EDITORIAL: Turkey Gets Its F-35s Back, a Gift That Embarrasses NATO

Introduction: a reversal nobody was announcing anymore

A line dropped between two Ukrainian files

The NATO summit in Ankara, on July 7 and 8, 2026, was supposed to focus mainly on Patriot systems, on billions promised to Kyiv, and on drones burning Russian refineries. Then, in the middle of a bilateral meeting, Donald Trump reopened a file many had believed buried for years: bringing Turkey back into the F-35 fighter jet program, despite Ankara's 2019 purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which had triggered its exclusion and sanctions under the CAATSA law ( Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) ([The Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/inside-nato-summit-ankara-ukraine-iran-and-turkeys-f-35-bid)).

This is not a protocol footnote. Since 2019, Turkey had paid cash for its closeness with Moscow: excluded from the program, denied delivery of more than a hundred jets it had already ordered, and cut out of the industrial supply chain that manufactures certain F-35 parts on its own soil. Watching Trump publicly raise the possibility of Ankara's return to this exclusive club sends a signal to the entire Alliance: the rules can bend when geopolitics presses hard enough.

Why this file resurfaces precisely now

The timing is not neutral. The same summit saw the Allies pledge at least seventy billion euros to Ukraine for 2026, with a comparable commitment floated for 2027 ([NATO](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/227508.htm?selectedLocale=en)), while NATO's defense spending crossed the 1.8 trillion dollar mark, up roughly 11 percent. Amid this general mobilization of the Alliance against Russia, bringing Turkey back into the F-35 program amounts to reinforcing NATO's southeastern flank at the precise moment when every piece of the setup matters.

But the manner matters as much as the substance. Trump announced this reintegration without concrete terms yet in place, in a style that echoes, almost line for line, the promise he made the same day to Volodymyr Zelensky on Patriot coproduction: a spectacular declaration, delivered at a press conference, arriving well ahead of the technical and legal work needed to make it real.

I cannot help but see, in this kind of announcement, a method that is by now familiar: the spectacular promise first, the details later, if they ever arrive at all. That works to capture a headline. It works far less well to reassure allies who need certainty, not punchlines.

The S-400 file, the original sin that cost Ankara dearly

A Russian choice that cut Turkey off from its own industry

It is worth remembering what preceded this rupture. In 2017, Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, chose to buy the S-400 air defense system from Russia rather than opt for Western equipment compatible with Alliance standards. Washington had warned that such a purchase was incompatible with participation in the F-35 program, whose stealth features and electronic systems could not coexist, on the same territory, with a Russian radar capable of studying them.

Ankara held its course. The penalty arrived in 2019: outright exclusion from the program, a freeze on delivery of roughly 100 jets already paid for by Turkey, and CAATSA sanctions directly targeting the Turkish defense industry, particularly the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB). That episode left a lasting scar on the relationship between the two countries, at a moment when NATO badly needed unity against a Russia already seen as threatening.

Seven years of industrial and diplomatic purgatory

For seven years, Turkey paid dearly for that decision. Its companies, which manufactured certain F-35 components, were cut out of the production chain. Its air force, which had built part of its modernization plans around the arrival of this jet, had to make do with an aging fleet of F-16s, supplemented by laborious talks over potential additional sales of upgraded F-16s.

This blockage fed, in Ankara, a sense of strategic humiliation that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan never stopped raising with his Western counterparts. The return of the F-35 file to the table in 2026 is therefore not simply a matter of military hardware: it touches Turkish national pride and the place the country intends to occupy within the Alliance.

One can understand Turkish frustration without erasing the original fault. Buying a Russian system while sitting in a Western alliance was not a misstep, it was a strategic choice heavy with consequences, and Ankara knew that perfectly well in 2017.

Israel, the opposition that complicates everything

A regional rivalry inserting itself into the file

Turkish reintegration is not playing out only between Washington and Ankara. Israel had already voiced, audibly, its opposition to a Turkish return to the F-35 program even before Trump's announcement ([The Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/inside-nato-summit-ankara-ukraine-iran-and-turkeys-f-35-bid)). Tensions between the two countries, sharpened by Turkey's position on Gaza and by increasingly harsh rhetoric between the Israeli and Turkish governments, turn a technical file into a regional geopolitical question.

