EDITORIAL: The IRGC, the backbone of a regime that refuses to bend

Introduction: understanding the real power behind Tehran

An army within the army, a state within the state

To understand why Iran refuses to yield despite weeks of American strikes, one must look beyond the official ministries and diplomatic spokespeople. The true center of gravity of Iranian power is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a parallel military and economic force that controls an immense share of the country's security, industrial, and financial apparatus. This is not a conventional army: it is the ideological and material backbone of the theocratic regime itself.

It is precisely this structure that American strikes target as a priority. On the night of July 11 to 12, 2026, roughly 140 targets linked to the IRGC were struck by American forces, according to the CENTCOM statement, after the Corps attacked another commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz and declared it closed. Striking the IRGC means striking directly at the heart of the system that keeps Tehran in a state of perpetual war with the West.

Understanding the IRGC means understanding that this war does not end with a simple agreement signed on glossy paper: it ends only when this parallel power structure loses its ability to dictate Tehran's actual policy.

Why this organization goes beyond a conventional military framework

The IRGC is not merely an armed force: it controls entire swaths of the Iranian economy, from ports to telecommunications, through major industrial conglomerates. This economic and military integration gives it a resilience that classic financial sanctions have always struggled to truly dent.

It is this duality — military force and economic empire — that explains why neutralizing the IRGC requires a strategy combining targeted military strikes with precise financial sanctions, like those recently announced against the network linked to Mojtaba Khamenei.

A force born of the 1979 revolution, never demobilized

The ideological origins of a praetorian guard

The IRGC was created in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the new theocratic regime against possible counter-revolutions, including from Iran's own regular army, deemed too close to the former Shah's regime. This origin explains why the Corps has always retained direct ideological loyalty to the supreme leader, rather than to the Iranian state as a whole.

This praetorian dynamic has persisted uninterrupted for 45 years, making the IRGC the most stable and powerful organization in the entire Iranian state apparatus, capable of surviving changes of government, economic crises, and successive wars.

An organization that has survived 45 years of crises, wars, and sanctions will not collapse under the sole weight of a Western press release. It takes a long-term strategy, not spectacular announcements with no follow-through.

A loyalty that outranks every other institution

This loyalty to the supreme leader, rather than to Iran's elected institutions, explains why President Masoud Pezeshkian himself has limited room to maneuver on the IRGC's strategic decisions, particularly on the most sensitive matters of national security and foreign policy.

This institutional reality makes any diplomatic negotiation with Tehran particularly complex: signing an agreement with Iran's civilian government guarantees nothing that the IRGC, an autonomous and often more radical actor, will honor the terms negotiated by civilian diplomats.

Control of the Strait of Hormuz, the Corps's favorite weapon

A naval militia that dictates the rules of the Gulf

The IRGC's naval branch directly controls maritime harassment operations in the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels like the one carried out against the M/V GFS Galaxy, sailing under a Cypriot flag, which left one crew member missing. It is not Iran's regular navy that conducts these operations, but the Corps's autonomous naval force.

This institutional distinction matters: it means that even a diplomatic agreement signed by Iran's civilian government is not enough to guarantee an end to maritime provocations, as long as the IRGC retains its operational autonomy over the strait.

A strait carrying a fifth of the world's oil should never depend on the goodwill of an ideological naval militia. Yet that is exactly the situation the world finds itself in today, and it should alarm far more governments than it currently does.

More than 60 fast boats neutralized, with no lasting effect

American strikes on July 7 destroyed more than 60 fast boats belonging to the IRGC, according to CENTCOM, but this material destruction did not prevent new attacks in the following days. This operational resilience demonstrates the depth of the rapid reconstitution capabilities the Corps possesses, despite significant material losses.

This capacity for rapid regeneration illustrates why a purely military approach, without a robust economic and financial component, will never be enough to durably neutralize the IRGC's capacity for harm in this strategic region.

The Corps's parallel economic empire

Industrial conglomerates under military control

The IRGC controls, directly or through subsidiaries, entire swaths of the Iranian economy, including port operations, telecommunications, and major infrastructure projects. This economic integration allows the Corps to generate considerable revenue, largely independent of the official Iranian state budget, which significantly complicates the effectiveness of classic economic sanctions.

This financial autonomy explains why recent American sanctions specifically target precise financial networks, such as the one linked to Mojtaba Khamenei, rather than settling for generalized sanctions against the Iranian economy as a whole.

A regime that turns its revolutionary guardians into construction and telecommunications tycoons has long since traded ideological purity for institutionalized greed. This internal contradiction deserves to be exposed more often than it is.

The hidden financing of regional militias

A significant share of the revenue generated by this parallel economic empire finances regional militias allied with Tehran, directly contributing to the regional instability observed in recent weeks, from strikes on Jordan to tensions in Lebanon. This financing architecture explains the apparent coherence between the various regional tension theaters.

