FACT-CHECK: Pickaxe Mountain, the underground site worrying the whole West

Introduction: a mountain that is breathing again

What the satellite images actually show

There are facts that no diplomacy can erase, and the satellite imagery released on July 11, 2026, is one of them. According to images obtained by CNN from private companies, the underground site at Pickaxe Mountain, in Iran's Isfahan province, shows "major signs" of rebuilding activity, months after being heavily damaged by the American and Israeli strikes of late February 2026. This is not another rumor in a war saturated with disinformation: it is a technical, comparative, dated reading of what a nuclear site does when nobody is watching closely enough.

This fact-check starts from a simple principle: a claim is only worth what its evidence is worth. And here, the evidence is photographic, comparative, and corroborated by several independent analysts who studied the site's evolution between July 2025 and January 2026, then again in July 2026. The logistics complex and the base's probable command post have not returned to their pre-strike operational capacity, but the rebuilding movement itself is documented.

Why this file deserves a rigorous fact-check

The Pickaxe Mountain story is easy prey for both camps: those who want to prove Iran has never stopped lying, and those who want to downplay a very real escalation. A serious fact-check must resist both temptations and stick to what the images, official statements, and expert reports actually allow us to establish. That discipline is what separates credible analysis from a simple relay of a press release, whether it comes from Washington, Tehran, or Tel Aviv.

Context matters too. This presumed rebuilding comes as the Islamabad memorandum, signed on June 17, 2026, between the United States and Iran, is supposed to frame a fragile ceasefire and negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. If the images hold up, they suggest Tehran is once again testing the limits of a deal it never fully honored in spirit.

I don't believe in coincidences when it comes to Iran's nuclear program. A mountain that starts moving again weeks after a peace memorandum is signed isn't an engineering accident, it's a political choice made by a regime that negotiates with one hand and rebuilds with the other.

What the satellite imagery precisely shows

A comparison that leaves little room for doubt

The comparative images cited by CNN and analyzed by satellite imagery experts show a clear evolution between shots taken on July 3, 2025, and January 30, 2026, then the more recent images from July 2026. Analyst Goodhind, cited in this file, noted that the logistics complex has not regained its full pre-war capacity, but that the construction activity itself is unambiguous. That distinction matters: nobody is claiming Pickaxe Mountain has become fully operational again, but the notion that the site remains frozen in February's rubble is, in fact, clearly disproved by the facts.

This kind of methodical reading, grounded in dated comparisons rather than impressionistic interpretation, is precisely what separates serious verification work from alarmist speculation. The images don't tell a story of immediate military capability; they tell a story of rebuilding intent, which is already, in itself, a major political data point.

The tunnel that worries more than anything else

The same file also documents the concealment of tunnel entrances at an Iranian nuclear site that was targeted during last year's conflict, notably the Isfahan complex, which houses elements of the nuclear fuel cycle and an underground zone where part of Iran's enriched uranium is believed to be stored. This is not an architectural detail: it is the signature of a site actively trying to shield itself from a future strike or a future inspection, which, in the context of a deal meant to frame Iran's nuclear program, constitutes an alarming signal that deserves to be taken seriously without giving in to sensationalism.

This technical finding builds on what Reuters already documented back in February 2026, when it noted repair and fortification efforts at several Iranian sites under tension with Washington. The continuity between these two waves of revelations, months apart, traces a coherent trajectory rather than an isolated incident.

Hiding a tunnel entrance is never an innocent gesture from a country that has spent decades playing cat and mouse with IAEA inspectors. This concealment says more about the regime's real intentions than any official Iranian statement ever could.

The Islamabad memorandum, a fragile and already contested framework

A text signed with great ceremony, but incomplete on the nuclear file

On June 17, 2026, Donald Trump and Iranian president Massoud Pezeshkian signed the Islamabad memorandum remotely, a 14-point framework meant to end the war triggered by the American-Israeli strikes of February 2026. The text called for reopening the Strait of Hormuz to commerce free of charge for 60 days, ending the American naval blockade of Iranian ports, and a 60-day extension of the ceasefire to allow for more substantive negotiations. But this memorandum, however valuable for stopping the human bloodshed of the conflict, contains no firm agreement on Iran's nuclear program or its stockpile of enriched uranium.

