ANALYSIS: Copenhagen fears a limited Russian strike, and Moscow decorated the Gedser commander

Ten to fifteen meters

A prediction dated the 24th

On September 24, Danish military intelligence wrote that Moscow could strike a NATO country bordering Russia “in the coming months.”

It does not speak of an invasion. It speaks of a limited attack. It even describes the likely forms.

Ten days earlier, a signal flare fired from a Russian frigate passed within 10 to 15 meters of a Danish helicopter, according to Danish Defence.

A helicopter over gray water

Ten to fifteen meters. Barely the length of a bus.

In a small helicopter over the sea, what you hear most is the rotor. You feel the cold air slipping through the door seals. You see the gray water, very close.

On the 14th, a shot. On the 24th, a prediction.

A Danish helicopter. A Russian frigate. Two signal flares.

No one was hurt. The service’s text explains why that reassures no one.

The service does not talk about what happened. It talks about what could happen.

Ten to fifteen meters, and a prediction that stops being abstract.

What the service writes

Low, but growing

The document runs to three pages, unclassified. It is dated September 24, 2026. It is public.

There is, the service writes, a “low but growing” risk that Russia will launch a limited military attack against one or more of the NATO countries on its borders.

It could happen even if the war against Ukraine continues. It could happen even if Moscow has not built the forces for a regional war.

Low. The word matters. Growing. That word matters more.

A desperate move

Such an attack would be, according to the text, a desperate move. It could come in the next few months.

Its aim: to divert European resources away from supporting Ukraine. And to sow division within NATO, if the Alliance cannot agree on a collective response.

The head of the service, Thomas Ahrenkiel, repeated those words, Euronews reports. He added that he does not expect a conventional military attack against Denmark.

The risk is for Russia’s neighbors. The lesson is for everyone.

The text supplements an assessment from February 9, 2025. That one gave timelines: about six months for a local war against a neighbor, two years for a regional war around the Baltic, five years for a large-scale war in Europe. Those timelines assumed the war in Ukraine had ended, or been frozen.

They remain valid, the service writes. The text of the 24th says something else. Even if the war goes on, the next few months count.

Low, but growing: two words, and a slope.

Three forms of attack

Strikes Moscow would blame on jamming

The service describes three possible forms.

First, isolated strikes with long-range weapons on infrastructure vital to supporting Ukraine. Moscow could then claim its weapons hit NATO territory only because Ukraine had jammed them.

Second, a false-flag operation. Russia would use Ukrainian-made drones to strike a NATO country.

The excuse would be ready in advance. So would the designated culprit.

Soldiers without insignia

Finally, a limited number of soldiers, possibly without national insignia, sent into a NATO border country.

But first, the service writes, Moscow would probably mass regular forces near the border. That would take several months. And it would be hard to hide.

According to the Kyiv Post, Ahrenkiel mentioned a possible cover story: protecting Russian-speaking minorities.

Two of the three forms blame Ukraine in advance. That observation is mine, not the service’s.

Three forms. None looks like an invasion. All of them test a response.

On that day, who will check where the drone came from?

Three scenarios, and Ukraine takes the blame in two.

Belousov’s medal

Moscow’s version

Back to September 14.

The Russian ministry claims the Danish helicopter was heading toward the ship. The Russian ministry claims it did not answer calls on an international channel. The Russian ministry claims the commander fired two flares to head off a provocation, Meduza reports.

Defense Minister Andrei Belousov awarded the ship’s commander a medal for distinction in combat.

The Russian embassy in Copenhagen, for its part, denounced Danish recklessness.

Copenhagen’s answer

On September 25, Danish Defence made an exception to its rule of operational secrecy. It published the facts, in response to Russian statements on the 24th that were sowing doubt again.

The helicopter was never closer than about 150 meters to the ship. No call was heard on the emergency frequencies, or on Channel 16, according to the command.

Two versions. Only one gives its meters.

I stand with those who take the Danish warning seriously, and with the Danish response that publishes its meters. Against the Russian decision to decorate the Gedser shot. Because the Danish service writes that Moscow would strike only if it believes the Alliance will not respond together.

The commander fired. Belousov decorated him.

A medal says what the statement leaves out.

The false flag aims at Kyiv

My reading, not the service’s

Here I leave the service’s text. What follows is my reading.

A Ukrainian-made drone falling on a NATO country would first cast doubt on Kyiv. Not on Moscow.

A tired public’s first reflex would be to demand answers from Ukraine. Support would waver before any investigation began.