Cutting these financial flows remains a priority strategic objective for Western decision-makers, who know that every untraced dollar escaping sanctions directly strengthens the Corps's capacity to fuel this coordinated regional instability.

The reconstruction of Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin, the Corps's work

Satellite images that betray a clear intention

Satellite images recently obtained by several media outlets show active reconstruction at the Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin sites, two installations linked to the military and nuclear program largely supervised by the IRGC. According to an analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, these images reveal significant, recent reconstruction activity, going well beyond simple post-strike cleanup.

This active reconstruction constitutes a violation of the spirit of the Islamabad memorandum signed on June 17, and confirms that the Corps continues to manage its strategic installations as though no de-escalation agreement had ever been signed by Iran's civilian government.

A regime that pours concrete over the craters of its military installations three weeks after signing a peace agreement is not seeking de-escalation, it is buying time to rebuild what diplomacy claimed to have dismantled.

The double talk between diplomats and the military

This gap between commitments made by Iranian diplomats and the concrete actions carried out by the IRGC on the ground perfectly illustrates the two-headed nature of Iranian power. Negotiators can sign agreements in apparent good faith, without this actually binding the parallel military structures that control the most sensitive strategic installations.

It is this institutionalized double talk that makes independent, continuous verification absolutely essential, rather than relying solely on official statements from Iran's civilian government about compliance with its commitments.

State funerals and the succession, a decisive moment for the Corps

Mojtaba Khamenei, a Corps man above all

The state funeral of the former supreme leader, held in Mashhad, opened the way to a succession pointing toward Mojtaba Khamenei, a figure whose historical influence within the IRGC is well documented. This structural closeness between the presumed successor and the Corps raises fears of an even greater consolidation of military influence over the entire Iranian state apparatus.

This power transition, if confirmed in that direction, would further consolidate the fusion between theocratic power and the Corps's military power, further reducing the room for maneuver of Iran's civilian institutions on the most sensitive strategic decisions.

If Iran's next supreme leader is above all an IRGC man, then the distinction between the theocratic state and the parallel army that protects it has just permanently disappeared, and the West must adjust its strategy accordingly.

A worrying signal for any future de-escalation

If Mojtaba Khamenei does become the next supreme leader with such a strong anchoring in IRGC structures, it becomes difficult to imagine a negotiated de-escalation that would not first and foremost require the explicit agreement of the Corps itself, rather than the will of Iran's civilian government alone.

This institutional reality must inform every future Western strategy: negotiating only with Iranian diplomats, without accounting for the real weight of the IRGC in final decisions, amounts to negotiating with the wrong part of Iranian power.

American sanctions, a targeted response to the Corps's financing

Hitting the financial network rather than the general economy

The American Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting a financial network linked to Mojtaba Khamenei and, by extension, to the IRGC's economic structures, targeting thirteen additional individuals and entities, including exchange houses that move billions of dollars every year on behalf of already-sanctioned banks. This targeted approach seeks to maximize impact on the Corps's real financial flows, rather than settling for largely ineffective, generalized sanctions.

This precise financial sanctions strategy reflects a better Western understanding of the real economic architecture of Iranian power, where money largely circulates through networks controlled by the IRGC, independent of the state's official budget.

Hitting the Corps's wallet is sometimes more effective than hitting its arsenals: the money financing domestic repression and regional militias is, in the final analysis, the real fuel of this power structure.

The uncertain but necessary effectiveness of this approach

The real effectiveness of these targeted sanctions remains, at this stage, difficult to measure with certainty, given that the IRGC has repeatedly demonstrated in the past its ability to circumvent financial restrictions through opaque networks and regional intermediaries. This uncertainty, however, does not invalidate the need to maintain this constant financial pressure.

Each additional sanction, even if it alone is not enough to neutralize the Corps, helps to complicate and slow down its financial operations, which constitutes a legitimate strategic objective in a long confrontation with this theocratic regime.

The Corps's role in Iran's domestic repression

A force also turned against its own people

Beyond its regional military operations, the IRGC plays a central role in repressing domestic dissent in Iran, through its Basij branch and its internal security units. This dual function, both external military and internal repressive, illustrates the scale of control this organization exercises over Iranian society as a whole.

This reality is a reminder that the current confrontation with Tehran is not only about regional security or the Iranian nuclear program, but also about the fundamentally repressive nature of a regime that uses the same military structures to project power abroad and to keep its population under strict control.

We too often forget that the same men firing missiles at tankers in the Strait of Hormuz are also the ones repressing protesters in the streets of Tehran. It is the same hand, the same uniform, the same blind loyalty to theocratic power.