This gap is not a minor detail. It means Iran was able to sign a de-escalation text while retaining, on paper, near-total freedom of action on its most sensitive nuclear file. That is precisely the gray zone that the images from Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin are now illuminating in harsh light.

A uranium stockpile that never left Iranian territory

Under the memorandum's own terms, Iran reaffirms it will neither produce nor acquire nuclear weapons, but both sides merely commit to negotiating later a management mechanism for the stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, estimated at roughly 440 kilograms. That figure, far from the 90% weapons-grade threshold, remains enough, if enrichment continued, to fuel several nuclear warheads. The text provides for no cap, no relocation, and no destruction of this stockpile during the 60-day negotiating window.

This contractual void is exactly what Tehran appears to be exploiting. A regime that negotiates the lifting of its sanctions while quietly keeping its underground construction sites running is not a good-faith partner; it is an actor playing every table at once, betting that the diplomatic complexity of the file dilutes accountability for its own maneuvers.

A memorandum that says nothing firm about enriched uranium isn't a peace memorandum, it's an armed pause. Iran isn't cheating at the margins of the deal, it's exploiting the very hole the deal left wide open.

The explosive context of the Strait of Hormuz

Three nights of American strikes, more than 300 targets

On the night of July 11 to 12, 2026, American forces struck about 140 military targets inside Iran, the third wave of strikes in a single week, in response to an Iranian attack on a Cyprus-flagged commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Across the whole week, more than 300 targets were hit, including missile and drone sites, naval facilities, munitions depots, communication networks, and coastal surveillance posts. This is not a symbolic punitive operation; it is a sustained campaign of military degradation.

The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) responded by declaring, on July 12, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz "until further notice," a chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil passes. This closure is not rhetorical posturing: it directly threatens the global economy and shows how ready the Iranian regime is to make the rest of the planet pay for its own escalation rather than defuse the crisis it itself fueled.

Iranian missiles on five Gulf countries in 48 hours

Between July 9 and 10, 2026, Iran fired missiles and deployed drones against the Al-Azraq air base in Jordan, as well as targets in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, hitting notably a Patriot air-defense system, a munitions depot, a radar site, and refueling platforms used by aircraft carriers at the port of Duqm, in Oman. The Revolutionary Guard also claimed strikes on the Prince Hassan air base in Jordan, targeting, it said, a command center and MQ-9 drone hangars.

This all-azimuth barrage against five different jurisdictions in under two days shows that the Iranian regime did not hesitate to take an entire region hostage in its own showdown with Washington. None of these countries is a direct party to the nuclear conflict; all of them nonetheless bore the consequences of an escalation decided in Tehran.

Striking bases in five different countries in two days is not a proportionate response, it's a calculated show of force meant to prove the Iranian regime can still hurt an entire region. Call it what it is: a geopolitical hostage-taking of the whole Gulf.

Parchin, the unsettling mirror of Pickaxe Mountain

A second site moving at the same time

The same images obtained by CNN show comparable activity at the Parchin military complex, also damaged during the February 2026 strikes. This is not an isolated site restarting by chance: it is a second point in the same Iranian nuclear file showing signs of reconstruction almost simultaneously, which makes the idea of mere construction coincidence increasingly hard to sustain on strictly factual grounds.

The fact that two distinct strategic sites, both linked to Iran's military and nuclear program, show signs of resumed activity within the same time window strengthens the reading that this is a coordinated decision rather than a series of isolated local initiatives. If confirmed, this coordination would make the rebuilding of Pickaxe Mountain part of a deliberate national strategy, not a construction accident.

What this simultaneity changes in risk analysis

In terms of risk assessment, the simultaneity between Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin carries more weight than either site taken alone. It suggests a centralized program-management capacity, able to restart several sensitive construction sites in parallel despite the heightened international scrutiny since February 2026. It is precisely this kind of organizational capacity that Western analysts fear most, even more than the technical progress of each individual site.

