ANALYSIS: The EU Embargo Against Russia Since 2022 — €48 Billion Banned in Exports, €91.2 Billion Banned in Imports

Introduction: Four years of economic warfare, the real record in numbers

An architecture of sanctions unprecedented in modern history

Since February 24, 2022, the European Union has engaged an economic war machine of unprecedented scale. Twenty sanctions packages adopted, more than sixteen thousand distinct restrictive measures imposed by the EU, the US, the UK, and their partners, thousands of individuals and entities targeted by asset freezes and travel bans. All with a single goal: to suffocate the financial engine of Vladimir Putin's war machine. On paper, it's colossal. In practice, the picture is both impressive and nuanced — and it's precisely this tension I want to explore here.

On June 15, 2026, the EU adopted a new so-called "mini" sanctions package, targeting forty additional individuals and forty-seven entities linked to the Russian military-industrial complex, the shadow fleet, and disinformation campaigns. On the same day, a draft of the twenty-first package was under discussion among member states, presented by the European Commission on June 9, 2026. The mechanics never stop. But the question remains: after four years of this colossal pressure, what do these numbers — €48 billion in banned exports and €91.2 billion in banned imports — actually represent?

What the embargo means in proportion to pre-war trade

To measure the true impact of the embargo, we must go back to 2021, the reference year. That year, the EU and Russia maintained robust bilateral trade relations. According to the European Commission, 54% of EU exports to Russia and 58% of EU imports from Russia are now subject to embargoes. These are not abstract numbers. These are entire swaths of the Russian economy being amputated from their access to European markets — technology, machinery, chemicals, energy, agri-food products.

We're talking here about more than half of bilateral trade being prohibited by political decision. This is the result of a will unprecedented in the history of contemporary international relations. Never before has a coalition of advanced economies imposed such a range of restrictions on a power of this size with this speed. The speed of execution — adopted within weeks of the invasion — testifies to a European coordination that many thought impossible.

The €48 Billion in Banned Exports: What Europe Refuses to Sell to Moscow

Critical technologies, the sinews of war

When the EU speaks of €48 billion in banned exports, this figure covers categories of goods of paramount strategic importance. From the start, the Union targeted dual-use goods — that is, civilian technologies that can be diverted for military purposes. Semiconductors, electronic components, navigation equipment, advanced industrial software: these are the technological building blocks that Russian engineers can no longer freely obtain on the European market. The Russian army feels it in the quality of its weapons systems, in the maintenance of its equipment, and in its ability to innovate.

Successive packages have gradually expanded this list. The twentieth package in April 2026 notably designated Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology, a Chinese company providing critical components for the automotive and defense sectors, allowing proxies to discreetly supply the Russian war industry. The mini-package of June 2026 introduced a derogation to allow European operators to cut their ties with this entity before December 31, 2026. Every detail matters. Every loophole closed reduces the possibilities for circumvention.

Industrial sectors bled dry by export restrictions

Metals and alloys used in the aerospace and defense sectors are among the new targets of the twenty-first package currently being adopted. Drone equipment — launch systems, jammers, ground support equipment — is also in the EU's crosshairs. Because Russia has invested massively in drone warfare, and these systems require components that its national industry does not fully master. Each additional restriction imposes an extra cost on Moscow — in time, in money, in logistical ingenuity.

It is important to understand that these €48 billion do not represent an instant loss for Russia. These are the amounts of goods the EU would have potentially exported, based on 2021 volumes, if the sanctions hadn't existed. In practice, Moscow has tried — with partial success — to resupply via third countries: Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and especially China. But these circumventions come with a cost, delays, and quality losses. And the EU is tracking these channels with increasing determination.

The €91.2 Billion in Banned Imports: Russian Energy Cut Off from Its Natural Outlet

Oil, coal, gas: a forced energy revolution

If the €48 billion in banned exports hits hard, it's the €91.2 billion in banned imports that represent the heaviest blow to Russian finances. This colossal figure primarily reflects the effect of restrictions on energy imports. Europe relied heavily on Russian crude oil, coal, and liquefied natural gas. Cutting these flows meant amputating Moscow from its main source of foreign currency — and forcing the EU into an energy revolution that no one would have dared envision in 2021.

