The American military burden, in numbers, ahead of Ankara

Introduction: numbers that tell a story of structural imbalance

A factbox that lands at exactly the right moment

Just days before the NATO summit in Ankara, the Anadolu Agency published a precise factbox on the defense spending levels of Alliance members. One figure dominates all others: the United States spends roughly $838 billion a year, nearly 60% of the combined total of the 32 allies. The United Kingdom trails far behind at $90.5 billion, France at $66.5 billion, and Turkey at $32.6 billion.

These numbers are not mere bookkeeping statistics. They map the real distribution of power inside the Atlantic Alliance, and they explain why Donald Trump has made burden-sharing an obsession of his foreign policy.

Why this analysis matters right now

Because Ankara must precisely measure progress toward the 5% of GDP target set last year in The Hague. Understanding who pays what, and in what proportion, is the indispensable starting point for any serious discussion about the future of burden-sharing among allies.

Washington's crushing weight

$838 billion, a figure that needs perspective

The American defense budget, at $838 billion, exceeds by itself the combined budgets of every other ally put together. That figure covers operational spending, salaries, research and development, and the maintenance of an unmatched global military presence, including in Europe, where tens of thousands of American troops remain stationed.

This budgetary reality gives Washington a disproportionate diplomatic weight inside the Alliance — leverage that Trump has used relentlessly to push the 5%-of-GDP agenda onto his European partners.

The price of American protection

Since 2014, this budgetary imbalance has fed growing resentment on the American side, where successive administrations have denounced the fact that American taxpayers disproportionately finance the security of European allies judged too reluctant to invest in their own defense.

The European trio: United Kingdom, France, Germany

Significant budgets, but nowhere near the American level

The United Kingdom, with its $90.5 billion in annual dollars, remains the Alliance's second-largest contributor, closely followed by France at $66.5 billion. These two European nuclear powers maintain significant power-projection capabilities, notably through their independent deterrence forces and their blue-water navies.

Germany, long criticized for chronic military underinvestment, has undertaken a notable transformation of its defense policy since 2022, although its pace of buildup remains, according to several analysts, below the ambitions initially announced.

France, a nuclear pillar with a constrained budget

Paris must contend with severe domestic budget constraints that limit its ability to significantly accelerate defense spending, despite the pressure exerted by Europe's post-invasion security context following Russia's attack on Ukraine.

Turkey, the Alliance's third-largest budgetary force

$32.6 billion and growing industrial ambition

With $32.6 billion in annual spending, Turkey holds a prominent place among NATO contributors, a rank consistent with its status as host of the Ankara summit. In recent years the country has built a robust national defense industry, exporting drones and weapons systems to several allied and partner nations.

This Turkish industrial rise, however, comes alongside persistent tensions with certain Western allies over related issues, notably past purchases of Russian equipment, which have strained Washington's trust in Ankara on certain sensitive programs.

A strategic ally on the margins of the southeastern flank

Turkey's geographic position, at the hinge between Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea, makes it an indispensable actor for monitoring Russian naval activity and developments in neighboring Syria and Iraq.

The 2% threshold finally crossed by all

A historic milestone in 2025

A striking fact confirmed by the Anadolu factbox: for the first time since the 2% of GDP threshold was codified at the 2014 Wales summit, all 32 members of the Alliance met or exceeded that threshold in 2025. This is real progress, achieved after years of American diplomatic pressure and a steadily deteriorating European security context since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

This milestone, however, should not obscure the scale of ground still to cover before reaching the new 5% target, far more ambitious and structurally demanding for most European economies.

Poland, the Alliance's model student

Poland now leads the Alliance in spending as a share of GDP, a choice directly tied to its acute perception of the Russian threat, given its direct border with the Kaliningrad enclave and its proximity to Belarus, an ally of the Kremlin.

The Spanish case, an assumed and controversial exception

A negotiated ceiling of 2.1%

Spain remains the only ally formally exempted from the 5% target, having secured a ceiling set at 2.1% of GDP. Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez justified this position by calling the collective goal "not only unreasonable, but also counterproductive," a statement that stirred diplomatic ripples within the Alliance.

