DECODING: Trump wants shipowners paid with Iran's frozen billions

One hundred billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets: that is the sum Donald Trump proposed using to reimburse shipowners hit by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, according to an announcement made on July 24, 2026 on Truth Social and relayed by the Syrian news agency SANA. The American president's phrasing left no room for ambiguity: "all damages caused to ships, cargoes, or anything related, will be paid with the Iranian money the United States holds and controls." Tehran answered with a direct threat, and the tension resurfaced four days later, on July 28, during the meeting between Trump and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, reported by the Washington Times.

Iranian military spokesman Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaqari warned, via the IRNA agency, that Iran would bar passage through the Strait of Hormuz to any company or country that accepted compensation funded by these frozen assets. The threat targets Washington's proposed mechanism directly, and it places every shipowner caught in this crisis in front of a choice: take the American money and risk exclusion from Hormuz, or refuse and keep absorbing losses. A compensation plan that turns into a retaliation weapon is no longer compensation. It is a new front.

This proposal comes amid massive losses for international shipping. According to an Allianz estimate cited by CNN on July 10, roughly 1,150 cargo ships, worth a combined 125 billion dollars, sat idle in the Persian Gulf. The scale of that figure gives a sense of the problem Trump claims to solve with frozen funds — and of the scale of the Iranian response it could trigger.

The Trump plan: a numbered promise, a vague mechanism

One hundred billion dollars, an announcement with no published legal framework

Trump's initial announcement, posted July 24 on Truth Social and relayed by SANA, cites a precise figure: at least one hundred billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets would be mobilized to compensate shipowners. No implementing decree, no statute, no court ruling accompanies this statement as of July 28. It is a political announcement, made on a social network, not a confirmed operational mechanism backed by any independent financial or judicial authority.

The legal feasibility of this operation — using frozen sovereign assets to compensate private companies — remains, according to the sources reviewed, unvalidated. No American court, no Treasury agency has published an execution framework. Washington promises. Nobody confirms.

A public repeat on July 28, at the White House

The subject did not disappear after the initial announcement. According to the Washington Times, the frozen-assets question resurfaced during the July 28 meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, against a broader backdrop marked by suspended strikes on Iran and disagreement over the "Pickaxe Mountain" nuclear site. The fact that this financial matter returned in a meeting devoted mainly to nuclear and regional security issues shows how tightly the two tracks — military and economic — are now intertwined in the American pressure strategy.

This continuity, four days after the initial announcement, confirms that the plan is not an isolated statement but a political line the Trump administration intends to keep repeating publicly, even without any implementing text. Repeating a promise does not make it truer. It only makes it harder to withdraw without losing face.

The Iranian response: closing Hormuz to whoever takes the money

Zolfaqari draws an economic red line

Colonel Zolfaqari's response, relayed by the IRNA agency, does not stop at denouncing the American plan: it sets a precise operational consequence. Any company or country accepting compensation funded by the frozen assets would be barred from passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The threat turns an abstract financial dispute into an immediate logistical risk for any shipowner tempted by American money.

This Iranian stance adds to a series of similar hardline gestures documented the same week, notably threats directed at Ukraine after a strike on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea. Tehran systematically responds with threats of targeted retaliation rather than direct negotiation. The regime, according to these repeated statements, leaves no action unanswered.

A double-edged squeeze for shipowners

For a shipowner whose vessel remains stranded in the Gulf, the situation becomes a concrete dilemma. Refusing the American money means continuing to absorb losses collectively estimated at 125 billion dollars according to Allianz. Accepting it means risking a transit ban in one of the world's most strategic waterways. Neither option offers full security, which partly explains why shipping traffic through the strait remains, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence, down roughly 90% year over year.

This situation illustrates a broader dynamic of this crisis: every gesture meant to ease one side's economic losses becomes, for the other side, a new lever of pressure. Hormuz closes. Hormuz reopens. Hormuz closes again, depending on who cashed which check.

The scale of the maritime blockage this plan tries to offset

Collapsed traffic, numbers that do not lie

Lloyd's List Intelligence data for the week of July 13-19 shows a measurable collapse in non-Iranian traffic through the Strait of Hormuz: 25 transits, against 108 the previous week. Inbound traffic fell to eight vessels, from forty-three before. Tanker transits collapsed to thirty-nine, from eighty-five, and very large crude carrier (VLCC) movements dropped to nine, from thirty-five.