For Israel, which had long enjoyed a form of qualitative exclusivity over the F-35 in the Middle East, watching Turkey join the club of operators of this aircraft changes the regional balance of air capabilities. It is no coincidence that rhetorical attacks between Ankara and Tel Aviv intensified precisely as this prospect became credible again.

A test for the cohesion of American partnerships

This Israeli opposition places Washington before an uncomfortable choice. Trump can decide to ignore the objections, as he has done on other files, but that means absorbing a diplomatic cost with a historic Middle East ally, in a region where every shift in air power balance carries weight. The Turkish file is therefore no longer purely transatlantic; it has become a point of friction between two distinct American strategic partnerships.

This complexity illustrates a broader reality of current American foreign policy: decisions made to reinforce one front, here NATO against Russia, can destabilize another regional balance, here the relationship with Israel. None of these tensions cancels out; they simply pile up on the same presidential agenda.

I note, without judging the whole file, that no major power seems to have seriously anticipated this collision between two partnerships. That is the symptom of a diplomacy that advances by announcement rather than by coherent planning of priorities.

The legal obstacles that did not disappear with a declaration

The American Congress, an actor Trump cannot ignore

A presidential statement is not, legally, enough to erase a sanction voted by Congress. The CAATSA restrictions imposed on Turkey rest on a legal basis the president can, in certain cases, bypass through waivers, but one that remains under close parliamentary watch. Several American lawmakers, particularly sensitive to national-security concerns tied to the presence of a Russian system on the territory of a country operating F-35s, have already flagged their unease ([The Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/inside-nato-summit-ankara-ukraine-iran-and-turkeys-f-35-bid)).

This legal reality demands a caution that the enthusiasm of Ankara's press conference does not reflect. Between the announcement of a political intent and its translation into statute or a formal waiver, there lies a gap where many presidential promises have already gotten lost, including at this very summit, regarding Ukrainian Patriots.

The unresolved question of the S-400 itself

No indication has been given of what would happen to the S-400 system already installed on Turkish soil. Technically, the fundamental incompatibility that justified the 2019 exclusion — the fear that the Russian radar could gather data on the F-35's stealth signature — remains entirely intact if Ankara keeps its Russian system while receiving the American jet. No known technical compromise currently allows the two to coexist without risk.

This question, purely technical in appearance, is in fact the crux of the problem since 2019. Without a resolution on the fate of the S-400, Turkish reintegration remains a statement of political intent, not a matter settled on the level of weapons-systems security.

A verbal promise has never melted a Russian radar already in place. As long as this technical point remains in the shadows, I refuse to treat this announcement as a done deal, even though it makes an excellent headline.

What Erdoğan actually gains from this summit

A communications triumph, regardless of the final outcome

Even if actual reintegration takes months, or years, Erdoğan has already gotten what he was looking for in Ankara: a moment of public recognition, on his own soil, in front of cameras from around the world, in which the American president treats Turkey as a top-tier partner rather than an ally under watch. This kind of symbolic victory matters enormously in Turkish domestic politics, where Erdoğan likes to present himself as the man restoring power and national pride against the West.

This theatrical dimension should not be underestimated. A NATO summit held in Ankara, with this specific announcement, already constitutes in itself a diplomatic win for Erdoğan, who has long cultivated a tightrope-walker posture between Moscow and Washington, never fully giving up either relationship.

A bargaining chip for other regional files

Turkey is not simply after airplanes. It is using this file as a bargaining chip in several parallel negotiations: its role in post-Assad Syria, its position on the Kurds, its ambitions in the Caucasus, and its ability to present itself as a credible intermediary between Kyiv and Moscow. Every American concession on the F-35 strengthens Turkey's negotiating position on these other fronts, where Ankara has direct and sometimes contradictory interests relative to its Western partners.

It is this accumulation of leverage that makes Turkey difficult to treat as an ordinary ally within NATO. It negotiates every file separately, never fully aligning with a unified Western line, which explains why this reintegration, however symbolic, remains suspended on so many unresolved conditions.

