# Xi Jinping purges six more generals, shaking the PLA's chain of command

> On the evening of June 26, 2026, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress issued a terse, unexplained communiqué announcing the

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-07-05
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/xi-jinping-purge-encore-six-generaux-et-fragilise-le-commandement-de-l-apl

## Key takeaways

- The removals were announced in a terse communiqué with no official reason given; the article says this pattern has been the signature of Xi Jinping's era since 2022.
- Removed officers include Xu Xueqiang, Wang Kangping, Li Fengbiao, Yin Hongxing, Guo Puxiao and Zhang Minghua, all from structures created by the 2015 reform.
- Citing Eurasia Review, the article says more than 100 senior officers have been removed since 2022, and that the Central Military Commission was reduced to two members after January 2026.
- The IISS reportedly concluded that the purges have seriously undermined operational readiness, while the author states that the purges may not eliminate the threat from ongoing Chinese exercises.
- The author, who states a pro-Western bias, concludes that the Chinese regime is fragile from within and that Western unity and steady deterrence are the best response.

## Introduction: a purge that never stops

### A black Friday for China's top brass

On the evening of **June 26, 2026**, the **Standing Committee** of China's **National People's Congress** issued a terse, unexplained communiqué announcing the removal of **six senior officers** of the **People's Liberation Army** (**PLA**) along with **nine other delegates**. This kind of announcement, typically dropped late at night to limit media coverage, has become the signature move of the **Xi Jinping** era since **2022**, according to the **Institute for the Study of War** (**ISW**), which has meticulously tracked every wave for months (ISW, July 2, 2026).

The names removed are not obscure figures. Among them: **Xu Xueqiang**, former head of the equipment development department of the **Central Military Commission** (**CMC**); **Wang Kangping**, lieutenant general of the **Eastern Theater Command**; **Li Fengbiao** of the **Western Theater Command**; **Yin Hongxing**, political commissar of the ground forces; air force general **Guo Puxiao**; and **Zhang Minghua**, commander of the **cyberspace force**. All of them come from structures created after the sweeping **2015** military reform, which worries analysts about the true scope of this purge (The Epoch Times, June 27, 2026).

### Why this purge shifts the strategic picture

One could shrug it off as just another **Chinese purge**, business as usual for the regime. Except the pace is dangerously accelerating. Since 2022, more than **100 senior officers** at lieutenant general rank or above have been removed, more than half of the roughly **176 top command posts** in the PLA, according to an analysis by **Eurasia Review** (Eurasia Review, March 14, 2026).

For a Western reader, that number should register as a strategic alarm bell, not a mere footnote of Chinese domestic politics. An army whose top ranks are being decapitated at this pace is an army that doubts itself, hesitates, and where the chain of command is uncertain. That is crucial information at a moment when Beijing is flexing its posture toward **Taiwan**.

*I'll say it plainly: by trying to purge his army of every trace of dissent, Xi Jinping risks making it incapable of fighting the very war he is actively preparing against Taiwan. That's a paradox that should reassure the West, while also forcing it to stay extremely vigilant.*

## The mechanics of a purge that has become a system

### How the Standing Committee operates

The **Standing Committee of the National People's Congress** functions here as a rubber stamp for decisions already made by the **Chinese Communist Party's** disciplinary apparatus. Once an officer loses his delegate mandate, he also loses his **immunity from prosecution**, which almost always means an investigation opens for "**serious violations of discipline and law**," a stock euphemism for corruption or political disloyalty.

This mechanism has been used almost industrially since **February 2026**, when **19 delegates**, including **nine military officers**, were already removed on the eve of the annual session of China's parliament (Breitbart, February 27, 2026).

### A pattern repeated without exception

Every new wave follows the same script: a terse announcement, silence on the motives, then implicit confirmation through later investigations run by the **Central Commission for Discipline Inspection** (**CCDI**). This body, run internally by people close to Xi Jinping, has established itself as the real center of gravity of power, sometimes more influential than the traditional military structures.

