ANALYSIS: The SABER Act and Euroclear's 193 Billion — When Russian Money Funds Ukraine's Defense

Introduction: The day the U.S. Senate turned the weapon against Moscow

A bipartisan bill dated June 18, 2026

On June 18, 2026, six American senators — three Democrats, three Republicans — introduced the Seized Assets for Battlefield Equipment and Readiness Act, known as the SABER Act, in the U.S. Senate. The name is deliberate: a sword turned against the one who forged it. The proposal is direct: allow Ukraine to use confiscated Russian assets under American jurisdiction not merely for reconstruction or humanitarian aid, but for the direct purchase of military equipment. Tim Kaine, Democrat from Virginia, and John Cornyn, Republican from Texas, are the principal co-sponsors. Chuck Grassley, Roger Wicker, Chris Coons, and Sheldon Whitehouse join them.

Three simultaneous fronts, one question

The dossier extends well beyond the bill itself. In Brussels, Euroclear — the Belgian central securities depository — holds €193 billion in frozen Russian assets. The Russian Central Bank is seeking €220 billion in damages before a Moscow tribunal, claiming the freeze was unlawful. Euroclear responded by bringing the matter before a Brussels commercial court on June 30, 2026. In Kyiv, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov was pressing London to accelerate the ERA program — the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration. Three fronts, one question: to whom does an aggressor's money belong?

The SABER Act: what it concretely changes

From the REPO Act to the SABER Act: a logical evolution

To understand the SABER Act, one must go back to the REPO Act — the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act — already in effect. That legislation allows the United States to confiscate frozen Russian sovereign assets under American jurisdiction and transfer them to Ukraine. But the use is restricted: reconstruction, economic aid, humanitarian assistance. Buying HIMARS rockets or 155mm shells with those funds? Prohibited under the REPO Act. That is precisely the lock the SABER Act seeks to break, by explicitly adding the purchase of military equipment to the authorized uses of confiscated funds.

The targeted munitions: shells, HIMARS, Excalibur

The munitions specifically targeted in the bill are concrete: 155mm artillery shells, Excalibur extended-range shells, munitions for HIMARS and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). The proposed mechanism includes pre-authorization for NATO allies and partners to purchase and transfer certain munitions categories to Ukraine without navigating the American bureaucratic labyrinth each time. The authorization would run through December 31, 2030, with a possible extension to 2035. Ukraine would be required to provide written guarantees that it will not transfer these munitions to third parties without American consent.

Ambassador Stefanishyna and the Ukrainian reading

A political signal beyond the legislative text

Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States, publicly responded to the SABER Act announcement. Her message: the bill opens new opportunities for Russian assets and restarts the discussion on practical mechanisms for using the aggressor state's funds. For Kyiv, the importance is not merely financial — it is political. Every dollar confiscated from Moscow and redirected to Ukrainian forces asserts that Putin's war is self-financing. That is a logic of retributive justice that goes beyond accounting.

Zero cost to American taxpayers

In a polarized Congress, redirecting frozen Russian assets represents a less painful political path than voting new appropriations. Chuck Grassley, Republican senator from Iowa, put it directly: this support costs nothing for taxpayers. The calculation is clear: forcing Putin to fund the Ukrainian resistance is an argument that sells well on both sides of the Senate aisle. This logic is not new, but the SABER Act formalizes it in a way that creates a durable legislative precedent: Putin's war must be paid for with Putin's funds.

Euroclear's €193 billion: the Brussels legal battle

The central depository at the heart of global legal conflict

Euroclear, Belgium's financial infrastructure based in Brussels, has become, despite itself, the epicenter of the dispute over frozen Russian assets. After the large-scale invasion of February 2022 and the subsequent Western sanctions, Euroclear found itself holding €193 billion in assets belonging to the Russian Central Bank and other Russian sovereign entities — the largest share of the roughly €260 billion in Russian assets frozen by Western countries in total. Euroclear applied European Union sanctions, as EU law required it to do.

Moscow's legal counter-offensive

In December 2025, the Russian Central Bank filed a claim before the Moscow arbitration tribunal. In May 2026, that tribunal ruled in its favor and ordered Euroclear to pay roughly €220 billion in damages for the asset freeze. A request for immediate enforcement was granted a few days later. Euroclear described the proceedings as unjust and fictitious — hearings having been held behind closed doors — and categorically contested the jurisdiction of Russian courts over a Belgian-law entity operating in compliance with European Union rules.

