ANALYSIS: Latvia alerts — drones and missiles, the hybrid war has already begun

ANALYSIS: Latvia alerts — drones and missiles, the hybrid war has already begun

Introduction: When Riga says "watch out," the Alliance must listen

An alert that deserves to be taken seriously

Latvia is not a country that cries wolf. It is a NATO and European Union member state, with a civil intelligence service — the SAB (Constitution Protection Bureau) — and a military service that have developed, since reintegration into the Western sphere, recognized expertise in analyzing the Russian threat. When Riga transmits to its allies an assessment that Russia is preparing hybrid attacks involving drones and missiles against NATO's Eastern Flank, as reported by Fox News on June 22, 2026, this is not routine communication. It is an alert.

This alert arrives in a context of multiplying signals of concern. Su-24M bombers and Su-30SM2 fighters from Kaliningrad are rehearsing strike operations toward the Baltic, according to Army Recognition of June 21, 2026. Western sources are pointing to a possible Russian provocation in the Baltic states or in Poland, according to The Guardian of June 26, 2026. And NATO officials admit fearing they can no longer count on American commitment, according to The Guardian of June 27. Each signal, taken in isolation, is worrying. Together, they compose a picture that decision-makers can no longer ignore.

Hybrid warfare: not a novelty, but an acceleration

Russian hybrid warfare did not begin with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It began, at least in its modern form, with the cyberattack against Estonia in 2007, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, with the intervention in Syria, with sabotage operations against industrial installations in Western Europe. What the Latvian alert signals is an intensification and a focusing: Russia is preparing hybrid operations specifically targeted at the Alliance's Eastern Flank, with identified military vectors — drones and missiles.

The analysis that follows seeks to understand why Latvia is sounding the alarm now, what a hybrid drone-and-missile attack actually means in concrete terms, and what NATO can and must do to respond to this threat before it materializes.

Anatomy of the Russian hybrid threat in the Baltics

Drones: a low-cost weapon of terror

Drones have become the weapon of choice in Russia's strategy of harassment of civilian populations and infrastructure destruction. In Ukraine, hundreds of Iranian Shahed-136 drones, renamed "Geran-2" by the Russians, have been launched at cities, power plants, water systems, and hospitals. The unit cost of such a drone is approximately $20,000 to $50,000 — ridiculously low compared to the cost of the defenses required to intercept it.

Deployed against the Baltic states, these same drones or their equivalents produced in Russia, Iran, or North Korea could target critical infrastructure — electrical grids, gas terminals, port facilities, data centers — with potentially considerable economic and psychological impact. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have modern economies highly dependent on their digital infrastructure. A prolonged blackout in any of these capitals would immediately trigger a political crisis.

Precision missiles: the high-intensity threat

Beyond drones, the threat of precision missiles from Kaliningrad is of a different nature entirely. The Iskander-M has accuracy in the single-digit meter range and can carry devastating conventional warheads or, in theory, tactical nuclear ones. An Iskander strike on a military headquarters, an air base, or a command center in the Baltic states would be an open act of war, not a hybrid operation. But a strike on an ambiguous target — a dual-use civilian-military installation, for example — would reintroduce doubt about attribution and the appropriate response.

It is in this space of ambiguity that Russian strategy seeks to operate. Strike hard enough to cause fear. Strike ambiguously enough to paralyze the Allied response. Use the 14 to 16 hours of political deliberation within NATO to consolidate a gain before the response comes. This scenario is not hypothetical: it is what Russia did, on a different scale, in the first hours of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022.

Why now: the timing of the Latvian alert

Growing pressure on the Russian army in Ukraine

The timing of the Latvian alert is probably not a coincidence. In June 2026, the Russian army in Ukraine is operating under growing difficulty. Russia's budget deficit tops $80 billion, according to United24 Media of June 23, 2026. War spending is increasing by 4 to 5 additional trillion rubles in 2026, according to Bloomberg via Ground News of June 23. The Russian economy is showing signs of "structural exhaustion," according to the Kiel Institute cited by the Foreign Affairs Forum of June 23.

A regime under military and economic pressure often seeks to compensate with successes elsewhere. A provocation in the Baltics — ambitious enough to be presented as a victory to the Russian population, limited enough to avoid a full NATO military response — could seem a tempting option for Putin. Latvian intelligence services have very likely detected planning signals in that direction.

The diplomatic calendar as a window of opportunity

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 also represents a paradoxical window of opportunity for Russia. On one hand, the summit will reinforce Allied cohesion and potentially harden defense commitments. On the other, in the days preceding the summit, the attention of leaders and media is concentrated on diplomatic preparations, creating a window during which a Russian action could sow maximum confusion.

An incident in the Baltics between now and July 7 would force the summit agenda, divide the Alliance on the response to give, and place leaders in the uncomfortable position of simultaneously managing a real crisis and negotiating long-term objectives. That is exactly the type of disruption Russian strategy seeks to provoke.

