# TESTIMONY: What I saw in Kim Jong Un's weapons tests — the North Korea rewriting the rules

> I read these specifications and do the simple math. Ninety kilometers from the border: Seoul enters range. Warheads designed to destroy a nation's infrastructure. This is not deterrence — it is operat

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-ce-que-j-ai-vu-dans-les-essais-de-kim-jong-un-la-coree-du-nord-qui-re

## Introduction: June 26, 2026 and what the images show

### A day of tests that changes the picture

On **June 26, 2026**, I am following news from **North Korea** with the attention I have paid this regime for years. And what I observe concerns me more than usual. The official North Korean news agency **KCNA** announces that **Kim Jong Un** personally oversaw a series of weapons tests. Not a symbolic test. Not a demonstration firing. A battery of tests covering at least three major weapons systems — each with specifications that sketch the outline of a revised military doctrine, more ambitious, more precise, more threatening.

What I observe in this publicly available data is not a complete surprise. **Pyongyang** has been intensifying its arms program since the talks with the **United States** collapsed in **2019**. But the scope and specificity of these **June 26** tests — and the statements from **Kim Jong Un** accompanying them — signal something qualitative. This is no longer a **North Korea** provoking to extract diplomatic concessions. This is a **North Korea** preparing for actual military operations, with a precise doctrine on how to strike, where to strike, and at what distance.

### The three systems tested: a threat matrix

Three systems were tested on **June 26, 2026**, according to information published by **KCNA** and relayed by **Al Jazeera** and the **AP**. The first: a **240mm multiple rocket launcher with 24 tubes** and extended range — analysts estimate it can reach up to **90 km** — and an automated fire control system. The second: a **special-mission ballistic warhead**, designed to inflict **"fatal damage"** on airports, ports, and power stations. The third: a **155mm self-propelled howitzer** with a range of **65 km**. These three systems cover different ranges, different targets, different missions. Together, they sketch a strike architecture that can reach a significant portion of **South Korean** territory.

What I read in this combination is not accidental. The **90 km rocket launcher** can hit **Seoul** from positions pulled back from the border. The **special-mission warhead** specifically targets critical infrastructure — airports to prevent reinforcements, ports to block deliveries, power stations to plunge **South Korea** into darkness. And the **65 km howitzer** delivers precision artillery fire against advanced military positions. This is a first-strike architecture — or rapid escalation architecture — designed to hit fast, hit far, and hit the right targets.

## Kim Jong Un's words: a lethal posture demanded

### "Lethal and destructive offensive posture": what Kim demands

I pay particular attention to the exact words **Kim Jong Un** uses during these tests. They are not rhetorical — they are doctrinal. According to **KCNA**, **Kim** called on his army to adopt a **"lethal and destructive offensive posture."** He demanded that his enemies feel **"constant anxiety and fear"** — and dare not attack. He set as objective capabilities of **"ultra-precision"** at long range. He declared that the test results demonstrate the **"progress made in his firing capabilities"** along the southern border.

These formulations are not diplomatic bluster. They are operational directives. A **"lethal and destructive offensive posture"** means that the objective of North Korean military posture is no longer merely to deter an attack — it is to prepare the army to strike first, massively and devastatingly. The demand for **"ultra-precision"** at long range indicates that **Pyongyang** is seeking to develop the ability to hit specific targets — not merely geographic zones — at significant distances. This is a meaningful qualitative shift in doctrine.

### The navy as nuclear priority

In statements close to these ground tests, **Kim Jong Un** also announced that the **North Korean navy** would be equipped with **nuclear weapons** and larger ships, ensuring that **North Korea** is ready for **"multifaceted and effective"** operations. I connect this declaration directly to the commissioning, a few weeks earlier, of the destroyer **Choe Hyon** — North Korea's first surface destroyer. A surface warship. Naval nuclear weapons announced. A **90 km** extended range for ground artillery.

What I observe is a military doctrine expanding progressively into every dimension: land, naval, ballistic, and — implicitly — nuclear in every vector. **North Korea** is no longer satisfied with strategic nuclear deterrence. It is developing tactical nuclear capabilities — weapons usable in real combat configurations, not only as instruments of last resort. This shift is potentially one of the most dangerous developments in Asian security in decades.

