# Xi Jinping Presses Chinese Military Ahead of 2027, Revives Taiwan Push > On July 1, 2026, at an event marking the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Column - Published: 2026-07-07 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/xi-jinping-presse-l-armee-chinoise-avant-2027-relance-taiwan ## Key takeaways - Xi called for "world-class standards" by 2027, which analysts cited by India Today read as an implicit benchmark against American military standards. - An ISW analysis reports an ongoing purge, with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli removed from the Central Military Commission in January 2026 and more than a million officials punished in the anti-corruption campaign. - The Fujian carrier transited the Taiwan Strait on June 23, 2026, which the ISW says could allow three carriers to rotate among regional commands. - Chinese air incursions into Taiwan's air defense zone fell to 134 in June 2026, while coast guard maritime patrols intensified. - The article's author argues China's strategy is gradual erosion of Taiwanese sovereignty rather than immediate invasion, and that the 2027 date is a capability target, not a confirmed invasion date. ## Introduction: an anniversary speech that is anything but ceremonial ### 105 years of the party, an army ordered to accelerate On **July 1, 2026**, at an event marking the **105th anniversary** of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, President **Xi Jinping** urged the People's Liberation Army to "move faster toward the goals set for its 100th anniversary in **2027**," aiming for "world-class standards." According to **India Today**, this phrasing is widely read by analysts as an implicit benchmark against American military standards. Xi also said he wanted to "resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, **security** and development interests," a line that, given the current tensions around **Taiwan** and the South China Sea, cannot be read as a mere protocol **exercise** in style. ### Reunification, a "historic mission" On **Taiwan**, Xi did not mince words: "Resolving the Taiwan question and achieving the complete reunification of **China** is a historic mission and an unshakeable commitment for the Chinese Communist Party." **Beijing** also promised resolute measures against "Taiwan independence" and firm opposition to any outside interference in the matter. This statement comes against the backdrop of a Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 with just over **50 members**, that has become the largest ruling party in the world, and where Xi Jinping, now in his third five-year term, is widely expected to seek a fourth, a first for a Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. *I'll say it plainly: when a leader who already controls the army, the party and the state keeps repeating that reunification is "unshakeable," that isn't wishful thinking, it's a timetable he's setting for himself. Ignoring this rhetorical clarity would be a serious analytical mistake.* ## The military purge running alongside the speech ### A purge that reaches the very top According to an **Institute for the Study of War** analysis published on **July 6, 2026**, Xi Jinping is continuing a purge of military representatives within the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, while his anti-corruption campaign now extends to military institutions born of post-2015 structural reforms. This anti-corruption campaign, described by **Beijing** itself as "the hard, prolonged, all-out battle against corruption," has already punished more than a **million officials**, including several senior military officers. Two members of the Central **Military** Commission, **Zhang Youxia** and **Liu Zhenli**, were removed from their posts in January 2026, a strong signal that even the highest ranks of China's military apparatus are not immune to the purge Xi is driving. ### An ideological training camp personally launched by Xi The official **PLA Daily** detailed an ideological training camp held from **April 8 to June 12, 2026**, personally initiated by Xi Jinping, whose central theme demanded that officers "speak the truth, offer sincere advice and fight wrongdoing." This emphasis on ideological loyalty, combined with the anti-corruption crackdown, reflects a drive to tighten political control over an army still seen as too vulnerable to internal drift. This dual dynamic — accelerated technical **modernization** and internal political purge — paints the picture of an army Xi wants to be both more powerful and more loyal, two goals that do not always go hand in hand in the history of major military institutions. *An army purged at the same time it is modernized is not necessarily a stronger army. Military history is full of examples where fear of internal betrayal paralyzed operational effectiveness at the critical moment. Beijing is playing a risky game.