Analysts at the **Council on Foreign Relations** note that this extreme centralization of disciplinary power around Xi is itself a risk factor, since it strips the state apparatus of any independent internal check capable of tempering the excesses of personal power.

### An ideological boot camp as prelude

The military's official newspaper, **PLA Daily**, revealed that these six removals followed an ideological training camp held from **April 8 to June 12, 2026**, personally launched by Xi Jinping. He stressed there the need to "build an atmosphere where people speak the truth, give frank advice and fight bad practices" (ISW, July 2, 2026).

That is language that sounds like political re-education disguised as military training. One can legitimately wonder how long an army can function effectively when its senior cadres spend more time proving their loyalty than training for combat.

*It's hard not to read this as an admission of weakness. A leader confident in his grip doesn't need to run ideological re-education camps for his four-star generals.*

## The dizzying numbers since 2022

### A methodical decapitation

The most spectacular case remains that of January 2026, when **Zhang Youxia**, vice chairman of the CMC and one of the most combat-experienced officers in the entire Chinese military, was placed under investigation alongside **Liu Zhenli**, chief of the Joint Staff Department. That decision reduced the CMC, which is supposed to have around seven members, to just **two people**: Xi Jinping himself and general **Zhang Shengmin** (BBC, January 26, 2026).

The research outfit **ChinaPower**, affiliated with CSIS, has tallied **36 generals** officially purged since 2022, and estimates that **65 more** are likely targeted by unconfirmed investigations, based on their repeated absence from major official events (ChinaPower Project, February 24, 2026).

### The hardest-hit areas

The **Rocket Force**, backbone of **China's nuclear arsenal**, has been particularly decimated since **2023**. But the **June 2026** purge shows a clear **broadening** to other branches: the **air force**, the **ground forces**, the **cyberspace force**, and above all the departments born of the **2015 reform**, previously relatively spared.

This geographic and institutional spread of the purge suggests that Xi Jinping is no longer simply eliminating targeted rivals, but instilling a generalized culture of fear throughout the military hierarchy.

*A witch hunt spreading at this pace has little left to do with the anti-corruption fight officially invoked. It is absolute political control being built, brick by brick, purge by purge.*

## The impact on combat readiness

### The IISS's damning report

The **International Institute for Strategic Studies** (**IISS**), based in **London**, published a report concluding that Xi Jinping's repeated purges "have seriously undermined **operational readiness**" of the **PLA** (Breitbart, February 27, 2026). That analysis was echoed by the think tank **The Firebrand Project**, which notes that the Rocket Force purge "disrupted chains of command, delayed supply lines and created a climate of fear in some of the PLA's most sensitive units."

This finding should temper excessive fears of an imminent invasion of Taiwan. An army whose senior leadership changes this radically and this often cannot mount a complex amphibious operation with the same confidence as a stable force.

### The paradox of ongoing exercises

Yet despite this instability at the top, Chinese forces continue their maneuvers around **Taiwan** and in the **South China Sea** without letup. **ISW** regularly documents flights by disguised **WZ-7** drones and "maritime militia" activity near **Kinmen** and the **Pratas Islands**.

This paradox captures the complexity of the situation well: China's war machine keeps running at a sustained operational tempo, even as its head is in perpetual reshuffling.

*It's precisely this dissonance that worries me most: a military apparatus can very well keep training and threatening while being hollowed out from within. Never confuse chaos at the top with paralysis on the ground.*

## Beijing's deafening silence

### No explanation, as always

One constant stands out across all these removals: **no official reason** is ever given. No specific **criminal charge**, no **public trial**, no detailed statement. The **bureaucratic silence** is total, fueling the widest range of speculation among observers.

That opacity is itself a political fact. It signals that the leadership has no need to justify its decisions to public opinion or a free press, a fundamental difference from Western democracies, where such purges would require at minimum a transparent judicial process.

### Tensions at the top of power

The outlet **Observing China** revealed a rarely noted fact: the chairman of the **National People's Congress**, **Zhao Leji**, a member of the **Politburo**, did not immediately sign off on the sanction against **Zhang Youxia** and **Liu Zhenli** in **February**, revealing "previously undisclosed disagreements" between him and **Xi** (Observing China, February 23, 2026).