## South Korea responds: 500,000 "drone warriors"

### Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and the drone revolution

I follow the South Korean response with equal interest. On **Friday, June 27, 2026**, the **South Korean** Defense Ministry announces a massive plan to expand its drone capabilities. Defense Minister **Ahn Gyu-back's** formulation is striking: he announces the training of **500,000 "drone warriors"** — soldiers capable of using drones as **"personal weapons,"** the same way they would use a personal rifle. This figure is colossal. For a country of **51 million**, training half a million drone warriors means integrating drone capabilities at every level of the military structure.

This response draws directly from lessons learned in the war in **Ukraine**. I have followed closely how drones transformed military operations in the **Donbas** — the ability of small operators to destroy armored vehicles, gather intelligence on enemy positions, deliver ammunition in inaccessible areas. **South Korea** is drawing the same conclusions and adapting them to its own geography: a dense, narrow land front, cities immediately adjacent to the border, demographics that prohibit maintaining a traditional mass army.

### 20,000 reconnaissance and attack drones on the horizon

Beyond individual warriors, the South Korean plan envisions acquiring more than **20,000 reconnaissance and attack drones**. This figure is not presented with full technical details in available sources — but it signals a large-scale deployment ambition that would fundamentally transform the tactical parity with **North Korea**. An army with **20,000 attack drones**, operated by soldiers trained to use them as personal weapons, is an army capable of saturating combat airspace in ways conventional defenses struggle to counter.

What strikes me about **Seoul's** announcement is its symmetry with North Korean doctrine. **Pyongyang** seeks **"ultra-precision"** at long range. **Seoul** answers with mass — thousands of drones capable of overwhelming defenses. The Korean Peninsula is transforming before my eyes into a laboratory of **21st-century** warfare: high precision against saturation, advanced armaments against massive quantities of cheap platforms. This is exactly what is also playing out in **Ukraine** — and the results there are instructive about what it might mean here.

## Trump and the North Korean stakes: "time to pay attention"

### What Lee Jae Myung heard from Trump

I note a statement from South Korean President **Lee Jae Myung** worth highlighting. The week before the **June 26** tests, he revealed that **American President Donald Trump** had told him that **"the time had come to pay attention to the North Korean question."** This vague formulation — characteristic of **Trump's** communication style — can mean several things. It may mean the American administration is considering a resumption of diplomatic negotiations with **Pyongyang**. It may also mean that **Trump** recognizes the escalating North Korean military capabilities and is seeking a diplomatic exit.

In the context of the **June 26** tests, this statement takes on particular dimensions. If **Trump** is contemplating a resumption of talks with **Kim Jong Un** — a dynamic he himself initiated during his first term — he would be doing so in a context where North Korean military capabilities have considerably advanced since **2019**. This is no longer the same **North Korea** he met in **Singapore** and **Hanoi**. This is a **North Korea** with **90 km** artillery, special-mission ballistic warheads, and announced naval nuclear weapons.

### What "paying attention" means in this context

**Trump's** statement — relayed by **Lee** — illustrates a fundamental tension in American policy toward **North Korea**: does "paying attention" mean negotiating, containing, or deterring? The history of American-North Korean negotiations since **1994** is the history of a series of partially respected agreements, calculated provocations, and the steady progression of **Pyongyang's** arms program during and after each phase of dialogue.

What I observe in following this long history is a consistent pattern: **North Korea** uses negotiations as space to advance militarily without suffering the consequences of direct escalation. The **June 26, 2026** tests fit this pattern — they probably precede a diplomatic opening from **Trump**, and they serve to define the terms of that opening. **Kim Jong Un** comes to the table with a more powerful arsenal. And the concessions he will demand in exchange for a pause in his tests will be proportionate to that arsenal.

## Russian assistance: a determining factor

### What the South Korean Defense Ministry confirmed

Defense Minister **Ahn Gyu-back** explicitly acknowledged it in his **June 27** statements: **North Korea** is receiving **technological assistance from Russia**. This is not analytical speculation — it is an official confirmation from the Defense Ministry of a government with significant intelligence capabilities on its northern neighbor. Russian assistance partly explains the rapid progression of North Korean capabilities — notably in the domains of ballistic missiles and precision guidance technologies.

What I observe here is one of the least discussed consequences of the war in **Ukraine**: the **Russia–North Korea** strategic rapprochement. **Pyongyang** has supplied **Moscow** with millions of artillery shells for the Ukrainian front. In exchange, **Russia** shares advanced military technologies. This is a technology transfer between two pariah states that benefits both parties: **Russia** gets ammunition for its operations in **Ukraine**, **North Korea** gets capabilities that would have taken decades to develop alone.