* ## The Fujian carrier, a symbol of naval ambition ### A new carrier in the strait The **Fujian**, the Chinese navy's newest aircraft carrier, commissioned in **November 2025** and fitted with electromagnetic catapults, transited the **Taiwan** Strait on **June 23, 2026**. This transit follows two previous ones in September and December 2025, a frequency suggesting the vessel's gradual integration into the Chinese navy's regular operational rotations. According to the ISW's analysis, this maneuver could allow the Chinese navy to rotate three carriers among its various regional commands, a naval projection capability no Asian **power** other than the United States currently holds in the region. ### The other vessels in rotation The **Liaoning**, China's first aircraft carrier, made its most recent transit in April 2026, while the **Shandong** has been under maintenance since January 2026. This rotation of three carriers, even partial, illustrates China's ambition to maintain a continuous, credible naval presence around **Taiwan**, without depending on a single vessel vulnerable to maintenance downtime. This naval buildup ties directly into the logic of Xi Jinping's speech calling for world-class military standards by **2027**, a deadline that coincides with this modernized carrier fleet reaching full operational maturity. *Watching a carrier fitted with electromagnetic catapults sail regularly through the Taiwan Strait is no routine exercise. It's a calculated, repeated demonstration meant to normalize a military presence that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.* ## The raw numbers behind June's military pressure ### A relative decline but constant pressure According to the ISW, Chinese air incursions into Taiwan's air **defense** identification zone totaled **134** in June 2026, down from the more than **300 monthly incursions** recorded after President **Lai Ching-te**'s inauguration in May 2024, returning roughly to the pre-inauguration baseline. June saw **12 days** with no incursions past the strait's median line at all. This statistical decline should not, however, be read as a sign of **strategic** easing: it could just as easily reflect a temporary tactical adjustment rather than a long-term doctrinal shift toward **Taiwan**. ### Maritime patrols, on the other hand, are intensifying On the maritime front, the Chinese coast guard conducted **3 intrusive patrols** around the Pratas Islands and **4** around Kinmen in June. At least **two vessels** maintained a continuous presence in Taiwan's eastern exclusive economic zone since June 1, while **China** inspected **198 ships** to assert its jurisdiction in the region. On June 27, roughly **10 Chinese and Russian aircraft** took part in a joint **exercise**, the **11th long-range patrol** of its kind, while **Beijing** sanctioned **40 entities** on June 29 (20 on a control list, 20 on a dual-use watch list), officially in response to Japanese "militarism," according to China's Ministry of Commerce. *A drop in air incursions paired with a rise in naval patrols is not a softening, it's a redeployment. Beijing never truly steps back, it simply changes its vector of pressure depending on what delivers the most effect at the lowest political cost.* ## The end goal: erode Taiwanese sovereignty without war ### A documented strategy of gradual encroachment According to the ISW's analysis, China's immediate objective is not necessarily a short-term **invasion**, but the gradual erosion of Taiwanese sovereignty and of threat-awareness among the population, in order to prepare the conditions for a future **blockade** or invasion meant to force "reunification." The joint blockade exercises conducted by the Chinese navy and coast guard during the major April and December 2025 maneuvers illustrate this methodical preparation. This strategy of gradual normalization aims to make each new incursion feel less shocking than the last, until China's **military** presence around **Taiwan** becomes a fait accompli the international community struggles to effectively challenge. ### A test of psychological resilience as much as military capability This constant pressure, documented month after month by Western analysts, is as much a test of the Taiwanese population's psychological **resilience** as of its actual military capabilities. This is precisely the ground **Lai Ching-te**'s government is trying to strengthen through its "whole of society" resilience exercises. Whether this gradual erosion strategy succeeds or fails will largely depend on the ability of **Taiwan** and its Western partners to maintain constant vigilance against incidents that are individually minor but cumulatively significant. *It's this strategy of gradual encroachment that worries me most, more than any scenario of a frontal invasion. A slow erosion, invisible month after month, is far harder to fight politically than a sudden, brutal act of aggression that would immediately mobilize international opinion.