Erdoğan has been playing a multi-level game for years, and he has probably just won an extra round, without having delivered the slightest guarantee on the Russian file that created this crisis in the first place. That should make us cautious, not admiring.

The fragile coherence of the Western front against Russia

An ambiguous signal sent to Moscow

While NATO promises billions to Ukraine and hardens its posture toward Russia, reintegrating a country that bought, and keeps, a major Russian air defense system sends an ambivalent message. In Moscow, this can be read as proof that Western sanctions, even those voted by the American Congress, remain negotiable whenever a sufficient strategic interest appears.

This kind of signal carries a credibility cost for the entire Western sanctions policy, which largely rests on the idea that the consequences of aligning with Moscow are serious and lasting. If Turkey manages to escape them without having given up its S-400, other capitals could legitimately wonder why they, too, should scrupulously respect the Western sanctions regime.

The price of surface unity within the Alliance

NATO has always had to manage members with diverging interests, but the war in Ukraine has made that diversity more visible and more politically costly. Every exception granted to a member for bilateral American reasons weakens the narrative of a united, coherent Alliance that Washington nonetheless seeks to project against the Kremlin.

It is this tension between displayed unity and behind-the-scenes bilateral arrangements that increasingly defines how NATO actually functions in 2026. Turkey is not alone in benefiting from this kind of differentiated treatment, but its case, because of the S-400 file, remains the most symbolically loaded.

An alliance that must constantly negotiate bilateral exceptions to maintain its cohesion is not a weak alliance, but it is not the unshakable fortress that some official speeches like to describe either. The truth sits, as often, in that uncomfortable in-between.

What this affair reveals about the Trump method in foreign policy

The spectacular announcement as a permanent negotiating tool

The same summit saw Trump announce, almost in the same breath, the Patriot coproduction license for Ukraine without having informed the companies concerned, and Turkish reintegration into the F-35 program without having settled the S-400 question. This repeated pattern suggests a deliberate method: use the public, spectacular, immediately headlined announcement as a pressure tool, leaving the technical teams to manage the contradictions afterward.

This method has real tactical advantages. It creates a political fact that is hard to reverse without an image cost, and it puts administrations and manufacturers under public pressure to align quickly with presidential will. But it also carries a structural risk: multiplying unfulfilled promises, whose accumulation eventually erodes the credibility of the American word, with allies as much as with adversaries.

A necessary evil for the West, despite its stylistic excess

It must be said plainly: on the geopolitical level, Trump's presence at the Ankara summit, with its off-the-cuff announcements, nonetheless helped extract concrete commitments for Ukraine, notably on Patriots and on the seventy billion euros promised by the Allies. Without the personal pressure he applies, some files stuck for months would probably not have advanced this quickly.

This tactical effectiveness, real in terms of Western mobilization against Russia, should not obscure the methodical disorder it produces on more technical files, like the Turkish F-35 case, where communications haste risks creating more complications than lasting solutions.

I consider Trump a necessary evil for the West on the geopolitical level, capable of unlocking files frozen for years through the sheer force of his personal pressure. That does not stop me from noting that his method often leaves more open questions than solid answers.

China, Iran, and North Korea are watching this file too

A precedent the systemic adversaries are studying closely

The great rival powers of the West, China, Iran, and North Korea, are following with obvious interest how NATO and the United States manage their own internal contradictions. An ally that buys a Russian system, gets sanctioned, then obtains, seven years later, reintegration into the Alliance's most sensitive military program, is a textbook case for anyone trying to gauge the real staying power of Western positions over time.

For Beijing in particular, which watches closely how NATO handles Russia to draw lessons applicable to its own relationship with Taiwan and its neighbors, this kind of Western flexibility can feed the idea that sanctions and strategic exclusions ultimately have a negotiable expiration date whenever the geopolitical interest shifts.

A double-edged lesson for Western credibility

This reading, if it takes hold in the West's rival capitals, could weaken the deterrent effect of future sanctions, whether against China in the event of escalation over Taiwan, against Iran on its nuclear program, or against North Korea on its ballistic tests. If Western firmness turns out to be negotiable for a NATO ally, why couldn't these regimes also hope for a similar exit after a sufficiently long period under sanctions?

