# DECODING: Section 122 and Trump tariffs — when the Supreme Court forces protectionism to reinvent itself

> On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that would force the Trump administration to rewrite its entire trade arsenal. In Learning Resources v. Trump, the Court ruled 6 to 3 — with Chief Justice John Roberts writing the majority opinion — that the

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/section-122-et-tarifs-trump-quand-la-cour-supreme-force-une-reinvention-du-prote

## Introduction: February 20, 2026 — the Court breaks Trump's toy

### The Learning Resources v. Trump ruling — a historic 6-3

On **February 20, 2026**, the **United States Supreme Court** issued a decision that would force the Trump administration to rewrite its entire trade arsenal. In **Learning Resources v. Trump**, the Court ruled **6 to 3** — with Chief Justice **John Roberts** writing the majority opinion — that the **IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act)** did not authorize the president to impose sweeping general tariffs. Roberts used a pointed formulation: **"extravagant by any measure"** — to describe the presidential interpretation of the IEEPA.

This decision dismantled the primary legal lever the Trump administration had been using to impose universal **10%** tariffs and higher targeted tariffs on specific trading partners. Within hours, the most ambitious — and most contested — tariff strategy since the 1930s was left without a legal foundation. The White House response was immediate and revealing: Trump signed the same day a rarely-used statute that would become the new pivot of his trade strategy.

### Section 122: an old statute brought back to life

**Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974** is a legislative instrument that had been gathering dust in the congressional archives for half a century. It authorizes the president to impose a **maximum 15% surcharge** on imports for a period of no more than **150 days** under circumstances of serious balance-of-payments imbalance. Trump invoked it on **February 20, 2026** to impose an initial **10%** surcharge on all American imports — replacing, in emergency fashion, the IEEPA tariffs invalidated by the Supreme Court.

The problem was immediately apparent: the **150-day** limit written into the statute meant that Section 122 would expire around **July 20, 2026**. The administration had therefore bought only a few months to rebuild its tariff architecture on more solid legal foundations. This deadline immediately raised the question of what would happen after — and what other legal tools the administration could use to sustain its protectionist policy.

*Watching Trump pivot his tariff policy from IEEPA to Section 122 within hours of the Supreme Court ruling is to observe the American protectionist machine in all its resilience. You can invalidate a lever. You cannot invalidate the political determination that drives it. The question is whether the replacement solutions are equally effective.*

## The International Trade Court invalidates Section 122 tariffs

### The CIT ruling of May 7, 2026 — a second legal blow

On **May 7, 2026**, the **Court of International Trade (CIT)** delivered a second blow to Trump's tariffs by declaring the Section 122 tariffs **invalid as contrary to law**. The CIT determined that the conditions for invoking Section 122 — a serious and imminent balance-of-payments imbalance — were not met in the case of Trump's universal tariffs, which aimed to alter trade behavior rather than respond to a balance-of-payments emergency in the strict sense of the statute.

But there was a crucial caveat: the CIT ruling was accompanied by a **stay of execution** pending appeal. This stay means the tariffs continue to be collected while the case moves up the judicial chain. American importers paying these tariffs therefore began accumulating refund claims — through a system called **CAPE (Customs and Automated Payments for Exports)** — in hopes of being reimbursed if courts ultimately confirm the tariffs' invalidity. Phase 2 of the CAPE portal was scheduled to open on **June 29, 2026**.

### The logic of the stay — why the tariffs continue

The logic of a **stay pending appeal** is a pragmatic decision by the American judicial system: immediately stopping the collection of billions of dollars in tariffs based on a single first-instance ruling would create immediate economic and commercial chaos. But maintaining the tariffs while awaiting the final appeal outcome means that **billions of dollars** are being collected on the basis of a policy that courts have found illegal — a paradox that trade lawyers describe as a practical denial of rights for importers.

Appeal proceedings at the **Federal Circuit** level and potentially the **Supreme Court** could take one to two years. In the meantime, tariffs apply, goods become more expensive, supply chains adapt — and businesses are betting on the final outcome. This is a massive legal uncertainty that is itself an economic cost, independent of whatever tariff rate is applied.