That is not written in the document. It is what the document makes possible.

The service does not say who would doubt. It only says the weapon exists.

Doubt as ammunition

That is exactly the aim the service ascribes to a limited attack: turning Europe away from supporting Ukraine.

The false flag would strike twice. Once against the ally that was hit. Once against the country under attack, blamed in place of the aggressor.

And yet the counter exists. It fits in one word. Attribution.

Fast. Public. Measured.

A Ukrainian drone is not a Ukrainian signature.

A condition spelled out

No joint response, no war

The service writes a sentence every capital should reread.

Russia would probably carry out military attacks only if it judges they will not trigger a collective NATO military response.

Yet Moscow probably does not know what would trigger such a war, it adds. So there is a risk it bets on there being no joint response.

The American variable

Especially, the text specifies, if Russia judges that the United States cannot or will not back its European allies.

The variable has no proper name in the document. It has a condition.

Together. Everything else depends on it.

The allies have a tool, Article 5. The service does not say it is faltering. It says Moscow might believe it is.

According to the Kyiv Post, Ahrenkiel describes the Russian goal as a test. Would the allies respond together? Would an ambiguous attack trigger Article 5?

Who in Washington will reread that sentence?

Deterrence hangs on one word: together.

A Russia under pressure

More than at any point in the war

The service does not describe a triumphant Russia. It describes the opposite.

Moscow is under more pressure than at any other point in the war, it writes. Ukrainian long-range strikes are causing ever deeper damage inside Russia. Russian losses are heavy, for marginal gains.

The Russian economy would be on the brink of a major crisis, driven by military spending, sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on energy, according to the service.

A window before 2030

No major Russian breakthrough is in sight within six months. And it is highly unlikely that Putin will give up his fundamental goals.

Moscow believes Europe will have built a threatening independent military capability by 2030. For the Kremlin, the next few years would therefore be a window.

Hence the service’s conclusion. It is probable that Putin will seek to change the trajectory.

Pressure. Losses. Crisis. And a window.

And yet that is not reassuring. A cornered power is not a calmed power.

The more Moscow falls back in Ukraine, the more it might strike elsewhere.

A service that does not shout

The alarmism argument

The argument against this text is familiar. An intelligence service would have an interest in inflating the threat. Moscow, for its part, talks of Danish provocation.

And after all, the risk is low. Why get worked up?

The document answers for itself. It does not shout. It grades.

Under 10%

It judges an invasion of a NATO country highly unlikely, meaning under 10% on its own scale. It would take at least six months of preparation, it adds.

It specifies that its probabilities are estimates, not statistical calculations.

On its scale, a probable event sits between 60 and 90%. It uses that grade for Putin’s will to change the trajectory. It does not use it for the limited attack.

Its facts do not come from it alone. Leipzig comes from the German authorities. Gedser comes from the crew’s measurements. The medal comes from Moscow.

Dated facts. Three different sources. None of them shouts.

An alarmist service would not publish its limits. This one prints them at the bottom of the page.

Under 10% for an invasion, and that is why we believe it.

The weak link is ours

The risk remains low

Now for what costs my own camp.

The risk is low. The service says so. I am not going to inflate it. If the word means anything, the most likely outcome is still that no military attack happens in the coming months.

And the weakness the text points to is not Russian. It is Western. It is the doubt about American solidarity.

The word low has no box on the service’s scale. It chose not to put a number on it. I will not put one on it in its place.

A Europe not yet ready

The service also writes what Moscow fears: a Europe able to defend itself on its own around 2030. So it is not there yet.

In other words, the Russian window opens onto our own lateness.

That is our share. I name it.

That is true. And it does not change who signed.

The frigate was Russian. So was the medal.

Our lateness opens the window. Their medal shows the intent.

Leipzig, Gedser, the factories

A hybrid war getting worse

According to the service, Moscow has stepped up sabotage and destructive cyberattacks. According to the service, Moscow attacks targets in Europe with drones. According to the service, Russian drones and sometimes missiles have hit NATO countries bordering Ukraine.

According to the service, German authorities believe the foiled attack on Leipzig/Halle airport had been planned by Russia for several months. According to the service, Moscow now seeks to stop aid from arriving directly, by sabotaging defense companies or rail convoys.

Hybrid war no longer just aims to frighten. It targets delivery.

A factory. An airport. A convoy.

Danes approached online

On September 3, PET, the Danish security service, revealed very concrete sabotage planning against the defense industry tied to aid for Ukraine, DR reports. Ordinary Danes were reportedly approached online to photograph facilities.

