# TESTIMONY: 18 Months of Russian Drones Over European Nuclear Sites — The Kremlin's Espionage Unmasked > I cannot testify to having seen these drones. Nobody I know has seen them either — and that is precisely the problem. An 18-month espionage campaign against Europe's most sensitive nuclear sites, and - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Profile - Published: 2026-07-02 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-18-mois-de-drones-russes-sur-les-sites-nucleaires-europeens-l-espionn ## Introduction: The Russian shadow hung over European nuclear assets for 18 months ### A revelation that changes the nature of the threat On **July 2, 2026**, **The Guardian** published an investigation documenting a reality that European governments preferred to keep quiet: for **18 months**, **Russia** conducted a systematic drone surveillance campaign targeting European nuclear sites. **144 incidents** were analyzed across more than a dozen countries. U.S. Air Force bases in the **United Kingdom**, French nuclear submarines in **Brest**, American nuclear weapons depots in **Belgium** and the **Netherlands**: the campaign was exhaustive, methodical, and conducted with what researchers describe as **"substantial impunity."** The campaign is believed to have been orchestrated by the **GRU**, Russia's foreign military intelligence service. It exploited vessels from the **Russian shadow fleet** as drone launch platforms — commercial vessels with transponders switched off, **"sailing dark"** off European coasts. These vessels reportedly served as launch, recovery, and signal relay platforms for reconnaissance drones. The **Orlan-10**, a Russian drone with a range of **300 miles** and an autonomy of approximately **12 hours**, is identified as one of the aircraft used in this campaign. ### A European response described as inadequate What is as striking as the campaign itself is the European response to it. Authorities were, according to the researchers, **"overwhelmed and confused."** Drones were neither captured nor shot down. A British police helicopter attempted to track drones but withdrew for safety reasons. The use of an anti-drone laser was considered but **"ultimately not undertaken."** The result: a **strategic gap in NATO's air defenses** was exposed in broad daylight — or rather, in the darkness of night, where Russian drones were navigating. European governments were reluctant to publicly accuse **Russia** — out of fear of escalation, legal uncertainty, or concern about revealing the full extent of their own gaps. That reluctance helped the campaign to continue for a year and a half before shadow fleet vessel seizures by European navies in **2026** began to reduce the incidents. ## The sites targeted: a map of Russian nuclear ambition ### RAF Lakenheath, Kleine-Brogel, Volkel — the homes of American bombs in Europe The nuclear sites targeted by the Russian surveillance campaign are not ordinary facilities. **RAF Lakenheath** in **Suffolk**, **United Kingdom**, is a base prepared to host **American nuclear weapons** — and drone activity was detected precisely before the first American nuclear weapons were installed at the base in **July 2025**. As if the **GRU** knew before even local residents that weapons were in transit. **Kleine-Brogel** in **Belgium** and **Volkel** in the **Netherlands** are the two bases where American **B61 gravity bombs** are stored, intended to be dropped by allied combat aircraft in the event of a nuclear conflict. The surveillance of these bases by Russian drones fits a direct military logic: mapping security procedures, identifying vulnerabilities, pinpointing guard rotation patterns and alert response times. This is operational military planning, not simple diplomatic espionage. ### Île Longue and France's deterrent force **Île Longue**, in **Brittany**, is the home port of France's nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. Five drones were detected above this facility in **December 2025**. **France's nuclear deterrent**, which constitutes the second Western nuclear pillar after the **United States**, thus became a surveillance target of the Russian campaign. In the context where **France** was discussing extending its nuclear umbrella to other European countries, this surveillance takes on an even more significant strategic dimension. **RAF Fairford** in **Gloucestershire**, the operational base from which American **B-2 bombers** flew missions in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**, was also overflown. Several other American bases in **England** figure in the **144 incidents** analyzed. The geography of the surveillance reveals a consistent Russian preoccupation: mapping the entirety of the American tactical nuclear infrastructure deployed across **Europe**. ## The shadow fleet as an espionage infrastructure ### Tankers with switched-off transponders as mother ships One of the most striking aspects of this campaign is its deployment mechanism. Russian drones would not have taken off from Russian territory — their range would not permit coverage of all the sites targeted in Western Europe. They were reportedly launched from **shadow fleet** vessels: tankers and bulk carriers navigating with their **AIS transponders switched off**, invisible on civilian maritime surveillance systems, discreetly positioned off European coasts. The **Boracay** incident illustrates this concretely. In **September 2025**, drone sightings in **Copenhagen**'s airspace forced the airport's closure. Four shadow fleet tankers were nearby, including the **Boracay**. This vessel was seized four days later by French commandos, then released a few days after that. On board: a Chinese captain and two Russian nationals employed by the **Moran Security Group**. This is not a coincidence — it is an operation whose actors have been identified. ### Shadow fleet seizures as a belated countermeasure European navies began in **2026** to seize shadow fleet vessels more systematically — and The Guardian investigation notes that drone surveillance incidents have **"diminished since European navies began seizing those vessels in 2026."