*Legal uncertainty may be the least visible but most durable economic cost of Trump's tariffs. Companies do not know whether they will pay tariffs in six months. They do not know whether they will be reimbursed for what they have already paid. This uncertainty paralyzes investment decisions — and it is an invisible tax on the entire economy.*

## Section 301 as a potential successor — what Bessent said

### The Treasury Secretary and the transition to Section 301

Facing the imminent expiration of Section 122 tariffs and ongoing judicial uncertainties, Treasury Secretary **Scott Bessent** signaled that the administration was preparing to use **Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974** as a replacement mechanism. Section 301 authorizes the **United States Trade Representative (USTR)** to impose tariffs on countries adopting unfair trade practices — and its interpretation is potentially broader and legally more defensible than IEEPA or Section 122.

The **USTR** had launched Section 301 investigations against **60 economies** in the weeks following the Supreme Court ruling. These investigations are a procedural prerequisite for imposing Section 301 tariffs — they justify presidential action through a documented administrative process, reducing the risk of judicial invalidation. Bessent had stated that Section 301 would allow the administration to **restore tariff levels** once investigations were completed.

### Section 301 vs. IEEPA vs. Section 122 — the key differences

Understanding the differences between these three instruments is essential to decoding Trump's tariff strategy. The **IEEPA** allowed unilateral and immediate imposition based on a national emergency declaration — fast but constitutionally fragile, as the Supreme Court confirmed. **Section 122** allowed temporary imposition limited to 150 days and a maximum 15% — a short-range solution. **Section 301** requires preliminary investigations but offers a more robust legal basis, potentially permanent tariffs, and potentially unlimited rates — at the cost of a procedural delay of several months.

The Trump administration therefore used a sequence: IEEPA to impose quickly, Section 122 as an emergency backup, Section 301 as the permanent solution under construction. It is a tariff architecture built under legal pressure — pragmatic, but revealing the constitutional limits of a protectionist strategy that had not fully anticipated judicial resistance of this magnitude.

*Trump is playing tariff chess with the courts as his opponent. Every move is blocked, and he finds another move. It is exhausting for trading partners who must adapt to each pivot. It is also, in a certain way, a demonstration that the American system of separation of powers functions — even facing a president who pushes it to its limits.*

## The impact on trading partners — Canada, Europe, China

### Canada and the progressive exception

**Canada**, the United States' primary trading partner, has been particularly affected by Trump's tariffs. Tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, automotive tariffs, and general tariffs have created significant bilateral tensions in a commercial relationship long presented as a model of North American economic integration. The **Carney government** — elected in part on its management of the Washington relationship — had to negotiate partial exemptions while maintaining **retaliatory measures** on politically targeted American goods.

The **CUSMA (Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement)** provides dispute resolution mechanisms, but they are slow and their outcomes do not directly bind the American president. Canada has turned toward **trade diversification** — notably toward Europe through **CETA** and toward Asia-Pacific — to reduce its dependence on exports to a market subject to unpredictable tariffs. This diversification is a rational response to structural American unpredictability.

### Europe and digital services taxes

On **June 26, 2026**, Trump threatened to impose tariffs of **100%** on countries maintaining **digital services taxes (DSTs)** targeting American companies — notably the **tech giants** (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple). This threat directly targets **France**, which has imposed a 3% DST on digital revenues, and other European countries considering similar measures. It is a further escalation in the digital trade war between Washington and Brussels.

The **European Union** responded with a dual strategy: negotiating a comprehensive digital taxation agreement within the **OECD** framework to avoid bilateral confrontation, while maintaining its position that digital companies must pay taxes where they generate their revenue. This confrontation over DSTs is symptomatic of a deeply strained transatlantic commercial relationship — going well beyond tariffs on industrial goods.

*Digital services taxes are the next front in the trade war between the United States and Europe. And this war directly touches European consumers and companies using American platforms. The American response of 100% tariffs is disproportionate — but it reveals one thing: Washington will not let Europe tax its tech giants without retaliating with the full force of its commercial power.*

## The CAPE portal and tariff refunds — importers in the fog

### The CAPE Phase 2 mechanism — how it works

The **CAPE (Customs and Automated Payments for Exports)** Phase 2 portal, scheduled to open on **June 29, 2026**, is designed to allow American importers to file refund claims for tariffs paid under tariff regimes that have been declared invalid by the courts. The mechanism is simple in theory: the importer documents its payments, submits them through the portal, and receives — theoretically — a refund once invalidity is definitively confirmed.

In practice, the system is complicated by **procedural uncertainty**: the courts have not yet rendered their final verdict. Refunds are not certain until the government's appeal is decided. Importers must therefore make a delicate financial calculation: file claims now (administrative cost, capital tied up) to maximize their chances of future reimbursement, or wait for legal certainty (risk of missed deadlines or procedures).