The results are in: according to Ursula von der Leyen herself, the European Union has "effectively ended its near-total dependence on Russian energy," a transformation that seemed improbable just a few years earlier. Russia's energy revenues dropped by about 40% by the beginning of 2026. In the first quarter of that same year, oil and gas revenues collapsed by 45% year-on-year, according to the Kiel Institute's Endgame report. These are hundreds of billions of dollars that Putin can no longer mobilize to finance his tanks, missiles, and shells.

Banned imports beyond energy: fertilizers, steel, fish

The twenty-first package proposes to further expand restrictions to unexpected sectors. For the first time, fishery products are in the crosshairs: substantial restrictions are proposed for some products, with a total ban for others, including cod. Metals and minerals, auto parts, are also among the new import targets. The logic is one of progressive tightening: every euro Europe stops sending to Moscow in payments for Russian goods is one less euro for the war machine.

This process of diversification away from Russian imports has a cost for Europeans too — a reality that sanctions proponents must honestly acknowledge. Finding alternatives to Russian energy has required considerable investment, negotiations with other suppliers, and industrial sacrifices. But the choice was moral as much as economic: continuing to import Russian raw materials in bulk meant directly financing the bombs falling on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa.

The Shadow Fleet: The Main Mechanism for Circumventing Energy Sanctions

Five hundred ships to bypass the oil embargo

The greatest challenge to the effectiveness of oil sanctions is called the shadow fleet. To bypass the G7 price cap of 60 dollars per barrel and Western insurance restrictions, Russia has assembled a fleet of more than 560 aging tankers sailing under flags of convenience and opaque ownership structures. According to the Kiel Institute, 632 vessels in this fleet have already been targeted by European sanctions — and the twenty-first package proposes to add 30 more to the list.

These ships operate outside the Western maritime insurance system, transporting Russian oil to Asia at prices often above the nominal cap. Beijing and New Delhi have taken the lion's share of this redistribution of Russian energy flows. Russia has redirected its crude exports: before the invasion, Europe received more than half of Russian crude exports. In 2024, that share had fallen to about 12%. Oil still flows, but through other pipes — less lucrative, more expensive to operate.

New weapons against the shadow fleet in the twenty-first package

The EU is no longer just targeting the vessels themselves. The twenty-first package proposes a much more aggressive approach: targeting the critical infrastructure that serves the shadow fleet — ports, airports, refineries that process or trade Russian oil. For the first time, ships that support the shadow fleet — by providing fuel or logistical services — would also be targeted. And the sale of LNG carriers to Russia would be banned, just as the sale of oil tankers has been.

This escalation in the sophistication of sanctions responds to a reality: Moscow has shown considerable adaptability. When one channel is blocked, another emerges. Intermediaries are proliferating in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Central Asia. It's a game of cat and mouse that has lasted four years, and it explains why despite €91.2 billion in banned imports, Russia continues to export its hydrocarbons — certainly less, certainly at a reduced price, but in sufficient quantities to still fuel its war budget.

China: Essential Accomplice for Russian Economic Survival

From 190 to 250 billion: the explosion of Sino-Russian trade

While EU sanctions have severely amputated bilateral trade between Europe and Russia, they have simultaneously caused a spectacular reshuffling of Moscow's trade partnerships. China has filled much of the void left by Europe. Sino-Russian bilateral trade rose from about 190 billion dollars in 2022 to nearly 250 billion in 2024, before slightly dropping to 234 billion in 2025. China now accounts for about 35% of Russia's total foreign trade, according to the Kiel Institute.

Even more troubling: China is the source of about three-quarters of the increase in Russian imports of sanctioned critical military components since 2022. The Chinese companies Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company were directly named in the latest European sanctions package. Beijing officially denies any military aid to Moscow — but the numbers tell a different story. China is becoming the industrial lung of the Russian war, and this reality is at the heart of growing tensions between the EU and Beijing.

Dedollarization and the dependency trap

The transformation goes beyond simple trade in goods. About 92% of Sino-Russian bilateral trade is now done in rubles and yuan, compared to only 25% before the invasion. Russia uses the Chinese cross-border interbank payment system, CIPS, as an alternative to the SWIFT network from which it has been partially excluded. This forced dedollarization, which Putin presents as a victory for his sovereignty policy, is actually a sign of deep weakness: Russia is trading its dependence on the West for an even more total dependence on China.