The Straits Daily Brief report of July 27 cites even more recent PortWatch data: fifteen daily transits against a pre-crisis baseline of eighty-eight transits per day. Six hundred seventy-five vessel arrivals were recorded in 24 hours, of which four hundred sixty were at anchor or stopped. It is against this backdrop of logistical paralysis that Trump's compensation plan takes on its full economic meaning — and its full political fragility.

What Tehran disputes in this same account

Iranian diplomatic spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stated on July 27 that "the situation in the Strait of Hormuz has not changed; it remains closed." This statement directly contradicts the Lloyd's List data, which shows sharply reduced but not entirely zero traffic. The divergence between the two accounts — total closure claimed by Tehran, partial collapse measured by commercial data — must be kept explicit, without artificially siding with either version.

This contradiction is not a technical detail. It directly determines how many shipowners are actually affected by the American compensation plan: if the strait is not fully closed, some vessels keep transiting and may not need compensation, while others remain stranded with no alternative.

The insurance bill, the real immediate cost

Premiums that exploded before Trump's announcement

Long before the July 24 announcement on frozen assets, the real cost of sailing through the region had already climbed dramatically. According to an S&P Global report cited by Al Jazeera, the war-risk premium for Hormuz now reaches between 7.5% and 10% of a vessel's hull value, up from 1% to 3% before. Insuring a 270,000-tonne tanker now costs roughly 21 million dollars, according to Marcus Baker, global head of marine insurance at Marsh, cited by the same source.

The shipping cost from the Gulf to China for a 270,000-tonne cargo reaches 77.96 dollars per tonne, up from 73.80 dollars before Monday, roughly four times the five-year average of 18.91 dollars per tonne. These figures, more than the political headlines, determine whether exposed shipping companies survive economically.

What Trump's plan does not cover

None of the sources reviewed specify whether the hundred billion dollars mentioned by Trump would also cover these insurance surcharges, or only the direct damage suffered by attacked ships and cargoes. This grey area leaves open the question of whether the plan would actually match the scale of the financial problem documented by Insurance Journal and Al Jazeera, or only its most visible slice.

A war-risk insurance industry source, cited by Reuters in early July regarding an earlier context, put it bluntly: "Someone will cover you, but probably at five percent minimum." Five percent of a ship's value, every voyage. No check from Washington makes that arithmetic disappear.

One piece of a larger diplomatic puzzle

A fragile military pause in the background

The compensation plan lands amid a fragile military pause between the United States and Iran. According to Euronews, the night of July 26 into 27 marked the third consecutive night without an American strike, following thirteen straight nights of strikes. American ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz summarized Washington's position on CBS Face the Nation: "He's giving diplomacy a chance," while warning that "additional military assets are arriving in the region."

This pause remains fragile. According to Townhall, citing a CENTCOM statement, Iran reportedly fired ballistic missiles at an American base in Jordan on July 28 at 5:45 p.m. Eastern time — the very day of the Trump-Netanyahu meeting. All missiles were reportedly intercepted, according to CENTCOM, but the episode shows that diplomacy and military threat are advancing in parallel, not in sequence.

A financial file that cannot be isolated from the rest

Treating Trump's compensation plan as a purely economic gesture would mean ignoring the context in which it was formulated. It is one piece among several — military pause, Omani proposals for Hormuz, tensions over the nuclear program — in a multi-layered negotiation where each side seeks to shift the financial and symbolic weight of the conflict onto the other. None of these pieces work in isolation.

You do not compensate a shipowner without, at the same time, sending a signal to Tehran. Every promised check is also a statement.

The Oman precedent: another path for Hormuz

A proposal modeled on the Strait of Malacca

While Washington talks financial compensation, Oman is offering a different structural solution. According to Reuters, Oman presented Iranian officials, over the weekend of July 25-26, with a proposal for joint regional management of the Strait of Hormuz, modeled on the Strait of Malacca, where Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore share traffic management. Under this proposal, shipping companies would voluntarily contribute to a fund dedicated to navigation, environmental protection and search-and-rescue — without Iran holding exclusive control.

Gulf states insist that no mandatory toll be paid to Iran under this mechanism. This requirement reflects lingering distrust toward any solution that would hand Tehran an additional financial lever over regional shipping traffic. A shared fund is not a gift to Tehran. It is a way of stripping it of its monopoly on leverage.