This reading does not, by itself, prove a full resumption of Iran's military nuclear program. But it establishes, with a reasonable level of confidence, that Tehran made the political choice to rebuild its sensitive capabilities even while negotiating their framework, which should alarm any good-faith partner engaged in the Doha talks.

Two nuclear sites restarting at the same time is no longer a technical footnote, it's a silent admission of strategy. I refuse to believe Tehran doesn't know what these images mean for the already fragile trust of its negotiating partners.

Trump declares the ceasefire over

A sentence that changes the diplomatic equation

Facing the Iranian attack on commercial vessels and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Donald Trump declared this week that he considers the ceasefire over. This declaration is not a mere rhetorical outburst: it registers, at the highest American level, the at-least-temporary collapse of the framework negotiated in Islamabad weeks earlier, and it opens the door to an intensification already underway with the strikes on 140 targets.

This presidential statement carries real factual weight in this file: it confirms, on the American side, that the diplomatic window opened on June 17 is now seen as broken by the very party that had signed it with the most political enthusiasm. This acknowledged rupture from Washington places the responsibility for the escalation squarely on repeated Iranian provocations in the Strait of Hormuz.

Sanctions returning faster than expected

In parallel, the U.S. Treasury Department reimposed sanctions on Iranian oil exports that had been lifted after the signing of the Islamabad memorandum, along with sanctions targeting the Revolutionary Guard's financial network and the circle around Mojtaba Khamenei. This rapid return of sanctions illustrates how quickly a de-escalation framework can unravel when one party continues its military provocations in the middle of negotiations.

This sanctions mechanism is not punitive for punishment's sake: it directly targets the financial flows that let the Iranian regime finance, among other things, the rebuilding of sites like Pickaxe Mountain. Cutting these flows also indirectly slows Tehran's ability to fund its underground military program.

Trump is right to declare this ceasefire over when the other side keeps closing the Strait of Hormuz and bombing five neighboring countries. The West cannot be expected to honor a deal that Tehran has been violating in practice since day one.

The Khamenei succession, backdrop to the crisis

State funerals that delayed the negotiations

The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in the American-Israeli strikes of late February 2026, led to state funerals spread over several days in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, gathering, according to estimates from Iranian state media, between 41 and 43 million people. These funerals suspended American-Iranian talks for the entire official mourning period, delaying by that much the concrete implementation of the Islamabad memorandum.

This delay is not neutral for the Pickaxe Mountain file. A period of diplomatic vacuum, where international attention focuses on funeral protocol rather than technical verification of commitments made, offers exactly the kind of discreet window in which sensitive site reconstruction can advance without immediately triggering a coordinated international response.

Mojtaba Khamenei, a succession that worries as much as it reassures Tehran

The succession pointing toward Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late supreme leader, comes with a documented internal split between pragmatists, grouped around President Massoud Pezeshkian and military officials favoring continued negotiations, and a harder faction rejecting any further concessions to Washington. This internal fracture could explain why some segments of Iran's security apparatus are pushing the rebuilding of sites like Pickaxe Mountain while others negotiate in good faith in Doha.

A regime split between pragmatists and hardliners is not a reliable partner for a durable ceasefire. It is this fracture, more than any unified strategic calculation, that could explain the troubling coexistence between official negotiations in Doha and underground construction sites that never stopped running.

A country that buries its supreme leader for six days while quietly letting its engineers go back under a mountain is not a country united behind a clear diplomatic line. It's a fractured regime that talks peace on one side and prepares the next round on the other.

The Israeli warning over a plot against Trump

Shared intelligence weighing on American decisions

According to CNN, citing two sources familiar with the matter, Israel shared with the United States this week intelligence describing a new Iranian plan to assassinate Donald Trump. The Wall Street Journal confirmed the warning was "fresh," and the American ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, also publicly confirmed, in an interview with Fox News, that a "very specific plot" had been flagged this week by Israeli intelligence.

This element must be handled with the caution that any not-fully-verified intelligence requires: some American sources cited by CNN also suggested this Israeli report could, in part, aim to influence Trump's decision on the intensity of the American military response toward Iran. Honest fact-checking means reporting both the confirmed existence of the warning and the reservations expressed about its exact scope.