It is precisely this kind of reasoning that the West must anticipate and counter with clear messaging, or every exception granted to a close ally risks becoming, in rival capitals, an argument for testing the patience and consistency of Western democracies on far more dangerous theaters.

This Turkish file is not trivial for the Atlantic Alliance alone; it sends a signal that Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang are analyzing coldly. The West must learn to measure the systemic cost of each of its bilateral exceptions, even the ones most justified in the short term.

The Greek precedent, a reminder that these files take years

A history of rivalry that complicates every American arbitration

Turkey and Greece, both NATO members, maintain an old regional rivalry that weighs on every American arms decision in the eastern Mediterranean. Any meaningful progress on the Turkish F-35 file will be watched closely in Athens, which has itself reinforced its own air fleet in recent years specifically to maintain a favorable balance of power against Ankara.

This regional dynamic adds another layer of diplomatic complexity to a file already burdened by the Israeli question and by American legal obstacles. Washington will once again have to manage several allied sensitivities simultaneously to avoid a gesture meant to reinforce NATO's southeastern flank ending up destabilizing another, equally sensitive, regional balance.

The long timeline of arms programs, against the urgency of communications

Historical precedents for reintegration or arms negotiations within NATO consistently show delays measured in years, not months. Between actually lifting the legal obstacles, resolving the S-400 question, managing Israeli opposition, and easing Greek concerns, it is reasonable to expect that this file will not find a definitive conclusion for several years, whatever ambition was on display in Ankara in July 2026.

This long timeline clashes violently with the tempo of American presidential communications, which needs immediate, visible wins. It is this gap between political time and industrial-and-diplomatic time that risks, once again, turning a triumphant announcement into a source of gradual disappointment, as has already happened on other arms files promised to Ukraine at the very same summit.

I would rather warn now than be surprised later: this Turkish file will probably follow the same bumpy path as the Ukrainian Patriots, between spectacular promise and laborious implementation, stretched over years rather than months.

What this means for the Western aerospace industry

Lockheed Martin, between commercial opportunity and diplomatic headache

For Lockheed Martin, the F-35's manufacturer, Turkish reintegration represents a potentially significant commercial opportunity: the sale of jets already partially financed by Ankara before 2019, the return of Turkish suppliers to the global production chain, and access to a defense market in the middle of a budget boom. But this opportunity comes with a security risk the manufacturer cannot ignore, that of possible exposure of sensitive data if the S-400 stays operational on Turkish soil.

This tension between commercial interest and security imperative puts Lockheed Martin in a delicate position, similar in some respects to the one faced by RTX and Lockheed Martin itself on the Ukrainian Patriot file: learning, through the press, of a presidential decision that directly commits them, with no prior consultation.

A global supply chain already under strain

The Western defense industry, pulled simultaneously by the war in Ukraine, the surge in NATO budgets beyond 1.8 trillion dollars, and now the prospect of Turkish reintegration into the F-35 program, faces an accumulation of demands that tests its production capacity. Every new file, however strategic, adds to an already long list of competing priorities for the same factories, the same engineers, and the same supply chains.

This industrial saturation partly explains why the timelines announced at political summits systematically run into a slower and more complex production reality than expected, a phenomenon already documented on the Patriot file and likely to repeat, almost identically, on the Turkish F-35 file.

Not enough people talk about this raw industrial reality: you can announce political decisions in a single sentence, but you do not build stealth fighters or Patriot interceptors at the pace of a press conference. This mismatch between political time and industrial time will keep producing disillusionment.

The American Congress's role in the coming months

Hearings to expect before any formal lifting of sanctions

Given the concerns already voiced by certain lawmakers over national security, the American Congress will likely demand hearings and precise guarantees before agreeing to any formal lifting of CAATSA sanctions targeting Turkey. This process, even if it does not necessarily prevent the final outcome Trump wants, introduces a delay and a level of public scrutiny that Ankara's announcement largely obscured.

This parliamentary dimension is a reminder that American foreign policy, even under a presidency that favors rapid unilateral action, remains framed by institutional mechanisms that can slow down, or in some cases block, decisions announced with confidence at an international summit.