** This is direct confirmation of the link between the mother ships and the drone campaign. It is also a signal that **Europe** has a concrete lever to reduce this threat: monitoring, intercepting, and seizing shadow fleet vessels before they can launch their drones. But this countermeasure is belated. For **18 months**, shadow fleet vessels were able to operate with relative impunity in European waters. The complex legal procedures surrounding seizures on the high seas, combined with political reluctance to escalate with **Russia**, created an operating window that the **GRU** exploited methodically. It is a textbook case of how legal complexity and political caution can be exploited by an adversary without scruples. ## The presumed objectives of Russian surveillance ### Sabotage, disinformation, or operational preparation? The researchers who analyzed the campaign identify several possible objectives, not mutually exclusive. Pure **nuclear surveillance** — mapping the location, security, and capabilities of adversary nuclear sites — is the most obvious objective. **Mapping military logistics** and supply chains along observed routes is a second documented objective. **Preparation for potential sabotage operations** against critical infrastructure is a third scenario cited by European intelligence services. But the psychological dimension should not be underestimated. A surveillance campaign of this scale, even if it never produces kinetic action, sends a message to European governments: **"We know where your most precious weapons are, and you cannot stop us."** This is **psychological warfare** — a capability demonstration designed to sow doubt about the security of allied nuclear arsenals, and to complicate Western deterrence calculations. ### The link to documented Russian hybrid warfare in Europe This campaign does not exist in isolation. It is part of a documented fabric of **Russian hybrid warfare** across **Europe**: infrastructure sabotage (undersea cables in the **Baltic Sea**, pipelines, railways), arson at logistics warehouses, targeted disinformation against public opinion, cyberattacks against state institutions. The nuclear surveillance campaign is the most sensitive layer of this set of operations — the one that touches strategic deterrence and the nuclear balances that have guaranteed peace since **1945**. The **ECFR** (European Council on Foreign Relations) has documented in several reports the extent of Russian hybrid operations in **Western Europe** since **2022**. The **Guardian**'s revelation on nuclear drones adds a qualitatively new dimension to this picture: for the first time, the **Kremlin** is directly associated with systematic surveillance of Western nuclear weapons deployed on the continent. This is a line that even the Cold War did not always dare cross as openly. ## Possible responses: between managed escalation and defensive reinforcement ### Legal and operational options against spy drones What can **Europe** do against Russian drones overflying its nuclear sites? The options are more limited than one might expect. **Shooting down** a drone over national territory is legally possible but politically delicate — it creates a precedent, exposes the state that does it to accusations of destroying "civilian property" if the drone is registered under a commercial flag, and risks recovering debris that reveals sensitive technical information. **Jamming** drones is an option, but wide-spectrum anti-drone jammers can also disrupt surrounding civilian communications. The most effective short-term response proved to be **seizing the mother ships** — the shadow fleet tankers. This maritime approach, which intervenes before the drones are even launched, is less legally and politically exposed. It worked: incidents have diminished in **2026**. But it requires permanent maritime surveillance of European waters — itself a considerable investment in intelligence resources and naval presence. ### Toward anti-drone defence of nuclear sites The revelation of the Russian campaign has accelerated discussions in allied capitals about deploying **anti-drone systems** around sensitive nuclear sites. Technologies exist — directed energy lasers, interceptor drones, targeted jamming systems — but their large-scale deployment around all **NATO** nuclear facilities represents a colossal investment. It also requires modification of the legal frameworks in some countries, which currently do not allow the military to shoot down drones over national territory without civilian authority authorisation. The **United Kingdom**, **France**, **Belgium**, and the **Netherlands** have all engaged in discussions with their **NATO** partners on new nuclear site protection procedures. These discussions are particularly urgent for bases like **RAF Lakenheath** and **Kleine-Brogel**, where American nuclear weapons are deployed under **dual-key** arrangements involving both American forces and host governments. ## The implications for European nuclear deterrence ### When espionage erodes the credibility of deterrence Nuclear deterrence rests on a balance of calculated uncertainty: the adversary must not know precisely where the weapons are, how they are protected, or what the response timelines are. If the Russian surveillance campaign has provided the **GRU** with precise information about security procedures, guard rotation patterns, and the vulnerabilities of European nuclear sites, it has potentially eroded this protective uncertainty. That is the most troubling dimension of **The Guardian**'s revelation. Nuclear deterrence experts emphasise that **deterrence credibility** is not only a question of capability — it is also a question of the **perception of invulnerability**. An adversary who believes it has mapped the weaknesses of the opposing nuclear arsenal may calculate differently the risk of an operation against those facilities. Without going as far as a preemptive strike — an extreme scenario — better knowledge of allied nuclear sites may encourage more targeted sabotage or intimidation operations. ### The revelation as an alarm signal for reforms to come The publication of **The Guardian**'s investigation is not merely a journalistic act. It is political pressure for the governments concerned to take concrete measures. By making public the **144 incidents**, the targeted countries, the modus operandi, and the inadequate responses, researchers and journalists are forcing confidential discussions out of classified settings and into the public space. This is democratic accountability pressure on institutions that preferred silence. In the weeks following publication, parliamentary questions were tabled in the **United Kingdom**, **Belgium**, and the **Netherlands**. Defence ministries were forced to