What Trump himself said publicly

Questioned by reporters after the NATO summit in Turkey, Donald Trump said: "They want to eliminate the American leader, me. I'm on every list." He added that he had learned of a new list ranking him as a top assassination target for Iran. These remarks, made publicly and reported by several American outlets, constitute a verifiable fact in themselves, independent of the ultimate reliability of the underlying intelligence.

This climate of personal threat against the American president directly contextualizes the firmness of his military response to Iranian escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. A leader who feels personally targeted by a hostile regime has structurally no incentive to show restraint in the face of that same regime's repeated provocations.

I handle this warning with the caution it deserves, because intelligence shared between allies sometimes also serves its own political interests. But I refuse to wave away a signal confirmed by a sitting American ambassador, on national television, under his own name.

The thousand-missile threat

A declaration that went around the world

In a message posted on Truth Social on July 10, 2026, Donald Trump wrote that "1,000 missiles are locked and loaded, pointed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, with thousands more ready to follow immediately," if the Iranian regime attempted to assassinate the American president. He added that orders had already been given and that the American military stood "ready, willing, and able" to "completely decimate and destroy every region of Iran" over a one-year period, subject to extension.

This declaration, rare in its rhetorical intensity even for Trump, must be understood in its precise context: it comes after a week of state funerals marked by placards explicitly calling for his death, and after confirmation, from several American and Israeli sources, of specific intelligence on an assassination threat. This is not a threat launched into a vacuum; it is a direct response to a documented provocation.

What this threat reveals about American doctrine

At its core, this declaration fits a doctrine of maximum deterrence that Trump has already used repeatedly since returning to the presidency: publicly announcing disproportionate consequences to deter any attempt before it materializes. Whether or not one approves of this communication style, it sends an unambiguous signal to Tehran about the potentially existential cost of following through.

This firmness, on national-security and deterrence grounds against a regime multiplying military provocations, illustrates why Trump remains, on this specific geopolitical terrain, a necessary actor for the West facing Iranian ambitions, whatever legitimate criticisms one can raise about other aspects of his domestic presidency.

You can find Trump's style excessive and still think that a threat this blunt, aimed at a regime that just closed the Strait of Hormuz and bombed five countries, is exactly the language Tehran understands best. Restraint has never stopped an Iranian missile.

What non-proliferation experts fear most

A uranium stockpile that remains the real unresolved question

Beyond the symbolism of the Pickaxe Mountain images, non-proliferation specialists stress a central technical point: the Islamabad memorandum never imposed a cap, dilution, or relocation of Iran's stockpile of 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. As long as that stockpile physically remains on Iranian territory, under Tehran's exclusive control, the question of its ultimate destination remains entirely open, whatever the outcome of the reconstruction sites observed by satellite.

This technical reality explains why some Western analysts view the Pickaxe Mountain images as a symptom rather than the root cause of the problem. The real structural risk lies in the absence of a binding mechanism on enriched uranium, a void that the June 2026 framework merely postponed to future negotiations whose outcome remains uncertain.

The 2015 deal's precedent hanging over the talks

This void recalls, with bitter irony, the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, abandoned by Trump during his first term, which subsequently triggered a gradual Iranian disengagement from its own nuclear commitments. Today's negotiators, meeting in Doha and Geneva, seem condemned to relive the same dilemma: how to obtain verifiable guarantees from a regime that has systematically demonstrated, for a decade, its ability to rebuild what everyone thought had been dismantled.

This historical reading is not a pretext for abandoning diplomacy. It is, on the contrary, an additional argument for demanding, in any final deal, far more robust verification mechanisms than the deliberately vague ones in the Islamabad memorandum, precisely because recent history gives every reason to doubt Iranian good faith on this specific file.

Iran's nuclear history is a history of broken promises and construction sites that resume the moment attention turns away. Pickaxe Mountain is not a surprise, it's the predictable repeat of a scenario this regime already played out with the 2015 deal.

