# REPORT: Zelensky proposes a three-way summit — Trump, Kyiv, and Moscow face to face in the United States

> According to converging reports published in June 2026, Kyiv transmitted to the Trump administration a bold proposal: hold a trilateral face-to-face summit between the American president, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and Russian president Vladimir Putin, on American soil. This idea, which Trump reportedly "appreciated" according to sources close to the discussions, r

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-zelensky-propose-un-sommet-a-trois-trump-kyiv-et-moscou-face-a-face-au

## Introduction: Ukrainian diplomacy goes on the offensive

### A proposal that changes the rules of the game

According to converging reports published in **June 2026**, **Kyiv** transmitted to the **Trump** administration a bold proposal: hold a trilateral face-to-face summit between the American president, Ukrainian president **Volodymyr Zelensky**, and Russian president **Vladimir Putin**, on **American soil**. This idea, which **Trump** reportedly "**appreciated**" according to sources close to the discussions, represents a significant diplomatic shift in **Kyiv**'s strategy.

This is not a disguised surrender. It is a calculated diplomatic offensive. In proposing such a summit, Ukraine simultaneously sends several messages: it is ready to negotiate from a position of growing strength; it trusts **Trump** to play the role of a favorable mediator; and it strips **Putin** of the argument that he refuses any direct negotiation. It is a sophisticated maneuver from a country whose diplomacy has matured as much as its military.

### The favorable military context that makes this gamble possible

This proposal fits within a coherent Ukrainian strategy: use military successes to strengthen the diplomatic position. In **June 2026**, Ukraine can point to a series of significant achievements — **Crimea** in logistical emergency, Russia's **space centers** at Vladimir and Dubna struck, Russian gasoline production down **25 percent**, the Russian advance rate fallen to **30 square kilometers** in June. This list of successes constitutes a negotiating posture far stronger than it was a year ago.

The timing of this proposal is not accidental. It coincides with the **G7 summit in Évian** in June 2026, where allies pressured **Trump** to move Ukraine back to the top of the American agenda, and with **Trump**'s statements calling **Zelensky** someone who is fighting "**pretty well**." The diplomatic window is open — and **Kyiv** is seizing it boldly.

*What strikes me about this trilateral summit proposal is its strategic audacity. Ukraine is not negotiating from weakness — it is making an offer from a position of relative strength. That is the exact opposite of what Putin hoped for: an exhausted Kyiv coming to beg for a ceasefire on Russian terms. The dynamic has reversed, and this summit proposal is the proof.*

## The preliminary US-Ukraine discussions on negotiation conditions

### The Zelensky-Trump dialogue reconfigures itself

According to **NewsUkraine RBC**, American and Ukrainian leaders discussed the conditions for a possible return of Russia to negotiations. These discussions reflect a notable evolution in the **Trump-Zelensky** relationship — which moved from a tense period in early **2025**, marked by public friction, to an apparently more constructive relationship by summer **2026**.

The shift in **Trump**'s tone following the **G7 summit in Évian** is documented. His statements calling **Zelensky** a leader who is fighting "**pretty well**" against Russia represent a reversal from his past criticism. According to **Euromaidan Press**, **Trump** reportedly told **Zelensky** he was "**impressed**" by Ukraine's battlefield results — a statement that, if accurate, signals an American strategic realignment.

### Ukraine's conditions for negotiation

Ukraine did not come to the diplomatic table empty-handed or on its knees. **Kyiv** clearly stated its minimum conditions for any negotiation: Russian withdrawal from all internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, including **Crimea** and the **Donbas**; legally binding security guarantees; war damage reparations; and prosecution of those responsible for war crimes.

These conditions are considered by many to be the maximum unrealistic threshold in the current context. But their public articulation serves a strategic function: it anchors the negotiating framework in international law rather than in military power balances at any given moment. It is a defensible posture that enjoys broad support among Western allies.

*Ukrainian diplomacy has matured enormously since the first weeks of the war. Kyiv is no longer simply asking for weapons — it is playing on every front: military, economic, legal, diplomatic. That sophistication is the hallmark of a state forged in adversity. And it makes Zelensky far harder to bypass than he was two years ago.*

## Trump — an unlikely but powerful mediator

### The role Trump might want to play

**Donald Trump** has always had a fascination with big negotiations and historic deals. The idea of a trilateral **Trump-Zelensky-Putin** summit — a peace agreement for the "**biggest war since World War II**," in his own words — fits exactly the profile of the spectacular presidential act he craves. That is why the Ukrainian proposal finds a receptive ear with the American president: it offers him the stage he covets.