An Iranian population held hostage by its own institutions

Ordinary Iranian citizens suffer doubly from the consequences of this power structure: Western economic sanctions weigh on their daily standard of living, while domestic repression carried out by the IRGC drastically limits their ability to express disagreement with the strategic choices of their theocratic leaders.

This double constraint explains why Western strategy must always seek to clearly distinguish, in its public messaging, between the theocratic regime and the IRGC on one hand, and the Iranian population itself, which often has no real say over these decisions made in its name, on the other.

It must be said unambiguously: supporting the Iranian people and fighting the IRGC are not contradictory positions, they are two faces of the same solidarity with those who endure this theocratic regime every day.

The Corps's military cooperation with Russia and North Korea

A network of alliances between sanctioned regimes

The IRGC maintains close military ties with Russia, notably through the supply of drones used massively in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as with North Korea on ballistic technology issues. This architecture of alliances between sanctioned regimes illustrates the global dimension of the threat posed by the Corps, well beyond the borders of the Middle East.

This multilateral cooperation between regimes hostile to the liberal international order confirms that the confrontation with the IRGC cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the global geopolitical competition between the West and this informal bloc of coordinated authoritarian powers.

Putin, Kim Jong-un, and IRGC commanders share no common values, only mutual hatred of the Western order. This convergence of circumstance should be enough to convince the last skeptics that these files are linked.

A threat that demands a coordinated Western response

Faced with this network of military alliances between sanctioned regimes, the Western response must itself be coordinated across the different theaters involved, rather than handled region by region in a compartmentalized manner. Every technological advance the IRGC obtains through its partnerships with Moscow and Pyongyang directly strengthens its regional capacity for harm.

This is why Western vigilance on this file must remain a constant priority for intelligence services, regardless of the media's fluctuating attention on any particular regional crisis.

Bushehr and the risks of a poorly calibrated strike on the Corps's interests

A plant under the Corps's military watch

American strikes carried out near the Bushehr nuclear plant illustrate the operational challenge posed by the tight overlap between civilian installations and military capabilities controlled by the IRGC in this strategic zone. This proximity considerably complicates the precise targeting sought by American and Israeli forces.

The risk of a radiological incident, even a limited one, would give the IRGC a major propaganda argument to present itself as a victim of irresponsible Western aggression, regardless of its own documented responsibility for the initial escalation of this regional crisis.

One can fully support the necessity of neutralizing the IRGC's capabilities while demanding, in parallel, absolute precision near any civilian nuclear site. The two requirements are not contradictory, they are complementary and non-negotiable.

The need for absolute precision on this issue

This operational reality demands absolute precision from Western forces in their future strikes, or else the strategic benefit of neutralizing the IRGC's capabilities could be largely offset by the diplomatic and humanitarian consequences of an avoidable and regrettable civilian nuclear incident.

This requirement for precision, however, must never serve as a pretext to slow the necessary military pressure on the Corps's real capabilities, which continues to represent the main operational threat in this sensitive strategic region.

Israeli intelligence and the direct threat to Western leaders

A grave allegation to be treated with methodological caution

Elements of Israeli intelligence point to the existence of an Iranian plot, possibly orchestrated by elements of the IRGC, targeting American President Donald Trump. This is grave information that must be treated with appropriate methodological caution, absent independent, complete public confirmation at this stage of the investigation.

I choose to mention this information because it is circulating in serious Western intelligence circles, while refusing to present it as an established fact until further evidence is made public by reliable, verified independent sources.

I would rather admit uncertainty on this specific point than turn unconfirmed intelligence into spectacular certainty. Rigor, even when it frustrates the appetite for sensationalism, protects the truth better than media excitement does.

A risk profile consistent with the Corps's capabilities

The IRGC has historically possessed advanced extraterritorial operational capabilities, through its Quds force, which makes this allegation credible in terms of operational risk profile, without this constituting sufficient factual proof to affirm it as an established, definitive certainty.

This analytical caution, even though it frustrates the appetite for sensationalism, better protects the credibility of the entire Western case against Tehran than a premature statement unsupported by solid, verifiable evidence on the ground would.

Oman and the difficulty of negotiating with a divided power structure

A mediation that must deal with two Iranian counterparts

The Omani proposal for a free navigation corridor in its territorial waters illustrates the structural difficulty of any mediation with Iran: negotiators must simultaneously deal with Iran's civilian government and with the IRGC's operational autonomy, which directly controls naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

This institutional duality explains why even an agreement accepted by Iranian diplomats in Doha in no way guarantees an end to maritime provocations carried out directly on the ground of the strait by the Corps's naval branch.

Omani diplomacy deserves credit, but it runs into a structural wall: you cannot negotiate a lasting peace with a country where half of the real power systematically escapes the official signatories of the agreement.