The Baltic and Baltic response: between resilience and calls for help

What the Baltic states are already doing

Faced with the Russian hybrid threat, the Baltic states have not waited for their allies' help to act. Estonia has developed the concept of "total defense society" — an approach that involves all civil, governmental, and military institutions in defense preparation. Lithuania reintroduced mandatory military service in 2015 and continues to expand it. Latvia is massively investing in its national guard and cyber defense capabilities.

These three countries have also developed civil resilience plans specifically designed to withstand hybrid attacks: energy storage, evacuation plans, alternative communication networks, government continuity procedures in the event of a cyberattack. This level of civil preparedness has no equivalent in most Western European countries, which have never seriously had to contemplate their own territory as a combat zone.

What they need from their allies

Despite their impressive efforts, the Baltic states know they cannot face a large-scale Russian hybrid attack alone. They need the physical presence of allies — not the current symbolic battle groups, but full brigades with their support systems — for deterrence to be credible. They need missile defense systems deployed on their soil, capable of intercepting both drones and Kaliningrad's missiles. And they need clear assurances about the Alliance's response in the event of an ambiguous hybrid incident.

The alert launched by Latvia is also an implicit request for attention. By making their threat assessment public, the Latvians place their allies in a position where not acting becomes a form of deliberate — and documented — choice. The European Parliament briefing of June 26, 2026 on the Ankara summit explicitly includes the hybrid threat on the Eastern Flank among priority topics. The message has been received, at least formally.

The drone defense challenge: a technological war to win

Intercepting hundreds of drones simultaneously

The drone war in Ukraine has revealed a major technical challenge: traditional missile defense systems, designed to intercept high-speed ballistic missiles, are not optimal for shooting down hundreds of slow and cheap drones. A Patriot firing a $3 million round to shoot down a $20,000 drone is not a viable equation at scale.

Ukraine has developed alternative methods — anti-aircraft guns, low-power lasers, electronic jamming systems, interceptor drones — to address this challenge. These experiences have inestimable value for NATO's defensive planning. The Baltic states, in cooperation with allies, are developing and deploying counter-drone systems. But as of June 2026, this capability remains insufficient to handle a saturation attack.

Electronic warfare as the first line of defense

Against drones, electronic warfare is often the first and most effective response. Jamming the GPS signals and communications of drones can blind them or divert them from their targets. The Baltic states, and Estonia in particular with its cybersecurity expertise, have developed capabilities in this domain. But Russia is simultaneously developing inertial guidance systems for its drones, making GPS jamming less effective.

This is a permanent technological race, and one the West can win if investments are sufficient and coordinated. The tens of billions in new defense contracts that Rutte promises for the Ankara summit must include a significant share dedicated to counter-drone systems and electronic warfare. This is no longer a niche capability: it is a survival capability for the Baltic states.

Electronic warfare and jamming: a double-edged weapon

GPS jamming as a hybrid warfare instrument

Russia has developed an electronic warfare capability recognized as one of the most sophisticated in the world. From Kaliningrad, systems like the Murmansk-BN can jam communications across hundreds of kilometers, disrupting the navigation systems of aircraft, guided missiles, and drones. This capability has been used in Ukraine to temporarily neutralize Western GPS-guided weapons systems. It can be deployed against the Baltic states with equal effectiveness.

GPS jamming affects not only military systems but also critical civilian infrastructure: commercial aviation, maritime navigation, electrical grid synchronization systems. Jamming incidents have been documented in Finland, Estonia, and Scandinavian countries in recent years — attributed to Russian operations from Kaliningrad or from bases in Russia. These incidents constitute the least visible but potentially most disruptive form of Russian hybrid warfare.

Counter-electronic warfare: an urgent investment

The response to the Russian electronic warfare threat requires developing and deploying counter-electronic warfare capabilities — systems capable of locating jamming emitters and neutralizing them, hardening critical systems against jamming through alternative navigation means, and maintaining communications in a contested electromagnetic environment. These capabilities are complex, costly, and require specialized expertise that not all allies possess equally.

The Alliance has capabilities in this domain — the United States, the United Kingdom, and certain European allies have significant capacities — but they are not systematically shared or integrated into a common doctrine for Eastern Flank defense. A targeted investment in counter-electronic warfare capabilities for the Baltic states, with active sharing of Allied know-how, should be among the concrete commitments of Ankara.

Belarus: the eastern flank of the Eastern Flank

Lukashenko, satellite and threat multiplier

The Russian threat against the Baltic states does not come only from Kaliningrad. It also comes from Belarus, whose dictator Alexander Lukashenko has definitively anchored his country to Russia since crushing the protests of 2020. Belarusian territory served as a staging ground for the Ukrainian invasion of 2022 — Russian columns attempted to march on Kyiv from Belarus. That same territory can serve as a launching point for military pressure against Lithuania or Poland.

The strategic depth that Belarus provides Russia is considerable. It reduces the warning time available to NATO in the event of an attack, multiplies the possible directions of attack, and allows Russia to threaten simultaneously the Suwalki Corridor from the north and Poland from the east. The forced reintegration of Belarus into the Russian orbit is one of the most significant strategic gains Putin has achieved since 2020, and one of the most concerning factors for the security of the Alliance's Eastern Flank.