* ## The parallel with Putin's Russia ### Two autocracies, the same logic of personal power Xi Jinping's path, seeking a fourth term after already surpassing the traditional two-term limit set after Mao, echoes in some respects the trajectory of **Vladimir Putin** in Russia, who himself amended his constitution to extend his power indefinitely. Both leaders share a deep distrust of any institutional limit on their personal authority. This convergence is not trivial in the context of growing **military** cooperation between **Beijing** and Moscow, illustrated by the regular joint air patrols observed in the Indo-Pacific region, whose 11th edition took place in late June 2026. ### An alliance of convenience with converging interests This Sino-Russian cooperation, while not a formal **military** **alliance** in the traditional sense, reflects a clear **strategic** convergence: the two authoritarian regimes share a common interest in weakening the international order dominated by **Western** democracies, each pursuing its own regional goals — **Taiwan** for **China**, **Ukraine** for Russia. This **strategic** convergence makes it all the more urgent for **Western** democracies to treat the Ukrainian and Taiwanese files not as two isolated crises, but as two faces of the same systemic challenge posed by the axis of autocracies. *I refuse to treat Taiwan and Ukraine as two separate files. Putin and Xi are watching closely how the West reacts to each of these crises, and every sign of weakness in one directly encourages aggression in the other.* ## Washington's muted reaction ### A Trump administration sending mixed signals The **Trump** administration has, so far, maintained the fundamental architecture of American **military** support for **Taiwan**, while sending at times contradictory signals about its long-term commitment to traditional American alliances in Asia and Europe. This ambiguity, already observed on the **NATO** file, also shows up in America's posture toward Taiwan. This structural uncertainty is pushing some analysts to question the long-term credibility of American **deterrence** against a **China** that, for its part, continues a documented and constant trajectory of military **modernization**, independent of American election cycles. ### A credibility test for the entire West How Washington handles this file in the years ahead will be a credibility test not just for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, but for the entire system of **Western** alliances, closely watched by **Beijing**, Moscow and other authoritarian capitals seeking to gauge the free world's true resolve. It is precisely this constant scrutiny by authoritarian regimes that makes every sign of **Western** hesitation potentially costly, well beyond whatever specific file is at issue at a given moment. *I remain measured on Trump: maintaining the current architecture of support deserves credit. But the ambiguity he cultivates around long-term commitment sends exactly the wrong signal at a moment when Xi Jinping is methodically testing Western resolve.* ## The role of Japan and the East China Sea ### Chinese sanctions against Japanese "militarism" The sanctions imposed by **Beijing** on June 29, 2026, against 40 entities, officially justified by opposition to Japanese "militarism," illustrate the widening of China's theater of confrontation beyond the Taiwan file alone. **Japan**, which has gradually strengthened its own **defense** capabilities against the growing Chinese **threat**, finds itself directly targeted by this rhetoric. This extension of the rhetorical and economic conflict toward **Japan** confirms that Chinese strategy is not aimed solely at **Taiwan**, but at the entire regional **security** architecture built around American alliances in the western Pacific. ### A region under multiple, simultaneous strain This multiplication of tension fronts — **Taiwan**, the South **China** Sea, the East China Sea, relations with **Japan** — reflects a Chinese strategy of simultaneous pressure across several theaters, making it harder for regional democracies to concentrate their defensive resources on a single identified point of friction. This dispersal of tensions is itself a major **strategic** challenge for Western and regional **defense** planners, forced to spread limited attention and resources across a growing number of potential fronts. *This multi-front pressure strategy is no accident. Beijing knows that a Western democracy distracted by several simultaneous crises always responds less effectively than one focused on a single, clearly identified threat.* ## What the 2027 deadline really means ### A capability target, not a confirmed invasion date It bears repeating with rigor that the **2027** deadline, marking the centennial of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, is a declared **military** capability target, not a confirmed **invasion** date for **Taiwan**. This methodological distinction, often overlooked in **Western** media coverage, deserves to be maintained with precision. Xi Jinping's repeated statements on **military** **modernization** explicitly target "world-class standards," a formulation concerning the overall capacity of the Chinese military to rival the United States, rather than a dated, irreversible commitment to a specific military action against **Taiwan**. ### Real urgency despite timeline uncertainty This nuance, however, takes nothing away from the urgency felt by **Taiwan** and its regional partners: whether an **invasion** is planned for **2027** or a later date, China's trajectory of military **modernization**, documented through concrete indicators like the Fujian carrier and the internal purges, points to systematic preparation for a scenario of direct confrontation. It is this combination of uncertainty about the precise timeline and certainty about the general trajectory that makes the situation especially hard for Western decision-makers to manage, forced to act on probabilities rather than absolute certainties. *I reject the fatalism of precise dates, but I equally reject the complacency of ignoring a modernization trajectory documented over several years. Uncertainty about the timeline must never become an excuse for Western inaction.