# TESTIMONY: Snihurivka, Night of June 30 — A 5,000 m² Store Consumed by Shaheds

> On the night of June 30 to July 1, 2026, a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone hit a building materials and DIY store in

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-01
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-snihurivka-nuit-du-30-juin-un-magasin-de-5-000-m-consume-par-les-shah

## Introduction: The Night the Building Materials Store Burned

### A drone, a store, and a war that targets everything

On the night of June 30 to **July 1, 2026**, a **Shahed-136 kamikaze** drone hit a building materials and DIY store in **Snihurivka**, **Mykolaiv** oblast. The fire consumed **5,000 square metres** of merchandise, stock, and tools. No one died in the strike. The store, however, was destroyed.

This detail matters. **Snihurivka** had been rebuilding. Families displaced by earlier Russian strikes were gradually returning. They needed construction supplies, wood, cement, tools. That store existed precisely because of that need — and a drone burned it.

### The architecture of the night

The **Russian Air Force** launched **154 drones** across Ukraine that night. Ukrainian forces intercepted **138 of them** — an **interception rate** of **89.6%**. The remaining 16 reached their targets. Snihurivka was one of them.

By morning, Governor **Vitaliy Kim** had published his nightly **situation report**: one store destroyed, an adjacent warehouse in **Nova Odesa** damaged, the **State Emergency Service** (DSNS) mobilized. His report was **factual**, short, and delivered at the same hour he always delivers it — as if refusing to allow the night to pass without a witness.

*A building materials store — not a weapons factory — burned with a kamikaze drone. That detail tells you everything about this war.*

## Snihurivka: A City Rebuilding Under the Bombs

### A city in the orbit of destruction

**Snihurivka** is a small city in **Mykolaiv oblast**, **southern Ukraine**. The region suffered heavily in the early months of the **full-scale invasion** — Russian forces advanced toward Mykolaiv city itself before being pushed back. Many buildings, roads, and infrastructure were damaged or destroyed. The wounds of **2022** are still visible.

Since the **liberation of the region**, the work of reconstruction has been ongoing. International funds, domestic programs, and above all the determination of residents who came back to repair what they could — this is the fabric of what rebuilding looks like in **post-occupation** Ukraine. Not dramatic. Slow. Necessary.

### What a building materials store means in this context

In a city rebuilding from war, a **building materials store** is not a luxury. It is infrastructure. Families applying through Ukraine's **eRecovery program** (**eВідновлення**) via the **Diia** app receive compensation to repair damaged homes — but they still need to source the materials locally. That store was part of the **supply chain** of **civilian recovery**.

When a drone burns that store, it does not just destroy inventory. It disrupts the fragile logistics of rebuilding. It forces residents to travel farther, spend more, wait longer. The **World Bank** estimated Ukraine's reconstruction cost at over **$500 billion** in 2025. That number is measured in burned stores, not just bombed bridges.

*I wasn't in Snihurivka. But I can describe what this burned store means for people who needed it — their homes were already destroyed and they were trying to rebuild them.*

## Shahed Drones: The Weapon of Nocturnal Terror

### The anatomy of a Shahed-136

The **Shahed-136** is an **Iranian-designed** kamikaze drone, also known as a **loitering munition**. It flies at approximately **180 to 200 kilometres per hour**, guided by **GPS and inertial navigation**. Its cost per unit is estimated between **$20,000 and $50,000** — cheap enough to be launched in swarms, expensive enough to cause real damage when it lands. Russia has **rebranded** the weapon as the **Geran**-2 for domestic propaganda purposes.

The drone carries a **warhead** designed to detonate on impact. Against a building materials store — wood, insulation, chemicals, flammables — the **incendiary** effect is catastrophic. Five thousand square metres can burn completely in a matter of hours.

### The documented supply chain

**Iran** manufactures the Shahed. **Russia** deploys it. **Ukraine** receives it on its cities. This chain is not speculation — it has been **documented, verified, and sanctioned** by the **European Union**, the **United States**, and the **United Kingdom**. Ukrainian officials have confirmed that **Japanese-made components** are present in approximately **90% of Russian missile and drone types**, according to a Ukrainian **sanctions** official cited by **Euromaidanpress**.

The sanctions exist. The entities involved are named. The drones keep coming. This gap between documented **accountability** and actual consequences is one of the defining moral failures of the **international response** to this war.