### The impact on small and medium-sized importing businesses

**Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)** importing goods are those most affected by this uncertainty. Large multinationals have legal and financial teams capable of navigating the complexity of the CAPE portal and financing the wait for refunds. SMEs, by contrast, face **immediate cash flow problems**: paying tariffs on imports compresses their margins, sometimes to the point of nonviability, without any guarantee of short-term reimbursement.

The firm **Sheppard Mullin**, specializing in international trade law, has documented hundreds of cases of American SMEs in difficulty because of this tariff uncertainty. The aggregate economic cost — in terms of compressed margins, delayed investments, and disrupted supply chains — is difficult to quantify precisely but is unanimously recognized as significant by economists who have analyzed available data.

*SMEs are paying the price of Trump's trade war without seeing its strategic benefits. They are the ones concretely financing the protectionist policy — not the large multinationals that have the means to relocate their supply chains. It is an economic injustice that deserves to be named clearly.*

## Section 301 investigations against 60 economies — an unprecedented scope

### A mass investigation as tariff preparation

Launching **Section 301** investigations against **60 economies** simultaneously is an unprecedented act in the history of American international trade. Traditionally, Section 301 investigations targeted specific countries or sectors — China for intellectual property, for example. Targeting 60 economies at once transforms Section 301 from a surgical tool into an instrument of global commercial pressure.

The targeted countries cover virtually all of the United States' major trading partners: the European Union (treated as a single entity), Japan, South Korea, India, Mexico, Canada, Australia, and a range of emerging economies. The investigations concern **unfair trade practices** — subsidies, currency manipulation, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property violations. The list of grievances is long, documented, and largely legitimate — even if the universal tariff response is debated.

### The WTO's reaction and the limits of commercial multilateralism

The **World Trade Organization (WTO)** has responded to Trump's tariffs with available tools — notably the **Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)** — but these tools are structurally limited. The DSB can find that a tariff violates WTO rules, but implementing its decisions depends on the goodwill of the states concerned. And the United States under Trump has clearly signaled it will not allow itself to be constrained by multilateral panels.

The WTO crisis runs deeper than Trump's tariffs alone: its appellate mechanism has been paralyzed since the United States blocked new judge appointments in 2019. It is an **institutional crisis of commercial multilateralism** that Trump has aggravated but did not create alone. Europe and other trading partners must decide whether they want to revive the WTO or build alternative commercial governance mechanisms — a decision that will shape the global economic order for decades to come.

*The WTO has been in structural crisis since 2019. Trump accelerated it but did not cause it. If Europe and its partners want an international trade order based on rules, they must invest in repairing it — not simply complain about what Trump does in his own space. That is a collective responsibility, not just an American one.*

## Tariffs on technology — Huawei, chips, and the tech war

### The technological dimension of Trump's tariffs

**Trump**'s tariffs do not only target traditional industrial goods — steel, aluminum, automobiles. They are part of a broader strategy of **technological decoupling** from China. Restrictions on exports of **advanced semiconductors** to China, Section 301 investigations on Chinese technologies, and tariffs on Chinese solar panels and batteries form a coherent whole aimed at **reducing American dependence** on Chinese technologies and maintaining American technological superiority.

This technology war has profound consequences for global **semiconductor** supply chains. **TSMC** (Taiwan), **Samsung** (South Korea), and **Intel** (United States) are the central players in a reconstitution of chip manufacturing chains that Trump's tariffs are accelerating. The American objective — repatriating chip production to the United States via the **CHIPS Act** — is strategically logical but industrially complex and expensive in the short term.

### Tariffs as industrial policy — and their limits

The vision behind Trump's tariffs is not purely protectionist in the classical sense. It is also an **industrial policy** aimed at incentivizing the relocation of strategic production to the United States or to trusted allies — what is called **friend-shoring** or **near-shoring**. This logic is defended by economists who argue that national security considerations justify some short-term economic inefficiency.

But the limits are real: tariffs are a blunt instrument for nuanced industrial policy. They increase input costs for American industries dependent on imports. They trigger retaliation that reduces American exports. And they do not necessarily incentivize companies to invest in the United States if other factors — labor costs, infrastructure, workforce qualifications — remain less favorable than elsewhere. The **CHIPS Act** and the **Inflation Reduction Act** are necessary complements to tariffs — but their long-term effectiveness remains to be demonstrated.

