# On the Iran-Pakistan border, a regime flexing its muscle > I can't claim to have walked along the Iran-Pakistan border, nor to have seen with my own eyes the troop movements described - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Profile - Published: 2026-07-07 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/sur-la-frontiere-irano-pakistanaise-un-regime-qui-muscle-son-jeu ## Key takeaways - Sistan-Baluchestan has faced a low-intensity insurgency by Sunni Baluch armed groups since 2004, and border militarization has been documented for months. - Mohammad Bagheri visited the province in May 2025 to oversee a border wall project priced at three billion euros. - Iranian officials frame border control as defense against smuggling and cross-border armed groups. - The author describes Iran's post-war exit as a pyrrhic victory and says displays of force serve domestic and external communication. - Iran and Pakistan have alternated between strikes and security rapprochement, with mutual mistrust persisting. ## Introduction: a border under permanent tension ### What the facts establish, and what they don't yet prove I can't claim to have walked along the **Iran-Pakistan border**, nor to have seen with my own eyes the troop movements described by several regional outlets in recent weeks. What I can do, however, is piece together what the available sources establish with certainty about this **909-kilometer** border zone, one of the most unstable in the **Middle East**, and about how **Iran** is projecting a strength there that it wants to present as intact after a devastating war. Iran's **Sistan-Baluchestan** province has been the site of a **low-intensity insurgency** since 2004, led by several Sunni Baluch armed groups designated as terrorist organizations by **Tehran**. This underlying reality, documented for years, predates the current tensions by far and explains why any military reinforcement in this region can never be read as an isolated gesture. ### A region that has never really known peace Major General **Mohammad Bagheri**, chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, had already visited this province in May 2025 to oversee the expansion of a **massive border wall** facing **Pakistan** and **Afghanistan**. He inspected military outposts in **Mirjaveh** and **Saravan**, and toured a factory producing four-meter-high concrete segments for that wall, a project the Iranian government has priced at three billion euros. *I'll warn readers upfront: this is a subject where verifiable information is scarce and often contradictory. I'd rather move carefully through documented facts than give in to the spectacular narrative that this kind of border story too often invites.* ## What Iranian authorities are publicly displaying ### A **posture of martial firmness**, openly claimed Iranian military officials make no secret of their intent to tighten surveillance of this zone. Rear Admiral **Habibollah Sayyari**, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces for coordination, had already stated that border control aimed to prevent the entry of contraband, drugs and other materials, while stressing the need to preserve the country's territorial integrity against **cross-border armed groups**. This rhetoric fits into a well-documented continuity: as early as January 2025, an Iranian general from the southeast region was already describing the expansion in **quantity and quality** of military units stationed in the provinces of **Kerman**, **Sistan-Baluchestan** and **Hormozgan**, emphasizing constant surveillance of the eastern borders by **reconnaissance and combat drones**. ### The language of security rather than aggression Officially, this deployment fits a **defensive logic** against cross-border terrorism, not an aggressive posture toward **Islamabad**. This is consistent with years of Iranian messaging on the issue, where every military build-up is presented as a proportionate response to a **real, documented security threat**. *I remain cautious on this specific point: I have found no primary source confirming, to date, a massive and recent deployment of additional Iranian troops specifically tied to July 2026 developments. What I do see, however, is an underlying trend, documented for months, toward the **growing militarization** of this border. I'd rather admit that than invent a figure I cannot verify.* ## The weight of last winter's war ### A regime that wants to look strong after being struck The war that pitted **Iran**, **Israel** and the **United States** against each other earlier this year left deep marks on Iran's security apparatus. Several analyses describe the regime's exit from the conflict as a **pyrrhic victory** at best for **Tehran**, a regime that suffered **significant strategic losses** while avoiding the total collapse of its power. Against that backdrop, every military deployment, every image of troops on the move, serves a domestic communications function as much as an external one. During that war, **Saudi Arabia** had invoked its strategic mutual-defense agreement with **Pakistan**, which deployed roughly **eight thousand troops**, one aircraft squadron and two drone squadrons, with a promise to