The Western position facing a multi-faced threat

China, North Korea, and Russia in the background

The Pickaxe Mountain file cannot be isolated from the broader geopolitical context in which it sits. Iran is not rebuilding its underground military capabilities in a vacuum: it is doing so while China, Russia, and North Korea continue to maintain economic and sometimes technological ties with Tehran, giving the Iranian regime room to maneuver that isolated Western sanctions do not fully close off.

This convergence among regimes hostile to the Western-led international order is the most worrying strategic backdrop to this file. Every rebuilt Iranian nuclear site indirectly strengthens the credibility of an axis of defiance that includes Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, all engaged, to varying degrees, in challenging Western primacy over the world order.

Why Western unity remains the only credible answer

Facing this convergence of threats, the Western response cannot be limited to one-off strikes, however necessary they may be in the short term. It requires durable diplomatic and security coordination between the United States, the European Union, and regional Gulf partners, to maintain consistent pressure on Tehran while negotiations continue in Doha.

This unity remains fragile, as shown by occasional disagreements between Washington and some European partners over the pace of sanctions or the scale of economic concessions considered for Iran. But despite its limits, it remains the only architecture capable of containing a regime that has demonstrated, with Pickaxe Mountain, that it negotiates and rebuilds simultaneously.

The West can no longer afford to treat Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea as separate files. Pickaxe Mountain is another reminder that these regimes feed off the same cracks, and none of them will ever back down in the face of a hesitant Western unity.

The convergence between Tehran, Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang is no longer an analyst's hypothesis, it's an operational reality that every new Iranian underground construction site confirms a little further.

The economic price of an escalation no one wanted

Global oil held hostage by a closed strait

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, decreed by the Revolutionary Guard on July 12, 2026, hits an artery through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil passes. This unilateral decision does not only punish Washington: it punishes India, China, Japan, and the whole range of Asian and European economies that depend on this maritime corridor for their daily energy imports. The global oil market, already weakened by months of tension, once again absorbs the price of a conflict it did not choose.

Oil companies and maritime insurers are already assessing the scale of the risk, and several shipowners have announced costly rerouting to avoid the zone. This chronic instability of the strait, alternating between partial closures and fragile reopenings since the conflict began in February 2026, shows just how ready the Iranian regime is to sabotage the global economy in order to gain leverage in the negotiations underway in Doha.

A bill that lands first on the most vulnerable

The first economic victims of this closure are not the great powers able to absorb an oil shock, but the most vulnerable importing countries, already weakened by years of global inflation. Every day the Strait of Hormuz stays closed adds further pressure on economies that have absolutely nothing to do with the nuclear dispute between Tehran and the West.

This economic reality reinforces, if it were even needed, the argument that Iranian behavior in the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be treated as a simple bilateral dispute with the United States. It is a matter of global economic security that justifies a coordinated international response, not case-by-case management dictated by the American electoral calendar.

A regime that takes the world's oil hostage to protect a nuclear program it refuses to cap deserves no economic leniency. This energy blackmail should cost Tehran far more than it currently does.

What the IAEA's silence leaves unresolved

Inspectors who have not had full access

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not publicly confirmed, as of this writing, having obtained full access to the Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin sites since the February 2026 strikes. This institutional silence, which must be distinguished from either confirmation or denial of the satellite images, illustrates the structural difficulty of independently verifying what is really happening under these Iranian mountains, far from cameras and commercial drones.

Without physical inspection, the international community remains dependent on satellite imagery and private expert analysis, a valuable but necessarily incomplete tool. This methodological limitation should not be used to minimize the gravity of the observed signals, but it should encourage caution about the exact scale of what is being rebuilt beneath the surface.

Why inspector access must become a priority in Doha

The next negotiating rounds in Doha and Geneva should, according to several diplomats cited by the Western press, make effective IAEA inspector access to both sites a non-negotiable condition of any new sanctions relief. Without that lever of physical verification, the West would be negotiating blind, relying solely on satellite images to gauge the sincerity of a regime that has, in the past, regularly delayed or restricted international inspectors' access.

This demand is not excessive: it is the bare verifiable minimum that any serious agreement should impose on a country that has just demonstrated, through its actions, its ability to quietly rebuild sensitive infrastructure while negotiating its own framework. Refusing this access would, for Tehran, confirm the worst suspicions rather than dispel them.