Euroclear counter-attacks before Belgian courts

A preliminary hearing on June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, a first preliminary hearing was held before the Brussels commercial court. Euroclear had officially filed its lawsuit to block enforcement of the Russian decision. The central argument is solid: Euroclear is a Belgian-law entity; only Belgian courts have relevant jurisdiction; EU law explicitly protects it for having complied with the sanctions. Further proceedings are expected before the Brussels tribunal in the coming months.

The risk in non-European jurisdictions

Reuters' analysis on June 30, 2026 highlighted the residual risk that Moscow may seek to enforce its ruling outside the European Union — in China, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan. In those jurisdictions, the protection that EU law offers Euroclear does not apply. Analysts describe this risk as more symbolic than practical in the short term, but it signals Russia's strategy: use the gaps in Western jurisdictional coverage to chip away at positions in non-aligned countries. The Bank of Russia stated it is preparing a defense strategy, confirming that it is closely tracking the Brussels proceedings.

The United Kingdom and the ERA program: a third front on frozen assets

Fedorov calls London to unlock funds on June 30

On June 30, 2026, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov spoke with Rachel Reeves, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer. The subject: accelerating the ERA — Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration program, the G7 mechanism that uses the revenues generated by frozen Russian assets as collateral for long-term loans to Ukraine. Fedorov requested that the funds be unlocked as quickly as possible, with three priorities: air defense, long-range munitions, and Ukrainian drones.

Kyiv's three priorities: air, munitions, drones

Each of these three needs has a documented cost and a measurable urgency. Ukrainian air defense faces daily pressure from Russian ballistic missiles and guided aerial bombs. Long-range munitions are needed to reach Russian supply lines and logistics depots. Ukrainian drones have proven their operational effectiveness both in strike and reconnaissance missions and require a continuous supply stream. For Kyiv, the British ERA program is a financing source that Ukraine considers legitimate and available; what is missing is the political decision in London.

The global context: €300 billion frozen, a potential arsenal

The scale of the international financial stakes

To grasp what is at stake, the global figures must be laid out. Western countries have frozen a total of roughly €300 billion in Russian sovereign assets since February 2022. About two-thirds of that is in Europe, the majority at Euroclear in Brussels. The United States holds a smaller share. Since 2024, the interest generated — approximately €3 billion per year — has been flowing to Ukraine through the ERA mechanism. That is the logic the G7 collectively endorsed. It has produced concrete results since its activation.

From the REPO Act to ERA interest: the progression of mechanisms

What the SABER Act proposes is to go much further: not merely the interest, but the confiscated principal. That is a major qualitative leap. The proposal by senators Kaine and Cornyn simply extends the permitted use under the REPO Act to direct armament. The international law argument invoked by Moscow — that seizing assets constitutes a violation of customary law — runs up against the Western position: obligations under jus cogens and UN resolutions on aggression authorize proportionate countermeasures against a documented aggressor.

What American senators are saying publicly

Statements that draw a clear moral line

John Cornyn, Republican from Texas, framed the stakes with remarkable political clarity: the current arms export approval process is too slow and causes critical delivery delays for Ukrainian forces. His amendment has two goals: unlock Russian assets for weapons financing, and reduce the bureaucracy that slows arms transfers through NATO allies. Tim Kaine, Democrat from Virginia, emphasized Ukraine's battlefield resilience and the enhanced effectiveness the new mechanism would enable.

Cornyn, Wicker, Whitehouse: the Republican and Democratic voices

Roger Wicker, Republican from Mississippi, summarized the bill's ambition: hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian funds should be put to good use to push back the Russian invaders and support Ukrainians fighting for freedom. Sheldon Whitehouse, Democrat from Rhode Island, drew the causal line directly: seizing Russian sovereign funds via the REPO Act was the first step; the SABER Act would go further to force Putin to fund the weapons that defeat him. These statements confirm that the American debate on Ukraine has moved beyond partisan lines.