### North Korean soldiers in Ukraine and their return

Credible data, notably information relayed by South Korean sources, indicates that North Korean soldiers have been engaged on the Ukrainian front alongside Russian forces. This deployment is militarily significant in both directions: it provides **Moscow** with additional manpower, but above all it provides **North Korea** with real combat experience in a modern high-intensity war. Soldiers who have seen how Ukrainian drones operate, how defense in depth resists artillery assaults, how precision strikes disrupt logistical lines — when these soldiers return to **Pyongyang**, they bring operational knowledge that no manual can replace.

This frontline experience from **Ukraine** is directly relevant to the **June 26** tests. The specifications of the **90 km rocket launcher** with automated fire control, the **special-mission warhead** against infrastructure, the **65 km howitzer** — all seem to reflect lessons drawn from real war in **Ukraine**. What artillery works. What targets are decisive. What ranges are needed to strike safely. **North Korea** is learning by watching — and by participating.

## South Korea's defense industry: the strategic response

### Five defense companies worth $650 million by 2030

Facing this escalation, South Korean President **Lee Jae Myung** announced an ambitious plan: develop **five defense companies** valued at **$650 million** by **2030**. This is not only an investment in national security — it is an investment in the industrial capacity to respond to a rapidly evolving threat. A nation that depends on arms imports for its defense is vulnerable to delivery delays, stock shortfalls, and the diplomatic calculations of its suppliers. **South Korea** has taken this lesson — notably by watching what is happening with **Taiwan** and its **$14 billion** in blocked weapons.

South Korea's defense industry is already substantial — the country has become one of the world's top arms exporters, selling tanks, howitzers, and aircraft to countries such as **Poland**, **Australia**, and the **United Arab Emirates**. This expansion plan strengthens an already competitive industrial base and gives it the resources to develop the specific capabilities **South Korea** needs against the evolving North Korean threat.

### 28,500 American soldiers: the presence that matters

The presence of **28,500 American soldiers** in **South Korea** remains a central deterrence factor. These troops are not there to conduct the defense of the peninsula alone — they are there to signal to **Pyongyang** that an attack against **South Korea** would be an attack against the **United States**. This tripwire force has maintained relative peace on the peninsula since the end of the **Korean War** in **1953**.

But in the current context — with a **Trump** who has demonstrated he can cancel deployments by tweet, who uses **Taiwan's** weapons as leverage, who maintains a personal fascination with **Kim Jong Un** since his first term — the certainty that these **28,500 soldiers** will always constitute a credible deterrence signal is less absolute than it was before. This is not a given. It is an assumption that must be maintained by consistent policy.

## What the June 26 tests mean for the Indo-Pacific region

### China, an interested spectator

I inevitably wonder how **Beijing** reads the **June 26, 2026** tests. **China** has a complex relationship with **North Korea**: it is its principal economic backer, the guardian of its political survival, but also a neighbor that does not want war on the peninsula and does not want a **North Korea** so nuclearized it becomes unmanageable. **Beijing** watches the **Trump-Kim** dynamic with particular attention — if a new series of negotiations produces American concessions without real counterparts, this further weakens the non-proliferation regime that **China** has a formal interest in defending.

But **Beijing** also watches the South Korean response — and notably the expansion of drone capabilities. A **South Korea** with **20,000 attack drones** and **500,000 trained operators** is a **South Korea** whose military capabilities are growing independently of American weapons systems. This development is deterrent against **Pyongyang** — but it is also a development that **Beijing** notes in its calculations on the regional balance of forces.

### Japan and the lessons it draws

I also note the Japanese reaction to this security environment. **Japan** has substantially increased its defense budget over the past two years — a decision directly motivated by North Korean provocations and Chinese ambitions in the region. The **June 26** tests reinforce the political justification for these expenditures in **Japan**. They also confirm that North Korean ballistic missiles, some of which have the range to reach Japanese territory, constitute a direct — not theoretical — threat.

What I observe, stepping back from the **Indo-Pacific** region on **June 27, 2026**, is an arms race accelerating across multiple vectors simultaneously. **North Korea** develops more precise, longer-range systems. **South Korea** responds with mass drones. **Japan** rearms. **China** modernizes its navy. And the **United States**, with its post-Iran industrial shortfalls, its internal tensions over allied commitments, and a president talking about "paying attention" to the North Korean question — is navigating these waters with a less reliable compass than at any recent point.