The Kiel Institute highlights that China "is steadily gaining leverage over Russian trade, finance, and industrial supply chains," reducing Moscow's economic autonomy and bargaining power in the long term. Putin may have gained a replacement trade partner, but at the cost of turning Russia into an economic satellite of Beijing. It's the law of history: those who seek to subdue others often end up subduing themselves.

The Russian Economy Under Pressure: Real Signals of an Endgame

Exhausted reserves, a budget underwater

The accumulation of sanctions is producing increasingly visible macroeconomic effects. The Endgame report from the Kiel Institute, published on June 11, 2026, is scathing: the liquid reserves of the Russian sovereign wealth fund have fallen from 6.5% of GDP at the start of the war to just 1.8% of GDP in April 2026. The federal budget deficit exceeded the government's annual target within the first three months of 2026. Oil and gas revenues collapsed by 45% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026.

Inflation is stuck at nearly 6% under an exorbitant key interest rate of 14.5%. Labor shortages are reaching record levels — the Russian Central Bank itself is sounding the alarm. More than two-thirds of the liquid assets in the sovereign wealth fund have vanished to cover past deficits. Russia has avoided the worst — a prolonged recession, a catastrophic sovereign default — but the buffers it had patiently built up before 2022 are inexorably running dry.

War as total economic distortion

To maintain its war effort, the Kremlin has radically distorted its economy. Military spending has exploded: from 65 billion dollars in 2021 (3.6% of GDP), it reached 190 billion dollars last year — or 7.5% of GDP, the highest level ever recorded in the SIPRI database. This forced militarization of the economy comes at the expense of everything else: productive investment, infrastructure development, the population's quality of life.

The Kremlin compensates by resorting to off-budget financing, rapid credit expansion, and indirect support via the banking system. Russian banks are massively channeling resources toward sectors linked to the war. This structural war economy creates credit bubbles that threaten internal financial stability. Matthew C. Klein, a renowned economist, summarizes the Russian dilemma: "The fundamental constraint on Russia today is not access to money, but access to people, technologies, and productive capacities." And that is precisely what the sanctions target.

What Remains: The €57.2 Billion in Residual Trade and Its Implications

Despite everything, trade continues

Analytical honesty requires not over-selling the sanctions. Despite twenty packages since 2022, bilateral trade between the EU and Russia still amounted to €57.2 billion in 2025 — including €27.2 billion in European imports from Russia and €30 billion in European exports to Russia. This is not nothing. It is still a significant amount of economic exchange generating value for Moscow, even if this amount is much lower than pre-war levels.

The Kiel Institute proposes going further with what it calls an "Ukraine Support Tariff": a targeted tax of 30 to 50% on this residual trade, which could generate between 11 and 16 billion euros per year to finance the Ukrainian war effort. This is a bold idea that raises complex political and legal questions, but it illustrates a fundamental reality: even after all the sanctions, there is still room to maneuver to increase the pressure. The embargo is not complete. It could be tighter.

Structural flaws: what the sanctions don't yet cover

Several important sectors remain partially or totally outside the sanctions net. Energy remains the Achilles' heel: even after the bans, significant flows of liquefied natural gas continue to reach European markets. The twenty-first package specifically targets ports, airports, and refineries associated with the shadow fleet — an implicit recognition that the current system still has flaws. Belarus remains a potential back door for Russian trade, which the new package attempts to address by aligning Belarusian trade restrictions with those applicable to Russia.

Circumvention is not limited to Belarus. Advanced Western-origin electronic components continue to find their way into the Russian arsenal via intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Central Asia. The EU is multiplying designations against these networks — Azerbaijan, Liberia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are among the countries of origin for entities targeted in the June 2026 mini-package. But every dismantled network gives birth to a new one. This is the very nature of sanctions circumvention: as long as the price differential justifies the risk, there will be takers.

The Economic Cost for Russia: €1,000 to €1,300 Billion According to Kallas

A staggering estimate of cumulative losses

Kaja Kallas, the head of European diplomacy, put forward a breathtaking figure: Western sanctions have reportedly already cost Russia an estimated loss of between €1,000 and €1,300 billion. This figure, cited by Al Jazeera on June 8, 2026, deserves to be put in perspective. It covers not only direct trade losses, but also higher financing costs, productivity losses linked to the lack of access to technology, brain drain, and the geopolitical risk premium that any transaction linked to Russia now entails for third-party partners.