A deal that does not guarantee physical, verifiable access for inspectors is just a piece of paper. I trust no satellite image, no official statement, until an independent inspector has set foot on the site itself.

What Kyiv sees in this Iranian file

A parallel Ukrainians know all too well

In Kyiv, military analysts are following the Pickaxe Mountain file with particular interest, because it illustrates a pattern already well known from the war Ukraine has endured since 2022: an adversary who negotiates publicly while quietly rebuilding its military capabilities. The parallel between Iranian maneuvers and the delaying tactics used by Vladimir Putin during multiple ceasefire attempts is no accident, given how much the two regimes share the same instrumental view of diplomacy.

This comparative reading does not erase the obvious differences between the two files, but it recalls a strategic lesson common to Western democracies facing authoritarian regimes: a signed agreement is never a guarantee in itself; only continuous on-the-ground verification can measure an adversary's real sincerity.

Why the West must refuse diplomatic fatigue

The risk for the West is giving in to a kind of diplomatic fatigue when facing files as long and technical as Iran's nuclear program or Russia's invasion of Ukraine. If this fatigue sets in, it directly benefits regimes that bet on time to exhaust the political will of their democratic adversaries.

Refusing that fatigue means maintaining constant, documented pressure, like the pressure exerted today by the revelations about Pickaxe Mountain, rather than settling for a fragile ceasefire presented as a definitive diplomatic victory. It is this long-haul vigilance that distinguishes a credible Western strategy from mere short-term relief.

What Iran is doing today under a mountain, Russia has been doing for years on the Ukrainian front: negotiate with one hand, rebuild with the other. Until the West treats these files as one single fight against authoritarian bad faith, it will keep getting caught off guard.

The factual verdict on Pickaxe Mountain

What can be stated with certainty

Based on the elements available in mid-July 2026, several facts can be established with a high level of confidence: comparative satellite images show rebuilding activity at Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin; these sites were damaged by the American-Israeli strikes of February 2026; the Islamabad memorandum, signed on June 17, 2026, contains no binding provision on Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium; and a major military escalation, including American strikes on roughly 140 targets and Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz, occurred simultaneously with these revelations.

What cannot yet be stated with the same certainty is the exact scale of operational capacity these sites have regained, nor the precise strategic intent behind this rebuilding, for lack of direct and verified access to the facilities themselves. This honestly acknowledged zone of uncertainty must guide the caution of any serious analysis of this file.

What this means for the negotiations ahead

This file confirms, once again, that trust in the Iranian regime must be built on verification, not on the word given. The next rounds of negotiations in Doha will need to integrate these satellite revelations as a central element of the balance of power, or risk repeating the verification failures that marked the 2015 deal.

For Ukraine and for all Western democracies facing authoritarian regimes that constantly test the limits of signed agreements, the Pickaxe Mountain file offers a universal lesson: documented, methodical, dated vigilance remains the only truly effective weapon against strategic concealment.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

An analysis column built on verified sources

This article is an analysis and fact-checking column, based on journalistic and institutional sources explicitly cited in the text. The italicized passages reflect the author's personal opinions, clearly identified as such, and should not be confused with the reported facts, which rest on dated, verifiable sources.

Limits and uncertainties of this file

Some elements of this file, notably the exact scale of operational capacity regained at the Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin sites, as well as the ultimate reliability of Israeli intelligence about a plot against Donald Trump, remain partially uncertain and should be treated with caution. The author commits to correcting any factual error brought to their attention.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Post, coverage of the Pickaxe Mountain file and regional tensions — July 2026

Foreign Policy, geopolitical analyses on Iran and the Gulf — July 2026

Al Jazeera, live blog on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — July 12, 2026

Secondary sources

New York Post, satellite images of rebuilding at Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin — July 11, 2026

CNN, American strikes on 140 targets after attack on a vessel — July 11, 2026

Wikipedia, text and context of the Islamabad memorandum — June 2026

Reuters, first traces of repair at Iranian sites under tension — February 2026