## The significance of "ultra-precision": a doctrine revealed

### Why Kim wants precision weapons

**Kim Jong Un's** demand for **"ultra-precision"** long-range capabilities deserves in-depth analysis. Traditionally, North Korean military doctrine rested on mass — thousands of artillery tubes positioned near the border, capable of saturating **Seoul** through sheer volume of fire. This is the hostage city doctrine: as long as **Seoul** can be destroyed within hours, no one attacks **North Korea**.

But the pursuit of precision at long range signals a strategic shift. With precise weapons, you do not need a thousand tubes to destroy an objective — you need one or two systems capable of hitting the right target at the right moment. This allows selective strikes: **Gimpo Airport** to block American reinforcements, the **port of Busan** to block supplies, power stations to plunge **South Korea** into darkness. This is a doctrine of strategic paralysis, not total destruction. And this doctrine is, in certain scenarios, more formidable than brute saturation.

### The "special-mission warheads": a new category

The term **"special-mission warhead"** used by **KCNA** to describe the ballistic missile tested on **June 26** is deliberately opaque — but its meaning is clear in context: this is a warhead designed for a specific mission against a specific target type. The examples given — airports, ports, power stations — correspond exactly to the targets of a strategic paralysis strike. This is not a thermonuclear warhead aimed at erasing a city. This is a precision warhead designed to surgically strike the critical infrastructure of an adversary.

The distinction matters militarily and politically. A total destruction warhead is a weapon of last resort — its use would trigger a disproportionate response. A surgical strategic paralysis warhead is a more "usable" weapon — it can be employed in an escalation context without necessarily crossing the threshold of national suicide. **Pyongyang** is developing a more granular, more flexible, more operationally usable range of military options. And this diversification is, to my eyes, the most troubling development of the **June 26** tests.

## What the failed 2019 talks produced

### After Hanoi: a North Korea preparing without constraint

The **Hanoi** talks between **Trump** and **Kim Jong Un** in **2019** collapsed without an agreement. **Kim** wanted sanctions relief in exchange for partial dismantlement of his nuclear facilities. **Trump** wanted complete dismantlement. The gap was too wide. And since that failure, **North Korea** has developed its arsenal without diplomatic constraint — without a freeze agreement, without inspectors, without international monitoring.

When I look at the specifications of the systems tested on **June 26, 2026** — **90 km** for the rocket launcher, **65 km** for the howitzer, special-mission warheads — I see directly the product of seven years of unconstrained post-Hanoi development. This period of intensive testing, accelerated technological development (potentially with Russian assistance), and accumulated experience through deployments in **Ukraine** has produced a North Korean army qualitatively different from that of **2019**.

### Kim's demand: abandoning denuclearization as a precondition

**Kim Jong Un's** current position on American diplomacy is unambiguous: he has responded to efforts to restart discussions with a non-negotiable precondition — the **United States** must abandon its denuclearization demand. For **Pyongyang**, nuclear weapons are not a problem to be solved — they are the foundation of state security. Any negotiation beginning with denuclearization as its goal is therefore a negotiation **North Korea** will reject by definition.

If **Trump** means to "pay attention" to the North Korean question, he will have to choose: either he maintains denuclearization as a condition — and there will be no deal — or he abandons it and agrees to negotiate with a nuclear **North Korea**, which creates a devastating regional precedent for non-proliferation. Between these two impossible options, history suggests American presidents tend to choose one, then the other, hoping the dynamic changes. It never does.

## The human dimension: a population armed against its will

### What the 25 million North Koreans are living through

Behind the range figures and technical specifications, there is a reality I try not to lose sight of: **25 million North Koreans** live under one of the most repressive regimes in human history. The resources **Pyongyang** devotes to these arms programs — the sums invested in a **90 km rocket launcher** with automated fire control — are resources not going to food, healthcare, or education for a population among the poorest in **Asia**.

North Korean military doctrine protects **Kim Jong Un's** regime — it does not protect the North Korean people. This is an army pointing its warheads at **South Korean** airports and ports — not an army feeding its soldiers or caring for its children. This gap between displayed military power and the real misery of the population is one of the most obscene contradictions of the **Pyongyang** regime. And it deserves to be named, even in a technical testimony about weapons tests.

### The soldiers returning from Ukraine

North Korean soldiers who fought in **Ukraine** are returning to **Pyongyang**. They have seen something that very few North Koreans ever see: another world. They have seen countries that function differently, societies that do not live under permanent fear, armies that fight for something beyond regime survival. What they do with that experience — whether it creates a seed of questioning or is drowned by the ideological conditioning of return — is a question I cannot answer.