*Iran makes the drones. Russia launches them. Ukraine receives them on its cities. Documented, proven, sanctioned — and still operational.*

## The Night of June 30 — The Full Picture of the Strikes

### 154 drones and 138 interceptions

The night of June 30 to July 1, 2026, was one of the larger **drone barrages** of recent weeks. The Russian Air Force launched **154 Shahed-type drones**. Ukraine's Air Force and ground-based air defense systems intercepted **138 of them** — a rate of **89.6%**. The 16 that broke through were enough to kill people, destroy buildings, and remind every Ukrainian city that the night is not safe.

Across Ukraine that same day, **13 people were killed** and **109 were wounded** by Russian strikes, according to the **Kyiv Independent**. These numbers come from a **daily count** maintained since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Behind every number is a name, a family, a specific address that no longer looks the same.

### Russia's parallel narrative — and what it says

That same night, Russian sources claimed their air defense had intercepted **419 Ukrainian drones**. **Moscow's mayor** reported that **61 drones** were approaching the capital. These claims cannot be independently verified, but their consistency with previous patterns suggests both that Ukraine is striking deep into Russian territory and that Moscow is experiencing a level of air threat it once considered unthinkable.

The **Dubna Space Communications Center** was struck for the **second time in eight days**, alongside three other satellite communications centers in the Moscow and **Vladimir regions**. Ukraine's capacity to strike at this distance — and this precision — is no longer a matter of debate.

*Governor Kim documents every strike. Since 2022, he has built an **archive** of Russian violence — the future's revisionists will find no ground to stand on.*

## Firefighters as the Civil Defense Line

### The DSNS mobilization in Snihurivka

When the Shahed hit the building materials store in Snihurivka, the **State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS)** responded immediately. Firefighting crews contained the blaze, preventing it from spreading to adjacent structures. The work was dangerous — burning construction materials produce **toxic smoke**, and the **structural integrity** of a burning warehouse cannot be trusted.

Ukraine's emergency services have become, over **four years** of war, one of the most systematically tested **civil defense** forces in the world. They operate under conditions that no peacetime training fully prepares for: the possibility of a second strike while the first is still burning, the certainty that the next alert will come before they have rested.

### Working under the threat of a second drone

This is a reality that receives little attention in international coverage: **firefighters responding to drone strikes work knowing a second drone may arrive**. Russian targeting patterns have included follow-up strikes on responders. This is not an accident. It is a deliberate tactic designed to maximize disruption and deter emergency response.

The men and women of the DSNS who worked the Snihurivka fire on the night of June 30 did so under that threat. Their names will not appear in international newspapers. Their work is the civil foundation without which no city can function after a strike.

*Firefighters worked knowing a second drone could arrive. This testimony belongs to them too.*

## The Geography of Terror: Targeting the Everyday

### What Russia targets and why

The targeting of a building materials store is not a military mistake. It fits a pattern that has been consistent throughout the full-scale invasion: **Russia targets the everyday**. Markets, pharmacies, apartment blocks, hospitals, grain silos, and now a DIY store in a city trying to rebuild. The logic is **strategic** — destroy the **civilian economy**, exhaust the population, make normal life impossible.

This is what military analysts call **coercion through exhaustion**. The goal is not to win a conventional military engagement but to make the cost of resistance — and of simply living — so high that the population accepts defeat as preferable to continued suffering. Four years of full-scale war suggest the calculation has failed. Ukraine has not capitulated.

### Resilience as a strategic response

The store burns. Within days, residents begin sourcing materials from elsewhere. The municipal government catalogs the damage. International partners are notified. A reconstruction claim is filed through the eRecovery program. This sequence — destruction followed by **documentation** followed by reconstruction — has repeated thousands of times across Ukraine since **February 2022**.

It is not a triumphant resilience. It is a grinding, exhausting, **daily refusal** to stop. **Putin bet on capitulation through exhaustion.** The evidence — from Snihurivka to **Kharkiv** to **Zaporizhzhia** — is that he has lost that bet, one rebuilt store at a time.

*Putin bet on capitulation through exhaustion. The store burns, then is rebuilt. That is Ukrainian resistance in its most silent, most durable form.*

## The Human Toll of **June 30, 2026**

### 13 dead. 109 wounded.

The Kyiv Independent reported on July 1, 2026, that Russian attacks across Ukraine over the previous 24 hours had killed **13 people** and wounded **109 others**. These are the numbers that appear in **morning briefings**, in parliamentary reports, in **international press** releases. They accumulate. The daily count has been published every morning for four years.

Each of those 13 people had a name. A home. A family that received a phone call that morning. Each of the 109 wounded faces weeks or months of recovery — physical, psychological, economic. The number 109 does not carry that weight. It is the function of journalism to refuse to let the number stand alone.

