim to surrender his only guarantee of existence. It is not impossible — but it is infinitely harder than the diplomacy optimists suggest.

Dynastic succession and the intensification of tests

Intelligence analysts have observed for two years an intensification of tests linked to the consolidation of potential succession. Kim Jong-un is visibly preparing his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, to succeed him — presenting her at military ceremonies, associating her with missile launches. In this context, every spectacular test is also an internal demonstration: the supreme leader is strong, the lineage is secured, North Korea is advancing.

This dynastic dimension is underestimated in Western analyses. It means the tests are not only directed outward — they are also internal political communication aimed at North Korea's military and political elite. Kim cannot afford to appear weak before his generals. Every cancelled test would be read as weakness. This is a prison of his own rhetoric that compels him to escalate regularly to maintain his internal credibility.

Conclusion: Kim is counting on our fatigue

The strategy of attrition through repeated tests

If North Korea has a doctrine that has worked for 30 years, this is it: test frequently enough for the world to get used to it, negotiate intermittently without ever concluding a lasting agreement, and advance inexorably in capabilities while the international community moves from one crisis to the next. Kim Jong-un is the third generation of a regime that has survived the collapse of the USSR, the famines of the 1990s, twenty years of sanctions, and multiple changes of American administration.

This regime is not mad. It is perfectly rational within its own survival logic. And that logic tells it that if it can hold out another 5 years, it will have ICBMs with multiple nuclear warheads capable of reaching American cities from submarines. When that day comes, extended deterrence becomes even harder to maintain. The clock is running.

What June 25, 2026 leaves behind

The June 25, 2026 tests do not start a war. They do not immediately tip the regional balance. But they add another layer to the threat architecture Kim Jong-un is methodically building: rockets at 90 km with precision guidance, howitzers that threaten Seoul, "special mission" warheads to hit vital infrastructure. Every test is a brick. And when the edifice is complete, it will be too late to contest its legitimacy.

The date of June 25 and the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 are connected in Kim's strategy. He disrupts, he compels attention, he asserts his presence. NATO should respond not with yet another declaration, but with concrete actions that make his strategy of accumulation more costly. Perhaps that is too much to ask of 32 democracies in a 48-hour meeting. But it would be a start.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and where I speak from

I am a columnist and analyst, not a non-proliferation specialist or Korean security expert. My analysis draws on available open sources: Straits Times, Yonhap, Al Jazeera, AP, CSIS. I share the conviction that North Korea represents a real threat and that supporting South Korea and Japan is a vital Western interest.

What I do not know and my biases

I do not have access to classified intelligence on Pyongyang's short-term intentions. I acknowledge that some experts view North Korean tests primarily as internal communication and a consolidation of Kim's power, rather than an imminent external threat. These nuances deserve to be heard, even though my overall reading remains that of a serious threat to be taken at face value.

Sources

Primary sources

Straits Times — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports, June 26, 2026

Yonhap — Kim Jong-un oversees weapons tests on anniversary of Korean War, June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, South training drone warriors, June 26, 2026

AP/SFGATE — North Korea's Kim watches weapons tests and calls for offensive posture, June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

CSIS — NATO Ankara Summit: NATO 30 in practice, June 9, 2026

Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO Summit (context and agenda), accessed June 2026

19FortyFive — North Korea's June 2026 weapons tests: strategic analysis, June 2026