An essential lesson for any future negotiation

Any future diplomatic strategy toward Tehran must necessarily incorporate this institutional reality: negotiating only with Iran's civilian government representatives, without a direct verification mechanism on the IRGC's commitments, amounts to negotiating an agreement doomed to fail from the moment it is officially signed.

This is the lesson, more than any other, that Western decision-makers must draw from the repeated failure of ceasefires signed since the start of this conflict last February with this theocratic regime.

China, a discreet client of the Corps's economic empire

Beijing, a constant buyer despite Western sanctions

China remains, despite decades of American sanctions, one of the principal buyers of Iranian oil, often shipped through opaque networks directly linked to commercial structures controlled by the IRGC. This trade relationship gives Beijing a direct stake in the Corps's economic survival, and therefore in the relative stability of the theocratic regime it protects.

This discreet trade partnership between Beijing and the IRGC's economic structures illustrates a reality Western decision-makers can no longer ignore: every targeted American sanction is partially circumvented thanks to the economic complicity of powers that benefit from the relative weakening of Western influence in the Middle East.

Beijing does not need to militarily support the IRGC to draw a constant strategic benefit from it. Every barrel of Iranian oil bought despite sanctions directly finances the military backbone of a regime hostile to the West, and China knows this perfectly well.

A complicity that deserves a firmer Western response

This Chinese economic complicity with the IRGC's financial structures should push Western decision-makers to strengthen secondary sanctions targeting Chinese intermediaries who facilitate these transactions, rather than focusing solely on directly sanctioned Iranian entities.

Without this additional pressure on foreign facilitators, notably Chinese ones, Western sanctions will continue to produce limited effects against the financial resilience the Corps has demonstrated since the start of this prolonged confrontation.

What the Corps's persistence reveals about the nature of the Iranian regime

A militarized theocracy rather than a classic Islamic Republic

The scale of power held by the IRGC reveals that contemporary Iran resembles less an Islamic Republic governed by civilian institutions than a militarized theocracy where security structures dictate, in the final analysis, most of the country's foreign and national security policy.

This structural reality must inform any serious Western analysis of this regime: calls for moderation addressed to Iran's civilian government will remain largely ineffective as long as the IRGC retains its current strategic autonomy on the most sensitive and decisive matters.

Calling this regime a simple Islamic Republic already means accepting its propaganda. The harder, more useful truth is that it is a militarized theocracy where the Corps's uniform counts for more than the diplomat's suit.

An institutional resilience that complicates any Western strategy

This institutional resilience of the IRGC, forged over 45 years of surviving wars, sanctions, and successive economic crises, explains why no quick Western strategy will succeed in durably neutralizing this organization without a sustained effort combining military pressure, precise financial sanctions, and long-term strategic patience.

It is this strategic patience, more than any isolated tactical victory, that will ultimately determine the outcome of this prolonged confrontation between the West and the military backbone of the entire Iranian regime.

Conclusion: neutralizing the backbone, not just the visible vertebrae

A strategic lesson for the entire Western coalition

Understanding the IRGC means understanding that this war will never be resolved by the mere signing of a diplomatic agreement with Iran's civilian government. As long as the Corps retains its military, economic, and ideological autonomy, every ceasefire will remain a tactical pause rather than a true, lasting peace for the entire region.

American strikes, targeted financial sanctions, and constant vigilance over reconstruction sites like Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin are necessary tools, but insufficient on their own, against an organization this resilient and this deeply rooted in the Iranian state apparatus.

What the future demands of the Western coalition

The future of this confrontation will depend on the West's ability to maintain coordinated, sustained pressure on every dimension of the IRGC's power simultaneously, rather than settling for isolated tactical victories that, without a coherent global strategy, would leave this backbone of the regime intact for decades to come.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

On method

This article is an analysis and opinion column, based on sourced and verifiable facts at the time of publication. Italicized passages represent my personal opinions as a columnist and should not be confused with the reported facts, which rest on official statements, news agency reports, and expert analyses cited in the text.

On the limits of this file

Some elements, notably those relating to a possible Iranian plot against the American president and the exact future orientation of Mojtaba Khamenei, remain unconfirmed independently and completely at this stage, and are presented with the methodological caution appropriate to this type of sensitive file.

Sources

Primary sources

CENTCOM, statement on American strikes against the IRGC — July 9, 2026

RBC-Ukraine, 140 targets struck in Iran — July 12, 2026

Institute for the Study of War, special report on Iran — July 8, 2026

Foreign Policy, geopolitical analyses on the Middle East — July 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters, new American sanctions against Mojtaba Khamenei's network — July 10, 2026

The Times of Israel, Iran declares the strait closed until further notice — July 12, 2026

Wikipedia, timeline of the 2026 Iran war — accessed July 13, 2026

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Iran continues work at key nuclear site — July 8, 2026