### The cost that doesn't make headlines

Beyond the dead and wounded are the displaced, the traumatized, and the economically devastated. A family whose building materials store was their livelihood faces a different kind of loss than those recorded in daily casualty counts. The Snihurivka strike left **no casualties** in the immediate sense — and yet it caused real harm, measurable and durable, to the people whose reconstruction supplies it carried.

The **World Bank's $500 billion** reconstruction estimate is not an abstraction. It is the sum of tens of thousands of incidents like the one in Snihurivka: small in the global scale, catastrophic at the human level.

*13 dead. 109 wounded. Published every morning for four years. Behind each number is a person. I refuse to let them become statistics.*

## Ukraine's Response: Drones Against Drones

### The **SBU** strike on **Izhevsk**

While Russia struck Snihurivka, Ukraine struck back — at a distance that would have seemed impossible three years ago. On July 1, 2026, **Ukrainian SBU** drones struck the **Kupol** plant in Izhevsk, approximately **1,300 kilometres from the Ukrainian border**. The Kupol plant produces **Tor and Osa** air-defense systems — the very types of systems Russia uses to shoot down Ukrainian drones and missiles.

The symmetry of this exchange is precise and intentional. Russia uses drones to strike Ukrainian cities. Ukraine uses drones to strike the factories that make Russian air defense. The strategic logic compounds: every Tor system damaged in Izhevsk is one fewer interceptor available over **Belgorod** or Moscow.

### The Dubna Space Communications Center — second strike in eight days

Also on the night of June 30, Ukrainian forces struck the **Dubna Space Communications Center** for the **second time in eight days**. Three additional satellite communications centers in the **Moscow and Vladimir** regions were also hit. These are not symbolic strikes. Satellite communications infrastructure supports Russian military coordination, targeting, and navigation.

The capacity of Ukraine to conduct operations at **1,300 kilometres** and to repeat strikes on hardened facilities within an eight-day window represents a fundamental shift in the strategic calculus of this war. Ukraine is no longer only defending its territory — it is shaping the conditions of Russian military operations from within Russian territory.

*Ukraine strikes the factory making the drones that strike its cities. The symmetry is real and it grows each month.*

## Nova Odesa and the Night's Collateral Damage

### The adjacent warehouse

The strike in Snihurivka was not isolated. The same attack or a closely related one damaged a **warehouse in Nova Odesa**, a nearby city in Mykolaiv oblast. The nature and contents of the warehouse have not been fully specified in **open-source reporting**, but its proximity to the Snihurivka strike suggests a coordinated targeting of the region's civilian economic infrastructure.

Nova Odesa, like Snihurivka, is part of the southern Ukrainian landscape that was partially occupied and heavily contested in 2022. The region's civilian recovery has been ongoing since liberation. Strikes that damage warehouses — storage for food, goods, construction materials, or equipment — interrupt that recovery directly.

### The regional pattern

Mykolaiv oblast has been targeted repeatedly throughout the full-scale invasion. The city of Mykolaiv itself sustained damage to water infrastructure, apartment buildings, and public facilities. Regional Governor **Vitaliy Kim** has been one of the most consistent documenters of Russian strike patterns in southern Ukraine, using his **Telegram channel** and official communications to produce a near-real-time archive of attacks.

The pattern across the oblast is clear: strikes are not concentrated on military targets. They are distributed across the **civilian geography** — stores, warehouses, roads, agricultural infrastructure, residential buildings. **Every strike on a civilian building is photographed, geolocated**, and documented. Putin may evade international tribunals in his lifetime. The archive will outlast him.

*Every strike on a civilian building is photographed, geolocated, documented. Putin can evade tribunals in his lifetime — but the archive will outlast him.*

## The Testimony of Fire: What the Ruins Say

### What remains after 5,000 square metres burn

A building materials store that covers **5,000 square metres** is not a small structure. It holds thousands of items: timber, insulation, roofing materials, hardware, tools, paint, cement, plumbing fittings. After a Shahed impact and the resulting fire, what remains is a skeleton of metal and ash. The inventory is gone. The shelving is gone. The records, the staff workspace, the storage systems — all gone.

Rebuilding such a store — sourcing new inventory, repairing or replacing the structure, reestablishing supply chains — takes months and significant capital. In a city already stretched thin by **four years of war** and reconstruction pressure, the loss of this particular store is not a minor inconvenience. It is a setback measured in months of delayed recovery for the families who depended on it.

### Testimony as an act of resistance

The act of **documenting what burned** is itself a form of resistance. Governor Kim's **nightly reports**, the DSNS after-action summaries, the photographs filed by Ukrainian journalists, the geolocated coordinates logged by **open-source intelligence** teams — all of this constitutes a living archive of what Russia has done and continues to do.

