# TESTIMONY: On the Lyman-Sloviansk Front, Russia Infiltrates Without Advancing — the Line Holds > In the Sloviansk direction, Russian forces continued their offensive operations on June 26 and 27, 2026 — without advancing. That is the formula repeated in the ISW (Institute for the Study of War) assessment of June 27, 2026: the Russians push, they strike, they try — but Ukrainian lines hold. This is not stagnation. It is resistance under constant pressure, in one of the most - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Profile - Published: 2026-06-29 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-dans-la-direction-lyman-sloviansk-la-russie-infiltre-sans-avancer-la- ## Introduction: The Sloviansk Direction, Theater of a Millimeter War of Attrition ### Russian Offensives That Make No Progress In the **Sloviansk direction**, Russian forces continued their offensive operations on **June 26 and 27, 2026** — without advancing. That is the formula repeated in the **ISW (Institute for the Study of War)** assessment of **June 27, 2026**: the Russians push, they strike, they try — but Ukrainian lines hold. This is not stagnation. It is resistance under constant pressure, in one of the most contested zones of the front. The head of the **Sloviansk** military administration, **Vadym Lyakh**, reported that Russian forces conducted an **MLRS** (multiple launch rocket system) strike against the city using **cluster munitions**. Geolocated images published on **June 27** show Russian forces conducting a **FAB-1500 guided glide bomb** strike in the eastern part of **Mykolaivka**, east of **Sloviansk**. The **FAB-1500** is one of the most destructive bombs used by **Russia** in this war. ### Zakitne: The Ambush of One Soldier Against Three In the **Sloviansk direction**, the village of **Zakitne** is largely under Russian control. But a Ukrainian soldier, sheltered in the ruins of a private home, faced **three Russian soldiers** who were searching the area. The Ukrainian soldier first threw a **grenade**, then opened fire with **small arms**. Result: **two Russian soldiers killed, one wounded** who managed to flee. This street combat, documented by the **Conflict Intelligence Team (CITEAM)**, illustrates the nature of this war in its most intimate dimensions. *One soldier, alone, in ruins. Three enemies. A grenade. That is war in its most naked expression. I was not there — I make no claim to have been. But this account documented by CITEAM says something essential about what this war costs in human terms, second by second, village by village.* ## The Lyman Direction: Ukrainian Advances East of Kupyansk ### Ukraine Holds Its Positions and Counter-Attacks In the **Kupyansk direction**, linked to that of **Lyman**, Russian forces continued their offensive operations on **June 26 and 27** without advancing — **because Ukrainian forces have recently advanced or held their positions east of Kupyansk**. A Russian milblogger published a map indicating that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced or held their positions east of **Podoly**, east of **Kupyansk**. This detail is significant: it is the Russians themselves — through their own propagandists — who confirm the absence of progress. Further north, in the **Kharkiv direction**, Russian forces also failed to advance — **because Ukrainian forces counter-attacked**. **Ukraine** is not passive on this sector of the front. It absorbs Russian attacks and strikes back, maintaining defensive pressure that costs the attackers dearly in men and materiel. ### The Siverskyi Donets Salient: The Ukrainian Pocket in Russian-Held Territory **CITEAM** documents a little-known fact: a Ukrainian salient extends along the **Siverskyi Donets River** deep into Russian-controlled territory, where fighting remains active and **Ukrainian troops have even set ambushes**. Ukrainian drone operators in the surrounding forests continue to strike Russian positions at **Kalenyky and Rai-Oleksandrivka**. This is not a zone **Ukraine** has abandoned — it is a zone where it actively fights, using asymmetric methods adapted to the terrain. *A Ukrainian salient in Russian-held territory, ambushes set in forests, drones striking from the trees. This image is far from that of a retreating army. This is an army fighting for every centimeter, with ingenuity, in the worst conditions.* ## The Russian Cognitive War: Doctored Images and Invented Victories ### AI in the Service of Propaganda The **ISW** reveals that the Russian Ministry of Defense published images **likely altered by artificial intelligence** of flag-raising events as part of a **cognitive warfare** effort designed to exaggerate Russian advances. These doctored images are intended to demoralize Ukrainians, mislead international opinion, and bolster domestic Russian morale. It is a deliberate, documented tactic — and an increasingly transparent one. Ukrainian spokesman **Volodymyr Polevyi** of the **7th Airborne Rapid Assault Corps** confirmed that Russian forces continue to claim they have taken **Pokrovsk**, despite **slow Russian progress** and **continued Ukrainian presence in the northern part of the city**. This gap between Russian claims and the reality on the ground is systematic — and documented week after week. ### The FAB-1500 and MLRS: The Terror Tactic Against Sloviansk **MLRS strikes with cluster munitions** and **FAB-1500 guided glide bomb** strikes against **Sloviansk** and its surroundings are aimed at forcing defenders to abandon their positions under the pressure of long-range strikes. The **FAB-1500**, weighing 1.5 tons, is devastating against buildings and fortified positions. Its use illustrates the Russian tactic of using raw firepower to compensate for tactical failures. *AI-doctored images to simulate victories. FAB-1500 bombs on civilian cities. Russia uses digital propaganda and physical destruction simultaneously as weapons of war. One to deceive the world. The other to crush human beings. Both are crimes — of different orders, but crimes.