ANALYSIS: The stabilization force meant to secure Gaza without fighting

Introduction: An international army with an impossible mandate

A force authorized, but still under construction

Resolution 2803, adopted by the UN Security Council on November 17, 2025, formally authorized the deployment of an International Stabilization Force, known by the acronym ISF, tasked with monitoring compliance with the ceasefire and overseeing the most sensitive commitments of the comprehensive plan for Gaza: the disarmament of Hamas and the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army. Eight months later, this force exists on paper, has a command structure and a handful of committed contingents, but remains far from the full strength originally envisioned.

The scale of the task entrusted to the ISF is considerable: it must simultaneously secure a territory devastated by years of war, train a new Palestinian police force, oversee a highly contentious disarmament process, and serve as a buffer between Israeli forces and zones transferred to the control of a transitional Palestinian administration. Rarely has a peacekeeping force had such a vast mandate with such gradually assembled means.

An American command, an international composition

Command of the ISF has been entrusted to American Major General Jasper Jeffers, appointed in January 2026, who coordinates a dedicated staff established specifically for this mission. This American command structure, though operating under a UN mandate, illustrates the central weight the United States continues to carry across the entire architecture of the peace plan, from the Board of Peace down to concrete military oversight on the ground.

Five countries initially confirmed troop commitments: Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania, while Egypt and Jordan committed to training Palestinian police forces. This heterogeneous coalition, diverse in geography and military traditions, still has to prove its operational cohesion on particularly hostile ground.

There's something both fascinating and troubling about this list of contributing countries. Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Albania — no major Western power rushed to send its own troops into this quagmire. We support Gaza in words. We outsource the physical risk to others. This isn't new in the history of peacekeeping operations, but it remains telling.

The official mandate, between ambition and calculated caution

What the ISF is authorized to do

Under the terms of resolution 2803, the ISF's mandate explicitly includes supporting demilitarization and the destruction of terrorist infrastructure, securing border areas with Israel and Egypt, protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, training a vetted Palestinian police force, and assisting the Board of Peace in the overall monitoring of the ceasefire. On paper, this mandate is surprisingly broad, almost bold in its ambition to completely transform Gaza's security environment.

The resolution even authorizes the ISF to demilitarize Gaza "by all necessary means," phrasing that, according to U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz, opens the door to the use of force if circumstances require it. This is legally consequential language that potentially sets this mission apart from classic peacekeeping operations, typically limited to self-defense.

The contradiction hanging over the ground

But in practice, several American officials have publicly insisted that the ISF "will not fight Hamas," creating a fundamental ambiguity between the resolution's legal text and the actual operational intentions communicated to contributing countries. This contradiction is not a mere rhetorical detail: it directly shapes countries' willingness to commit, with several of them — including Indonesia — explicitly specifying that their troops would be limited to humanitarian and civilian security missions, without taking part in forced disarmament operations.

A force authorized to do everything on paper, but whose most contributors refuse in advance to take on some of the riskiest tasks, in reality has only a partial mandate — a reality that considerably complicates the ISF's ability to fulfill the full set of objectives set out by the resolution that created it.

"It will demilitarize by all necessary means, but it will not fight Hamas." You have to read that sentence twice to grasp the scale of the contradiction it contains. This is the kind of diplomatic language that lets everyone sign a text without ever agreeing on what it actually means on the ground.

The phased deployment, sector by sector

Rafah, the symbolic starting point

In line with the plan presented by General Jeffers, the ISF's deployment began in the Rafah sector, in southern Gaza, chosen as an entry point because of its relative stability compared to other areas of the territory. The medium-term goal is to gradually extend the ISF's presence sector by sector, eventually covering five sectors, each set to receive a dedicated brigade of the international force.

The ISF command's stated final target is to reach a strength of 20,000 soldiers and 12,000 trained Palestinian police officers, a considerable figure that, if reached, would represent one of the largest international stabilization operations of recent decades. But between announcing that target and actually achieving it, the road remains long, littered with political and logistical obstacles that slow every stage of the deployment.