But I raise it because it matters. Regimes sometimes change from within. Soldiers who have seen other realities are sometimes the first to question. This is not a prediction. It is an observation about how history works — and about the fact that the **June 26, 2026** weapons tests do not tell the whole story of what is happening in **North Korea**.

## What I could not have foreseen — and what I should have seen coming

### The progression faster than models predicted

I must honestly acknowledge: the progression of North Korean military capabilities since **2019** has been faster than most analysts — myself included — would have predicted. The development of a special-mission warhead to strike critical infrastructure at long range, the deployment of a surface destroyer capable of receiving nuclear weapons, the **90 km** range for multiple artillery — all represent a significant qualitative leap in seven years.

In retrospect, I should have weighted more heavily the combination of factors that made this progression possible: the absence of diplomatic constraint post-Hanoi, the potential acceleration through Russian assistance, and the operational lessons drawn from engagement in **Ukraine**. These three factors together create a multiplicative — not merely additive — acceleration. And this acceleration has produced, by **June 26, 2026**, a **North Korea** militarily more capable than I would have estimated probable in **2020**.

### What I see now and what it implies

What I see now, from publicly available data as of **June 26, 2026**, is a **North Korea** that has systematically filled the capability gaps that limited its military doctrine. It had nuclear range — it is now developing conventional precision. It had short-range artillery — it is now extending to **90 km**. It had land capabilities — it is now developing naval capabilities with nuclear potential. This systematic progression is deliberate. It answers a doctrine. And this doctrine, as **Kim Jong Un** laid it out during the **June 26** tests, is a doctrine of **operational first strike** — not pure deterrence.

This implication is the most important of this testimony. A deterrence doctrine seeks to prevent attack. An operational first-strike doctrine seeks to be ready to strike decisively if the decision is made. **Kim's** demand for a **"lethal offensive posture"** is not compatible with pure deterrence. This is an offensive doctrine. And its targets — airports, ports, power stations — are those of a strategic paralysis first strike, not a deterrence retaliation.

## The question of regional threat integration

### North Korea, China, Iran, Russia: the adversary constellation

On **June 26, 2026**, North Korean tests do not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. They unfold in a context in which **Russia** is fighting in **Ukraine** with North Korean shells, **China** is pressing its economic and military advantage in the western Pacific, and **Iran** recently challenged the **United States** in the **Middle East** — exhausting interceptor stocks that should have gone to **Taiwan**. This is not coincidence. It is an architecture of adversaries — coordinated, even if informally — all acting to simultaneously test and erode American capabilities and credibility.

This informal coordination is perhaps the most underestimated element of **2026** geopolitics. **North Korea**, **Iran**, **Russia**, and **China** do not form a formal alliance. But their actions mutually reinforce — each benefits from the difficulties the others create for the **United States** and its allies. This is a high-intensity geopolitical game for which Western democracies struggle to formulate a coherent response, notably because their decision-making structures are fragmented and their interests are not always perfectly aligned.

### What North Korea brings to this constellation

Within this adversary constellation, **North Korea** plays a specific role: it pins American and allied military capabilities in **Northeast Asia**, it consumes political and diplomatic attention that cannot therefore be concentrated elsewhere, and it supplies **Russia** with ammunition allowing **Moscow** to maintain pressure in **Ukraine**. In exchange, it receives advanced Russian technologies. This is a mutually beneficial arrangement for both parties — and unilaterally destabilizing for international security.

The **June 26, 2026** tests therefore also signal to this constellation: **Pyongyang** is a reliable partner that continues advancing militarily, honors its commitments to **Moscow**, and maintains pressure in **Northeast Asia** while other constellation members maintain theirs in their respective theaters. This is coordination through action, if not through words.

## What this testimony attempts to document

### The limits of observation at distance

This testimony comes from an observer who follows open data, agency reports, official statements, and expert analyses. It is not the testimony of a reporter in the field in **North Korea** — a country closed to independent press — nor of an intelligence official with access to classified sources. The limits of this observation are real and I own them. I do not know with certainty what the North Korean "special-mission warheads" can actually do. I do not know the real production figures for the tested systems. I do not have access to the intelligence analyses of **South Korea**, **Japan**, or the **United States** on the **June 26** tests.

What I can do is read the public data with the attention it deserves, contextualize it within the long history of the North Korean arms program, and formulate reasonable inferences about what it means. These inferences are my opinions — not certainties. And I prefer honest uncertainty to feigned certainty.