respond publicly for the first time about their anti-drone protection protocols for nuclear sites. This process — uncomfortable for governments — is healthy for democracy and necessary for security. Parliamentary and public oversight is one of the mechanisms that forces reforms which bureaucracies prefer to defer. ## Denmark, Ireland, and the incidents that almost went unnoticed ### Copenhagen airport closed by Russian drones In **September 2025**, drone sightings in **Copenhagen**'s airspace forced the temporary closure of the Danish capital's airport. The incident was attributed to the presence of four shadow fleet tankers in surrounding waters, including the **Boracay**. This closure of a major civilian airport because of suspected Russian military drones is one of the most tangible moments of Russian hybrid intrusion into the daily lives of European societies. This is not only a matter of military security — it is a concrete disruption of civilian life, measurable in flight delays and economic disruption. The fact that the **Boracay** was then seized by French commandos, released, and found to contain a Chinese captain and two Russian nationals from the **Moran Security Group** reveals the complexity of the actors involved in the shadow fleet. This is not an exclusively Russian operation: it mobilises flags of convenience, private security firms, and multinational crews. Untangling these networks is long and complex intelligence work that European agencies have begun but not completed. ### The Irish incident after Zelensky's visit The symbolic dimension of certain incidents deserves to be highlighted. In **December 2025**, four drones were reportedly observed above an Irish naval vessel near the Irish coast — on the very evening after an official visit by **Volodymyr Zelensky** to **Ireland**. If this timing is deliberate — and nothing allows us to rule it out — it represents a Russian message addressed directly to a country that had just hosted the Ukrainian president: **"We are watching you too."** This is targeted psychological warfare, adapted to the political events of the moment. **Ireland**, historically a neutral country, is not a **NATO** member. But its geographical proximity to the **United Kingdom** and its transatlantic undersea communications cables make it an actor in critical European infrastructure. Russian attention to **Ireland** in this context is not incidental — it reflects a precise understanding of the geography of European infrastructure vulnerabilities that the **GRU** is seeking to map exhaustively. ## The silence of governments and its costs ### Why capitals preferred to stay quiet European governments' reluctance to publicly accuse **Russia** of these incidents has several explanations. First, formal **attribution** of an espionage operation requires a level of evidence that classified intelligence allows achieving but that diplomats do not want to expose publicly. Formally accusing **Russia** means revealing intelligence sources and methods. Second, a formal accusation demands a formal response — and the question of what an appropriate response to nuclear site surveillance would look like creates potential escalation that nobody wanted to manage. Third, the concerned governments had to face an embarrassing reality: their own protection systems had failed. Admitting that Russian drones were overflying **RAF Lakenheath** or **Île Longue** with impunity for months, without being intercepted or captured, means admitting a massive, politically costly **security gap**. Silence was the path of least resistance in the short term — at the price of accumulated risk in the long term. ### The cost of strategic ambiguity The strategic ambiguity chosen by European governments in the face of the Russian drone campaign has a documented strategic cost. It allowed the campaign to continue uninterrupted for **18 months**. It reinforced the **GRU's** belief that this type of hybrid operation could be conducted without significant consequences. And it delayed the doctrinal reforms and anti-drone protection investments that could have reduced the exposure of nuclear sites. The cost-benefit ratio of this ambiguity is clearly negative. **The Guardian**'s revelation — and the parliamentary questions that will follow — shows that chosen opacity ultimately protects nobody. It merely delays the moment of reckoning while accumulating risk in the interim. Democracies need transparency about the hybrid threats they face — not to reassure their adversaries, but to mobilise the resources needed for their response. ## Conclusion: Europe needs an anti-drone doctrine equal to the threat ### 18 months too late — but not too late to act The Russian nuclear surveillance campaign lasted **18 months**. It involved **144 incidents** across more than a dozen countries. It targeted **NATO**'s most sensitive weapons — the components of nuclear deterrence that have guaranteed peace since the end of the Second World War. The European response was insufficient, belated, and politically inhibited. That is a severe assessment, but it is the honest one that **The Guardian**'s investigation imposes. The good news — if one can call it that — is that this revelation comes at a moment when **Europe** is rearming, strengthening its maritime surveillance capabilities, and revising its critical infrastructure protection doctrines. The British **DIP**, German rearmament, Polish and Baltic investments: all these processes now include a response to Russian hybrid warfare of which the nuclear drone campaign is the most serious manifestation. The awakening has happened — let us hope it is not too late. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [The Guardian — Russia mounted drone surveillance of European nuclear sites over 18 months — July 2, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/02/russia-mounted-drone-surveillance-of-european-nuclear-sites-over-18-months) - [Kyiv Independent — Russia-Ukraine war news — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com) - [Ukrinform — Ukraine news — July 2026](https://ukrinform.net) ### Secondary sources - [Interfax Ukraine — Ukraine news — July 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua) - Militarnyi — Ukraine defence news — July 2026 - [United24 Media — Ukraine news — July 2026](https://united24media.com) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/temoignage-18-mois-de-drones-russes-sur-les-sites-nucleaires-europeens-l-espionn