Such an episode, however minor it appears, is significant within a system as tightly controlled as the Chinese Communist Party's. It suggests that the facade of unity conceals real fault lines at the top of the state.

*These cracks, however discreet, are valuable to us in the West. They remind us that the Chinese monolith is not as solid as it likes to appear.*

## The February 2026 precedent

### A near-identical repeat

The June 2026 purge is by no means an isolated event. It nearly mirrors February's, when **nine military officers** were removed just before the opening of the annual session of the National People's Congress, among them **Li Qiaoming**, commander of the ground forces, and former navy commander **Shen Jinlong** (Asiae, February 27, 2026).

The number of delegates representing the **PLA** and the **armed police** within the **National People's Congress** has thus fallen to **243**, down from several hundred previously, a continuous decline over **three years** that reflects the scale of the cleanup Xi has ordered.

### A dangerously accelerating pace

Over the last three years, the effective roster of the **National People's Congress** has dropped from **2,977** to **2,848** delegates, after **ninety-nine expulsions** cumulatively, according to **Eurasia Review**. This ongoing erosion undermines the image of unity that the **Chinese regime** is desperately trying to project, both domestically and internationally.

For Xi Jinping, as the 21st Congress of the Chinese Communist Party approaches in 2027, this climate of permanent suspicion could become a formidable political boomerang.

*A power that must purge endlessly to stay in place is not a strong power. It is a power that is afraid, and fear, over time, always comes due.*

## What this means for Taiwan

### Beijing's strategic timeline

The central question on the minds of Washington and Taipei is simple: does this internal instability delay or accelerate Chinese ambitions toward Taiwan? Western analysts remain divided. Some believe Xi might want to move faster, before internal dissent worsens. Others, including the IISS, lean toward an objective slowdown of Chinese operational capacity.

In this uncertain context, Western vigilance must never let up. Taipei continues to bolster its defenses, with logistical and diplomatic support from the United States and its Pacific allies.

### A lesson for the West

This purge should also remind us of a truth too often forgotten: China is not an invincible monolithic bloc. Its internal fault lines, its power rivalries, its repeated purges are all signals that an authoritarian regime, however powerful, remains fragile from within.

That is one more reason for the West to maintain coordinated diplomatic, economic and military pressure, without naivety but also without excessive panic in the face of an adversary whose foundations show visible cracks.

*The greatest danger for us would be to fall for a morbid fascination with Chinese power without seeing its structural fragilities. Strategic clarity starts right there.*

## The Rocket Force, a symbol of the chaos

### The most strategic unit, the hardest hit

Since **2023**, the **Rocket Force**, which controls a large share of **China's nuclear arsenal**, has seen nearly its entire leadership swept away by corruption accusations tied to equipment procurement and promotions. This unit, supposedly the most reliable and closely watched in the entire **PLA**, turned out to be a nest of malfeasance.

Former commander **Li Yuchao** and his deputy **Zhang Zhenzhong** are among the emblematic figures of this debacle, revealed as far back as 2023 but whose aftershocks are still being felt in 2026.

### Consequences for nuclear credibility

When the force in charge of a global power's nuclear arsenal reaches such a level of compromise, the question of that arsenal's operational reliability becomes legitimate. Western intelligence experts are following this situation very closely, since it has direct implications for global strategic deterrence.

This is not about minimizing the Chinese threat, but understanding that this threat carries its own internal contradictions, which should intelligently inform Western deterrence doctrine.

*A nuclear strike force riddled with corruption should worry us just as much as it should reassure us. That ambiguity is exactly what makes analyzing China so difficult and so essential.*

## Xi's historical precedents

### A method proven since 2012

This is not Xi Jinping's first military purge. As early as his rise to power in 2012, he had already eliminated historic figures like retired generals **Xu Caihou** and **Guo Boxiong**, seen as pillars of the old system. This methodological continuity, documented by Engelsberg Ideas, shows a constant in Xi's governing style: never let an alternative center of power take lasting root (Engelsberg Ideas, January 30, 2026).