But **Trump** is an ambivalent mediator. On one hand, he has shown sympathies for **Putin** and reluctance toward prolonged military aid to Ukraine. On the other, he is pragmatically influenced by success and prefers to associate himself with winners. Ukraine's military results in **June 2026** — **Crimea** in emergency, Russian space centers struck — position him as someone who can afford to back Ukraine without appearing to back a loser.

### The risks of an unpredictable mediator

Incorporating **Trump** into a formal mediation process carries serious risks for Ukraine. His tendency toward sudden reversals, his impulsive decisions based on partial information, and his appetite for quick "**deals**" rather than lasting agreements could create pressure on **Kyiv** to accept premature compromises. The memory of the **February 2025** meeting at the **White House** — tense and humiliating for Ukraine — remains fresh.

Despite these risks, Ukraine considers that **Trump**'s engagement in a diplomatic process is preferable to his disengagement or alignment with **Putin**. A **Trump** invested in a diplomatic summit is a **Trump** less likely to unilaterally reduce American military aid. It is a pragmatic logic: involve the unpredictable to better manage him.

*Trump as a peace mediator in Ukraine — the idea would have drawn laughs two years ago. Today it is a diplomatic reality that Ukraine takes seriously. Not because Trump is reliable or predictable, but because he is the only actor capable of imposing real pressure on Putin — and Kyiv has learned to work with difficult partners.*

## Putin confronted with the trilateral summit dilemma

### An invitation he can hardly refuse

The trilateral summit proposal places **Putin** in an uncomfortable position. If he accepts, he legitimizes **Zelensky** as an equal interlocutor — something the Kremlin has always publicly refused to do, preferring to treat Ukraine as an entity under guardianship rather than a sovereign state. If he refuses, he finds himself declining a personal invitation from **Trump** — an affront to the man whose goodwill he long cultivated.

This diplomatic pincer move is deliberate. Ukraine designed its proposal to put **Putin** in an impossible position: every response carries a cost. Accepting means recognizing Ukraine; refusing means antagonizing Trump. In a context where Russia needs sanctions relief and recognition of its territorial gains to ease its pressured economy, falling out with **Trump** would be particularly costly.

### Russia's internal power dynamics

The proposal also arrives at a moment of domestic political pressure in Russia. According to sources cited by **Meduza**, the **FSB** and figures close to **Putin** are pushing to cancel or postpone the **Duma elections** in **September 2026**, fearing an unfavorable result for the **United Russia** party amid shortages and discontent. In this environment, a diplomatic breakthrough — even an imperfect one — could be useful to **Putin** to show his public that the war is yielding political results.

But **Putin** can only accept a summit if he is assured that the negotiating conditions will be favorable — or at least not too unfavorable. The current state of the front, with Ukraine reinforcing its positions and striking deep into Russian territory, does not create the conditions Moscow would demand for good-faith negotiations.

*Putin in a diplomatic dilemma of his own making — that is the most satisfying reversal in this whole sequence. He believed Ukraine would collapse, the West would fracture, Trump would be his ally. None of those calculations held. And now it is Kyiv making proposals, not Moscow imposing them.*

## Ukraine's strategy: military successes as diplomatic leverage

### The "win to negotiate" doctrine

The trilateral summit proposal perfectly illustrates the Ukrainian strategic doctrine that can be summarized as: "win to negotiate." Ukraine refuses to negotiate from a position of weakness. Every successful strike on Russian infrastructure, every kilometer of front held, every city liberated strengthens **Kyiv**'s position in any eventual peace process. That is why Ukrainian officials insist that Western arms deliveries must not stop while the war continues.

This doctrine is consistent with the principles of principled negotiation: concessions are made only when one has credible alternatives and when pressure is sufficient for the adversary to prefer agreement over continuing the conflict. In **June 2026**, Ukraine is working to create exactly those conditions — enough pressure on Russia that the cost of refusing to negotiate exceeds the cost of accepting.

### The limits of the strategy and escalation risks

This doctrine nonetheless carries risks. Growing military pressure on Russia can provoke unpredictable reactions — escalations that neither Ukraine nor its allies want. The specter of Russian **tactical nuclear weapons** looms over any strategy that aims to impose too direct a pressure on Russian territory itself. The summit proposal partly plays this role: offering **Putin** a dignified diplomatic exit to prevent him from feeling cornered.