This testimony is not propaganda. It is precisely sourced, **cross-referenced**, and **publicly available**. It is the material that will be used in **future prosecutions**, **historical records**, and **accountability processes**. The ruins of the Snihurivka store are not just rubble. They are evidence.

*I was not in Snihurivka. I don't pretend to be. This testimony is built from verified sources — not a presence I didn't have.*

## Governor Kim: A Voice in the Night

### The discipline of nightly documentation

**Vitaliy Kim**, Governor of Mykolaiv oblast, has become one of the defining voices of Ukrainian civil administration under fire. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, he has published near-**nightly situation reports** documenting Russian strikes, Ukrainian responses, casualty figures, and infrastructure damage. His reports are short, factual, and consistent — published at roughly the same hour, in the same format, with the same refusal to sensationalize.

This consistency is itself a political act. It says: we are here, we are counting, we are not overwhelmed. It denies Russia the narrative that Mykolaiv has been silenced or subdued. It provides Ukrainian citizens, international partners, and journalists with reliable **primary documentation** that feeds into the broader record of the war.

### Administrative resistance as a form of war

Kim's approach represents a model of what might be called **administrative** resistance — the use of state function, documentation, and public communication as a tool of resilience. It is not glamorous work. It does not generate headlines. But it produces the **evidentiary foundation** that makes accountability possible.

The **Snihurivka strike of June 30** was documented because Kim documented it. The world knows a 5,000 m² store burned because a governor sat down in the night and filed a report. In the aggregate, that discipline — repeated across hundreds of Ukrainian regional administrators — constitutes an institutional resistance that has outlasted Russian predictions of Ukrainian collapse.

*Kim publishes at night. Short, factual, no fanfare. Perhaps the purest form of administrative resistance.*

## What Snihurivka Represents for the Memory of War

### The risk of the small story being lost

Snihurivka will not be remembered in the same breath as **Mariupol** or **Bakhmut** or **Bucha**. It is a small city. The strike that hit it on June 30 was one of 16 that broke through an **air defense net** that intercepted 138 others. No one died. The international press gave it a sentence, if that.

This is the risk of scale in **war coverage**. The stories that receive sustained attention are the ones with large casualty figures or dramatic turning points. The stories of cities quietly burning and quietly rebuilding — Snihurivka, Nova Odesa, dozens of others across southern and eastern Ukraine — accumulate into a pattern that only becomes visible when you step back and count.

### What the pattern says about the war

What the pattern says is this: Russia is conducting a systematic campaign against Ukrainian **civilian infrastructure** and economic capacity. Not only in dramatic strikes on Kyiv or Kharkiv. But in the steady, daily targeting of the fabric of ordinary life — stores, warehouses, energy infrastructure, agricultural facilities — across the full width of the country.

Snihurivka represents that pattern. It is a data point and a testimony simultaneously. **Looking at this war from afar carries a responsibility** — the responsibility not to let Snihurivka become just another number in a morning briefing.

*Looking at this war from afar carries a responsibility. To not let Snihurivka become just a number in someone's morning briefing.*

## Shaheds and the Dynamics of Asymmetric Warfare

### The **cost asymmetry** that drives **drone warfare**

The **Shahed-136** costs between $20,000 and $50,000 per unit. An **air defense interceptor missile** costs between $500,000 and several million dollars. This cost differential is the engine of drone warfare: Russia can launch dozens of cheap drones and force Ukraine to expend interceptors that cost ten to fifty times more. Over time, the mathematics threaten to exhaust Ukrainian **air defense stocks**.

Ukraine's response has been to attack this equation at its source: strike the factories that make the drones, destroy the supply chains that feed them, and develop its own low-cost interception systems. The **EU**'s disbursement of €**3.9 billion** for Ukrainian **drone production** on June 30, 2026, represents an institutional commitment to sustaining this asymmetric competition at scale.

### The strategic significance of intercepting 89.6%

An interception rate of **89.6%** sounds impressive. And it is — it represents extraordinary performance under **real-time conditions**, across **hundreds of kilometres** of airspace, using a mix of **air defense platforms**, **electronic warfare**, and **drone interceptors**. But **10.4%** of 154 drones is still **16 drones** reaching their targets. On a night of 154 launches, that means 16 Snihurivkas, 16 burned stores, 16 damaged warehouses, 16 more files in Kim's archive.

Intercepting a Shahed above Snihurivka is a defensive victory. Striking the Kupol factory in Izhevsk is a strategic victory. **Ukraine does both — but not alone.** The Berlin **E5 summit** of **June 24**, where **Chancellor Merz**, **President Macron**, **Prime Minister Starmer**, **Prime Minister Meloni**, and **Prime Minister Tusk** committed **€70 billion** for Ukraine, is the institutional framework that makes both possible.