A timeline that disappoints initial expectations

Early estimates, made in early 2026, projected a full deployment of the first contingents by spring 2026. That timeline has been revised repeatedly, with some officials now speaking of a more substantial deployment spread over several additional months. These successive delays, documented in several defense-focused outlets, illustrate the difficulty of coordinating so many different international actors around such an ambiguous mandate.

Every month of delay in the ISF's deployment is one more month in which the security vacuum in Gaza benefits the actors least interested in lasting stabilization — whether local armed factions or criminal networks thriving in the prolonged uncertainty of a territory still largely left to itself.

Twenty thousand soldiers, twelve thousand police officers, five sectors. These figures look reassuring on a presentation slide in Washington. On the ground in Gaza, they remain, for now, largely theoretical. The gap between the PowerPoint and the reality of deployment, in this file as in so many others, is measured in human lives waiting for a security that is slow to arrive.

Israel's rejection of certain contributors, Turkey in particular

Ankara sidelined despite its troop offer

Turkey, which had declared itself ready to send troops as part of the ISF, saw its participation explicitly ruled out under pressure from the Israeli government, which views Ankara as too close to Hamas to play a neutral stabilizing role. This exclusion has created persistent diplomatic friction between the United States, which would have liked to include Turkey given its regional weight, and Israel, which has maintained firm opposition on this specific point.

Turkish security sources have indicated they are "ready and waiting" for a green light to deploy their troops, adding that Washington has been pressuring Israel to accept their participation — without success so far. This situation illustrates the limits of American influence when it runs into a clearly established Israeli security red line.

Other regional powers stay on the sidelines

Beyond Turkey, several other countries initially approached to contribute to the ISF ultimately declined or delayed their commitment. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, despite substantial financial contributions to the reconstruction process, have not confirmed any troop commitment on the ground. Azerbaijan, initially cited as a potential contributor, also withdrew from the process according to several analyses specializing in regional defense affairs.

This widespread reluctance among several regional powers to send actual troops reveals a shared strategic caution: nobody wants to expose themselves to the risks of a mission whose mandate remains legally ambiguous and politically explosive, caught between Israel's contradictory demands and Hamas's expectations.

We often measure international commitment by the billions pledged at funding conferences. We should also measure it by the number of soldiers actually sent onto dangerous ground. On that second measure, many major powers who claim to care about Gaza's stability have preferred to stay cautiously at a distance.

Indonesia, the coalition's unexpected pillar

A disproportionate commitment for Jakarta

Among all the contributors, Indonesia stands out for the scale of its announced commitment, with up to 8,000 personnel potentially deployable, and a possible appointment as deputy commander of the ISF under General Jeffers's authority. For Jakarta, this commitment represents a mobilization seven times greater than its entire current presence in peacekeeping operations worldwide — a considerable political and logistical bet for the world's largest Muslim democracy.

Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin nonetheless took care to publicly specify that Indonesian troops would focus strictly on humanitarian missions — health services, reconstruction, protection of Palestinian civilians — rather than on disarmament operations against armed groups. This clarification, partly meant to reassure Indonesia's majority-Muslim public opinion, which is sensitive to the Palestinian cause, illustrates the domestic political tensions every contributing country must manage.

A diplomacy of prestige as much as conviction

Indonesia's massive commitment to the ISF also fits into a broader strategy of international diplomacy, aimed at strengthening Jakarta's status as an essential actor on major multilateral causes, while consolidating its relations with the Western and Arab capitals backing the peace plan. This military generosity is never entirely disinterested, as is generally the case in major international stabilization operations throughout recent history.

Still, whatever the underlying motivations, the concrete commitment of thousands of Indonesian soldiers represents one of the few tangible examples of effective implementation of resolution 2803 on the ground, at a time when many other commitments remain purely declaratory.

I won't pretend to know the exact motivations of the Indonesian government. But I note, with genuine respect, that Jakarta has done what many other capitals closer to the file have avoided doing: actually sending troops, not just statements of support.