* ## Ukrainian Medium-Range Strikes in the Occupied Donbas ### Hornet Drones Against 12 Russian Artillery Pieces In response to Russian offensives, **Ukraine** is conducting a continuous medium-range strike campaign in occupied **Luhansk** and **Donetsk**. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the **Donetsk** region reported destroying, through **Hornet** drone strikes along the **M-30 Donetsk-Pokrovsk highway**, **12 artillery pieces, one self-propelled artillery system, one BM-21 Grad MLRS, three command posts, and four engineer vehicles and trucks**. This type of systematic strike on Russian support forces cumulatively degrades enemy offensive capability. These medium-range drone strikes on Russian supply routes are part of the **logistical degradation doctrine** that **Ukraine** applies across the entire front. Destroying artillery pieces and engineer vehicles before they even reach their firing positions is more effective than engaging them once they are in place. This is preemptive counter-battery by drone. ### The Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Direction: Another Line Under Pressure In the **Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya** directions, Russian forces also continued their operations on **June 26 and 27** without advancing. These sectors, less covered in the media than **Pokrovsk**, are secondary pressure points that **Russia** maintains to disperse Ukrainian defenses and reduce **Kyiv's** ability to concentrate its reserves on a single decisive sector. *Russia attacks on all fronts simultaneously — not to win everywhere, but to exhaust everywhere. It is a strategy of total attrition aimed at saturating Ukrainian defensive capabilities. Ukraine responds with the same logic, but with drones rather than men. That is the asymmetry that could make the difference.* ## The Novopavlivka-Oleksandrivka Direction: Zaporizhzhia Under Tension ### Operations Without Confirmed Advances In the **Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions**, Russian forces continued their operations on **June 26 and 27** without achieving confirmed advances. These sectors of the **Zaporizhzhia** front are regularly cited in military assessments as zones of constant pressure but limited results for **Russia**. The Russian army is not breaking through — it is wearing down, testing, searching for the gap. Previous updates published by the Ukrainian general staff have documented Ukrainian counter-offensives in these sectors, notably at **Oleksandrivka** and **Huliaipole**. These limited land-reclamation actions, even small in scope, demonstrate that **Ukraine** is not in an exclusively defensive posture — it seeks to reclaim tactical initiative on targeted sectors when conditions allow. ### The Logic of Attrition: Who Gets Exhausted First? The central question of this phase of the war is not **who advances**, but **who gets exhausted first**. **Russia** mobilizes continuously, at a rate of approximately **29,500 new soldiers per month** according to Western estimates. But it is losing soldiers at a rate that exceeds its recruitment capacity in its unmanned systems units. And its materiel losses — **12,066 tanks, 44,969 artillery systems** on the Ukrainian count as of **June 29, 2026** — represent an irreplaceable depletion. *12,066 Russian tanks destroyed. 44,969 artillery systems. I don't know if these figures are 100% accurate — they are Ukrainian counts. But even at 70% truth, they describe an army that has burned through decades of accumulated materiel capital. And that cannot be replaced in a few years.* ## Pokrovsk: The Contested City, the Symbol of the Front ### Russians Claim to Have Taken the City — It's False Russian forces continue to claim they have seized **Pokrovsk** — a strategic city in the **Donetsk** region that represents a crucial road and logistics hub. The reality documented by the **ISW** and confirmed by Ukrainian spokesman **Polevyi** is different: **continued Ukrainian presence in the northern part of the city**, **slow Russian progress**. The city has not fallen. This gap between Russian claims and the reality on the ground in **Pokrovsk** is emblematic of the **Kremlin's** systematic disinformation. It serves Russian domestic interests — showing victories to justify the losses — and seeks to discourage Western support for **Ukraine**. Ukrainian counter-communication, factual and documented, is essential to combating this narrative. ### The Cognitive Battle Is Also a Front The **ISW** documented that Russian images doctored by **AI** are used as part of a **cognitive warfare effort** to falsely depict Ukrainian lines as on the verge of collapse. This tactic targets multiple audiences: the Russian population, which needs victories to accept sacrifices; third countries, whose support may waver; and Ukrainians themselves, whose morale is a strategic target. *Ukraine simultaneously fights two wars: that of arms and that of truth. On the war of arms, the facts are what they are — lines that hold. On the war of truth, Ukraine must do more than hold — it must win. Because if the Russian narrative prevails, even solid allies can waver.