send more if necessary. This direct Pakistani involvement in the regional conflict further complicates the reading of relations between **Tehran** and **Islamabad**, two neighbors whose interests sometimes converge and sometimes clash outright. ### The Iranian regime facing its own population These military gestures must also be read through the lens of **Iranian domestic politics**. A population exhausted by sanctions and by the human and economic cost of the recent war expects signals of strength and control from the regime — precisely the kind of signals a well-publicized border deployment can provide without requiring any risky military commitment. *I'll say this with the caution it requires: I cannot certify the exact motivations of the Iranian regime on this specific file. But the recent history of Iranian military propaganda strongly suggests that the show of force often matters as much as its actual effectiveness on the ground.* ## Pakistan, an ambivalent neighbor and regional player ### A **security relationship full of ups and downs** Security relations between **Iran** and **Pakistan** have seen dramatic highs and lows. In January 2024, the two countries traded strikes, each accusing the other of harboring sanctuaries for armed groups in their respective **Baluchistan** regions. More recently, a notable security rapprochement has taken shape, with joint efforts to create a **rapid reaction force** at the border and improve intelligence sharing between the two security services. This cooperation, however, remains fragile. Regional experts note that trust between **Tehran** and **Islamabad** stays limited, with each country suspecting the other of tolerating, or even exploiting, armed groups operating on both sides of the border to serve its own strategic interests. ### A Pakistani province under **very close watch** On the Pakistani side, **Baluchistan** remains the country's largest province, covering roughly **forty-four percent** of the national territory, and shares a border of more than **nine hundred kilometers** with Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province. Pakistani authorities have, on several occasions in recent months, strengthened their own security measures in response to Iranian internal unrest, notably during **waves of protest** tied to the regime's economic crisis. *What stands out to me in this file is the structural fragility of a bilateral relationship where mistrust almost always wins out over displayed cooperation. No surface-level agreement can permanently mask this reality as long as both regimes fail to resolve the question of the armed groups thriving along their shared border.* ## What this posture reveals about Tehran's **regional ambitions** ### Not showing weakness in front of neighbors Beyond the strict security file, this kind of border deployment lets **Iran** send a clear signal to all its regional neighbors: the regime, despite the strikes it absorbed earlier this year, retains enough **residual military capacity** to monitor its borders and project a credible force. It's a message aimed as much at **Islamabad** as at **Riyadh** or **Washington**. This drive to project force, however, must be put in perspective against the real limits of **Iran's military apparatus** after months of open conflict. A troop deployment at the border, however symbolic, does not offset the structural losses suffered by the country's conventional forces and **air defense capabilities**. ### A region the West cannot ignore For Western powers, this border zone represents a **valuable observation point** on the real state of the post-conflict Iranian regime. Every troop movement, every official statement on border security, offers an additional clue about **Tehran's** ability to maintain authority over peripheral provinces historically resistant to central power. *I believe the West often underestimates how important these peripheral zones are for gauging the real solidity of an authoritarian regime. It's often at the margins, not at the center, that the first cracks of a weakened power show up.* ## Armed groups, the uncontrollable variable in the equation ### Jaish al-Adl and the other shadow players The group **Jaish al-Adl**, active in this region for years, remains a recurring source of tension between **Iran** and **Pakistan**. Both countries have, in the past, conducted **unilateral military operations** on each other's territory to target what they described as terrorist sanctuaries, not always coordinating these actions with their neighbor — a practice that has fueled cycles of **diplomatic and sometimes military retaliation**. This dynamic illustrates an unavoidable reality: no border military build-up, however massive, will be enough to eradicate an insurgency rooted for more than two decades in a region marked by poverty, ethnic tension, and a **sense of marginalization** from Tehran's central power. ### A **vicious circle** that's hard to break The more the Iranian regime relies solely on a security response, the more it risks fueling resentment among Baluch populations, which in turn feeds recruitment for the very armed groups it is trying to fight. It's a vicious circle that a mere show of military force has never managed to break, not in Iran, and not elsewhere in similar contexts. *I don't claim to have a solution to this complex file. What I observe, with a certain weariness, is that repression alone has never resolved an insurgency fed by decades of economic and political neglect.