This exception illustrates the limits of NATO's displayed consensus: behind the show of unity, deep disagreements persist over the pace and scale of European remilitarization.

A risky precedent for Alliance cohesion

Should the Spanish exception inspire other reluctant capitals, the collective credibility of the 5% commitment could erode quickly, weakening the Alliance's negotiating position against adversaries who closely watch its internal fault lines.

NATO's common budget, a drop in the ocean

$5.3 billion euros for 2026

NATO's commonly funded budget, which covers headquarters operations, the permanent command structure, and shared military infrastructure, totals a maximum of 5.3 billion euros for 2026, according to the Anadolu factbox. That amount represents less than 0.4% of total allied defense spending, which exceeds $1.4 trillion.

This proportion reveals an often-overlooked reality: the bulk of the Alliance's military power does not come from a centralized budget, but from the sum of national budgetary efforts, politically coordinated but separately financed by each capital.

A decentralized architecture, a source of complexity

This budgetary decentralization considerably complicates the coordination of military investments, with each country retaining sovereign control over its acquisition priorities, which partly explains the duplication of certain weapons programs across Europe.

What these numbers mean for Ukraine

The direct link between defense spending and support for Kyiv

This budgetary analysis is not an abstract accounting exercise: it directly determines the Alliance's capacity to support Ukraine against Russia's ongoing aggression. The allies who invest the most in their own defense are generally also the ones who contribute most generously to Ukraine's war effort, whether in munitions, air-defense systems, or military training.

The Baltic states, Poland, and the Nordic countries, often at the top of the spending-as-a-share-of-GDP rankings, also rank among Kyiv's most consistent supporters — a correlation that is anything but accidental.

President Zelensky, a strategic guest at the summit

The expected presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Ankara underscores the total interweaving of the Alliance's internal budget discussions and the fate of the Ukrainian conflict. Every additional percentage point of GDP invested by a European ally potentially translates into additional capabilities available for Kyiv.

The threats that justify this budgetary race

Russia, the number-one structuring threat

This entire budgetary architecture responds to a clearly identified threat: Vladimir Putin's Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine in 2022 upended European strategic calculations for at least a generation. Drone incidents on the Alliance's eastern flank, documented repeatedly in recent months, reinforce the perception of a persistent and evolving threat.

This Russian threat alone justifies most of the budgetary acceleration observed since 2022, well before the pressure exerted by the Trump administration on its European allies.

China and Iran, secondary but growing threats

Beyond Russia, the Alliance is progressively factoring into its strategic calculations the rising military power of China, as well as the destabilizing activities of Iran, notably through its support for the Houthis in the Red Sea. These threats, though geographically distant from Europe, increasingly influence the investment priorities of certain allies, particularly in cyberdefense and the resilience of strategic supply chains.

Toward Ankara: what to watch in the coming figures

Credible national plans, the new expected standard

At the Ankara summit, every ally will have to present a credible trajectory toward the 5% goal, a budgetary transparency exercise that will separate real commitments from face-saving promises. This credibility requirement, championed by Secretary General Mark Rutte, constitutes an important political test for Alliance cohesion.

The results of this exercise will largely determine NATO's credibility against adversaries who scrutinize every sign of division or collective weakness.

Momentum that must not fade

The 20% increase in European and Canadian spending observed in 2025 is an encouraging signal, but nothing guarantees this pace will hold over time, especially if domestic budgetary tensions intensify in several European capitals facing growing public deficits.

Lessons from a decade of European underinvestment

2014-2024, ten years of structural delay

It took more than a decade, from 2014 to 2025, for all allies to finally reach the initial 2% of GDP threshold set at the Wales summit. This structural delay left European armed forces, in many cases, under-equipped and undersized against a Russian adversary that, despite massive losses in Ukraine, retains a worrying capacity for military regeneration.

This lost decade partly explains why the 5% target seems so ambitious today: it must compensate for years of chronic underinvestment, not merely meet the immediate needs of the Ukrainian conflict.