If this figure is accurate in its order of magnitude, it represents a sum equivalent to several times Russia's annual GDP — an economic bloodletting that, in the long term, can only compromise the country's ability to rebuild after the war. "Brick by brick," in Kallas's own words, the West is demolishing the foundations of the Russian war economy. The image is fitting. About 300 billion dollars in reserves from the Russian Central Bank have been immobilized by the West — a financial weapon that Putin can use neither to defend the ruble nor to finance emergency imports.

The asymmetric burden: Russia suffers more than Europe

A crucial aspect of the debate on the effectiveness of sanctions is the question of relative cost. Who suffers more? The Kiel Institute has calculated that Russia's aggregated economic losses due to sanctions are three to four times greater than those suffered by the EU as a whole. Yes, European consumers have suffered energy price hikes, industrial difficulties, and supply chain disruptions. These pains are real and should not be minimized.

But they are incomparable to what the Russian economy is going through: persistent high-rate inflation, structural labor shortages, a nearly exhausted sovereign wealth fund, and a manufacturing sector that contracted for seven consecutive months in 2025, with production levels declining for ten consecutive months. Russia has lost industrialists, scientists, and engineers — the best elements who have left the country since 2022. This human capital cannot be replaced in a few years.

The Debated Effectiveness: What Sanctions Have Accomplished and Where They Failed

Real and measurable successes

Analytical honesty requires listing first what works. Sanctions have effectively cut Russia off from global capital markets: access to global financing is "virtually closed," meaning public and private sector financing must come from domestic sources. This creates inflationary pressure and makes credit for productive investments scarce. Russian industry is deprived of sophisticated Western technologies that it cannot fully replace locally, degrading its ability to innovate.

European energy has been successfully diversified: von der Leyen emphasizes that Europe's near-total dependence on Russian energy is now a thing of the past. This is a profound structural change whose benefits will be felt for decades to come. The Russian manufacturing sector contracted at the fastest pace since March 2022 in 2025. These signals should not be ignored. Economist Timothy Ash summarizes it this way: Russia is "close to recession, despite higher energy prices".

Limits and blind spots

The limits are just as real. Russia avoided a deep recession: its GDP contracted by only 2.1% in 2022, before rebounding to 3.6% in 2023 and 4.3% in 2024 — before slowing to 1% in 2025. These figures reflect the stimulating effect of the war economy: colossal military spending creates short-term economic activity, even if it generates no lasting wealth. The IMF predicts growth of only 1.1% for 2026 — a figure comparable to those of Germany (0.8%), France (0.9%), or Italy (0.5%).

Most importantly, sanctions have not changed the behavior of the Russian state. This is the central question: have economic restrictions contributed to ending the war, which was their primary goal? The honest answer is no — not yet. More than sixteen thousand distinct restrictions have bent the Russian economy without breaking it. Substitution via third countries, the shadow fleet, circumvention circuits, and the complicity of China, Iran, and North Korea have allowed Moscow to maintain its war effort. This does not mean the sanctions are failing — it means they must be strengthened.

The West Facing the Dilemma: Tightening the Vise or Negotiating a Compromise

The twenty-first package and the escalation dynamic

On June 9, 2026, the European Commission presented the twenty-first sanctions package against Russia — the most ambitious in months. It targets sectors still partially preserved: energy in all its forms, financial and crypto services, trade in general, and for the first time, fisheries. It proposes a major innovation: an entry ban into the EU for anyone who has served in the Russian armed forces since the start of the war. Europe is making a strong symbolic statement: there will be no normalization for the combatants of an invading army.

The European Council of June 19-20, 2026, unanimously reaffirmed its support for Ukraine and decided to extend for one year the sanctions in force against Russia. A unanimous decision — even including Viktor Orbán's Hungary, long considered the weak link in the chain of European solidarity. Heads of state called on their teams to work toward the rapid adoption of the twenty-first package. The momentum is toward strengthening, not loosening.

Aid to Ukraine: the other side of the sanctions coin

Sanctions are only one side of the Western strategy. The other side is direct support for Ukraine. According to von der Leyen's statement on June 10, 2026, the EU had delivered nearly €3 billion via the Ukraine Facility the day before, and was preparing to disburse the first installment of a €90 billion loan before the end of the month — including €6 billion for drones. By the end of June 2026, more than €9 billion would be mobilized for Ukraine. European solidarity is expressed not only in what it refuses to sell to Moscow, but in what it gives to Kyiv.