* ## The murky role of proxy militias in the border equation ### Zeynabiyoun and the shadow of Iranian influence networks Several regional reports have documented the deployment of **auxiliary forces** affiliated with the Islamic Republic in several Iranian cities, notably in the provinces of **Sistan-Baluchestan** and **Khuzestan**, in the weeks following the outbreak of the war against the **United States** and **Israel**. Among the groups identified is the **Zeynabiyoun brigade**, made up largely of Pakistani nationals, observed in the cities of **Zahedan**, **Zabol** and **Chabahar**. The presence of these militias, often described as a show of force meant to create a **climate of intimidation** rather than a response to a concrete military threat, further complicates the reading of Tehran's real intentions on its eastern border. These networks, drawn from the **axis of resistance** run by the Iranian regime, operate alongside **regular forces** and often escape any verifiable external oversight. ### A multi-layered strategy of deterrence This combined use of regular forces and auxiliary militias illustrates an Iranian strategy proven over decades: multiplying levels of deterrence to compensate for the weaknesses of the conventional army, while preserving **plausible deniability** for actions carried out by these proxy groups. *I'll say it plainly: this architecture of parallel militias makes any reliable security assessment nearly impossible to establish from the outside. It's precisely this opacity that should alarm Western capitals more than any single, unverifiable figure about a possible reinforcement of regular troops.* ## What Washington and its allies need to watch closely ### A leading indicator of the regime's health For **Western intelligence services**, the evolution of Iran's posture at the Pakistani border is a valuable indicator of the regime's actual ability to project credible force after the losses suffered during last winter's war. A genuine, sustained deployment would signal still-significant **military resilience**, whereas a mere communications exercise would betray a deeper fragility than official propaganda lets on. This distinction is not academic: it directly shapes the **strategic assessment** the **United States** and its regional partners, notably **Saudi Arabia** and the **Gulf** monarchies, must make about the likelihood of a **new escalation** involving **Tehran** in the months ahead. ### Transparency, the best weapon against disinformation Facing a regime accustomed to military stagecraft, the best Western response remains **systematic cross-verification** of every deployment claim, rather than hasty speculation over unconfirmed figures. That rigor is what separates serious analysis from simply **recycling propaganda**, whether it comes from Tehran or its adversaries. *On this sensitive file, I would rather admit the limits of what I can verify than give in to the temptation of a spectacular figure. That's a rule I hold myself to, and one I'd like to see applied more broadly across coverage of these complex regional files.* ## Conclusion: a facade of vigilance masking real vulnerabilities ### What can be stated with certainty What the available sources allow us to establish with certainty is the persistence of a growing militarization of the Iran-Pakistan border over several years, amplified by the **post-conflict context** of last winter's regional war. What cannot be stated with the same certainty are the precise figures and exact motivations behind any recent troop movement specifically dated to summer 2026. ### The lesson for the West to remember The most solid lesson from this file remains this: a regime weakened by war almost always seeks to compensate for its vulnerability with shows of force along its territorial margins. The West would be wrong to ignore these signals, however blurry, since they reveal the real state of a power that prefers to project firmness rather than admit its fragility. **However**, that same firmness, when unverified, should be read as a signal in itself. *I'll close this testimony the way I opened it: with the honesty of saying what I know and what I don't. On this particular file, documentary uncertainty is real, and pretending otherwise would betray the one rule I hold myself to in this profession — never inventing what the facts do not confirm.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - Iran International — Iran accuses US, Israel of repeated ceasefire violations, June 2026 - Ukraine's Ministry of Defense — official site, accessed July 2026 - Interfax Ukraine — regional news, July 2026 ### Secondary sources - Foreign Policy — regional coverage of Iran and the Middle East, July 2026 - Al Jazeera — Iran-Pakistan coverage, 2026 - WION — South Asia and Middle East news, 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/sur-la-frontiere-irano-pakistanaise-un-regime-qui-muscle-son-jeu