Funding, between billions promised and money actually disbursed

Considerable financial commitments at launch

At the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington in February 2026, about forty countries attended the presentation of the funding plan, with combined pledges nearing 17 billion dollars for the entire stabilization and reconstruction process in Gaza. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Morocco, Uzbekistan, and Kuwait are among the main financial contributors announced, alongside a direct American commitment of ten billion dollars.

These figures, impressive on paper, remain nonetheless far below the total estimated needs for Gaza's reconstruction, assessed at around seventy billion dollars by several international organizations. The gap between actual needs and current financial commitments remains considerable, a recurring problem in this type of large international operation, where the enthusiasm of announcements collides, over time, with the reality of actual disbursements.

The conditional link between money and disarmament

Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly tied financial reconstruction to the complete disarmament of Hamas, a position that mechanically slows the disbursement of promised funds as long as the security question remains stuck. This conditional link, consistent with the overall logic of the peace plan, nonetheless creates a frustrating paradox: the funds needed to durably stabilize Gaza remain suspended precisely because of the security instability those same funds could help resolve.

This may be the most frustrating vicious circle in this entire file: without security, no reconstruction; without reconstruction, no sufficient economic incentive to convince part of Gaza's population to definitively abandon the logic of armed resistance that has fueled decades of conflict.

Seventeen billion announced, seventy billion needed. Placed side by side, these figures tell a story that official communiqués prefer to soften: the international generosity displayed in Washington remains, for now, at less than a quarter of what would actually be needed to rebuild Gaza durably.

Training the Palestinian police, the civilian backbone of the plan

Two thousand candidates within hours

Alongside the ISF's military deployment, the Board of Peace launched a recruitment process for a transitional Palestinian police force, an element Nickolay Mladenov has presented as just as essential as the plan's military component. According to official announcements, about two thousand candidates registered within just a few hours of recruitment opening, an encouraging signal about the availability of a local workforce ready to join this stabilization process, despite the obvious risks associated with this type of role in a territory still largely unstable.

Training these recruits is to take place mainly in Egypt, with additional support from Jordan, two countries with significant historical experience training regional security forces. This police force, once operational, is meant to gradually replace the informal security structures that proliferated in Gaza during the war years, including those directly tied to Hamas.

The challenge of vetting and loyalty

The main challenge of this recruitment remains background vetting of each candidate, to ensure that no former Hamas fighter or member of other armed factions infiltrates this new force meant to embody a break from previous power structures. This vetting process, carried out in coordination with intelligence services from several partner countries, necessarily slows the pace at which the force is built, but is considered non-negotiable by all parties involved in the process.

A local police force seen as legitimate by Gaza's population is arguably just as important, in the long run, as the presence of thousands of foreign soldiers — because it will be the one responsible, once the ISF partially withdraws, for ensuring the daily security of a territory that above all longs to regain some form of normalcy after years of uninterrupted conflict.

We talk a lot about foreign soldiers, military budgets, international contingents. We talk much less about those two thousand Palestinians who signed up within hours to become police officers in their own territory. They may well be, in the end, the ones who carry the real weight of Gaza's lasting stabilization, long after the international cameras have turned their attention elsewhere.

Expert skepticism, a force without clear consensus

Analysts who doubt full feasibility

Several research centers specializing in Middle East security issues have expressed marked skepticism about the ISF's real ability to fulfill its entire mandate. According to an analysis published by the Institute for National Security Studies, it is unlikely that the force can compel Hamas's disarmament without a clear combat mandate, a reality most contributing countries explicitly refused to take on from the outset.

The same analysis notes it would be more realistic, at this stage, to limit ISF operations to areas where Hamas has no military presence, a cautious approach that, while reducing risks to international troops, also leaves untouched the most security-problematic areas — precisely those where intervention would be most needed to truly advance the demilitarization process.