The NATO Ankara summit: the diplomatic backdrop

An additional €70 billion on the table in July

The SABER Act arrives at a pivotal moment for Western military support to Ukraine. The NATO summit is scheduled for July 7–8, 2026 in Ankara. Discussions center on additional military aid estimated at €70 billion, with a stated intent to maintain similar funding levels in 2027. Support for Ukraine is expected to feature among the key points of the final declaration. The American senators' initiative takes on strong symbolic weight in this context: it signals that at least part of the U.S. Congress remains engaged.

The convergence of American, European, and British approaches

For European allies gathered in Ankara, the SABER / ERA / Euroclear mechanism represents a convergence of different approaches toward the same goal. The EU has approved using frozen asset interest for arming Ukraine since 2024. The European Commission has proposed loans on the principal. The United States is considering direct arms purchases. The United Kingdom is pushing on the ERA program. This informal coordination is unprecedented in its scale. What is still missing is the speed of execution in the face of a war that cannot wait.

What Moscow loses in this legal battle

The Russian ruling: more symbolic than practical within the EU

Financial analysts cited by Reuters on June 30, 2026 agree: the ruling from the Moscow arbitration tribunal ordering Euroclear to pay €220 billion carries more symbolic than practical effect within the European Union. EU law explicitly protects Euroclear, and no Belgian or European court will recognize the jurisdiction of a Russian tribunal over a Belgian-law entity operating in compliance with Community sanctions. Euroclear's counter-move before Belgian courts forces Moscow to demonstrate, before an independent tribunal, the legal substance of its claims.

Russia's global legal intimidation strategy

Moscow knows its ruling will not be enforced in Europe. The strategy lies elsewhere: creating uncertainty for financial institutions cooperating with the sanctions regime, feeding a victimization narrative to BRICS countries, and chipping away at positions in non-aligned countries. The Bank of Russia declared it is preparing a defense strategy against the Brussels proceedings — a defensive posture that reveals the real fragility of its position. The West's objective must be to legally close the dossier before that uncertainty produces effects in third-party financial markets.

The limits of the mechanism: what the SABER Act cannot do

A text still at the bill stage

The limits of the SABER Act must be named clearly. As of July 1, 2026, the text is a bill, not a law. It must pass through Senate committees, a full Senate vote, the House of Representatives, then receive a presidential signature. In a polarized Congress where the SAVE Act — a neighboring initiative — had already failed to reach the 60 votes needed in the Senate, the road remains long. Senator Thune, the Senate majority leader, stated that the SAVE Act lacked sufficient votes. The SABER Act has a stronger bipartisan profile, but a majority is not guaranteed.

The geography of assets limits direct American impact

Furthermore, Russian assets under strict American jurisdiction represent a fraction of the €300 billion frozen in total. The vast bulk remains in Europe, primarily at Euroclear. The SABER Act therefore has no direct reach over European funds — it can only act on what is under American control. To mobilize European assets, it is the European Parliament, the Council, and EU member states that must act. The American initiative carries strong political signal value, but its direct financial impact is constrained by the geography of frozen assets.

The paradox: Ukraine waiting for funds that are technically already available

The distance between legal framework and actual execution

There is a cruel paradox in this dossier: frozen Russian assets exist. The €300 billion are immobilized, identified, located. The mechanisms to use them are under construction or partially in place. And yet, every week of delay translates into concrete weapons shortfalls in Ukrainian forces. The distance between the legal framework and actual execution is not technical — it is political. Western decision-makers have not yet decided to move as fast as the war demands.

The NATO summit's €70 billion against Ukraine's urgency

The NATO summit in Ankara is discussing €70 billion in additional aid. That is a significant sum. But frozen Russian assets represent four times that amount and cost allied taxpayers nothing. The political question is therefore why Western democracies prefer to mobilize their own resources rather than go after those of the aggressor. The answer is partly legal — the mechanisms are not yet complete — and partly political: fear of the international precedent and economic retaliation from Moscow in other domains restrains the boldest decisions.

What Ukraine actually expects from these mechanisms

The defense-financing-time equation

On the Ukrainian side, coordination is visible. Fedorov addresses London on the ERA program on June 30. Stefanishyna welcomes the SABER Act in Washington. In Brussels, the legal proceedings against the Russian Central Bank advance. This is not coincidence: Ukraine is running a coordinated diplomatic-financial offensive to maximize access to frozen Russian assets before the political window closes. Ukrainian forces need artillery munitions in massive volume, air defense systems, drones. Frozen Russian assets theoretically represent the means to fund them without overloading Western defense budgets.