### Why it is important to testify despite the limits

I am documenting these tests because they deserve more attention than the news cycle gives them. A **90 km rocket launcher** capable of reaching **Seoul**, warheads designed to paralyze a country's infrastructure, announced naval nuclear weapons — this is not routine. This is a meaningful qualitative evolution in North Korea's military posture, documented by the regime's own official agency.

And in the broader context I have sketched — American interceptor shortfalls, ambiguity of American regional commitment, Russian assistance, informal adversary coordination — these tests fit into a more troubling geopolitical dynamic than their technical specifications alone suggest. The dots connect. And when the dots connect, it is better to name them clearly.

## Conclusion: a peninsula in slow combustion

### What June 26, 2026 changes — and what it does not

**June 26, 2026** does not mark the start of a new war on the Korean Peninsula. Nor does it mark the collapse of the diplomatic status quo. It marks something more insidious: a qualitative progression in North Korean military capabilities that progressively narrows the strategic room for maneuver of all actors involved. Every successful test is one more capability that **Pyongyang** can use in its negotiations, its provocations, or — in the worst case — its operations.

What **June 26** does not change: deterrence remains the dominant policy. The **28,500 American soldiers** are still in **South Korea**. Allied retaliatory capability remains deterrent. And **North Korea**, despite its ambitions, is still a state that rationally calculates its survival risks. These constants matter.

### What South Korea and its allies must do

But these constants do not justify complacency. What I observe in **South Korea's** response — the **500,000 drone warriors**, the **20,000 attack drones**, the **five defense companies worth $650 million** — is a response adapted to the nature of the threat. It deserves to be supported and strengthened. What I observe in the American response — a possible diplomatic opening with **Kim** in the context of an administration that has already shown it treats its security commitments as bargaining chips — is more concerning.

The security of the Korean Peninsula, and by extension all of **Northeast Asia**, rests on a combination of credible military deterrence and consistent diplomatic pressure. Weakening one to feed the other is to weaken both. And in the context of the **June 26, 2026** tests, this is a luxury the region cannot afford.

## Final conclusion: the peninsula the world is watching

### What history says about weapons tests

The history of North Korean weapons tests is not one of gratuitous provocations. Every major test has preceded a diplomatic phase or a strategic evolution. In **2017**, intercontinental missile tests preceded the **Trump-Kim** meetings. In **2022**, the series of tests preceded a series of international diplomatic actions. The **June 26, 2026** tests fit this pattern: they probably precede an attempt by **Trump** to "pay attention" to the North Korean question in the form of dialogue.

What history also says: these dialogues have never produced real dismantlement of the arms program. They produced temporary pauses, partial agreements, unrespected statements of intent. And after each cycle, **North Korea** emerged more armed than when it entered. **June 26, 2026** documents the current state of that arsenal. Tomorrow's tests will document the state of the arsenal after the next failed diplomatic cycle.

### The last word belongs to the facts

I leave the facts to speak in conclusion. A **240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher** with **90 km** range and automated fire control. A **special-mission ballistic warhead** designed to destroy airports, ports, and power stations. A **155mm self-propelled howitzer** with **65 km** range. A demand from **Kim Jong Un** for a **"lethal offensive posture."** A plan for **500,000 South Korean drone warriors** in response. An American president saying **"it's time to pay attention."** These facts together draw a picture. That picture, I have documented as faithfully as possible. What is done with it belongs to everyone who reads it.

I remain on this peninsula — at least in my analytical watch. And I will continue to testify to what open sources allow us to observe. Not to fuel panic. To name reality with the words it deserves.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Al Jazeera / Reuters — North Korea conducts major weapons tests — June 26, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/26/north-korea-conducts-major-weapons-tests-south-training-drone-warriors)

- [Anadolu Agency — North Korea tests upgraded artillery and missile systems — June 26, 2026](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/north-korea-tests-upgraded-artillery-missile-systems-as-kim-vows-stronger-strike-capability/3978375)

- [Kyiv Independent — Context North Korean soldiers in Ukraine — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com)

### Secondary sources

- [SOFX — North Korea commissions destroyer Choe Hyon — June 2026](https://www.sofx.com/north-korea-commissions-destroyer-choe-hyon-complicating-un-sanctions-at-sea/)

- [Channel News Asia — North Korean soldiers in Ukraine — June 2026](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/north-korean-soldiers-ukraine-6221126)

- [Interfax Ukraine — Regional context and North Korea — July 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-ce-que-j-ai-vu-dans-les-essais-de-kim-jong-un-la-coree-du-nord-qui-re