OPINION: Two Years of the Russia-North Korea Pact — 6,000 Dead and an Axis Reshaping Asia

OPINION: Two Years of the Russia-North Korea Pact — 6,000 Dead and an Axis Reshaping Asia

Introduction: June 19, 2024 in Pyongyang — When Putin and Kim Signed the Future

An anniversary Moscow and Pyongyang celebrate — and the West watches with unease

On June 19, 2026, North Korea marked the second anniversary of the signing of its comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia. The official North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun called it an "essential legal weapon" promising a "new world order." That formulation — new, essential, promising a new order — is not rhetoric. It is a program.

Two years earlier, on June 19, 2024, Vladimir Putin was in Pyongyang to sign that pact during a state visit. It inaugurated what analysts now call the first mutual defense pact between Pyongyang and a major power since the Cold War. Two years later, the pact has already produced its first effects — measured in shells, soldiers, and deaths.

The two-year balance sheet: numbers that speak for themselves

In two years, the Russia-North Korea pact has produced military flows without precedent since the end of the Cold War. More than 20,000 North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia, primarily in the Kursk region. Approximately 6.5 million artillery shells delivered to Russia. At least 100 ballistic missiles supplied. And approximately 6,000 casualties — killed or wounded — among North Korean troops deployed in Russia. Those 6,000 North Koreans killed or wounded will never be officially acknowledged by Pyongyang.

In return, Russia has provided North Korea with advanced military technologies: air defense systems, anti-aircraft missiles, electronic warfare systems. Attack drones and reconnaissance drones. And very likely advances in reconnaissance satellite programs, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles. U.S. General Xavier Brunson testified before Congress in April 2025 that these technology transfers could allow North Korea to significantly advance its weapons of mass destruction programs within three to five years.

The June 2024 Treaty: What It Says — and What It Promises

Article 3: the mutual defense clause

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024 contains a central clause that alarmed defense analysts: Article 3. It stipulates that each party must provide "immediate military and other assistance by all available means" if the other party is "put into a state of war through an armed attack." This is a mutual defense clause — the first linking North Korea to a major power since the Sino-Korean pact of 1961.

The geostrategic implication is major: if Russia is attacked — or declares itself to be — North Korea is technically bound to intervene militarily. And vice versa. This creates a formal link between the war in Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula. An escalation in Europe could theoretically trigger Article 3 in Asia. And vice versa.

Article 10: nuclear and space cooperation

Article 10 of the treaty provides for cooperation in the fields of nuclear energy and space technology. Both fields have civilian applications — and direct military applications. The launch of a North Korean reconnaissance satellite in May 2024 using a new kerosene-liquid oxygen engine presumed to be based on Russian technology illustrates how that cooperation translates concretely.

North Korea has long sought to improve its satellite targeting capabilities for its intercontinental ballistic missiles. If Russia genuinely transfers advanced space technologies within this framework, it represents a proliferation threat of considerable magnitude — not only for South Korea and Japan, but for U.S. territory.

North Korean Soldiers in Russia — Anatomy of an Unprecedented Deployment

20,000 soldiers — without Beijing's approval

The deployment of more than 20,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia since late 2024 is a geopolitical event without precedent since the Cold War. It happened — and this is crucial — without China's approval. Kim Jong-un made this decision unilaterally, demonstrating a strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Beijing that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

This deployment illustrates the depth of the transformation in Russia-North Korea relations. It is no longer a relationship of economic assistance from a great power toward a small dependent state. It is a symmetric military alliance — North Korea provides troops, Russia provides technologies. Both parties consider each other mutually necessary.

Kursk: where North Korean soldiers fought and died

The North Korean deployment was concentrated in the Kursk region, the theater of Ukraine's spectacular summer 2024 offensive. North Korean soldiers were engaged to repel — and ultimately reverse — that Ukrainian incursion onto Russian soil. Casualties in the Kursk region alone reached approximately 6,000 killed or wounded according to available estimates.

Many of these soldiers were North Korean conscripts who had never seen modern combat — battles involving FPV drones, loitering munitions, precision artillery systems. They learned in the field, at the cost of severe losses. What they will bring back to North Korea — experience of modern combat, training in countermeasures, knowledge of Ukrainian and Western tactics — is a strategic added value for Pyongyang.