Of the **seven members** of the **CMC** that **Xi** himself had promoted at the **20th Party Congress**, **five** have since been purged in a little over **three years**, an extraordinary attrition rate for China's supreme military command body.

### The weight of party history

As far back as **1989**, even a mere suggestion that a general might invoke a role for the **National People's Congress** in troop deployments was perceived as "existentially threatening" to the party's supremacy. This historical obsession with absolute control partly explains the current intensity of the purge.

For Xi, every officer with a network of personal loyalties, what the Chinese call "guanxi," represents a potential threat, regardless of his actual military competence.

*This obsession with control, pushed this far, always ends up turning against the one who wields it. History is full of leaders who ended up isolated by their own paranoia.*

## International reactions and diplomatic silence

### Washington watches, cautiously

Officially, **American** officials remain measured in their public comments on these purges, preferring to leave the analysis to specialized **think tanks**. But behind the scenes, the topic is closely tracked by **intelligence services**, particularly to assess the impact on the Taiwan timeline.

This diplomatic caution does not stop American experts, widely quoted in the specialized press, from calling the situation "unprecedented" for China's command structure.

### Shockwaves in Taipei and Tokyo

In **Taiwan**, these purges are being watched with a mix of caution and hope. Caution, because a destabilized Chinese military could also become more unpredictable. Hope, because every sign of internal weakness in the **Beijing** regime statistically reduces the odds of immediate, coordinated military action against the island.

For its part, **Japan** is bolstering its own defense capabilities amid this regional uncertainty, convinced that stability in the **Indo-Pacific** region directly depends on the readability of Chinese power.

*This strategic uncertainty should push the West to invest more in human and technical intelligence on China, rather than settle for comfortable assumptions.*

## The role of internal propaganda

### A tightly controlled narrative

China's **state propaganda**, via **Xinhua** and **PLA Daily**, systematically presents these purges as proof of "zero tolerance" toward **corruption**, regardless of rank or position. This rhetoric, repeated relentlessly, aims to legitimize an operation that, seen from outside, looks much more like a brutal **political consolidation**.

PLA Daily did not hesitate to describe generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as people who "betrayed the trust of the Party Central Committee," language that prejudges their guilt before any formal proceedings.

### The absence of any internal check

What stands out most in this sequence is the total absence of any **counterweight** capable of publicly questioning these decisions. No **independent Chinese media**, no genuinely deliberative **parliament**, no **organized opposition** can challenge the regime's official version.

It is this structural lack of transparency that makes the work of Western think tanks and the ISW so valuable for understanding the reality of Chinese power behind the unanimous facade.

*Without the free press and independent institutions that define our democracies, imperfect but alive, we wouldn't even be able to document this chaos. That's one more reason to defend our own freedoms tooth and nail.*

## Scenarios going forward

### Toward a new wave of purges

Nothing suggests this **dynamic** will stop. The next major political milestone, the **21st Congress of the Chinese Communist Party** set for **2027**, could instead accelerate the trend, with **Xi Jinping** likely seeking to secure absolute loyalty before that crucial deadline.

Analysts at Vision Times note that "more than ten officials of ministerial rank or above" have already been removed since the start of 2026, a pace that could intensify further in the coming months (Vision Times, July 3, 2026).

### The challenge of filling vacant posts

One question remains largely unanswered: who will replace all these purged officers? The **CSIS** notes that many **top command** posts have remained vacant for months, for lack of candidates deemed sufficiently loyal or competent to fill them.

This prolonged vacancy could, over time, create a worrying command vacuum, including for Xi Jinping himself, who will sooner or later have to rebuild a functioning chain of command if he hopes to credibly project his military power.

*A system that purges faster than it can rebuild ends up cannibalizing itself. That may well be the true Achilles' heel of China's current military strategy.*

## What Kyiv and Ukraine can take from this

### A parallel with Russia

This Chinese instability is not unlike certain dynamics observed on the **Russian** side since the start of the **invasion of Ukraine**, where internal purges, sudden dismissals of generals and power rivalries have marked the entire conduct of the war.