Ukrainian coordination between Washington, Brussels, and London

Every week of delay in unlocking the funds translates into unfunded military capabilities. The time pressure is real. The NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026 will be followed by an implementation period. If the SABER Act is not passed before the end of 2026, the political window risks closing. If the ERA funds are not quickly released by the United Kingdom, air defense system deliveries will fall behind schedule. The issue, ultimately, is not just whether Russian money will fund Ukrainian weapons — it is how fast.

Historical precedents and the legitimacy of seizure

A legal innovation constructed under the pressure of war

The question of using a belligerent state's assets before the end of a conflict has no perfectly comparable recent precedent. War reparations imposed by treaty — Versailles in 1919, post-war agreements in 1945 — came after the aggressor's defeat. What is happening with frozen Russian assets is different: mobilizing resources during the conflict, without waiting for a hypothetical peace, to allow the victim to defend itself. That is a major legal-political innovation that the West is building on the fly, under the pressure of a real war.

The Budapest Memorandum and the West's debt

The strongest moral argument remains the Budapest Memorandum of 1994: Ukraine renounced the Soviet nuclear arsenal inherited on its territory in exchange for security guarantees signed by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Moscow violated those guarantees in 2014 and again in 2022. Using frozen Russian assets to fund Ukrainian resistance is not a dangerous precedent for the international system — it is proof that sanctions carry real consequences. Lawyers who worry about the precedent should first worry about the precedent of a large-scale European invasion that produced no lasting financial consequences for the documented aggressor.

Conclusion: three hundred billion reasons to act fast

The political window that is gradually closing

The week of June 18–30, 2026 marked a rare convergence of signals: a bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate, a legal action by Euroclear in Brussels, a direct request from Fedorov to London. These three parallel events form a coherent message: the Western world has decided that Russian money will serve to defend Ukraine, but the mechanisms are still incomplete, the procedures slow, the votes uncertain. The SABER Act needs its 60 Senate votes; the ERA program needs a swift political decision in London; Euroclear needs diplomatic support from the EU to defend its legal position.

What history will make of this pivotal moment

In five years, historians will look at this moment and judge whether the West acted quickly enough. €193 billion at Euroclear. €300 billion in total. Entire arsenals could be funded by the money of the one who started the war. The question is no longer whether this is legally possible — the legal framework is being built — nor even whether it is politically desirable — the Western consensus exists. The question is whether democratic institutions, slow by nature, can move fast enough for there to be something left to defend. Ukraine cannot wait for the next legislative session. It is waiting for the munitions.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Sources and method

This article draws on dated, verifiable primary sources: the official press release from Senator Tim Kaine's office announcing the SABER Act (June 18, 2026), Reuters reports on Euroclear's Brussels legal proceedings (June 30, 2026), the Kyiv Independent on the same developments (July 1, 2026), Censor.net on the Fedorov–Reeves discussions on the ERA program (June 30, 2026), and RBC Ukraine on American senators and munitions (June 29, 2026). The amounts cited — €193 billion at Euroclear, €220 billion in Russia's claim, €300 billion in total — come directly from these sources.

Editorial positioning

I am in favor of using frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine's defense. I consider Russian aggression to be illegal and that sanctions must carry real consequences. This position is assumed and does not affect the factual verification of the information presented. Uncertainties — the SABER Act vote, ERA timelines, Brussels proceedings — are explicitly named in the text. No invention. No fabricated quotation.

Sources

Primary sources

Senator Tim Kaine's office — Introduction of the SABER Act — June 18, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Euroclear takes frozen assets dispute against Russia to court in Brussels — July 1, 2026

Censor.net — Fedorov and the UK on frozen Russian assets and the ERA program — June 30, 2026

RBC Ukraine — U.S. senators and acceleration of munitions deliveries to Ukraine — June 29, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters — Euroclear sues Russian central bank over €220 billion — June 30, 2026

RBC Ukraine — Pentagon and unused Russian assets — June 2026

Vilni Media — Stefanishyna on the SABER Act and new opportunities — June 21, 2026