North Korea's Arsenal to Russia: Shells, Missiles, and Containers

6.5 million artillery shells — and an industry producing for war

North Korea has sent Russia approximately 6.5 million artillery shells and other munitions according to estimates available through November 2026 — and that flow continues. These shells, in standard calibers compatible with the Soviet-era artillery Russia uses in Ukraine, have been a lifeline for the Russian army, which was consuming munitions at a rate its domestic industry could not sustain alone.

Following the Russia-North Korea summit of September 2023, 20,000 containers of armaments had been shipped by October 2024 — primarily artillery shells, short-range missiles, and anti-tank missiles. According to May 2025 estimates, North Korea had supplied up to 9 million rounds of ammunition for various weapons systems used in Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence estimated the figure even higher — at 10 million.

North Korean ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory

North Korea also supplied Russia with at least 100 ballistic missiles according to May 2025 estimates. These missiles — variants of the North Korean KN-23 or KN-24 — were used against targets in Ukraine. Their use was documented by Ukrainian ballistic analysis services. These missiles represent not only additional strike capacity for Russia, but also a real-world test of North Korean ballistic technology under combat conditions.

That real-conditions testing is valuable for Pyongyang. It allows the identification of weaknesses in its systems, improvements to their reliability, and the development of countermeasures against the Western missile defense systems used by Ukraine. The war in Ukraine is a military laboratory for North Korea — without its soldiers ever having to officially acknowledge it.

What Russia Gives in Return: Deterrence Technologies and Greater Autonomy

Drones, air defense systems, electronic warfare

Russia's transfers to North Korea are not symbolic. Russia has supplied Pyongyang with air defense systems, anti-aircraft missiles, and advanced electronic warfare systems. It reportedly transferred approximately 5 attack drones and 1 reconnaissance drone as technology samples. These transfers directly improve North Korean military capabilities.

On the strategic programs front, the testimony of General Xavier Brunson before the U.S. Congress in April 2025 is alarming: Russia is sharing technologies in the fields of space, nuclear, and missiles with North Korea, which could enable significant advances in its weapons of mass destruction program within three to five years. Combined with Article 10 of the treaty on nuclear and space cooperation, that picture is deeply troubling.

Kim's new strategic autonomy — beyond Beijing's control

One of the most significant consequences of the Russia-North Korea pact is the reduction of Pyongyang's dependence on Beijing. China still controls approximately 95% of North Korea's annual trade and 85% of its exports. It is the source of virtually all fuel, a large share of food imports, and the currency of its limited external commerce.

But Kim Jong-un has demonstrated that he no longer needs Beijing's approval for his major strategic decisions. He deployed troops to Russia without prior consultation with Beijing. He signed a mutual defense pact without Chinese consent. He tested missiles and developed his nuclear capabilities without concern for China's objections. That autonomy is precisely what Beijing had feared — and what the pact with Moscow has made possible.

The Implications for Northeast Asian Stability

Seoul and Tokyo facing a new security equation

For Seoul and Tokyo, the Russia-North Korea pact has structurally changed the security equation of Northeast Asia. North Korea now has improved military capabilities, recent combat experience, ballistic missiles tested under real-world conditions, and a strategic partner providing cutting-edge technologies. That combination is qualitatively different from the North Korean threat that existed before 2024.

South Korea has maintained its forces on high alert since the first reports of North Korean deployment in Russia. It has also provided Ukraine with intelligence on North Korean military capabilities — crucial information for adapting Ukrainian tactics against soldiers from Pyongyang. That intelligence sharing has created an indirect link between the Korean Peninsula and the war in Ukraine that would have seemed absurd five years ago.

China's dilemma: tactical advantages, strategic disadvantages

China finds itself in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis the Russia-North Korea pact. On one hand, it indirectly benefits from North Korean military support to Russia — a Russia holding its own in Ukraine distracts the West and maintains pressure on U.S. strategic resources. On the other hand, a militarily stronger and more autonomous North Korea is a source of unpredictability that Beijing no longer controls as it once did.

China has expressed "discomfort" with the depth of the Russia-North Korea military partnership, according to various diplomatic sources. It fears that a North Korea with improved nuclear and ballistic capabilities could provoke an escalation on the Korean Peninsula that directly involves it. That calculation is the real Achilles heel of the Russia-North Korea pact: it creates tensions in the Sino-North Korean axis that Beijing cannot fully control.