Emil Græsholm, head of counterintelligence at PET, considers it extremely serious that an ordinary Dane would help Russian intelligence, according to DR.

The military service expects more frequent attacks, with graver consequences. Including sabotage with a high risk of casualties.

None of this has been tried in court. All of it is documented by state services.

Sabotage has changed its target: the delivery.

150 meters above the water

The command’s account

I come back to the ten to fifteen meters.

On September 14, the Fennec comes in at about 400 meters of altitude, at 185 km/h, visible from far off, according to Danish Defence. It slows. It descends toward the frigate Soobrazitelny, photographed the same way since 2022.

The crew is monitoring the civilian emergency frequency and the military one. Nothing. The maritime operations center does not hear the frigate call on Channel 16, the international distress channel at sea, either.

Nothing on Channel 16. Then the smoke. Then the flare.

At about 200 meters above the sea, the crew sees a trail of light smoke behind the helicopter. Then a flare fired from the ship passes within 10 or 15 meters. The aircraft is then 150 meters above the water.

Channel 16 stayed silent

The helicopter showed no threatening or provocative behavior, the pilot said, as quoted by the command.

He describes Russian conduct experienced as harassing, escalatory, and not without danger for the crew.

The reconnaissance followed the rules in force, the command specifies.

A shot, according to Copenhagen. A precaution, according to Moscow, which decorated the commander.

Between the two versions, there are measurements. On one side only.

One hundred fifty meters up, fifteen to spare, then a medal.

What Copenhagen published

An exception to secrecy

The Danish response deserves a close look.

The command does not normally share the details of a photographic reconnaissance, for operational reasons. It made an exception, it writes, because of the latest Russian statements.

It published the altitude. It published the speed. It published the distance. It published the frequencies monitored. It published the photo of the frigate.

No adjectives. Numbers.

On the evening of the 14th, its first statement ran a few lines. On the 25th, it gave everything.

A false flag lives on ambiguity. Published measurements dissolve it.

The answer to a false flag

The chief of defence, General Michael W. Hyldgaard, said he was proud of the crew’s professionalism in the face of unprofessional Russian conduct.

This is the counter I mentioned earlier. Facts, fast, in public. Against a false flag, it would be worth more than a protest.

PET made the same choice on September 3, by making a sabotage plot public.

Publishing the meters disarms the other side’s version.

The months ahead

A drone over Romania

The service speaks of the next few months. The last few days already give it material.

On the night of September 26 to 27, an unidentified aerial object, probably a Russian drone, entered Romanian airspace near Chilia Veche, according to the ISW. Two Spanish F-18s and a Romanian helicopter took off.

On the 26th, Danish police were investigating an attempted arson targeting an aircraft wing at Lolland-Falster airport. No link to Russia has been established, the institute reports.

The institute describes a Russia normalizing its violations of European airspace. One more drone. One more habit.

None of this is a limited attack in the service’s sense. All of it sets the stage.

Putin’s winter

The ISW also assesses that Putin is seeking to force Ukraine’s capitulation before the spring of 2027, through a strike campaign.

The Danish service’s coming months and Putin’s winter overlap. That connection is mine.

If the winter fails to bend Kyiv, then the desperate move Copenhagen describes…

The Danish service’s months are also Putin’s winter.

The benefit of the doubt

A fear, stated once

I confess a fear. Not of an invasion: the service judges it highly unlikely.

Of a morning when a Ukrainian-made drone falls on a Baltic train station, and we hesitate.

That morning, the first hour would count more than the first drone. It would be the hour of doubt.

At the first drone

I have no better answer than Copenhagen’s. Measure. Publish. Attribute.

Meters, frequencies, a photo. On September 25, that was enough to make the Russian version fragile.

And yet a published answer is worth something only if someone reads it.

When the first “Ukrainian” drone falls on an ally, who will you give the benefit of the doubt?

The answer is prepared beforehand. Not during.

Copenhagen fears what comes next. Belousov has already decorated the shot.

Sources:

Primary Sources:

• Danish Defence Intelligence Service — assessment of the threat from Russia, September 24, 2026
• Danish Defence Command — the facts of the Gedser incident, September 25, 2026
• Danish Defence — helicopter targeted by a Russian frigate, September 14, 2026

Secondary Sources:

• Euronews — Ahrenkiel and the low but growing risk, September 24, 2026
• Breaking Defense — the expected hybrid escalation, September 24, 2026
• Meduza — Moscow decorates the corvette’s commander, September 16, 2026