This is an inherent tension in Ukraine's strategy — and Western allies feel it too. How far to push pressure without triggering a disproportionate response? The answer is not simple, and Ukraine is navigating these uncertain waters with a strategic caution that deserves recognition.

*The fear of nuclear escalation has been used by Russia as a blackmail tool since the first day of the war. And it worked — the West often held back arms deliveries or imposed usage restrictions because of that fear. I understand the caution. But I also understand that if we let that fear dictate every decision, we hand Putin permanent impunity. That is the central dilemma, and there is no easy answer.*

## EA WorldView analyzes the Trump shift — a key source

### The post-G7 turning point in American policy

The analysis published by **EA WorldView** on **June 27, 2026** — "A Trump Shift Towards 'Winner' Zelensky and Kyiv?" — documents what appears to be a notable reversal in **Trump**'s perception of Ukraine. This reversal is linked to several factors: Ukraine's military successes in **June 2026**, the coordinated pressure from **G7 allies at Évian**, and the repositioning of the American national security adviser who sees a strong Ukraine as a better deal for the United States than a Ukraine negotiating under Russian pressure.

**Trump**, according to this analysis, is more motivated by the image of backing a "winner" than by fixed geopolitical convictions. **Zelensky** — who is striking Russian refineries, neutralizing military space antennas, and holding lines in the **Donbas** — looks increasingly like that winner. If this analysis is accurate, American support for Ukraine could consolidate further in the weeks and months ahead.

### The limits of the Trump shift

Even accepting the thesis of a shift, the limits are obvious. **Trump** can reverse course within hours if his advisers present different information, if a conversation with **Putin** changes his perception, or if American domestic political calculations push him in another direction. American foreign policy under **Trump** is structurally unpredictable — which is a vulnerability for any partner counting on continuity of American engagement.

**Europe** has drawn that lesson. The strengthening of European defense capabilities, accelerated national armaments programs, the construction of European strategic autonomy — all of this is being accelerated by the awareness that American support cannot be taken for granted indefinitely. The trilateral summit proposal, by actively engaging **Trump**, temporarily reduces that risk.

*Trump enthused about a peace summit in Ukraine — that is good news, and I say it without excessive enthusiasm. The man is unpredictable by nature. But a Trump engaged in a diplomatic process is less dangerous than a disengaged Trump who would let Putin do whatever he wants. Sometimes the involvement of a necessary evil is preferable to its absence.*

## Moscow's reaction — between contempt and calculation

### The Kremlin has not yet officially responded

At the time the reports on the Ukrainian proposal were published, the **Kremlin** had not yet officially responded to the idea of a trilateral summit. This absence of response is itself significant — it suggests Moscow is carefully studying how to respond without committing itself in one direction or the other.

Kremlin spokesman **Dmitry Peskov** maintained the standard Russian position: Russia is ready for negotiations, but not on Ukrainian terms. This hollow formula says nothing about the specific response to the trilateral summit proposal. It leaves the door of discussion slightly ajar while refusing to walk through it.

### Russia's contradictory diplomatic signals

Russian diplomacy is sending contradictory signals. On one side, **Lavrov** multiplies aggressive statements — accusations of theft over frozen assets, threats to international financial system stability, inflammatory anti-Western rhetoric at the **Primakov Readings**. On the other, sources close to Russian intelligence services suggest the Kremlin is seeking an honorable exit from the war but cannot find conditions that suit it.

This contradiction between the aggressive facade and the reality of an increasingly costly war perfectly characterizes Russia's state in **June 2026**. The Ukrainian trilateral summit proposal inserts itself into the space between rhetoric and reality — offering an exit that Moscow might be tempted to seize if conditions deteriorate further.

*Russia wavering between rhetorical aggression and strategic realism — that is the Kremlin's central tension in 2026. Lavrov shouts, Peskov temporizes, and the generals count the losses. That dissonance between speech and reality is often the sign that a regime is approaching a moment of truth. This is not a prediction — it is an observation.*

## Ukraine and its restored diplomatic credibility

### From survival mode to major diplomatic actor

In **February 2022**, Ukraine was a state fighting for its survival, whose diplomatic voice was that of a country asking for help rather than proposing solutions. In **June 2026**, it is a country proposing trilateral peace summits to the world's superpower. This transformation of posture is one of the most remarkable evolutions of this period.

**Zelensky** played a central personal role in this transformation. His presence at the **G7 summit in Évian**, his speeches before the **US Congress**, his repeated appearances before European parliaments, his constant engagement on the diplomatic stage — all of this has built a credibility and presence that few wartime leaders have managed to sustain.