* ## The economic dimension of military modernization ### A defense budget that keeps growing China's **military** **modernization** rests on considerable and growing investment, fueled by an economy that, despite signs of slowdown in some sectors, continues to finance sustained military expansion. This long-term financing capacity sets **China** apart from other authoritarian powers, notably Russia, whose **war** economy rests on far more fragile foundations. This relative economic solidity gives Xi Jinping **strategic** room to maneuver that Vladimir Putin does not possess to the same extent, a factor that could make China's trajectory more sustainable in the long run than Russia's current **war** effort against **Ukraine**. ### A systemic risk for the global economy This combination of economic **power** and **military** ambition makes **China** a structurally different challenge from Russia for **Western** democracies: a potential adversary whose economy remains deeply embedded in global value chains, making any direct confrontation potentially more costly for the entire international economic system. It is this economic interdependence that partly explains the relative caution of **Western** capitals toward **China**, compared to the sharper firmness adopted toward Russia since 2022, an asymmetry that certainly has not escaped Chinese strategic planners. *This Western economic caution toward China worries me deeply. It could signal to Beijing that the consequences of aggression against Taiwan would, in practice, be more tolerable than those Russia suffered over Ukraine.* ## The lessons Taiwan is drawing from this escalation ### Preparation accelerating in mirror image Facing this documented Chinese **military** **modernization** and the internal purge accompanying it, **Taiwan** has accelerated its own preparation efforts, including the "whole of society" **resilience** exercises and the strengthening of its asymmetric **defense** capabilities, betting on mobile, dispersed systems rather than an unlikely frontal confrontation against Chinese numerical superiority. This asymmetric **defense** doctrine, partly inspired by lessons observed in Ukrainian resistance against Russia, aims to make any Chinese **military** operation against **Taiwan** costly enough to deter its launch, rather than seeking a direct military parity deemed unrealistic in the short term. ### Deeper strategic dialogue with regional partners This Taiwanese acceleration comes alongside deeper **strategic** dialogue with **Japan**, the Philippines and other regional partners facing the same trajectory of Chinese assertiveness, gradually sketching out an informal but increasingly coordinated **security** architecture in response to **Beijing**'s **military** **modernization**. This regional coordination, while still far from a formal **alliance** comparable to **NATO**, could prove decisive in the years ahead in deterring **Beijing** from testing the collective resolve of its democratic neighbors. *I see in this emerging regional coordination the only credible long-term response to Chinese military modernization. No single Asian democracy can face this trajectory alone; it's together, or not at all.* ## What the anti-corruption drive reveals about internal fragility ### A powerful but potentially fragile army The massive anti-corruption campaign led by Xi Jinping, having punished more than a million officials including several very senior military officers, implicitly reveals a structural fragility within China's own **military** apparatus. An army that requires such a vast and repeated purge is not necessarily the monolithic, perfectly controlled instrument official propaganda would like to project. This internal fragility, documented by the dismissal of figures as central as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, could become a factor of delay or unpredictability in the execution of any complex **military** operation against **Taiwan**, a scenario that would demand flawless coordination across multiple branches of the Chinese military. ### An uncertainty that could, in fact, favor deterrence This uncertainty about the real cohesion of Chinese **military** command could, paradoxically, work in favor of **Western** and Taiwanese **deterrence**: a military apparatus weakened by repeated purges might prove more cautious before committing to an operation as risky and complex as an **invasion** or **blockade** of **Taiwan**. This optimistic reading must, however, be handled with caution: an army in the midst of internal purging can just as easily be tempted by an external show of force to close ranks and divert attention from internal tensions, a dynamic historically observed in other authoritarian regimes under pressure. *I am wary of reading China's internal purges too optimistically. History shows that weakened authoritarian regimes sometimes seek an external victory precisely to shore up threatened internal legitimacy. Caution remains warranted.