This parallel should remind us of an essential strategic truth: authoritarian regimes, however formidable on paper, often carry structural dysfunctions that end up affecting their real military performance on the ground.

### Vigilance that must never waver

For Ukraine and its Western backers, the lesson is not to underestimate these regimes, but to understand that tenacity and democratic cohesion remain, over time, major strategic assets against systems eaten away by internal distrust and endless purges.

It is precisely this cohesion that the **West** must keep cultivating, as **China**, **Russia**, **Iran** and **North Korea** appear to form an axis of convenience whose internal cracks are just waiting to be intelligently exploited.

*Facing adversaries eaten away from within, our best weapon remains our unity. It's a simple lesson, but one too often forgotten in the noise of daily crises.*

## The Taiwan factor and the Western urgency

### A window of vulnerability for Washington and Taipei

American and Taiwanese intelligence services are closely watching how this internal instability might influence the timeline of any eventual Chinese action against **Taiwan**. Some scenarios envision a leader weakened at home seeking a quick external win to consolidate his authority, a classic of political science sometimes called strategic diversion.

Other, more cautious experts believe the opposite: an army whose leadership changes this radically does not offer the operational guarantees needed for a complex amphibious invasion like that of **Taiwan**, one of the most logistically difficult military operations there is.

### What Washington and its allies should take from this

For the **United States**, **Japan** and **Australia**, the strategic lesson is clear: keep strengthening deterrence capabilities in the Pacific, without being lulled into thinking that internal Chinese chaos automatically eliminates the threat. A destabilized army can remain dangerous, sometimes even more so if its leaders seek to prove their loyalty through an external show of force.

The **Pentagon** and its **Quad** counterparts are therefore continuing to reinforce their positions in the region, betting on a combination of military firmness and constant diplomatic vigilance toward **Beijing**.

*It's exactly in this kind of uncertain moment that the West must show itself at its most united and most predictable, to leave no room for miscalculation by a regime backed into a corner.*

## Conclusion: an army to watch closely

### The record of a purge without end

The removal of six senior officers on June 26, 2026, is neither the first nor likely the last step of a purge that has already deeply transformed the face of Chinese military command. More than **100 officers** removed in four years, a Central Military Commission reduced to its bare minimum, a decapitated Rocket Force: the picture drawn by Western analysts is one of an institution in perpetual reshuffling, under the constant pressure of one man, **Xi Jinping**, whose obsession with control seems never to be satisfied.

This situation calls for redoubled Western vigilance, without giving in to either panic or underestimation. China remains a major military power, but a power whose internal foundations show real, documented and verifiable signs of fragility.

### What to take away

For Western decision-makers, as for the general public, the challenge is to keep following this story with rigor, relying on credible sources like the ISW, rather than on alarmist speculation or, conversely, on naive optimism about Beijing's automatic weakening.

The only certainty at this stage is that the Chinese regime is going through a period of significant internal turbulence, whose outcome remains uncertain, but whose very existence deserves to be followed with the greatest attention by anyone interested in global strategic balance.

*I close this file with one conviction: the best Western response to a China hollowed out from within is neither panic nor complacency, but quiet determination, grounded in verified facts rather than catastrophic scenarios.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- Institute for the Study of War, China & Taiwan Update — July 2, 2026

- Institute for the Study of War, China & Taiwan Update — April 10, 2026

- The Epoch Times, China Removes 6 Military Deputies — June 27, 2026

- Bloomberg, China Ousts Six Military Lawmakers — June 26, 2026

### Secondary sources

- ChinaPower Project, CSIS — February 24, 2026

- Eurasia Review, Xi Jinping's Rectification Campaign — March 14, 2026

- BBC News, China has purged its highest-ranked military general — January 26, 2026

- Observing China, The Tangram — February 23, 2026

- Engelsberg Ideas, China's century of purges — January 30, 2026

- Breitbart News, China Purges Nine More Military Officers — February 27, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/xi-jinping-purge-encore-six-generaux-et-fragilise-le-commandement-de-l-apl