Russia Dismantles International Oversight — The UN Vote

The Russian veto against the UN panel of experts on North Korea

In March 2024, Russia voted against the renewal of the UN panel of experts mandated to monitor compliance with sanctions on North Korea. That vote effectively dismantled one of the few multilateral mechanisms capable of documenting arms transfers between the two countries. It was a deliberate act of obstruction — Moscow destroyed the monitoring mechanism precisely because it was about to document its own violations.

This destruction of the panel of experts is a perfect example of how permanent members of the UN Security Council use their status to cover their own sanctions violations. The UN was founded on the assumption that permanent members would be accountable. Russia has shown that assumption to be naive. It has turned the Security Council into a tool to protect its own illegal activities.

The impact on international monitoring capacity

Without the panel of experts, documenting Russia-North Korea arms transfers must rely on alternative sources: national intelligence (U.S., South Korean, Ukrainian), independent monitoring organizations, and open sources. These sources are valuable but fragmentary. They cannot replace a multilateral mechanism formally mandated by the Security Council.

The loss of the panel of experts is therefore a real loss for the international community's ability to document and sanction violations of the North Korean sanctions regime. It is a deliberate weakening of international law by a state that positions itself as a guarantor of world order. That contradiction must be named — and denounced.

New Routes and New Bonds: Hospital, Air Links, Collective Memory

A new hospital, Pyongyang-Moscow flights, anniversary ceremonies

Rodong Sinmun celebrated the treaty anniversary by listing its concrete "fruits": a new hospital under construction with Russian assistance, restored air links between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the deployment of soldiers in Russia. Those three elements illustrate the partnership's dimensions — humanitarian (the hospital), commercial (the flights), and military (the soldiers).

Vladimir Topekha, the Russian embassy's chargé d'affaires in Pyongyang, visited the House of National Gifts on the eve of the anniversary with embassy staff. These meticulous diplomatic ceremonies — symbolic visits, official publications, speeches — are how authoritarian regimes build the narrative of their alliances. They tell a story of brotherhood, shared interests, and resistance to the West. That story has an audience: the North Korean and Russian elites who must believe in the partnership's legitimacy.

The ideological dimension: two regimes against the liberal order

Beyond the military and economic exchanges, the Russia-North Korea pact has an ideological dimension that the West often underestimates. Both regimes share a deep hostility toward the international liberal order — multilateral institutions, human rights, freedom of expression, representative democracy. They share the conviction that the West seeks to destabilize and overthrow them. And they share the strategy of resistance — accumulating sufficient military capabilities to make any aggression against them too costly.

This ideological dimension creates a solidarity that goes beyond immediate interests. It explains why the partnership holds even when it creates friction with Beijing. It explains why Kim Jong-un has invested politically in the pact by publicly associating his image with it. And it explains why the June 19 celebration was as much an ideological affirmation as a review of military accomplishments.

The Consequences for Ukraine — Direct and Documented

North Korean shells on Ukrainian cities

For Ukraine, the Russia-North Korea pact is not an abstract geopolitical matter. It is a daily reality on the battlefield. North Korean artillery shells fall on Ukrainian cities. North Korean ballistic missiles have been identified in debris from strikes in Ukraine. North Korean soldiers fight Ukrainian soldiers in the Kursk region.

This direct involvement of North Korea in the war against Ukraine is a fact the West must take more seriously. It justifies broader sanctions on Pyongyang — beyond those already in place. It justifies deeper engagement with South Korea and Japan on managing the North Korean threat in the context of the war in Ukraine. And it justifies a response strategy that acknowledges that this war is not merely a Russia-Ukraine conflict — it is a war by the axis of disruptors against the international order.

The West's debt to Ukraine in this context

If Russia can count on allies — North Korea for munitions and troops, Iran for drones, China for dual-use goods — then Ukraine must be able to count on its allies with the same consistency and depth. That equation is fundamental. The West cannot frame the war in Ukraine as a bilateral Russia-Ukraine conflict and respond bilaterally — with limited support, hesitations, conditions — while the adversary benefits from a global support network.