Volodymyr Zelensky has been leading a country at war for 1527 days. Under his bombs, his teams are negotiating EU membership, reforming governance, and maintaining state functions. The European Council is preparing to open the first membership negotiation cluster with Ukraine — a historic step. Europe is not just observing: it is committing to integrating this country that is fighting for the values that found the Union. This is the moral counterweight to the embargo: not only suffocating the aggressor but rewarding the victim's heroic resistance.

Trump and the West: The Necessary Evil in the Sanctions Equation

American sanctions: an essential but unpredictable actor

The architecture of sanctions against Russia is multilateral. Without the United States, it would be radically less effective. Washington contributed to the exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the freezing of Russian Central Bank reserves, and export controls on critical technologies. But under Donald Trump, this architecture is experiencing turbulence. The administration renewed a sanctions exemption allowing nations to buy Russian oil and oil products already loaded onto ships at sea — a crack in the system's tightness.

Trump is a variable both necessary and uncontrollable in the equation of pressure on Moscow. His transactional temperament, his ambiguous relations with Putin, his unpredictable statements on a quick peace — all of this creates uncertainty. But the United States remains the main military guarantor of European security via NATO, and its participation in the sanctions regime remains, despite the turbulence, fundamental to its overall effectiveness. A sanctions coalition without America would be infinitely easier for Moscow to bypass.

The question of secondary sanctions: wielding the weapon against third-party accomplices

One of the most significant innovations of the proposed twenty-first package is the possibility of a total ban on crypto-asset services for entire third countries that host platforms helping Russia bypass sanctions. This threat of secondary sanctions — penalizing not just Russia but those who help it — is a powerful but diplomatically sensitive weapon. It directly affects the interests of China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom have profited from the Russian trade realignment.

The European Council was explicit in its June 2026 conclusions: it calls on all countries to immediately cease all assistance to Russia, direct or indirect, notably via the provision of dual-use goods. It explicitly names Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. China is mentioned in the background, without being named directly — diplomacy has its modesty. But pressure is mounting. And North Korea, which has provided thousands of shells to Moscow, as well as Iran, which delivered Shahed drones, are now clearly identified as de facto co-belligerents.

The Escalation Continues: Toward a Twenty-First Package and Beyond

The sanction-circumvention-reinforcement mechanics

The dynamic of sanctions against Russia has taken the form of a spiral. Each package targets the flaws revealed by the previous one. Circumvention inspires new restrictions, which create new flaws, which call for new packages. Since moving to a "rolling" mode — adopting sanctions continuously rather than in large episodic packages — the EU has accelerated the designation cycle. The mini-package of June 15, 2026, is the illustration: 40 individuals and 47 additional entities in a few weeks, without waiting for a large omnibus package.

This approach has the advantage of speed and surprise: targeted entities don't have time to anticipate and transfer their assets before being hit. It also has the political advantage of demonstrating constant and visible pressure on Moscow. Asset freeze measures and prohibition of provision directly affect Putin's circle, his oligarchs, his financiers, and his propagandists. It is a slow but real degradation of the regime's operational capacity.

The twenty-first package: big ambitions

Presented on June 9, 2026, the twenty-first package proposes a significant extension of restrictions on crypto-assets — a sector Russia is increasingly using to bypass banking restrictions. Thirty-one additional Russian banks are targeted by transaction bans. Twenty banks, crypto companies, or platforms located in third countries that reportedly serviced sanctioned Russian entities are in the crosshairs. For the first time, a total ban on crypto-asset services for entire third countries would be possible — a sword of Damocles over any jurisdiction that turns a blind eye to Russian circumvention.

The oil price cap is receiving particular attention. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz offered Moscow a temporary windfall: Russian oil revenues rose from 9.7 billion dollars in February 2026 to 19 billion in March. The EU proposes to pause the automatic adjustment mechanism of the cap until next January, in order to maintain pressure on Russian revenues even during this energy market volatility. It's a technical adjustment, but with concrete financial consequences for Moscow.

The Human Toll Behind the Numbers: Why the Embargo Remains a Moral Necessity

Nine thousand chemical weapons incidents and a war that lasts

Behind the billions of euros and trade statistics lie human lives. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported more than 9,000 incidents of banned chemical weapons use by Russia in Ukraine — an accusation of absolute gravity that reminds us we are not talking about a simple trade dispute, but an ongoing war crime. Civilians are killed every week by Russian ballistic missiles on civilian targets. Entire cities have been razed. Millions of people have been displaced.