The IMO sidelined, a contested legal authority

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has explicitly stated it is not involved in these bilateral talks, even though it established Hormuz's recognized shipping lanes back in 1968. An IMO spokesperson, cited by Reuters, noted that "any proposal for new shipping routes or traffic management measures should be submitted to the IMO for review by member states." This sidelining of a recognized international authority by an Oman-Iran bilateral deal raises a legitimacy question that goes beyond the financial scope of the Trump plan alone.

The coexistence of two competing approaches — unilateral American compensation on one side, an Omani regional mechanism on the other — shows that no actor currently holds an uncontested legal framework for resolving the Hormuz crisis.

Tehran denies any negotiation through Oman

"It's not in our DNA," says Baghaei

Iranian diplomatic spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei explicitly denied, on July 27, that the talks with Oman amount to a negotiation with or through the United States. His phrasing left no room for diplomatic ambiguity: "negotiations with the United States are not in our DNA." Baghaei also accused certain Gulf countries of being "involved in the American war against Iran," an accusation that further complicates any regional mediation, including Oman's.

This official posture contrasts with the more optimistic framing from Reuters and from Trump himself, who spoke of "good talks" with Iran. The gap between the two narratives — an ongoing dialogue on the Western side, a categorical refusal on the Iranian side — must be preserved without artificial arbitration between the two versions.

Diplomatic theater or a calculated double game

Iran claims, according to Anadolu, to still be exchanging messages with Washington while judging the conditions for genuine talks absent. This wording allows Tehran to maintain a communication channel without publicly acknowledging a negotiation, giving both sides political room to maneuver in case the discussions later fail or succeed. Talking without negotiating, denying without breaking off: Tehran always keeps a door ajar behind the closed one.

Denying a negotiation while exchanging messages is not a contradiction. It is a strategy that refuses to pay the political price of an admission. The result stays the same for shipowners: no certainty on the outcome.

Documented precedents of Iranian retaliation

American and allied bases already targeted

Zolfaqari's threat over the frozen assets did not come out of nowhere. According to Euronews, previous Iranian retaliation, before the late-July pause, had hit American and allied bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. This list of earlier targets gives a concrete sense of what Tehran considers legitimate pressure levers when it believes it has suffered harm. Five countries targeted in a few months. That list does not grow by accident.

The July 28 ballistic missile launch against a base in Jordan, reported by CENTCOM via Townhall, fits directly into this continuity — the first attack of this kind since Trump's decision to suspend strikes, according to Axios's Barak Ravid cited on X. Only a single chain of sources reports this episode at this stage; no additional independent confirmation had been obtained at the time of writing.

The link to the Ukrainian strike in the Caspian Sea

The logic of targeted retaliation also shows in Iran's reaction to a Ukrainian strike on a vessel in the Caspian Sea, announced July 25. Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi called the strike "baseless and illegal," adding that it "could not go unanswered." Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of the Iranian parliament's national security committee, warned that "Ukraine too may soon understand that Iran never leaves an action unanswered."

These repeated statements, in different contexts — Hormuz, the Caspian, regional bases — sketch a consistent behavioral pattern: Tehran systematically responds with a threat of retaliation, proportionate or disproportionate, never with silence. None of the threats listed in this account has yet materialized into independently confirmed action as of July 28.

What Kyiv and Washington have in common on this file

Sybiha explicitly ties Iran to the war in Ukraine

Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha stated, according to the Washington Times, that "the Tehran regime is a direct accomplice in Russian aggression against Ukraine, fueling Moscow's criminal war with weapons that have killed Ukrainians since 2022." This accusation, made within the same time frame as the frozen-assets crisis, explicitly links the Iranian Gulf file to the war in Ukraine.

A bipartisan Russia sanctions bill in the American Senate, honoring the memory of Senator Lindsey Graham, explicitly cites "the Iranian regime's capacity to support terrorism and advance its nuclear program," formally linking the Russian and Iranian files in a single piece of legislation. This legislative link gives extra institutional weight to the argument that pressure on Iran and pressure on Russia now follow a single Western strategic logic.

A convergence of interests, not a formal alliance

It would be excessive to present this convergence of rhetoric — Kyiv accusing Iran, Washington freezing its assets, an American Senate linking the two files — as a single coordinated strategy. No source reviewed allows for the claim that explicit coordination exists between these different actors on this specific point. It is a structural observation, not proof of concerted intent.