### Allied support — the foundation of diplomatic credibility

Ukraine's diplomatic credibility ultimately rests on its allies' unwavering support. The **EU** extending its sanctions for a year, the **G7** maintaining the freeze on Russian assets, the **United Kingdom** developing long-range missiles without American components to allow sovereign use by Ukraine — each of these acts strengthens Ukraine's negotiating position.

The trilateral summit proposal capitalizes on this support. It would not be credible without it. And it sends a message to allies: Ukraine is using the support it receives not only to defend itself, but to actively build a path toward peace. That message reinforces the legitimacy of Western support and makes it easier to sustain.

*Zelensky proposing a trilateral summit in the United States — I just want to recall where Ukraine stood in March 2022, besieged in its capital, with Western leaders offering evacuation planes. That journey over four years is a lesson for everyone who had doubts. Resilience pays. Resistance builds.*

## The geopolitical implications of a successful summit — scenarios

### The optimal scenario — a lasting framework agreement

In the most favorable scenario, a trilateral **Trump-Zelensky-Putin** summit would produce a framework agreement establishing a ceasefire along current lines, opening negotiations on occupied territories and security guarantees, and creating an international monitoring mechanism. For Ukraine, this agreement would be acceptable only if the **security guarantees** are legally binding — that is, more solid than the **1994 Budapest Memorandum** that proved worthless.

This scenario is politically difficult to achieve. It would require Ukrainian concessions on the temporary status of some occupied territories — concessions the Ukrainian public is not ready to accept. It would also require Russian concessions on security guarantees — which Moscow is not ready to grant. But an imperfect agreement that preserves Ukraine is infinitely preferable to a war that continues to bleed both sides.

### The realistic scenario — diplomatic process without an immediate agreement

The more realistic scenario is that of a summit that opens a **diplomatic process** without producing an immediate agreement. This process would have its own value: it would create formal channels of communication, it would show the world public that the parties are ready to talk, and it would reduce the risk of unintentional escalation. That is already progress over the current situation of total absence of direct dialogue.

In this scenario, **Ukraine** wins diplomatically by being seen as the good-faith actor — the one who proposed dialogue — even if the negotiations do not immediately produce results. And the war continues, but within a diplomatic framework that makes it more manageable for weary Western partners.

*I am not expecting miracles from a trilateral summit — the conditions for lasting peace are not yet in place. But I believe in the process. Every formal conversation reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. And in a war where both sides have access to massively destructive weapons, reducing that risk has immense value.*

## The battle for Western public opinion

### Sustaining support against the fatigue

Behind the trilateral summit proposal, there is also a domestic-politics objective in Ukraine's allied countries. After more than four years of war, a portion of Western public opinion — in **Germany**, in **France**, in the **United States** — is showing signs of conflict fatigue. Voices are calling for a quick negotiated solution, even an imperfect one. The Ukrainian summit proposal responds to these concerns: it shows that **Kyiv** is actively seeking peace, not permanent escalation.

This is a crucial political message for sustaining internal support coalitions in allied democracies. A government that backs a Ukraine proposing peace summits is more easily defended against critics than one backing a Ukraine that refuses all dialogue. The summit proposal is aimed as much at Berlin, Paris, and Washington as it is at Moscow.

### Zelensky's strategic communication

**Zelensky** is an exceptional communicator, and the summit proposal is a prime example. It creates what communication strategists call a "**win-win frame**" for Ukraine: if **Putin** accepts, Ukraine negotiates from a position of strength. If he refuses, Ukraine can point to that refusal to justify continuing the war and maintaining Western support. In both cases, **Kyiv** comes out stronger from the maneuver.

This mastery of communications, forged in adversity since **2022**, is one of Ukraine's most precious assets. In a war where information matters as much as firepower, **Zelensky** has succeeded in transforming his country into a credible and sympathetic diplomatic actor in Western public opinion. It is an advantage that Russian propaganda, despite its considerable resources, has failed to erode.

*Zelensky may be the most effective political communicator of this decade. This is not idle flattery — it is a factual observation. Transforming a besieged country into a diplomatic actor proposing summits to the world superpower in four years is a feat of strategic communication that political science schools will study for a long time.*

## The prerequisites for any serious negotiation

### What Ukraine cannot concede

Before any summit, certain Ukrainian red lines are non-negotiable. Recognition of **Ukrainian sovereignty** over all internationally recognized territories — including **Crimea** — is the indisputable legal foundation. **Security guarantees** must be substantially stronger than in **1994**. Ukraine's access to European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes cannot be conditioned on Moscow's agreement.