* ## What the Lyman-Sloviansk Direction Tells Us About the War in 2026 ### A War of Attrition Where Holding Counts as Victory Week after week, in the **Lyman-Sloviansk direction**, the operational result is the same: Russian forces attack, Ukrainian lines hold, and the Russians make no progress. In a war of attrition, **holding constitutes a relative victory**. Every day the line does not move is a day **Russia** spends human and material resources without territorial gain. Over time, this logic is untenable for **Moscow**. **Ukraine's** ability to maintain its lines in this direction while simultaneously conducting deep strikes in **Crimea**, operations in the Black Sea, and counter-offensives in other sectors, testifies to a military organization that has considerably evolved since **2022**. This is not the same army. It is a more experienced force, better equipped, with a more coherent doctrine. ### The Incomplete Testimony of a War Documented From a Distance What I can offer from here is a testimony of available information — **ISW** assessments, **CITEAM** dispatches, official Ukrainian communications. I was not in the trenches of **Zakitne**. I did not see the Russian soldiers approaching in the half-light. What I can do is assemble these fragments of documented reality and render them honestly. That is the only testimony I am able to offer. *The Ukrainian soldier in the ruins of Zakitne. The Hornet drones destroying 12 Russian artillery pieces on the M-30 highway. The salient holding in the forests of the Siverskyi Donets. These are fragments of this war. I don't claim to totalize them. I claim to report them faithfully.* ## The Pokrovsk Direction: Slow Advance, Continued Ukrainian Resistance ### Russian Pressure on Central Donbas The **Pokrovsk direction** remains one of the most active on the front. Russian forces continued their offensive operations there on **June 26 and 27, 2026** without advancing. But the pressure is real and continuous. Russian airstrikes there are frequent, with **FAB**-type guided glide bombs and **MLRS** rockets striking Ukrainian defensive positions and surrounding civilian infrastructure. In this context, the **7th Ukrainian Airborne Assault Brigade** and other units maintain their positions with artillery and drone support. The capacity to hold these lines depends in part on Western artillery and ammunition deliveries — which makes every foreign policy decision in **Brussels, Washington, or Berlin** directly relevant to a soldier in a trench at **Pokrovsk**. ### The Interdependence Between the Front and the Western Political Rear This tactical reality on the ground at **Lyman, Sloviansk, Pokrovsk** is inseparable from the political decisions made in Western capitals. Every delay in the delivery of artillery systems, every hesitation over military technology transfers, every political compromise in **Washington** under pressure from **Russia**, translates directly into additional pressure on soldiers holding a line with the means available. *This testimony is also a challenge. To the capitals that hesitate, to the allies that stall, to the decision-makers who measure their support according to their domestic agendas. The soldier in the ruins of Zakitne cannot wait for their political calculations. He has waited long enough.* ## Conclusion: The Lyman-Sloviansk Line Holds — and That Is All That Matters ### Attacks That Make No Progress, a Resistance That Endures The **Lyman-Sloviansk direction** in **June 2026** tells a simple but vital story: Russian forces attack, spend, strike with 1.5-ton bombs and MLRS rockets — and **make no progress**. Ukrainian lines hold. Ukrainian counter-attacks retake ground east of **Kupyansk**. The **Siverskyi Donets** salient resists. A lone soldier eliminates two Russians in the ruins of **Zakitne**. ### Holding Is a Form of Victory In a war of attrition against a power that bets on mass and duration, **holding is a form of victory**. It is not final victory. It is not the reconquest of the **Donbas** or **Crimea**. But it is the foundation on which any subsequent victory must be built. And in **June 2026**, that foundation holds. That is the testimony I can offer from here, with the honesty of someone who was not there, but who reports what is documented. *I cannot testify to what I have not seen. But I can testify to what the documentation says: the lines hold. Lyman holds. Sloviansk holds. In this war, that is not nothing. It is not nothing at all.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/) - [CITEAM — Situation Dispatch June 19–22, 2026](https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-jun-19-22-2026) ### Secondary sources - [MinFin Ukraine — Russian troop losses in Ukraine as of June 29, 2026](https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-invading/casualties/) - [Ukrainska Pravda — Losses and military operations in Ukraine — June 17, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/17/8039707/) - [Kyiv Independent — Ongoing coverage of the war — June 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/) - Militarnyi — Coverage of Ukrainian military operations — June 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-dans-la-direction-lyman-sloviansk-la-russie-infiltre-sans-avancer-la-