Three capitals, three separate grievances, one name that keeps coming up: Tehran. The coincidence has started to look like a pattern.

Iran's nuclear program, the backdrop weighing on any financial negotiation

"Pickaxe Mountain," a public rift between allies

During the July 28 meeting, Trump publicly reproached Netanyahu for having revealed the existence of the underground nuclear site "Pickaxe Mountain," near Natanz: "Why couldn't you just tell me? Why did you have to tell the whole world?" This disagreement, aired in front of the press according to the Washington Times, shows that even the closest American allies on this file do not agree on how to handle sensitive information about Iran.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies identifies this site as a burial location where Iran would be rebuilding nuclear capabilities, an assessment supported by satellite images showing tunnel work in late June 2026 — despite the status-quo commitment made in the June 17 memorandum of understanding. A tunnel that keeps being dug after a status-quo promise is not a negotiation in good faith. No independent IAEA confirmation of this specific site had been obtained, since the agency has had no access to Iranian nuclear sites since the 2025 strikes.

Why this nuclear backdrop complicates the financial file

Trump's compensation plan cannot be analyzed in isolation from a context where trust between allies on nuclear intelligence matters is itself publicly strained. If Washington and Israel show open disagreement over what to say or withhold about Iran, the credibility of a unilateral American financial plan aimed at Tehran is inevitably affected in the eyes of other regional actors.

This coordination fragility among Western allies is, in the background, a factor that could limit the effectiveness of any economic pressure on Iran, however precisely numbered and publicized it may be. Two allies arguing in front of cameras do not inspire confidence in a third one watching from a distance.

Markets already reacted, before the plan was even implemented

Oil drops on hopes of de-escalation

According to Reuters, relayed by WTVB, Brent crude fell 4.61 dollars, or 5.2%, to 83.75 dollars a barrel on July 28 at 12:01 p.m. Eastern time. WTI followed a similar path, falling 4.06 dollars, or 4.9%, to 78.55 dollars. This decline is directly attributed by Reuters to hopes of de-escalation in the US-Iran conflict following the pause in strikes — not to the compensation plan itself, which has no established direct link to this market movement in the sources reviewed.

Argaam reported, at 9:59 a.m. Mecca time, Brent at 86.07 dollars (-2.60%) and WTI at 80.79 dollars (-2.20%) — a gap with the Reuters figures explained by different reading times within the same trading day. This intraday volatility illustrates how sensitive this market remains to every signal, including those unrelated to the frozen assets themselves.

A fragility that renewed hostilities could reverse

That same July 28 saw the ballistic missile launch by Iran against the American base in Jordan, reported by CENTCOM. This single fact is enough to show how much the drop in oil prices rests on a fragile hope rather than a settled outcome. Nothing in the available sources guarantees this downward trend will hold beyond a few days.

Oil dropped five percent in one morning. One intercepted missile would be enough to reverse it all overnight.

What this file reveals about Washington's economic strategy

Using frozen money as a pressure tool, not just repair

Trump's compensation plan is not limited to a humanitarian or commercial gesture toward wronged shipowners. By making public its intention to use frozen Iranian assets, Washington simultaneously sends a signal to Tehran: these funds, frozen for years, can be mobilized unilaterally, without prior negotiation with Iran over their use. This unilateral gesture is itself a form of economic pressure distinct from any conventional sanction.

Tehran's immediate response — threatening to close Hormuz to anyone who accepts this money — confirms that Iran perceived this plan as an act of pressure more than a simple commercial repair measure. Both sides are treating this financial file as an extension of the conflict, not as a strictly economic question.

A test for the credibility of American financial diplomacy

If Washington fails to demonstrate, in the weeks following this announcement, a concrete legal framework for unlocking these funds, Trump's plan risks becoming one more example of a political promise with no operational follow-through — a pattern already observed on other files in this conflict, such as the Patriot manufacturing license floated for Ukraine at the NATO summit in July. The gap between an announcement and an execution remains, on this file as on others, the most uncertain variable.

The shipowners affected, meanwhile, keep absorbing losses counted in tens of billions of dollars while this debate continues across social media and diplomatic statements. No vessel has, to date, been formally compensated under this mechanism according to available sources.

