# Taiwan trains to survive, the West must train to act > Taiwan conducted, in early July 2026, a new round of national resilience exercises, simulating blockade and attack scenarios, as Chinese military incursions - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-07-07 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/taiwan-s-entraine-a-survivre-l-occident-doit-s-entrainer-a-agir ## Introduction: the routine that is no longer a drill ### Exercises that simulate the inevitable **Taiwan** conducted, in early **July 2026**, a new round of **national resilience exercises**, simulating **blockade** and **attack** scenarios, as Chinese military incursions around the island multiply at a worrying pace. This is no longer an isolated theoretical drill, but an increasingly frequent rehearsal of a threat **Taipei** now considers plausible in the short term. Taiwan's **Ministry of National Defense** confirmed these exercises, which mobilize not only the armed forces but also the civilian population, called on to prepare for power outages, supply disruptions, and prolonged territorial defense scenarios. ### Why this editorial is necessary Training to survive a blockade is no longer a theoretical exercise for **Taiwan**; it has become a routine of preparation for the inevitable. This editorial defends a simple thesis: what Taiwan practices at home, the West must practice in its decisions of support. *Training to survive a blockade is no longer a theoretical exercise for Taiwan, it has become a routine of preparation for the inevitable. And this normalization should alarm us as much as it impresses us.* ## What these exercises reveal about the perceived threat ### Preparation intensifying alongside Chinese incursions The frequency and intensity of these **resilience exercises** track directly with the curve of **Chinese military incursions** into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, a **clear signal** that **Taipei** no longer views **Beijing**'s **threat** as mere **rhetorical posturing**, but as a **concrete operational possibility**. These exercises cover varied scenarios: **civilian evacuation**, keeping **critical infrastructure** running under blockade, coordination between armed forces and civil defense, all elements suggesting **serious planning** rather than a mere show of political firmness. ### The psychological dimension of this preparation Beyond its practical dimension, this civilian preparation also plays an important psychological role: it sends a **message of resolve** to **Beijing** while accustoming the **Taiwanese** population to the idea that **confrontation**, though feared, is no longer unthinkable. *This psychological normalization impresses me as much as it saddens me. No people should have to get used to the idea of a blockade, but Taiwan does not have the luxury of illusion when it comes to China.* ## The West's relative silence in the face of this preparation ### Insufficient media coverage Despite the scale of these exercises, Western media coverage remains largely insufficient compared with the attention given to other geopolitical theaters, an **imbalance** that reflects a questionable **strategic prioritization** at the very moment **China** is intensifying its military pressure on the island. This relative media silence contrasts with the gravity of the documented situation on the ground, where each new round of Taiwanese civilian exercises confirms **preparation** for a scenario most **Western analysts** now consider a matter of time rather than probability. However, the disparity becomes even more striking when compared with the extensive coverage devoted to other flashpoints of comparable or lesser strategic weight, a discrepancy that says as much about Western editorial priorities as it does about the actual severity of the Taiwan question. ### What this silence costs Western preparedness This deficit in media attention also translates into a deficit of political preparedness in the **West**, where **decision-makers** struggle to anticipate the **economic** and **security consequences** of an actual blockade of **Taiwan**, which nonetheless sits at the heart of **global semiconductor production**. *I find this Western silence irresponsible. While Taiwan keeps rehearsing blockade scenarios, our governments continue treating this threat as a distant problem rather than an immediate strategic emergency.* Indeed, this pattern of delayed attention is not unique to Taiwan; it mirrors a broader Western tendency to treat authoritarian pressure as background noise until it erupts into open crisis, at which point the cost of catching up is inevitably higher than the cost of early prevention would have been. ## What Taiwan concretely expects from its partners ### Beyond symbolic statements of support **Taiwan** is not looking only for symbolic statements of support from its Western partners, but for a more tangible commitment in military cooperation, **intelligence sharing**, and support for its own **defense industry**, notably in the strategic drone sector. This expectation reflects an evolution in Taiwanese strategy, which increasingly relies on the **autonomy** of its own **deterrence capability** rather than exclusive dependence on a hypothetical military intervention by its allies in the event of open conflict with **Beijing**. Notably, this shift also reduces the political risk for partner nations, since strengthening Taiwan's own capacity requires fewer public commitments than an explicit promise of direct military intervention would. ### A resilience that must also be economic Beyond military and civilian preparation, **Taiwan** is also seeking to strengthen its economic resilience, notably by diversifying its **critical supply chains** to reduce its vulnerability to a prolonged blockade that would isolate the island from the **rest of the world**. *I understand this Taiwanese quest for autonomy perfectly. No democracy should base its survival solely on the promise of a foreign intervention that might arrive too late.