Rebuilding a weakened defense industrial base

Beyond budgets, Europe must rebuild a defense industrial base weakened by decades of consolidation and underuse. This industrial rebuilding, slower than budgetary announcements, will determine the Alliance's real ability to turn its dollars and euros into tangible military capabilities.

The role of Canada and the Nordic countries in the equation

Ottawa under pressure to accelerate

Canada, long criticized for its chronic lag on NATO spending targets, has announced significant budget increases in recent years, without fully closing the gap with the most committed European allies. This pressure, jointly exerted by Washington and several European capitals, illustrates the collective dynamic pushing the entire Alliance toward accelerated remilitarization.

The Nordic countries, notably Sweden and Finland, recently integrated into the Alliance, stand out for a particularly ambitious budgetary trajectory, driven by their direct geographic proximity to Russia and a deeply rooted territorial-defense culture.

Exemplary Nordic and Baltic solidarity

Sweden has already announced its intention to reach its core defense target as early as 2030, five years ahead of the collective 2035 deadline, an example that several analysts cited by the Atlantic Alliance urge other capitals to follow.

The concrete impact on real military capabilities

Budgets that must become tanks, missiles, and soldiers

Increased budgets only matter if they translate into tangible military capabilities: more operational brigades, more air-defense systems, sufficient munitions stockpiles to sustain a prolonged conflict. Several experts cited in the trade press stress that, despite the spending increase, Europe remains below the capabilities needed to ensure its own collective defense without American support.

This reality explains why Mark Rutte insists so strongly on the need to turn "cash into combat capability," a phrase he has repeated several times before various Western audiences in recent months.

The irreducible delay of industrial buildup

Even with unlimited budgets, the buildup of Europe's defense industry takes time: building a new munitions plant, training specialized engineers, or recruiting additional soldiers are processes measured in years, not months, no matter the political will displayed in Ankara.

What Western public opinion still misunderstands

A debate often reduced to slogans

In several European countries, public debate over defense spending often remains reduced to simplistic slogans, crudely pitting "social spending" against "military spending," without factoring in the geopolitical reality that makes this effort necessary against a Russia that has shown no sign of de-escalation since 2022.

This misunderstanding of the strategic context complicates the task for European governments, who must justify significant budget increases to their voters in an often strained economic climate.

The educational role of political leaders

It falls to European political leaders to clearly explain to their citizens why these additional expenditures are necessary, relying on verifiable facts rather than merely invoking fear, however justified it may be given the Kremlin's revisionist ambitions.

Conclusion: numbers that call for consistency, not euphoria

Real but fragile progress

This budgetary analysis confirms undeniable progress: all NATO allies have finally reached the 2% of GDP threshold, and the trajectory toward 5% is taking shape, driven by constant American pressure and a very real Russian threat. But this progress remains fragile, uneven across capitals, and dependent on political will to sustain the effort over time.

Ankara's figures, whether they confirm or contradict current trends, will determine whether this budgetary momentum can withstand the economic and political pressures within each member country.

The real test still lies ahead

The true test of this budgetary architecture will not play out in Ankara, but in the years that follow, when national budgets must concretely translate these commitments into delivered military capabilities, notably to sustainably support Ukraine against a war of attrition that Russia appears determined to prolong.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist-analyst, convinced that collective Western defense must be strengthened against the threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. This conviction leads me to support the increase in European defense budgets, without closing my eyes to the inefficiencies and imbalances that the numbers themselves reveal.

What I don't know, and my method

I do not have access to classified budgetary data from each member country, and I rely exclusively on figures published by NATO and by specialized press agencies. I cannot predict with certainty whether allies will actually reach the 5% target by 2035, and I refrain from any definitive prophecy on this point.

Sources

Primary sources

Factbox – NATO defense spending: Where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit — Anadolu Agency, July 1, 2026

Official overview of the NATO summit in Ankara — NATO, July 2026

Secondary sources

NATO sees sharp increase in Europe and Canada's defence spending — Reuters, March 26, 2026

Factbox – NATO by the numbers ahead of Ankara summit — Anadolu Agency, June 25, 2026

What to Watch at the NATO Summit in Ankara — CEPA, July 2, 2026

NATO defense spending tracker — Atlantic Council, 2026