The second anniversary of the Russia-North Korea pact is a brutal reminder of that reality. The axis forming against the West is real, operational, and deepening. The West must respond with the same rigor and consistency. That is what the Ankara summit must affirm. And that is what Ukraine deserves to hear.

Looking Ahead: What the Pact Will Look Like in Two More Years

If current trends hold

If the current trends of the Russia-North Korea pact hold over the next two years, the picture at the horizon of 2028 is troubling. North Korea will have accumulated significant modern combat experience through its soldiers returning from Russia. It will potentially have benefited from technology transfers in the fields of nuclear and ballistic missiles. And it will have reinforced its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China.

A North Korea that is more militarily capable, more autonomous, and with a strategic partner in Russia is a qualitatively different threat to South Korea, Japan, and the United States. It structurally changes the security equation of Northeast Asia. And it demonstrates that Russia's gains in this pact are not only military — they are also geopolitical, by firmly anchoring North Korea in the anti-Western camp.

The West's options in the face of this pact

The West has several levers to counter this pact: enhanced sanctions on North Korea and the Russian entities involved in transfers; increased support for South Korea and Japan to strengthen their defense capabilities; and a more direct response to North Korean sanctions violations in multilateral forums — even if Russia continues to block UN mechanisms. There is no simple solution. But inaction is not an option.

The second anniversary of the Russia-North Korea pact is an occasion for the West to reassess its strategy against the axis of disruptors — not only in Europe but in Asia. The war in Ukraine has ramifications that extend far beyond the Donbas. They reach Pyongyang. They touch Seoul. They concern the entire world.

Kim Jong-un and Putin: A Brotherhood of Arms — and Its Limits

Two leaders who found each other in necessity

Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un found each other at the exact moment each needed the other. Putin needed munitions that the Russian defense industry could not produce quickly enough. Kim needed military technologies that only a great power could provide — and international legitimacy through a high-level strategic partnership. This marriage of necessity has become, in two years, an alliance with real effects on global geopolitics.

But this alliance has its limits. Putin cannot offer Kim everything that Beijing offers — trade, food, fuel, multilateral diplomacy. And Kim cannot offer Putin the diplomatic legitimacy or the advanced technologies that China could provide. This partnership is strong in its military dimension — and potentially fragile in its political durability if interests diverge after the war.

The post-war question: will the pact survive the end of the conflict?

The question few ask but that deserves to be asked: what will become of the Russia-North Korea pact if the war in Ukraine ends? Without immediate military pressure, the mutual incentives will weaken. Russia will need fewer munitions. North Korea will have received some of the technologies it sought. Tensions with China linked to Pyongyang's strengthening could weigh more heavily.

Article 3 of mutual defense would remain — on paper. Air links would remain. But the intensity of the military partnership could erode. That is why it is crucial for the West that the end of the war in Ukraine — whatever form it takes — not leave Moscow free to further deepen this partnership in Asia. The war in Ukraine and the security of Northeast Asia are now linked. Addressing one while ignoring the other would be a strategic mistake of the first order.

North Korean Prisoners in Ukraine — An Explosive Dossier

Soldiers captured on Ukrainian soil

The presence of North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian battlefield — through their deployment in the Kursk region, which sometimes brought them close to Ukrainian lines — has led to captures. North Korean soldiers are now in the hands of Ukrainian forces. Their status is complex: prisoners of war from a state that officially denies their presence on the battlefield?

These North Korean prisoners in Ukraine constitute an explosively sensitive diplomatic dossier. South Korea has announced its readiness to receive them. The United States and Ukraine see them as a potentially valuable intelligence source on North Korean military capabilities and on Russia-North Korea coordination. And Pyongyang would prefer they not officially exist — because their existence proves that its soldiers are fighting in Ukraine, which the regime denies.

The question of reintegration or repatriation

The question of repatriating these prisoners is complex. Sending them back to North Korea would be handing them to a regime that will likely punish them severely for having been captured. Keeping them in Ukraine indefinitely is not a solution. South Korea, which considers all North Koreans as its nationals, offers an alternative — to welcome them, to give them the chance of a free life. It is simultaneously a humanitarian gesture and a geopolitical act that tells Pyongyang: your soldiers chose another life.