* ## The South China Sea, a quiet second front ### Tensions that persist far from the cameras While international attention focuses on **Taiwan**, **China** continues consolidating its contested positions in the South China Sea, notably against the Philippines around Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. These tensions, less covered by the media than the Taiwan file, follow the same logic of gradual territorial assertion that **Beijing** applies across several simultaneous fronts. Repeated incidents between Chinese and Philippine coast guards, including documented collisions and the use of water cannons against Philippine resupply vessels, illustrate a graduated harassment strategy similar to the one seen around **Taiwan**, applied here against a treaty ally of the United States. ### A test for the credibility of American treaties These incidents are a direct test of the credibility of the mutual **defense** treaty binding Manila and Washington, a precedent **Beijing** is watching closely to calibrate its own reading of American resolve to honor its **alliance** commitments in the region, including toward **Taiwan**. Every American hesitation toward the Philippines becomes, in Chinese strategic calculations, an additional data point in assessing the real risk associated with more direct action against **Taiwan**. *I believe the South China Sea deserves far more Western attention than it receives. What is playing out against the Philippines today is a full-scale, real-world laboratory for what Beijing might attempt against Taiwan tomorrow.* ## Technological dependence and semiconductors ### A Chinese race for self-sufficiency The **military** **modernization** Xi Jinping is pushing comes alongside a massive parallel effort to reduce **China**'s dependence on foreign technology, particularly the advanced semiconductors needed for next-generation weapons systems, a field where **Taiwan** and companies like TSMC hold a dominant global position. This race for technological self-sufficiency is not unrelated to **Beijing**'s Taiwan obsession: controlling or neutralizing the island's semiconductor industry would, in one stroke, eliminate one of the main economic levers the West could use to deter Chinese aggression. ### A long-term calculation that goes beyond the military alone This technological dimension adds another layer to the 2027 deadline: beyond conventional military capability alone, Beijing could also be calculating the optimal moment based on its own growing technological self-reliance, reducing its vulnerability to the Western sanctions that would inevitably follow any military action against Taiwan. It is this convergence of military ambition, technological calculation and internal political timeline that makes precisely assessing the Taiwan risk so complex for Western analysts, forced to juggle multiple simultaneous variables. *I think China's race for semiconductor self-sufficiency is underestimated as a factor in strategic timing. The day Beijing no longer needs Taiwan technologically may be the day it feels freest to act militarily.* ## Conclusion: a trajectory to watch relentlessly ### Neither panic nor complacency Xi Jinping's July 1, 2026, speech, combined with documented data on Chinese military modernization, the internal purge of the army and the constant pressure applied around Taiwan, sketches a trajectory that demands constant vigilance from Western democracies, without giving in to either alarmist panic or reassuring complacency. What the documented facts reveal — rotating carriers, repeated purges, joint patrols with Russia, sanctions extended to Japan — is a power methodically preparing, on several simultaneous fronts, for a future in which the use of force would no longer be excluded from China's strategic playbook toward Taiwan. ### A deadline that still belongs to the future, but is drawing closer Whether 2027 marks a decisive turning point or not remains uncertain. What is not uncertain is the general direction Beijing has taken for several years now: more internal control, more projected military capability, and an increasingly explicit political discourse on the inevitability of reunification, by force if necessary. *I'll close with one conviction: the West does not have the luxury of choosing between supporting Ukraine and watching Taiwan. The two fronts are linked, and they must be defended together, with no hierarchy of value among threatened democracies.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - Institute for the Study of War — China-Taiwan Update, July 6, 2026 - Taiwan Ministry of National Defense — official site - Focus Taiwan — politics section ### Secondary sources - India Today — Xi Jinping urges PLA modernisation, July 1, 2026 - Reuters — China coverage - Foreign Policy — geopolitical analysis --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/xi-jinping-presse-l-armee-chinoise-avant-2027-relance-taiwan