These red lines are popular in Ukraine and enjoy the formal support of Western allies. They define the floor of what is acceptable for **Kyiv** — and they constitute exactly what **Putin** will refuse to recognize initially. The tension between these positions is the main obstacle to any serious negotiation.

### Security guarantees — the Gordian knot

The question of **security guarantees** is the Gordian knot of any negotiation. The experience of the **1994 Budapest Memorandum** — in which Ukraine gave up the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for territorial integrity guarantees, guarantees Russia violated with impunity — has made Ukrainians rightfully wary of any non-binding guarantee formula.

**NATO** membership remains the only truly credible guarantee — and that is precisely what Russia conditions on Ukraine's neutralization. This vicious circle is at the heart of every peace negotiation. No trilateral summit will resolve it by magic — but a summit could create the conditions for an innovative guarantee mechanism that functionally approximates **NATO** membership without formal accession.

*Budapest 1994. The moment when Ukraine surrendered the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees on paper. I do not forget that precedent when I analyze the current discussions on security guarantees. Ukraine cannot trust promises — it needs binding commitment mechanisms. That is an absolutely legitimate position.*

## Europe's role in the mediation

### Europeans absent from the trilateral format

A notable aspect of the Ukrainian proposal is the absence of European actors from the envisaged trilateral format. **Europe**, which is both Ukraine's main economic and military backer and the main beneficiary of lasting peace on the continent, would find itself in the position of observer in this format. This absence raises legitimate questions about the role Europeans want — and can — play in resolving the conflict.

**Macron**, who attempted his own diplomatic initiatives with **Putin** without much success, and German leaders tainted by their past dependence on Russian gas, are seeking to maintain influence in any peace process. The **E5 meeting in Berlin** — gathering the main European countries — was a signal of this commitment: Europeans will not let **Trump** alone manage the contours of a peace in Ukraine.

### European diplomacy as an indispensable complement

The trilateral format proposed by Ukraine should not be read as a bypass of Europe, but as a first step in a broader process that will necessarily include European actors. **France**, **Germany**, the **United Kingdom**, and **Poland** are too involved — economically, militarily, geographically — to remain on the margins of a peace agreement.

The **EU**, which has provided dozens of billions in aid to Ukraine, will have its say on the economic conditions of any eventual agreement — particularly on Ukraine's reconstruction and the reparations owed by Russia. No diplomatic format that ignores these actors will produce a lasting agreement.

*I am suspicious of diplomatic formulas that exclude Europeans from their own security. If Trump and Putin were to decide Ukraine's future alone — even with Zelensky's agreement — Europe would be reduced to picking up the tab for a decision made without it. Europe must be in the room, not in the hallway.*

## Regional allies — Poland, the Baltics, and their role in peace diplomacy

### Eastern European countries as guardians of the red lines

In the diplomatic landscape of Ukrainian peace, the countries of **Eastern Europe** — **Poland**, **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania** — play a crucial but often underestimated role. These are the countries that, through their historical memory of Soviet occupation, most clearly identified the nature of the Russian threat, and that have most consistently pushed for full support of Ukraine. They are also those who would be first exposed to an undefeated Russia pursuing its imperial ambitions.

**Poland**, in particular, has been one of the essential logistical channels for military aid to Ukraine, and has become one of the **European** countries spending the most in proportion to its **GDP** on defense. These countries will be indispensable actors in any post-conflict security architecture, and their demands — notably on guarantees against future Russian aggression — closely align with those of **Kyiv**.

### Historical memory as a strategic compass

The Baltic states and **Poland** lived under Soviet occupation. They do not need abstract geopolitical analyses to understand what an unconstrained imperial Russia means — it is their direct historical experience. That collective memory makes them immune to appeasement arguments and to proposals for "peace through Ukrainian capitulation" that certain Western pacifist circles regularly produce.

Their influence within the **EU** and **NATO** is significant. They represent the moral and strategic conscience of the Alliance on the Russian question. And they will ensure that no peace agreement sacrifices **Ukraine** on the altar of comfortable stability for Western Europe.