Possible bipartisan opposition on this specific file

What makes this file particularly delicate is that it could generate opposition transcending the usual partisan divides in Washington. National-security concerns tied to the presence of the S-400, combined with the sensitivity of the Israeli question, give lawmakers of very different persuasions grounds to slow down or strictly condition this reintegration.

This internal American political configuration adds another layer of uncertainty to a file already complicated by the technical and diplomatic obstacles noted above. Nothing guarantees, at this stage, that the presidential will displayed in Ankara will find a quick and unconditional legislative translation.

I continue to believe one must distinguish presidential rhetoric from the action of the American state as a whole. Congress is not a mere bystander in this story, and its role could prove decisive in turning, or not turning, this announcement into a lasting reality.

The broader Ukrainian front context that dominated the summit

A war that keeps dictating the Alliance's agenda

It would be a mistake to treat the Turkish F-35 file as a subject isolated from the rest of the Ankara summit. The entire week was punctuated by Ukrainian urgency: the 268 clashes recorded on the front on July 9, the particularly intense fighting around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, and Ukrainian drone strikes reaching deep into Russian territory, as far as the Syzran refinery in the Samara region, struck for the third time in 2026.

This wartime backdrop gives a different meaning to every decision made in Ankara, including the one concerning Turkey. Every gesture, every promise, every reintegration fits into a logic of general Western mobilization against a Russia that continues its offensive, four years after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Turkey, an ambiguous bridge between two worlds

Turkey occupies a singular position in this war: a NATO member, it supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar drones that became emblematic in the invasion's earliest months, while maintaining constant dialogue with Moscow and refusing, unlike other Allies, to impose full sanctions on Russia. This calculated ambiguity makes Ankara a partner both useful and unpredictable for the entire Western coalition.

It is precisely this ambiguity that makes the Turkish F-35 question so revealing of the real state of Western unity in 2026: an Alliance capable of mobilizing colossal sums for Ukraine, yet still having to deal with members who refuse to clearly choose sides between the West and a form of active neutrality toward Moscow.

Turkey supplied decisive drones to Ukraine while remaining one of the rare diplomatic bridges to Moscow, and it is this openly held contradiction that makes it both indispensable and frustrating for the rest of the Alliance.

What Zelensky and Kyiv take away from this summit

A Turkish file seen as secondary from Kyiv

For Ukraine, the heart of the Ankara summit is not the Turkish F-35 file, but the financial commitments and the still-vague promise of a Patriot coproduction license. Volodymyr Zelensky, whose actions since 2022 continue to deserve respect for the resistance he embodies against Russian aggression, focused his public statements on the urgency of air defense, as Kyiv keeps absorbing massive missile and drone strikes.

This difference in priority between the Turkish and Ukrainian files illustrates how the same summit can produce radically different readings depending on which capital is observing it. What constitutes, for Ankara, a major diplomatic win remains, for Kyiv, a wholly peripheral subject compared to the vital urgency of defending its civilian population.

An Alliance that must manage several simultaneous priorities

This multiplicity of files, handled at the same summit, reveals the growing complexity of NATO's diplomacy in 2026: managing simultaneously an existential war for Ukraine, a bilateral American-Turkish reconciliation over armaments, and persistent tensions between Alliance members on distinct regional files. None of these files can be handled in isolation without accounting for its effect on the others.

It is this simultaneous, often contradictory management that now defines Western diplomatic work in the face of a Russia that, for its part, pursues a single, constant objective since 2022: break Ukrainian resistance and fragment Western unity by every means available, including by exploiting precisely this kind of parallel file.

I continue to think Zelensky is right to keep his focus on what matters most, his country's survival, rather than letting himself be distracted by side files, even symbolically important ones like the Turkish F-35.

The possible scenarios for the coming months

A bogging-down scenario, the most likely in the short term

The most plausible scenario, given the obstacles identified, remains a gradual stalling of the file: technical discussions that drag on, Congress hearings that slow the timeline, Israeli opposition that does not weaken, and an S-400 question that stays without a clear answer for months, if not years. This scenario matches the pattern observed on other arms files announced with fanfare at international summits, before getting bogged down in the usual bureaucratic machinery.