That is why the embargo, however imperfect it may be, remains a moral and strategic necessity. Every euro Russia cannot earn, every technology it cannot buy, every missile it cannot manufacture for lack of adequate components — that is a life potentially saved in Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odesa. The €48 billion in banned exports and €91.2 billion in banned imports are not just accounting lines on a trade balance: they are lives, homes, and children who come home in the evening.

The memory of Bucha and the imperative for justice

In cold economic analysis, we sometimes tend to forget the trigger. Russia invaded a sovereign country. It has occupied, tortured, and bombed civilian populations. It has conducted operations to deport Ukrainian children. It uses chemical weapons on the battlefield in flagrant violation of international law. Sanctions are not an excessive punitive measure — they are the minimally proportionate response of the international community to documented war crimes.

The argument that sanctions "haven't stopped the war" as if that were enough to invalidate them ignores this imperative for justice. Doing nothing would have had a much higher cost: the normalization of aggression, the collapse of the rules-based international order, and the opening of a Pandora's box whose consequences would far exceed the Ukrainian case. Sanctions are also a statement of values — that Europe refuses to be complicit in war crimes through its trade.

Conclusion: An Embargo That Bites, Costs, and Must Continue

Suffocation in numbers: a provisional but eloquent record

The record of four years of European sanctions against Russia is both impressive and incomplete. €48 billion in banned exports, €91.2 billion in banned imports, 54% and 58% of pre-war trade flows subject to embargo — these are figures that illustrate a political will unprecedented in the history of international economic relations. The shadow fleet targeted to the tune of 632 vessels, Russian sovereign reserves immobilized to the tune of 300 billion dollars, oil revenues collapsed by 45% in the first quarter of 2026 — the vise is tightening. It's really tightening.

But the vise is not yet fatal. Russia is suffering, it is slowing down, its buffers are being exhausted. But it is holding on, supported by China, Iran, and North Korea — partners who have made the explicit choice to defy the international order. Putin's regime is betting on the West's wear and tear, on the fatigue of European public opinion, and on cracks in the coalition. Twenty-one sanctions packages in four years demonstrate that this strategy by Moscow has failed so far. The coalition is holding. Ambition is not flagging.

What History will remember from this record

History will remember that 21st-century Europe knew how, in the face of brutal aggression, to transform its energy dependence into an economic pressure lever. That it accepted a real economic cost to defend its values. That twenty nations with often divergent interests managed to maintain a remarkable coherence during four years of prolonged war. But History will only be kind to us if the embargo continues to intensify — if the twenty-first package is adopted, if the twenty-second follows, if the loopholes are closed one by one.

Ukraine is resisting. Zelensky is holding. Europe must hold too. Every additional sanction, every new designation, every loophole closed in the shadow fleet, in crypto-asset trade, in military component supply chains — it's one more brick in the economic wall surrounding Putin's regime. €48 billion plus €91.2 billion: this is the cost Europe has chosen to impose on the aggressor. It's not enough. But it's a beginning to be proud of.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary sources

European Relations — The EU's latest sanctions against Russia: targeting the networks behind the war (official figures: €48B exports, €91.2B imports, 54% / 58%) — June 20, 2026

Mayer Brown — EU adopts "mini" sanctions package against Russia: 40 individuals, 47 entities, Yangzhou Yangjie derogation — June 20, 2026

EEAS / European Commission — Statement by Ursula von der Leyen on the 21st sanctions package against Russia — June 10, 2026

Secondary sources

Kiel Institute — Endgame: Russia's war economy hits its limits (sovereign fund at 1.8% of GDP, oil revenues -45%) — June 11, 2026

Kiel Institute — EU-Russia trade could fund Ukraine (€57.2B residual in 2025, Ukraine Support Tariff) — June 9, 2026

Euronews — After 20 rounds of sanctions, the EU finally sees cracks in the Russian economy (inflation 6%, rate 14.5%, Q1 2026 recession) — May 8, 2026

Al Jazeera — EU planning to add to €1,300 billion sanctions hit on Russia — June 8, 2026

International Policy Digest — The sanctions that couldn’t stop Russia’s war: 16,000 restrictions, Moscow's adaptation, shadow fleet of 560 vessels — June 19, 2026