ANALYSIS: RIMPAC 2026: thirty-one nations facing China's naval rise

ANALYSIS: RIMPAC 2026: thirty-one nations facing China's naval rise

Introduction: the Pacific fills with warships

RIMPAC 2026 — the world's largest naval exercise

Since June 24, 2026, the waters around Hawaii have become a ballet of warships. Exercise RIMPAC 2026 — Rim of the Pacific — brings together roughly 40 ships, more than 25,000 military personnel and 31 participating nations for maneuvers running through July 31. It is the largest multinational naval exercise in the world, and in 2026, its geopolitical significance is heavier than ever. ThinkChina put it plainly on June 25: the Pacific is filling with warships in a new context of Sino-American military competition.

Around the same time, exercise Valiant Shield 2026 was launched on June 22 — a separate American demonstration of power projection in the Western Pacific. This is not a coincidence. These exercises are synchronized to send a collective message: the Indo-Pacific is a vital area of interest for an enlarged coalition of nations that refuses to see China exercise unilateral dominance there.

31 nations — a coalition that goes beyond NATO

RIMPAC is not NATO. There is no collective defense treaty, no Article 5, no obligation of mutual response. But the presence of 31 nations — from Southeast Asia, South America, Africa, Oceania, Europe — says something important about the contemporary geopolitics of the Pacific. Nations that have no natural reason to cooperate militarily with the United States choose to do so. And their presence at RIMPAC is a declaration: we do not want a Pacific under Chinese hegemony.

The composition of this coalition is strategically significant. France, present through its Pacific territories, brings European legitimacy to the exercise. Japan, Australia, South Korea, India — QUAD members and their partners — are at the heart of the demonstration. The ASEAN nations participating signal that even states that normally prefer calculated neutrality toward China are choosing to associate themselves with this exercise in collective sovereignty.

China's naval buildup: numbers that demand attention

More ships than the US Navy — but...

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) today counts more than 350 combat vessels — more in number than the US Navy. This is a factual point that has been circulating in all naval strategy circles for several years. China has built its fleet at a stunning industrial pace: a destroyer every few weeks, aircraft carriers launched one after another, nuclear submarines in series.

But ship count is not everything. In terms of total tonnage, in terms of power projection capability, in terms of cutting-edge technology — missiles, underwater detection systems, electronic warfare — the US Navy maintains significant advantages. More importantly, the US Navy operates within a network of alliances and partnerships that China cannot match. RIMPAC is precisely the demonstration of this multiplier dimension.

Chinese aircraft carriers: symbol and reality

China now possesses three aircraft carriers: the Liaoning (converted from a Soviet hull), the Shandong (first built in China), and the Fujian (the first with electromagnetic catapults comparable to American ones). A fourth is under construction. This carrier fleet is a symbol of the global power projection that Beijing aspires to.

But Chinese aircraft carriers still have significant operational limitations. Their carrier strike groups lack the operational experience of American carrier strike groups, which have accumulated decades of combat practice and coordination. PLAN naval pilots have fewer carrier flight hours than their American counterparts. These gaps narrow with time and training — but in 2026, they remain a reality.

Valiant Shield 2026: American power projection in the Western Pacific

The exercise that says «we are here»

Exercise Valiant Shield 2026, launched on June 22, differs from RIMPAC in its philosophy. Where RIMPAC is multilateral and inclusive, Valiant Shield is first and foremost an American demonstration — of the capacity to project air and naval power into the Western Pacific, within striking distance of China, North Korea, and potential tension zones around Taiwan.

These exercises typically involve carrier strike groups, B-2 and B-52 bombers out of Guam, nuclear-powered submarines, and coordination exercises between US Pacific forces (INDOPACOM) and regional allies. The message is clear: the United States can strike any point in the region, quickly, with disproportionate means.

The island chain and the strategy of standoff defense

American strategy in the Western Pacific rests on the concept of the «island chain» — a series of island arcs running from Japan to the Philippines and the Northern Mariana Islands that form successive lines of defense. China seeks to break through these chains to freely access the waters of the Central Pacific. The United States seeks to maintain them as Chinese anti-access zones.

Taiwan is at the heart of the first island chain. Its geographic position is such that if China took control of the island, its submarines and aircraft could operate freely in areas that are currently inaccessible. That is why Taiwan's fate is not just a question of human rights or democracy — it is a question of strategic geography that American admirals lose sleep calculating.

The Taiwanese tabletop exercise: simulating the quarantine

The most likely scenario according to experts

The tabletop simulation conducted by Taiwan and reported by Bloomberg on June 25, 2026 modeled a precise scenario: a maritime quarantine imposed by Chinese naval forces around the island. This scenario is considered by many experts to be more likely than a direct amphibious landing — more discreet in its triggering, harder to counter, and capable of forcing Taiwan into capitulation through economic exhaustion rather than military defeat.