Belarusian resistance: a factor not to be overlooked

Belarus is not a uniformly pro-Russian population. The massive protests of 2020 showed that a large portion of Belarusian society aspired to democracy and rapprochement with Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have fled abroad since the crackdown. Resistance networks continue to operate despite repression. This internal resistance is a potential strategic asset for the West — even if its capacity to influence Lukashenko's military decisions is, in the short term, very limited.

Solidarity with Belarusian civil society is a dimension often forgotten in European security policy. Supporting Belarusian exiles, maintaining information channels toward the Belarusian population, refusing to normalize the Lukashenko regime: these are long-term measures that keep alive a possibility of political change in Minsk — change that, if it occurred, would radically alter the strategic geography of the Russian threat against the Baltics.

Prisoner exchanges and the human dimension of the conflict

160 Ukrainians freed: every exchange counts

While strategists debate billions of dollars and weapons systems, women and men continue to emerge from Russian captivity thanks to prisoner exchanges. The 76th exchange, carried out on June 26, 2026, enabled the return of 160 Ukrainian prisoners of war, according to the Kyiv Independent. In 2026, 1,596 Ukrainians have returned home, and more than 9,500 since 2022, thanks notably to the mediation of the United Arab Emirates.

These figures deserve to be recalled in an article about the Baltic threat. Because they say something essential: the hybrid warfare that Russia is preparing against the Baltics would, if it materialized, be a war with prisoners, civilians taken hostage, people tortured and humiliated. This is not a geopolitical abstraction. It is what happens to human beings when strategic algorithms decide their fate. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania know this. That is why they are sounding the alarm.

The diplomacy of Ukrainian resistance

Ukraine's capacity to maintain regular prisoner exchanges, to negotiate with international mediation, to sustain an active diplomatic presence despite a total war on its territory is remarkable. It is the sign of a functioning state, with clear human priorities, that refuses to leave its soldiers and civilian prisoners in Russian jails without fighting for them by every available means.

This Ukrainian institutional resilience is one more reason to believe that defending Ukraine is worth the political and military investment the West devotes to it. A country capable of maintaining democratic institutions, prisoner exchanges, and active diplomacy in the midst of total war deserves to be defended not only out of strategic interest but also out of respect for its values. And defending the Baltic states, facing the same Russian threat, merits the same commitment.

Conclusion: The Latvian alert — an opportunity not to be squandered

Turning the alert into collective action

The alert launched by Latvia in June 2026 is an opportunity. Not an opportunity to panic, but an opportunity to finally take the measures that should have been taken years ago. The Ankara summit can be the moment when NATO shifts from symbolic defensive posture to real defensive posture: permanent brigades in the Baltics, deployed missile defense systems, rapid hybrid incident attribution protocols, clear and pre-approved rules of engagement.

The hybrid war has already begun. The sabotaged cables in the Baltic, the repeated cyberattacks, the drones violating European airspaces, the disinformation operations — all of this constitutes an ongoing war. The difference between the current situation and a dramatic escalation is the robustness of the Allied response. The clearer and more credible this response, the less tempting escalation will be for Moscow.

What Latvia is really telling us

The Latvian alert says something deeper than just the immediate military threat. It says that countries that are supposed to be part of a collective defense alliance still feel insufficiently protected, four years after a war broke out on their doorstep. It says that the solidarity mechanics of NATO do not yet function automatically enough to effectively deter Russia.

That is Latvia's real message. Not just "watch out for the drones." But "are we truly in the same Alliance, or are you watching from a distance hoping it happens to us rather than to you?" The answer to that question will be given at Ankara — and it will be judged by Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians by actions, not words.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Positioning and sources

This analysis relies on open sources dated June 2026, cited in the Sources section. I am in favor of a reinforced NATO military presence in the Baltic states and a firm response to Russian provocations. This bias is declared and conscious. It does not alter the facts I report, but it informs their interpretation.

I am not a military officer or a defense specialist. My analysis is that of an informed observer, not of a technical expert in weapons systems. The technical specifics I mention — missile ranges, drone costs — are estimates commonly cited in open specialized media, not classified data.

Uncertainties

I do not know precisely what the Latvian alert actually says. The information I use comes from media coverage of this alert, not from the intelligence document itself. The details about the nature and timeline of the alleged Russian preparations remain unknown to the general public. I have presented what open sources allow us to know, nothing more.

The hybrid attack scenarios I describe are plausible based on Russian military doctrine and Ukrainian precedents. They are not certain. Forecasting military intentions in such a volatile context remains fundamentally uncertain.

Sources

Primary sources

Fox News: Intelligence warns of Russian hybrid attacks on NATO's Eastern Flank — June 22, 2026

Army Recognition: Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026

The Guardian: Russia preparing a possible provocation in the Baltic states — June 26, 2026

The Guardian: NATO leaders fear they can no longer count on the United States — June 27, 2026

Secondary sources

United24 Media: Russia's budget deficit tops $80 billion — June 23, 2026

European Parliament EPRS: Briefing on the NATO Ankara Summit — June 26, 2026

Swedish Government: Gdansk Declaration — June 25, 2026

Ground News/Bloomberg: Russia to increase war spending by 4-5 trillion rubles — June 23, 2026