* ## China, an attentive observer of this preparation ### Military pressure that shows no sign of easing While **Taiwan** steps up its resilience exercises, **China** continues its own military pressure around the island, through repeated **aerial** and **naval incursions** that regularly test the reaction capabilities of **Taiwanese** armed forces without crossing the **threshold of open conflict**. This constant pressure, without triggering direct hostilities, corresponds to a Chinese gray-zone warfare strategy aimed at **gradually wearing down** Taiwanese resources and vigilance rather than provoking an immediate confrontation with unpredictable consequences for **Beijing**. This gradual approach considerably complicates the Western response, since no single incident seems serious enough to justify an immediate collective reaction, even as the accumulation of these incidents progressively reshapes the regional strategic balance to **Taiwan**'s detriment. Moreover, this incremental method allows Beijing to test Western resolve in small, reversible increments, gauging each response before calibrating the next provocation accordingly. ### Why this Chinese strategy makes Taiwanese resilience essential Facing this strategy of continuous pressure, the **civilian resilience** developed by **Taiwan** becomes a deterrence tool in its own right, demonstrating to **Beijing** that a blockade or invasion would meet a prepared population rather than a country caught off guard. *I believe this Taiwanese civilian resilience constitutes, in itself, a form of deterrence. A prepared population costs more to conquer than a surprised one, and Beijing knows this perfectly well.* ## What recent history teaches about these preparations ### The Ukrainian precedent as a reference The **Ukrainian** experience since **2022** offers an instructive precedent for **Taiwan**: countries that invest early in **civilian resilience** and **defensive preparedness** withstand aggression better than those relying solely on a rapid external intervention. This comparison is not perfect, given how much the geographic and military contexts differ between **Eastern Europe** and the **Taiwan Strait**, but it strengthens the **legitimacy** of Taiwan's strategy of **intensive civilian preparation** over passive wait-and-see. ### What Taiwan has learned from this precedent **Taiwanese** officials have explicitly cited lessons from the **Ukrainian** conflict in designing their own resilience exercises, notably on the importance of keeping **critical infrastructure operational** under the strain of a prolonged conflict. *I see in this Ukrainian reference a universal lesson for every threatened democracy: resilience is built before the crisis, never during it.* ## What the West must do, not just say ### Support that must precede the crisis This editorial defends a clear position: the **West** cannot afford to passively observe **Taiwanese** preparation while reserving its concrete support for the moment a crisis has already erupted, a scenario in which **aid** would almost certainly arrive **too late** to be fully effective. Western support must precede the crisis, through an immediate strengthening of defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and economic support for the **Taiwanese** industry, particularly in the semiconductor sector and autonomous defense technologies. ### The price of inaction would be immense Western inaction in the face of this **Taiwanese** preparation would carry a potentially immense cost, not only for regional **Indo-Pacific** security, but also for the global economy, heavily dependent on semiconductor production concentrated on the island. *I'll say it plainly: if the West waits for a blockade to begin before acting, it will have already lost the most important part of this confrontation, the preparation phase.* ## What these exercises cost the economy and daily life ### A collective effort that disrupts daily routines These **resilience exercises** are not without cost to the **Taiwanese** population: temporary interruptions of economic activity, mobilization of considerable public resources, and repeated disruption of daily life in urban areas where the most intensive **blockade** and **attack** simulations take place. This cost, however, is accepted by a majority of the **Taiwanese** population according to available polls, a sign that awareness of the **Chinese** threat has reached a level sufficient to justify these temporary sacrifices in the name of preparation deemed necessary. ### A model other democracies should study This **Taiwanese** model of integrated civilian preparation deserves careful study by other democracies exposed to similar threats, notably the **Baltic** and **Eastern European** countries facing continuous pressure from **Russia**, who could draw practical lessons from this systematic approach. Exporting this model is not limited to the military sphere: it also encompasses economic, energy, and communication dimensions that could inspire a more coherent Western approach to converging **authoritarian** threats. *I believe this Taiwanese model deserves serious study by every Western democracy exposed to an authoritarian threat. Civilian preparedness is not paranoia, it is basic political responsibility.* ## Conclusion: a lesson in preparedness for every democracy ### What Taiwan demonstrates to the world The series of **resilience exercises** conducted by **Taiwan** in early **July 2026** illustrates a simple but often overlooked truth: the best defense against authoritarian aggression begins well before that aggression materializes, through systematic preparation of the population and critical infrastructure. This Taiwanese preparation deserves to be recognized not as a sign of excessive alarmism, but as a model of democratic responsibility in the face of a threat clearly identified and documented for years. ### The test this preparation represents for the West The real test does not concern **Taiwan**'s capacity to prepare, already demonstrated by these repeated exercises, but the **West**'s capacity to turn its rhetorical admiration for this resilience into concrete commitments before a crisis makes the question tragically urgent. *I close with a firm conviction: admiration is no longer enough. Taiwan has done its preparation homework; it is now up to the West to do its own, before it is too late to act usefully.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - Ukraine's Ministry of Defence — official statements - Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense — official statements - Army Inform — defense news ### Secondary sources - Foreign Policy — coverage of China-Taiwan tensions - Al Jazeera — Asia-Pacific geopolitical coverage - WION — international coverage --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/taiwan-s-entraine-a-survivre-l-occident-doit-s-entrainer-a-agir