*The Balts and the Poles do not conduct foreign policy from luxury hotel suites. They conduct policy with the memory of occupation in their blood. When they say Ukraine cannot lose, that is not rhetoric — it is historical survival politics. And they are right. I trust Poland on NATO far more than I trust certain Parisian cabinets.*

## The memory of Minsk — why Ukraine will not repeat that mistake

### The Minsk accords as a permanent lesson

Any discussion of a Ukrainian peace negotiation must confront the precedent of the **Minsk accords** of **2014–2015**. Those accords — presented at the time as a path toward peace in the **Donbas** — in reality gave Russia the time and space to rearm and plan the full-scale invasion of **2022**. That stinging failure left deep scars in Ukrainian society and its political leadership.

**Zelensky** and his diplomatic team know that any agreement with **Putin** that lacks robust verification mechanisms and enforceable guarantees is stillborn. The **Minsk** experience has inoculated Ukraine against diplomatic naivety. It is one of the reasons why the trilateral summit proposal is accompanied by explicit demands for binding security guarantees.

### The difference between a ceasefire and lasting peace

The highest risk of a trilateral summit at this stage would be producing a **ceasefire** without lasting peace — a freeze of the front lines that would give Russia time to recover, rearm, and prepare the next aggression. That is the scenario Ukraine wants to avoid at all costs, which is why its conditions include long-term structural demands.

A ceasefire without guarantees is **Minsk 3**. That is why **Kyiv** insists that any negotiation must address both the immediate armed conflict and the long-term structural questions of European security. A summit that produces a **Minsk 3** would be a Ukrainian defeat dressed up as a peace agreement.

*Minsk. That word should be carved above every negotiating room on Ukraine. Minsk gave Putin seven years to rearm and plan the 2022 invasion. Anyone who proposes a ceasefire today without solid guarantees must answer this question: what prevents a Minsk 3? If the answer is not convincing, that is not diplomacy — it is progressive capitulation.*

## Conclusion: a proposal that says everything about Ukraine in 2026

### From defensive to offensive — on every front

The **Trump-Zelensky-Putin** trilateral summit proposal perfectly encapsulates Ukraine's transformation between **2022** and **2026**. From survival to initiative. From aid seeker to architect of solutions. From victim seeking pity to strategic actor proposing negotiating frameworks. This transformation is not the product of chance — it is the fruit of Ukrainian resilience, Western support, and exceptional leadership under extreme pressure.

### Peace will not be built in a single summit

This proposal is a step, not a conclusion. Peace in Ukraine will not be built in a single spectacular summit — it will require long and difficult negotiations, painful compromises, and a security architecture that genuinely protects Ukraine against future aggression. The work is immense. But the fact that Ukraine is in a position to propose rather than to endure is, in itself, a strategic victory that deserves recognition.

*This summit proposal is proof that Zelensky and Ukraine have won the narrative war. Four years after everyone predicted collapse within 72 hours, it is Kyiv that is setting the terms of the diplomatic debate. That is the real victory of this period — even before a single bullet is fired at the summit.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [NewsUkraine RBC — US and Ukraine leaders discuss conditions for Russia's return to negotiations — June 23, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/us-and-ukraine-leaders-discuss-conditions-1782231200.html)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Zelenskyy doing 'pretty well' against Russia, declares Trump — June 25, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/25/ukraine-war-briefing-zelenskyy-doing-pretty-well-against-russia-declares-trump)

- [Euromaidan Press — Trump told Zelenskyy he was impressed by Ukraine's battlefield results — June 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/24/trump-told-zelenskyy-he-was-impressed-by-ukraines-battlefield-results-ft-reports/)

### Secondary sources

- [EA WorldView — EA-Ukraine VideoCast: A Trump Shift Towards 'Winner' Zelensky and Kyiv? — June 27, 2026](https://eaworldview.com/2026/06/ukraine-trump-shift-towards-zelensky-and-kyiv/)

- [Ground News — G7 allies scramble to put Ukraine back atop Trump's agenda as war drags on — June 26, 2026](https://ground.news/article/g7-allies-scramble-to-put-ukraine-back-atop-trumps-agenda-as-war-drags-on_3c2918)

- [Kyiv Independent — Crimea now zone of constant losses, SBU says — June 24, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-crimea-now-zone-of-constant-losses-sbu-says-after-strikes-on-russian-air-defenses-military-airfields/)

- [UNN — At the E5 meeting in Berlin, European leaders pledged not to stop supporting Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://unn.ua/en/news/at-the-e5-meeting-in-berlin-european-leaders-pledged-not-to-stop-supporting-ukraine)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-zelensky-propose-un-sommet-a-trois-trump-kyiv-et-moscou-face-a-face-au