Doubt looming over the force's very existence in the long run

Other analyses, notably those published by the Global Policy Journal, go further, questioning the long-term viability of the ISF concept itself, in a context where neither Hamas nor Israel has fully consented to the exact parameters of the mission. A stabilization force that does not enjoy the full trust of the two parties it is meant to separate risks becoming, in time, a symbol of failure rather than an instrument of peace — a risk several diplomats now openly acknowledge, even as they continue to publicly defend the project.

For now, neither extreme scenario — complete success or total failure — has materialized. The ISF exists, progresses slowly, but has not yet demonstrated its ability to fulfill the entirety of the ambitious mandate given to it by resolution 2803 eight months ago.

People sometimes ask me if I believe this force will succeed. My honest answer: I don't know, and I think no one truly knows at this stage, including those commanding it. What worries me isn't the uncertainty itself — it's the polite silence surrounding it in official communiqués.

Conclusion: A necessary force, still far from sufficient

What the ISF has accomplished despite it all

Despite all its limitations, the ISF's very existence marks a notable step forward compared to the total absence of any international security mechanism that prevailed before the adoption of resolution 2803. The initial deployment in the Rafah sector, the ongoing training of Palestinian police forces in Egypt and Jordan, and the concrete commitment of several thousand soldiers represent real, verifiable steps, even if they remain well below the initially announced targets.

An imperfect force that exists and progresses remains preferable to the total absence of any international mechanism in such a fragile territory. That may be the most honest way to sum up these first eight months of the ISF's existence: real but fragile progress, still far from the ambition displayed by its architects in Washington.

The decisive test of the coming months

The ISF's future will depend largely on mediators' ability to resolve the fundamental ambiguity of its mandate: a force authorized to demilitarize Gaza by all necessary means, but whose contributors mostly refuse to take on direct combat missions against Hamas. Without clarifying this contradiction, the planned expansion to the five planned sectors will likely remain as slow as the eight months that have just elapsed.

The West, in particular, must decide whether it is ready to concretely support this force beyond financial announcements, or whether it will continue delegating physical risk to countries like Indonesia, Morocco, or Kazakhstan, while reaping the diplomatic credit of a peace plan it does not fully own on the ground.

Twenty thousand soldiers promised, five confirmed to date as serious contributors, one sector out of five deployed, two thousand police officers in training. Placed side by side, these figures paint neither failure nor success. They paint a transition that is moving forward, slowly, at the pace of a distrust that refuses to disappear as quickly as official communiqués would have us believe.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial position

This analysis takes an editorial line favorable to a lasting resolution of the Gaza conflict through credible international mechanisms, while casting a critical eye on the structural ambiguities limiting the effectiveness of the International Stabilization Force. The West is called upon to make a more substantial commitment, consistent with its claim to remain central in managing major international crises. This position engages the columnist's judgment, without claiming false neutrality.

Methodology and sources

The facts reported in this analysis come from public institutional reports, notably those of the Security Council Report, as well as coverage of official announcements from the Board of Peace and the ISF command. No fact, figure, or quote has been invented. Assessments about the force's future viability remain, by nature, forward-looking and subject to revision as the file evolves.

Nature of the analysis

This text is a geopolitical analysis, not a neutral report devoid of viewpoint. The genre implies an argued interpretation of the available facts. Maxime Marquette (MadMax) is a columnist-analyst whose mission is to illuminate the news in light of documented strategic issues. Italicized passages are explicitly identified as personal opinions, distinct from the facts reported in the body of the text.

Sources

Primary sources

Monthly forecast on the Middle East, including the Palestinian question — Security Council Report, July 2026

Five countries commit troops to Gaza international security force, commander says — Reuters, February 19, 2026

Overview of the International Stabilization Force for Gaza — Wikipedia

Secondary sources

Stabilization force and funding pledged for Gaza at Board of Peace meeting — FDD's Long War Journal, February 20, 2026

The challenges of the International Stabilization Force in Gaza — Institute for National Security Studies, 2026

Indonesia's Gaza gamble: peacekeeping mission meets political reality — The Diplomat, February 13, 2026