EDITORIAL: Looking back at the Ankara summit and the 5% of GDP target, what the numbers confirm

Introduction

The Ankara summit, held July 7-8, 2026, confirmed the 5% of GDP target in defense spending by 2035 for all NATO members, according to Forbes. This editorial revisits that summit in light of the figures published a few days later by Reuters, which show a more nuanced picture than the usual triumphalism of official communiqués. A summit can confirm a course; only the numbers, published afterward, tell us whether it matches a reality already in motion.

This editorial does not pretend to arrive at this subject without a point of view. It is written, deliberately, from a position that considers collective Western deterrence against Russia a legitimate and necessary project, not a relic of Cold War thinking. That starting point does not excuse anyone from scrutiny; it simply explains why the gap between rhetoric and budgets, documented here, is treated as a serious problem rather than a footnote.

Only five countries — Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Greece — currently exceed 3.5% of GDP in core defense spending, according to Reuters on July 7, 2026. The great powers that have carried the Alliance's diplomatic and military weight for decades remain, themselves, far behind. It is this tension between the rhetoric of Ankara and the arithmetic of Reuters that this editorial chooses to own, without detour.

Our position is clear: the course set is the right one. The question that remains open, and one the numbers pose with uncomfortable frankness, is whether the great Western capitals have the political will to hold it, or whether they are, for now, settling for a collective communications exercise.

What the Ankara summit actually produced

A confirmation, not a revolution

The Ankara summit did not invent the 5% of GDP target: it reaffirmed it, in continuity with the Alliance's earlier decisions, according to Forbes on July 1, 2026. This continuity has a merit: it avoids the impression of strategic zigzagging that would have damaged NATO's collective credibility vis-à-vis Moscow.

But this continuity also has a cost: it extends a gap already documented between intentions stated for years and the budgets actually voted in most Western capitals, a gap the summit did not close overnight.

The absence of new binding mechanisms

No source consulted mentions the introduction, in Ankara, of any additional binding mechanism to accelerate the laggards. This absence, which could have been corrected at this summit, suggests the Alliance continues to favor peer pressure over formal sanction.

Reading the Reuters figures, a necessary exercise in candor

Five countries proving the target is not a utopia

The performance of Lithuania at 5.33% and Estonia at 5.1% of GDP shows that the final 2035 target has already been reached, nearly a decade early, by at least two Alliance members. This lead deserves to be saluted without reservation: it proves budgetary constraint is not an absolute fatality when the perception of threat is sharp enough.

Latvia at 4.92% and Poland at 4.68% round out this encouraging picture, with trajectories that are also already nearing the final threshold well before the 2035 deadline.

The great powers, the real weak point

Germany at 2.69%, the United Kingdom at 2.56%, and France at 2.22% show a lag that, arithmetically, would require a major acceleration to hope to close the gap by 2035. The United States, at 3.17%, does slightly better without yet exceeding the intermediate 3.5% threshold already crossed by five smaller members.

Why this Western lag is not trivial

A signal sent to Moscow

Every persistent gap between summit rhetoric and actually voted budgets sends, whether we like it or not, a signal to Moscow about the real solidity of Western deterrence. This editorial believes that signal deserves to be taken seriously by the capitals concerned, at a time when the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year with no clear diplomatic resolution.

A prolonged lag by the great Western powers could, over time, weaken the cohesion of the Alliance itself, by creating a sense of unfairness among the Baltic states and Poland, who already shoulder a proportionally much greater budgetary effort.

A test for transatlantic solidarity

The ability of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France to close their gap by 2035 is, for this editorial, a decisive test of real transatlantic solidarity, beyond the summit rhetoric and the ceremonial photographs from Ankara.

The 2% of GDP precedent, a lesson not to forget

A similar target, long unmet

The earlier 2% of GDP target, set at the Wales summit in 2014, was reached by only a minority of members for many years, despite repeated reaffirmations. This editorial rejects collective amnesia: this precedent must weigh on any assessment of the credibility of the new 5% target.