*Intercepting a Shahed above Snihurivka is a defensive victory. Striking the factory in Izhevsk is a strategic victory. Ukraine does both — but not alone.*

## Rebuilding After Each Strike: Ukrainian Civil Resilience

### The eRecovery program and the mechanics of reconstruction

Ukraine's **eRecovery program** (eВідновлення), accessible through the **Diia app**, allows residents whose properties have been damaged by Russian strikes to file claims and receive compensation for repairs. The program is designed to work at scale, processing thousands of claims across hundreds of cities and towns simultaneously. It is one of the most ambitious civil recovery systems fielded during an active war.

For residents of Snihurivka — homeowners who needed the building materials store to complete repairs funded through eRecovery — the strike of June 30 creates a concrete obstacle. The materials they needed are now ash. They will need to source them from farther away, at higher transport cost, with longer lead times. The program can compensate for damage. It cannot fully compensate for disrupted supply chains.

### The €70 billion from Berlin

The **E5 Berlin summit** of June 24, 2026, committed **€70 billion for Ukraine**. This figure is diplomatic in its scale and real in its implications. It funds weapons, yes — but also reconstruction, infrastructure repair, and civil recovery. The **World Bank** placed Ukraine's total reconstruction need above **$500 billion** in its 2025 assessment. The Berlin commitment is a significant step toward that number.

Every strike is followed by reconstruction. Not always visible, not always fast — but real. The **€70 billion from Berlin** stops being a diplomatic figure the moment you stand in front of what was a 5,000 m² store in Snihurivka. That is where the money becomes material. That is where the summit becomes human.

*Every strike is followed by reconstruction. Not always visible, not always fast — but real. The 70 billion from Berlin stops being a diplomatic figure here.*

## Conclusion: What Snihurivka Demands We Remember

### The measure of a night

On the night of July 1, 2026, a building materials store in **Snihurivka** burned. Thirteen Ukrainians were killed across the country. One hundred and nine were wounded. Forty-six drones broke through air defense and reached their targets. An Izhevsk factory was struck 1,300 kilometres from Ukraine. A Space Communications Center in Dubna was hit for the second time in eight days.

These facts, taken together, are the measure of a single night of this war. Not exceptional. Not exceptional at all — which is precisely the point. Nights like this have been accumulating for four years. The buildings that burned, the people who died, the cities that rebuilt and were struck again — this is the record. It is thorough, it is documented, and it demands to be taken seriously by anyone who claims to think about what comes next for Ukraine and for Europe.

### What we owe Snihurivka

**Snihurivka doesn't burn in the abstract.** It burned on the real night of July 1, 2026, in a real city where real people had been trying to rebuild real homes. This detail should be the measure of everything decided — and not decided — at Berlin, at Ankara, at every summit table where Ukraine's future is discussed by people who sleep in cities where the night is still quiet.

What we owe Snihurivka is the refusal to abstract it. To keep the number at **5,000 square metres**, not smooth it into a statistic. To remember that behind the diplomatic language of reconstruction commitments and drone interception rates is a store that burned, a city that will rebuild, and a war that is not over.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Shahed drones burn store, damage warehouse in Mykolaiv region — Ukrpravda, July 1, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/01/8041883/)

- [Russian attacks kill 13, injure 109 across Ukraine over the past day — Kyiv Independent, July 1, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-attacks-kill-13-injure-109-across-ukraine-over-past-day/)

- [Russian bomb strike devastates Sumy infrastructure, wounding 11 civilians — United24 Media, June 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russian-bomb-strike-devastates-sumy-infrastructure-wounding-11-civilians-20298)

### Secondary sources

- [Zelensky confirms second strike on Russia's Dubna Space Communications Center — Kyiv Independent, June 30, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-zelensky-confirms-second-strike-on-russia-s-dubna-space-communications-center/)

- [Ukrainian drones strike Russian plant 1,300 km away, SBU source says — Kyiv Independent, July 1, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-ukrainian-drones-strike-russian-plant-1-300-km-away-sbu-source-says/)

- [Russo-Ukrainian War Day 1588 — Ukraine have knocked out nearly 200 Russian air defense systems — Euromaidanpress, June 30, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/30/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1588-ukraine-have-knocked-out-nearly-200-russian-air-defense-systems-since-start-of-year/)

- [Night of June 30 to July 1: drones and strikes across Ukraine — Ukrpravda, July 1, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/01/8041843/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-snihurivka-nuit-du-30-juin-un-magasin-de-5-000-m-consume-par-les-shah