*Tariffs as industrial policy is using a hammer to place a thumbtack. It can work — but only if the hammer is accompanied by the right investment, training, and infrastructure policy. Without those complements, tariffs create more collateral damage than they build lasting industrial capacity.*

## What July 20 means — the expiration of Section 122

### A countdown that is accelerating

With **Section 122** expiring around **July 20, 2026**, the Trump administration faces a critical deadline. If Section 301 investigations are not sufficiently advanced to justify immediate imposition, and if no other legal mechanism is ready, there will be a period — perhaps brief, perhaps extended — in which Trump's universal tariffs will have no clear operational legal basis. That is a **window of vulnerability** for the presidential trade strategy.

Sources close to the **USTR**, cited by CNBC on **June 26, 2026**, suggest that Section 301 decisions could be made public before July 20 to close this gap. The urgency is real: every day without clear tariffs sends a signal to trading partners that American pressure may be easing — a signal the Trump administration wants to avoid at all costs.

### What trading partners can expect after July 2026

For the United States' trading partners — Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea — the post-July 20 period is navigable uncertainty. If Section 301 tariffs take over, they will likely be **more targeted** than the universal tariffs — offering greater sectoral predictability. If tariffs temporarily disappear during the judicial appeal, it is a window of opportunity to renegotiate bilateral agreements.

In any case, the fundamental direction of American trade policy will not change: **Trump believes in protectionism**, in commercial reciprocity, and in American reindustrialization. The legal tools may vary — IEEPA, Section 122, Section 301 — but the objective remains constant. Trading partners that have invested in diversifying their exports and negotiating alternative agreements are those that will best weather this new American trade reality.

*Trump's trade policy is predictable in its objectives — protectionism, reciprocity, reindustrialization — and unpredictable in its means. That combination is the most difficult to manage for trading partners. Anticipating the ends rather than the means is probably the best available adaptation strategy.*

## Conclusion: a legally fragile but politically determined tariff landscape

### The resilience of American protectionism in the face of the courts

The legal sequence around Trump's tariffs — IEEPA invalidation, Section 122, Section 301 investigations — demonstrates one fundamental thing: the political determination of the Trump administration to maintain high tariffs is structurally stronger than the legal obstacles it encounters. Every time a mechanism is invalidated, another is activated. The American protectionist machine does not stop in the face of a court ruling — it pivots.

This resilience has lasting implications for the **international trade system**. If the United States — the world's largest economy — can circumvent WTO rules and invalidate its own multilateral commitments through a succession of internal legal instruments, the normative framework of international trade is fundamentally weakened. **Europe**, **Canada**, and other trading partners must draw the consequences: commercial multilateralism cannot rely solely on Washington to defend it.

### The future of transatlantic trade relations

The transatlantic trade relationship is experiencing a structural crisis that Section 122 or Section 301 alone do not explain. The fundamental divergence between a Europe that believes in multilateral rules and a Trumpist America that believes in bilateral power is a worldview gap in economics. This divergence does not preclude cooperation on other fronts — defense, NATO, Ukraine, China — but it makes every trade round difficult and costly.

The **West** needs stable trade rules to finance its rearmament, support Ukraine, and maintain pressure on **Russia**, **China**, **Iran**, and **North Korea**. Trade wars within the Alliance directly undermine this collective capacity. That may be the strongest argument for Washington and Brussels to finally find common ground on trade — not for idealist reasons, but for concrete strategic ones.

*The transatlantic trade war is the conflict no one can afford but everyone seems prepared to sustain indefinitely. This decoding reminded me of one thing: legal and economic systems are human constructions, not natural laws. They can be changed. They can be improved. The question is always whether the political will is there to do it.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [CNBC — Trump tariffs, Section 122, tech taxes, and 100% threats — June 26, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/26/trump-tariff-trade-tech-tax.html)

- [Sheppard Mullin — Legal status of Section 122 tariffs after the CIT ruling — June 2026](https://www.sheppardmullin.com/insights/2026/06/section-122-tariffs-legal-status-june-2026/)

- [Tariffs Tool — Section 122 expiration, CAPE Phase 2 portal, refund timeline — June 2026](https://tarifftool.com/updates/section-122-expiration-cape-phase-2-june-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- BBH — U.S. tariff policy, Section 301, Bessent statements — June 2026

- FEDA — Impact of tariffs on small and medium-sized American importing businesses — June 2026

- Outlook Business — CAPE Phase 2 portal, tariff refund claims — June 29, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/section-122-et-tarifs-trump-quand-la-cour-supreme-force-une-reinvention-du-prote