Ignoring this precedent would amount to repeating, on a larger scale, the same communications error: announcing an ambitious target without the tracking mechanisms needed to guarantee its actual fulfillment.

What could be different this time

The difference from 2014 lies in the context: the war in Ukraine has made the Russian threat tangible, documented by concrete incidents on the eastern flank. This difference in context could, this time, produce a faster political conversion than the one observed after 2014.

The Baltic drone wall, an example to follow

A concrete response to a concrete threat

The Baltic drone wall, funded to the tune of roughly one billion euros and targeting an initial operational capability by late 2026, illustrates what this editorial considers the model to follow: a fast, costed, and documented response to a concrete incident, rather than an abstract target set on a distant horizon.

This Baltic responsiveness contrasts with the relative slowness observed in the great Western capitals, where budgetary decisions of this scale require longer and more uncertain parliamentary cycles.

A transposable model, with conditions

This Baltic model is not directly transposable to the scale of Germany or France, whose defense budgets commit far larger sums. But its principle — acting quickly in the face of a documented threat rather than waiting for perfect consensus — deserves, according to this editorial, to inspire the great Western capitals.

The PURL program, a proof of solidarity worth highlighting

A collective mechanism that already works

The PURL program, which mobilized more than 6 billion dollars by June 2026 through the participation of twenty-one allies and two partners, is concrete proof that Western solidarity with Ukraine is not limited to national GDP percentage figures alone. This editorial believes this mechanism deserves more public visibility than it currently receives.

The additional 70 billion euros announced in Ankara for Kyiv confirm this collective solidarity dynamic, which coexists, sometimes contradictorily, with the national budgetary slowness of several of these same contributing countries.

A contradiction worth naming

This contradiction — generous collective solidarity toward Ukraine, but national slowness on the 5% target — deserves to be named without detour by this editorial, rather than hidden behind the usual diplomatic enthusiasm of summit communiqués.

What the Alliance must do differently before the next summit

More systematic annual transparency

This editorial recommends more systematic annual budgetary transparency, allowing the public tracking, country by country, of real progress toward the 5% of GDP target, rather than settling for a general reaffirmation at each summit. Such a practice would not require inventing new institutions: NATO already collects and publishes the underlying numbers, as the Reuters report itself demonstrates. What is missing is a standing, predictable rhythm of disclosure that treats budgetary transparency as a recurring obligation rather than an occasional courtesy tied to a summit's news cycle.

This transparency, if applied with the same rigor as current Reuters or NATO reports, would allow objective documentation of real progress and early identification of the countries most likely to miss their commitments, well before any final deadline turns a slow trajectory into an irreversible shortfall.

An expanded role for public pressure

In the absence of a formal sanction mechanism, public and media pressure remains the most effective tool for keeping attention on this target between summits. This editorial plays precisely that public reminder function, and it will keep returning to these same figures at future milestones rather than treating this piece as a closed case after a single news cycle.

The specific responsibility of the United States in this gap

A budgetary weight that exceeds all others

The United States, despite its position as the Alliance's historic leading contributor in absolute terms, shows a GDP percentage of 3.17%, below the 3.5% threshold already exceeded by five much smaller members. This editorial believes this reality deserves to be highlighted without complacency: the size of the American economy does not exempt Washington from a proportional effort comparable to that made by the Baltic states.

An American move closer to the 5% threshold would, by its sheer absolute budgetary weight, have a considerable pulling effect on the Alliance's entire collective trajectory toward 2035, far more than that of any other member taken individually.

France and Germany, two trajectories to watch closely

Powerful economies, lagging defense budgets

France, at 2.22% of GDP, and Germany, at 2.69%, rank among the largest economies in the Alliance, which makes their lag all the more significant for the final collective average. This editorial believes these two countries, as historic engines of the European defense project, bear a particular responsibility for the success or failure of the 2035 target.

A joint Franco-German acceleration would be, according to this editorial, the most powerful signal Western Europe could send to Moscow about the solidity of its collective defense commitment.