A maritime quarantine would mirror, conceptually, the isolation of Taiwan's own supply lines: the island depends on imports for almost everything — energy, food, raw materials. Cutting its supply lines for a few weeks would create shortages, massive economic pressure, and potentially a political ultimatum. The scenario is horrifying in its logic.

The countermeasures: break the blockade or negotiate?

The American response to a Chinese maritime quarantine of Taiwan would involve, according to publicly discussed plans, sending warships to break the blockade. That is an act constituting a direct declaration of war against China — with all that implies for two nuclear powers. The tabletop exercises of June 2026 explore precisely these dilemmas: at what point do the United States decide to intervene militarily, and with what means?

The simulation has no good answer. That is precisely why the exercises are necessary: to identify decision points, to prepare command chains, to test assumptions. What emerges from these simulations, according to sources who participate in them, is the complexity and danger of any escalation scenario — and the necessity that deterrence be strong enough that the scenario never materializes.

Taiwan's June exercises: tanks in the streets

Five days of readiness for real combat

Taiwan conducted a five-day «immediate combat readiness» exercise starting June 22, 2026, including the deployment of tanks in the streets of the island. These unusual scenes — armored vehicles patrolling urban arteries — are both a demonstration of military preparedness and a political communication to Beijing: we are ready, we will not be taken by surprise.

These exercises responded directly to PLA maneuvers that China had presented as simulations «toward actual combat». The memory of Ukraine in 2022 is omnipresent in Taiwanese military planning: commanders in Taipei have drawn lessons from Ukrainian mistakes — notably the absence of urban defense preparation — and are incorporating them into their own exercises.

Urban defense: the Ukrainian lesson

Ukrainian resistance in cities — Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol — showed that urban warfare can stop or exhaust armies with superior equipment. Armed civilians, soldiers trained in urban guerrilla tactics, barricades, improvised armor — all of this counted in the Ukrainian resistance. Taipei is taking note and adapting its doctrine.

An invasion of Taiwan would face urban defenses that make the cost of controlling a city extraordinarily high. Taipei, a city of several million inhabitants, is a potential fortress if civilians resist. That is the scenario that PLA planners fear most: a long, costly war that mobilizes the international community against China and devastates the image of a country presenting itself as a responsible power.

European powers and the Pacific: a growing presence

Europe reaching beyond its own backyard

The European presence at RIMPAC 2026 — notably French, through its Pacific territories, and British, through a regular naval presence — signals an important strategic evolution. Europe is no longer concerned only with its Eastern flank and the Russian threat. It recognizes that the security of the Indo-Pacific is linked to its own security.

France, a Pacific power through its territories — New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna — is the most deeply engaged European nation in the region. Its participation in RIMPAC is not symbolic: it brings real naval capabilities, regional relationships, and a legitimacy that confirms the Chinese threat is not merely an American obsession.

The European warning on Taiwan: a diplomatic turning point

The collective warning issued by European powers on the Chinese threat against Taiwan, reported by Yahoo News on June 24, 2026, marks a turning point in European diplomatic posture. For years, European capitals carefully avoided naming China as a threat on the Taiwan question, preferring formulas like «support for the status quo» or «concern for regional stability».

Explicitly naming the Chinese threat is a language break. It reflects a recognition that strategic ambiguity has limits — and that if China attacks Taiwan, Europe will be economically and politically affected, whether it has said so in advance or not. Better to tell the truth now and strengthen deterrence.

Submarines: the invisible dimension of the naval rivalry

China's submarine fleet: a silent buildup

The submarine component of the Chinese navy is perhaps the most concerning for American planners. China today possesses a numerically significant submarine fleet — including several nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines. While the technological level remains below that of American submarines of the Virginia class or British submarines, the trend is toward rapid improvement. And in submarine warfare, silence matters as much as performance.

RIMPAC exercises include intensive training in anti-submarine warfare — detection, pursuit, simulated neutralization of enemy submarines. This is a domain in which American allies — notably Japan and Australia — have serious capabilities. The AUKUS agreement, which plans to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, is precisely designed to reinforce this submarine dimension of the coalition facing China.

AUKUS and the variable geometry of Indo-Pacific defense

The AUKUS agreement — between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia — represents a major transformation of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. By equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines (not nuclear-armed), it creates a capacity for discreet presence in deep waters that will be crucial in any future conflict in the Western Pacific. This capability will take years to materialize — the first Australian nuclear submarines will not be operational before the early 2030s.