This dossier of North Korean prisoners in Ukraine is one of the most intriguing geopolitical threads in this conflict. It connects the war in Europe to the question of Korean reunification, to Seoul's strategy, and to Kim Jong-un's policy toward his own soldiers. It is a microcosm of the complexity of the post-2024 world — where local wars have global ramifications.

Conclusion: Two Years of an Alliance That Is Changing the World

June 19, 2026 in the long arc of history

The second anniversary of the Russia-North Korea pact marks the point from which this alliance can no longer be described as an anomaly or a temporary reaction to wartime circumstances. It has become a structural reality of international relations — a reality that has already produced profound military, technological, and geopolitical effects. Denying or minimizing this reality would be a strategic mistake.

What the West must do now

The West's response to the Russia-North Korea pact must be multidimensional. Broader sanctions on entities involved in transfers. Strengthened support for Seoul and Tokyo in the face of an amplified North Korean threat. A coordinated strategy to diplomatically isolate Pyongyang in international forums. And assistance to Ukraine that explicitly acknowledges it is fighting not only Russia, but a support network that Moscow has patiently built since 2022.

Conclusion: The Pariah Pact — and Why It Concerns Everyone

An alliance that transcends the war in Ukraine

The Russia-North Korea pact was born from the war in Ukraine. But it already transcends it. It is reshaping the balances of Northeast Asia. It is weakening the sanctions regime on North Korea. It is transferring dangerous military technologies. It sets a precedent for other alliances within the anti-Western axis — between Russia and Iran, between China and Russia, between all those who see in the decline of the liberal order an opportunity.

Why Ukraine must win — and what that means for Asia

A Ukrainian victory — or at least a peace agreement that does not reward Russian aggression — would send a powerful signal to the entire world: pariah alliances don't pay off. Invasions don't pay off. Kim Jong-un's support for Putin did not bring Russia victory. And the exchanged military technologies were not enough to overcome Ukrainian resolve and Western support. That signal is crucial — not only for Kyiv, but for Seoul, for Tokyo, for Taiwan, for all those watching this war as a test of the West's capacity to defend its values.

Conclusion: June 19, 2026 — The Anniversary No One in the West Wanted to Commemorate

What two years of the pact have taught

Two years of the Russia-North Korea pact have taught the West several painful lessons. That alliances between authoritarian regimes can be rapid, effective, and durable. That international law can be circumvented with cynicism by those willing to pay the diplomatic price. That sanctions without universality are imperfect tools. And that the security of Europe and the security of Asia are now linked in ways geography had long concealed.

The only coherent response

The only coherent response to the Russia-North Korea alliance is a coherent response from the West and its partners: NATO + EU + South Korea + Japan + Australia. Multidimensional alliance systems covering both Europe and Asia, sharing intelligence, coordinating sanctions, and supporting Ukraine with the understanding that this war is the defense of the world liberal order — not merely the defense of one country.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and method

This opinion piece draws on the Korea Times (Yonhap) article of June 19, 2026 on the second anniversary of the Russia-North Korea treaty, the Modern Diplomacy article of June 11, 2026 on the geopolitical impact of the Russia-North Korea partnership in Northeast Asia, and secondary data on military transfers. The figures on soldiers (20,000 deployed, 6,000 casualties), munitions (6.5 million shells), ballistic missiles (100+), drones, and technology transfers are drawn from the cited sources. General Brunson's congressional testimony dates to April 2025 according to Modern Diplomacy.

What I do not know

The precise number of North Korean casualties has not been officially confirmed. The details of technology transfers in the nuclear and space domains remain largely classified. The durability of the Russia-North Korea partnership after a potential end to the war in Ukraine is an open question this opinion piece cannot resolve.

Sources

Primary sources

Korea Times — N. Korea vows deeper ties with Russia on 2nd anniv. of signing key treaty — June 19, 2026

Modern Diplomacy — How Moscow's wartime alliance with Pyongyang is redrawing the map of Northeast Asian power — June 11, 2026

Secondary sources

Kyiv Independent — North Korean presence on the Ukrainian battlefield — June 2026

Defence Ukraine — Russia-North Korea military transfers and impact in Ukraine — 2026

Foreign Policy — Geopolitics of the Russia-North Korea partnership — 2026

Euromaidan Press — Axis of disruptors: Russia, Iran, North Korea, China — June 2026