In that case, Trump's announcement in Ankara will remain mostly a political symbol, useful in the short term for Erdoğan and for staging Western unity, but without a quick, concrete translation onto the tarmac of Turkish air bases.

A fast breakthrough scenario, less likely but not ruled out

Conversely, if Trump decides to make this file a personal priority, as he has done on other subjects where his will allowed him to bypass usual institutional blockages, a faster resolution cannot be excluded. That would nonetheless require a negotiated solution on the S-400, at least a partial easing of tensions with Israel, and cooperation from Congress that remains, at this stage, hypothetical.

Between these two scenarios, analytical caution dictates treating the first as the most likely, without entirely ruling out the possibility that sustained presidential will, if it holds over time, ends up forcing a faster outcome than the institutional obstacles alone would suggest.

I never bet against Trump's ability to upend an institutional timeline when he makes it a personal priority. But I also do not bet on his consistency over time, given how quickly his agenda shifts priorities from one week to the next.

Conclusion: a file that tests the Western word as much as Turkish diplomacy

What this affair reveals, beyond the fighter jet itself

The announced reintegration of Turkey into the F-35 program is never simply a matter of military aircraft. It questions the coherence of Western sanctions, the solidity of commitments made within NATO, and the West's ability to hold a firm line with partners who, like Turkey, play on several boards simultaneously. This file, however technical it may appear, is a credibility test for the entire Western sanctions system.

The context of the summit, dominated by the war in Ukraine and the urgency of Kyiv's air defense, reminds us that every decision made in Ankara must be measured by its effect on Western unity against Vladimir Putin, whose army continues to bomb Ukrainian cities while the Allies negotiate related files.

Necessary vigilance rather than premature enthusiasm

It would be unwise to celebrate this reintegration as a diplomatic victory already secured, when so many legal, technical, and diplomatic obstacles remain unresolved. Caution demands following this file with the same rigor applied to tracking the Patriot promise made to Ukraine the same day: words spoken in Ankara guarantee nothing about rapid implementation on the ground.

What this Turkish F-35 file ultimately teaches is that summit diplomacy, however spectacular, never replaces the patient work of resolving concrete obstacles. The West will need both, political boldness and institutional rigor, to turn Ankara's announcements into lasting gains against a Russia that, for its part, shrinks from no contradiction in its effort to weaken its adversaries.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

What I know and what I do not know

I know that on July 8, 2026, at the NATO summit in Ankara, Donald Trump publicly raised the prospect of reintegrating Turkey into the F-35 program, seven years after its 2019 exclusion over the purchase of the Russian S-400 system ([The Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/inside-nato-summit-ankara-ukraine-iran-and-turkeys-f-35-bid)). I know that Israel publicly opposed this prospect, and that national-security concerns have already been raised in Washington regarding the coexistence of the S-400 and the F-35 on Turkish soil.

I do not know whether this reintegration will be formally enacted in the coming months, nor what precise conditions will be imposed on Ankara regarding the fate of its Russian air defense system. I also do not know how the American Congress will handle this file in detail. I would rather admit that clearly than speculate beyond what the sources allow us to establish today.

Method

This editorial draws on the analysis published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on July 8, 2026, on official NATO documents relating to the Ankara declaration, and on coverage of the summit by several Western media outlets on July 7 and 8, 2026. No scene has been invented, no direct testimony is claimed.

My editorial angle is openly stated: I consider the pro-Western, pro-Ukrainian line the only coherent one against Russian aggression, while refusing to give in to easy enthusiasm over spectacular announcements whose implementation remains, at this stage, uncertain.

Sources

Primary sources

Joint press conference of the NATO Ankara summit — NATO, July 8, 2026

Russian offensive campaign assessment, July 8 — Institute for the Study of War, July 8, 2026

The industrial context of the Patriot license announced at the same summit — Euromaidan Press, July 10, 2026

Secondary sources

Analysis of the Ankara summit on Ukraine, Iran, and Turkey's F-35 bid — The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, July 8, 2026

Trump reintegrates Turkey despite the S-400 issue — Meta-Defense.fr, July 9, 2026

NATO pledges 70 billion euros for Ukraine — Al Jazeera, July 8, 2026

Allies pledge 80 billion dollars in aid to Ukraine — Janes, July 9, 2026