The United Kingdom, between stated ambition and budgetary constraint

Assertive rhetoric, lagging figures

The United Kingdom, at 2.56% of GDP according to Reuters, regularly displays an assertive rhetoric on European collective defense, without this rhetoric yet translating, in the figures, into crossing the intermediate threshold of 3.5% already reached by five smaller Alliance members.

This editorial urges London to match its rhetorical commitments with actually voted budgets, rather than letting this gap drag on from summit to summit without precise budgetary justification.

What Greece and Poland demonstrate about the possible conversion

Two different trajectories, the same result

Greece, at 3.65% of GDP, and Poland, at 4.68%, illustrate two distinct trajectories — one long-standing and tied to historical regional tensions, the other more recent and directly tied to the proximity of the war in Ukraine — that nonetheless converge on the same result: crossing the threshold of 3.5% of GDP.

This convergence, despite different national histories, suggests reaching high thresholds of defense spending remains possible via varied political paths, which nuances the idea of a universal, insurmountable obstacle for the great Western powers.

The risk of double talk the Alliance must avoid

Solidarity toward Kyiv, national slowness

This editorial warns against a double talk that would consist of displaying generous solidarity toward Ukraine, via the PURL program and the 70 billion euros promised in Ankara, while maintaining a national budgetary pace insufficient to reach the 5% of GDP target by 2035.

This double talk, should Moscow come to perceive it as a structural weakness rather than mere administrative slowness, would risk undermining the credibility of collective Western deterrence far more than an openly acknowledged and publicly documented budgetary lag would.

What this editorial expects from the next NATO summit

Costed commitments rather than general formulas

This editorial expects the Alliance's next summit to produce costed commitments, country by country, with verifiable interim milestones by 2030, rather than a mere general reaffirmation of the final 2035 target like the one seen in Ankara.

Such a change of method, if adopted, would turn a collective target still largely declarative into a series of verifiable national commitments, the only ones capable of restoring full credibility to the trajectory toward 5% of GDP.

The expected role of independent media in this tracking

In addition to strengthened institutional tracking, this editorial believes independent media has a role to play in the annual tracking of defense spending figures, systematically comparing summit rhetoric to the budgets actually voted by each national parliament concerned, rather than merely relaying official communiqués without critical distance.

Conclusion

The Ankara summit confirmed the right course: 5% of GDP by 2035. But the Reuters figures, published a few days later, remind us that only five countries have, to date, exceeded 3.5% of GDP, while the great Western powers remain far behind. This editorial chooses to salute the ambition without hiding the gap.

Western solidarity exists, documented by the PURL program and the 70 billion euros promised to Kyiv. But it does not replace the national budgetary effort the 2035 target demands of every member, without exception. A collective target is only worth what each member is willing to pay individually; it is that bill, not the summit communiqué, that will tell us whether Ankara was a turning point or merely a family photo.

Signature

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's Transparency Box

Editorial positioning

This editorial is written from an openly held pro-Western position, which supports the 5% of GDP target as a necessary deterrence tool, while exerting legitimate critical pressure on the great Western powers to honor their commitments.

Methodology and sources

This editorial relies on Reuters figures from July 7, 2026, on a Forbes article from July 1, 2026 concerning the Ankara summit, on official NATO data on the 5% commitment, and on PURL program information published by NATO on July 13, 2026 as well as by European Pravda on June 30, 2026.

Nature of the analysis

This piece is an openly acknowledged editorial: it combines verifiable facts with the columnist's explicit critical judgment, clearly distinguished from the raw figures cited, without claiming a neutrality the editorial genre does not require.

Sources

Primary sources

Reuters — Defense spending of NATO members — July 7, 2026

NATO — Official 5% of GDP commitment

NATO — Support for Ukraine and the PURL program — updated July 13, 2026

Secondary sources

Forbes — Context of the Ankara summit — July 1, 2026

European Pravda — Western funding for Ukraine — June 30, 2026

Latvian Ministry of Defense — Joint statement — March 27, 2026