But the announcement itself has already had strategic effects. It signaled to Beijing that Australia is investing in long-duration capabilities, that it will not be a passenger in the coalition but a serious military actor. And it demonstrated that the United States is willing to share its most sensitive technologies with allies to build the Indo-Pacific coalition. RIMPAC 2026 is the collective training while these new capabilities become operational.

The logistical chain of conflict: who holds whom?

America's dependence on regional bases

American power projection in the Western Pacific depends on a network of forward bases — Guam, Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan, Diego Garcia. These bases are essential logistics hubs that allow American forces to operate thousands of kilometers from the continental US coast. They are also obvious targets in any conflict with China — Chinese DF-26 missiles, nicknamed «carrier killers», are specifically designed to threaten these bases and American carrier strike groups.

The vulnerability of these bases is one of the most debated questions in American strategic circles. The response underway is dispersion: rather than concentrating forces in a few large bases, develop a network of smaller, more mobile, less predictable ones. The Philippines have authorized the United States access to additional bases on their territory since 2023. Australian bases are being reinforced to accommodate larger American forces. This dispersion is costly but complicates the calculation of a potential attacker.

Logistics as a decisive factor

Modern warfare, as Ukraine has demonstrated since 2022, is won or lost in factories and logistics as much as on the battlefield. In the Pacific, where distances are enormous and supply lines long, logistics would be even more decisive. An American carrier strike group running short of missiles, fuel, munitions mid-conflict is no longer a deterrent force — it is a target. RIMPAC exercises test these logistical chains precisely under realistic conditions.

China holds the advantage of geographic proximity in any conflict around Taiwan. Its supply lines are short. Its bases are close. The United States compensates through technology, quality, and coalition. But logistics remains a critical factor that exercises like RIMPAC seek to optimize year after year, integrating new nations and new capabilities into a mutual support network that can survive disruptions.

Conclusion: RIMPAC as a geopolitical mirror

What 31 nations are saying together

RIMPAC 2026 is not just a military exercise. It is a geopolitical mirror reflecting the fears, alliances, and calculations of 31 nations facing a China whose naval ascent and strategic ambition sharpen with each passing year. These nations do not form a formal alliance. But they exercise together, they train together, they build interoperabilities that, when the moment comes, could be decisive.

China is not invited to RIMPAC. It was invited in the past — in 2014 and 2016 — and its participation was withdrawn after the relationship with the United States hardened. Today, its absence is as much a signal as its presence once was. RIMPAC is clearly positioned as an exercise of the coalition that does not want a hegemonic China in the Pacific.

The naval race: who will win, and when?

The question every strategist is asking is one of timeline: how long can the United States and its allies maintain qualitative naval superiority over a China that builds faster? The current — fragile — consensus places the critical window around 2030–2035: if China takes no aggressive action by then, the industrialization of its navy could create a balance unfavorable to the allies.

This time pressure is what gives RIMPAC 2026 its particular urgency. Every exercise is an opportunity to build collective capabilities that complicate the Chinese calculation. Every new partner joining the coalition expands it. Every demonstration of coherence reduces the temptation of adventurism. And in this game of naval deterrence, time counts — now more than ever.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My positions on China and the Indo-Pacific

I am Maxime Marquette, a geopolitics columnist. I regard China's naval buildup as a real threat to the liberal international order and to the security of the region's democracies. My position is pro-American in the sense that I believe the American presence in the Pacific is a stabilizing factor — imperfect, but real. I acknowledge that this position is contestable by analysts who view the American presence as a factor of tension rather than stabilization.

The data on RIMPAC, the Taiwanese exercises and the Chinese naval posture come from sources dated June 22 to 26, 2026: ThinkChina, Bloomberg, Washington Post, Yahoo News. I do not have access to classified data on PLAN capabilities.

What I do not know

I do not know when — or whether — China will act militarily against Taiwan. I do not know the internal decisions of the Politburo or the Central Military Commission. I acknowledge that respected analysts — including some at RAND Corporation and Brookings — believe China prefers unification through economic and political means rather than military ones.

The critical window of 2030–2035 that I mention is a common estimate in defense circles, but it remains speculative. The future of the Sino-American naval competition is uncertain, and forecasts about the balance of power can be overturned by unforeseen technological innovations.

Sources

Primary sources

ThinkChina — RIMPAC 2026: 40 ships, 25,000 personnel, 31 nations facing China's naval rise — June 25, 2026

Washington Post — Taiwan: 5-day immediate combat readiness exercise, tanks in the streets — June 22, 2026

Bloomberg — Taiwan tabletop drill simulates maritime quarantine by Chinese forces — June 25, 2026

ISW — China-Taiwan update: PRC countermeasures against the 1260H list — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Yahoo News — European powers issue rare warning on Chinese threat against Taiwan — June 24, 2026

The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer count on the United States — June 27, 2026