What Gulf allies actually expect from Washington

American pressure that must reassure without provoking

Gulf states, directly exposed to Houthi and Iranian retaliation, are following this frozen-assets file with an interest that goes beyond the financial question alone. According to the same sources documenting the American naval deployment — three aircraft carriers, more than 200 aircraft and 15,000 troops according to Army Recognition — these countries want a show of force that deters without triggering a broader escalation on their own soil. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama have already been targeted by earlier Iranian retaliation, documented by Euronews.

The compensation plan, if it materializes, would give these countries an additional argument to justify aligning with Washington without having to publicly claim an offensive role in the crisis. This regional caution partly explains why the quieter Omani mediation is advancing in parallel to the more spectacular American plan.

The French withdrawal, one signal among others

The withdrawal of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, confirmed by President Macron in early July and reported by Shafaq News, illustrates another dynamic: not every Western ally maintains the same level of direct military engagement in the region. According to Maritimes Crimes, France nonetheless retains mine-warfare, escort and maritime patrol assets in place. This partial disengagement contrasts with the American buildup, leaving Washington to carry a disproportionate share of the military weight of this crisis — and, by extension, a disproportionate share of the political responsibility for the financial compensation plan.

An aircraft carrier heading home is not desertion. It is a quiet admission that not everyone calculates the same risk.

One hundred billion dollars promised, zero dollars paid to date, and an Iranian threat already issued against anyone who touches that money: that is the real state of this file as of July 28, 2026. Trump made a numbered announcement on a social network. Tehran answered with an operational red line. Between the two, 1,150 vessels remain stranded in the Gulf and traffic through Hormuz remains down roughly 90% according to Lloyd's List Intelligence.

What this text can state with certainty is that this plan has, at this stage, no published execution framework, no judicial validation, and an Iranian counter-move already on the table before it has even been implemented. What remains to be proven is whether Washington will follow through on a promise this political and this legally fragile — and whether Tehran will actually carry out its threat the day a shipowner cashes that first check. A hundred-billion-dollar promise is, for now, worth only what a social media post is worth. That is not much, against a strait that remains half closed.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's Transparency box

Editorial positioning

This analysis is written from an acknowledged angle, pro-Western, which guides the choice of subject and the priority given to established American and Western sources documenting this financial file. This positioning is a declared editorial choice, not a claim to absolute neutrality. It implies no fixed categorization of any real person cited in this text as a settled fact: every named actor, whether American, Iranian or Israeli, is presented through his attributed statements and reported actions, never through a moral judgment presented as definitive truth. Any accusation made by one side against the other is reported conditionally with explicit attribution, respecting the presumption of innocence for anyone named.

Methodology and sources

This analysis relies on Donald Trump's initial announcement relayed by the Syrian agency SANA on July 24, 2026, and on its repetition during the July 28 meeting documented by the Washington Times, as primary sources for the frozen-assets file. This data was contextualized using established secondary sources — Reuters, CNN, Al Jazeera, Insurance Journal and Euronews — for everything concerning the scale of the maritime blockage, insurance costs and the broader diplomatic context. Each figure has been explicitly attributed to its source; where information came from only a single chain of sources, such as the July 28 missile launch reported via Townhall, that limit was flagged in the text rather than smoothed over.

Nature of the analysis

This text distinguishes three categories of information: corroborated facts confirmed by at least two independent sources or verifiable official data; statements reported by a single party to the conflict or a single outlet, presented with explicit attribution and no implicit validation; and the columnist's personal analysis, clearly identified as such by its tone and wording, which reflects only his judgment on the significance of reported facts, never on the intrinsic morality of any person named in this text.

Sources

Primary sources

SANA — Trump announces use of frozen Iranian assets to compensate shipowners — July 24, 2026

Washington Times — Trump meets Netanyahu, wars drag on — July 28, 2026

CNN — Allianz estimate on ships stranded in the Persian Gulf — July 10, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters — Oman proposes a regional mechanism for Hormuz — July 28, 2026

Al Jazeera — Marine insurance premiums climb as Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb shut down — July 23, 2026

Insurance Journal — Marine insurance premiums rise in the Red Sea — July 23, 2026

Euronews — A third night without strikes between the United States and Iran — July 27, 2026

Townhall — CENTCOM announces interception of Iranian missiles targeting an American base — July 28, 2026

Lloyd's List Intelligence — Collapse of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — July 21, 2026