# REPORT: A Russian Ka-52 Shot Down on July 2, 2026 — 353 Helicopters Lost, a Toll That Does Not Lie

> I look at this figure of 353 helicopters and I think about what it represents in human and industrial terms. Rebuilding 353 modern helicopters takes years. Each pilot killed represents years of traini

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-un-ka-52-russe-abattu-le-2-juillet-2026-353-helicopteres-perdus-le-bil

## Introduction: Ka-52 Number 353 and What It Represents

### A confirmed loss in the conflict's most intense week

On **July 2, 2026**, Russia lost another **Ka-52 "Alligator"** attack helicopter. The information, reported by **Charter97** citing Russian military bloggers and relayed by **Serhiy Sternenko** on Telegram, was accompanied by condolence messages suggesting the pilot likely perished. The exact circumstances — location, method of destruction, unit involved — had not been officially confirmed by Russian authorities at time of publication. What is confirmed with certainty is that the **cumulative total of Russian helicopters destroyed since February 24, 2022** has now reached **353 aircraft**, according to Ukrainian General Staff data published on **July 2, 2026** by **Ukrainska Pravda**.

This loss comes during a week of extreme operational intensity. On **July 1, 2026**, Russia launched **9,463 kamikaze drones** in a single day. It conducted **210 combat engagements**. It fired **6,667 drones** and carried out **53 air strikes** with **158 guided bombs**. Against that backdrop of operational saturation, losing a **Ka-52** — one of its most advanced attack helicopters — reveals a truth that Russian communiqués prefer to suppress: escalating strikes does not protect the crews.

### A report on what the numbers conceal

This report is not solely about one helicopter. It is about **353 helicopters**, and what their destruction reveals about Russian strategy, its costs, its limits. It is about the pilots who did not come home, the decimated squadrons, the command staffs still sending **Ka-52s** into an aerial environment where Ukrainian defences are waiting. It is, ultimately, about what the war in Ukraine says about Russian military doctrine — and its fatal flaws.

## The Ka-52 "Alligator": Understanding What Was Destroyed

### The crown jewel of the Russian attack fleet

The **Ka-52**, designated "Alligator" by **NATO**, is the most advanced attack helicopter in the Russian fleet. Developed by **Kamov**, it is distinguished by its **coaxial rotor** configuration — two stacked rotors turning in opposite directions — which gives it exceptional maneuverability and eliminates the need for a tail rotor. It can carry a varied range of anti-tank missiles, unguided rockets, air-to-air missiles, and a **30mm cannon**. Its top speed is approximately **300 km/h**, and it is designed for both day and night combat.

The **Ka-52** was built for anti-armour operations and close air support missions — exactly the missions the Russian Army assigns it in Ukraine, where it is meant to destroy Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles from secure distances. Its unit cost is estimated at roughly **$16 to $20 million**. Its destruction is not only the elimination of a direct threat for Ukraine — it is an assault on Russia's capacity to replace its equipment at a sufficient rate.

### Why Russia keeps committing its Ka-52s despite the losses

The logical question is: why does Russia continue committing its **Ka-52s** at a pace that produces regular losses? The answer lies in Russian **close air support** doctrine and the limits of its alternatives. On the Ukrainian front, where contact lines are dense and positions well entrenched, Russian infantry requires aerial fire support to reduce Ukrainian defences. Su-34s and Su-35s operate at high altitude with guided bombs to avoid surface-to-air defences. **Ka-52s** operate at low altitude, more exposed, delivering direct support to troops in contact.

This doctrine imposes a high engagement tempo for helicopters in environments where Ukrainian MANPADS missiles, armed drones, and anti-aircraft systems are waiting. Every mission is a risk calculation that Russian commanders accept with increasing frequency — and which results, regularly, in losses like that of **July 2**.

## 353 Helicopters in Four Years — A Crushing Arithmetic

### The starting fleet and the reality of replacements

Before the invasion of **February 24, 2022**, Russia possessed roughly **1,500 to 1,900 military helicopters** of all categories — attack, transport, reconnaissance, utility — according to various estimates. Its attack helicopter fleet — primarily **Ka-52s**, **Mi-28s**, and **Mi-24/Mi-35s** — numbered between **600 and 700 aircraft**. Losing **353 helicopters** in under five years represents attrition on the order of **50 percent of the estimated attack fleet** — a figure that cannot quickly be offset by Russian industrial production.

Russia's annual production of advanced military helicopters is estimated at a few dozen aircraft per year under normal conditions, with additional dozens if assembly lines are accelerated — but Western sanctions weigh heavily on access to critical electronic components. The **ISW** and other analysts have documented Russia's difficulty maintaining its supply chains for high-technology components since the invasion, limiting its capacity to reconstitute its fleet in line with losses.

### The second confirmed destruction of the week

The **July 2** loss is not isolated in the context of the week of **June 30 to July 2**. It is the **second confirmed destruction** of a **Ka-52** in under seven days. This pace — one **Ka-52** destroyed per week during high-intensity periods — reveals permanent operational pressure on the Russian attack helicopter fleet. **Ka-52** pilots are engaged in the most active sectors of the front: **Pokrovsk**, **Sloviansk**, **Kostiantynivka** — precisely where **23**, **22**, and **17** respective attacks were carried out on **July 1** alone.

The Ukrainian General Staff data is formal: by **July 2, 2026**, Russia had lost **353 helicopters** since the invasion, according to **Ukrainska Pravda**. This figure covers all categories — attack, transport, reconnaissance — but the share of advanced attack helicopters is disproportionate, reflecting their front-line engagement.

## The Operational Context of July 2, 2026

### A day of high intensity across all sectors

To understand the context in which this **Ka-52** was lost, one must measure the operational intensity of this period. On **July 1, 2026**, Russian forces conducted **210 combat engagements** — a figure that reflects ubiquitous engagement across the entire front exceeding **1,000 kilometers**. The most active sectors: **Pokrovsk** with **23 attacks**, **Sloviansk** with **22**, and **Kostiantynivka** with **17**, according to Ukrainian General Staff data tracked by front monitoring sources.

In these conditions of intense engagement, attack helicopters play a direct support role in infantry assaults. They operate at low altitude, under constant threat, in flight corridors increasingly familiar to Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian defences have developed an increasingly sophisticated capability to engage these helicopters, combining **MANPADS** (portable surface-to-air missiles), **Stinger** and **NASAMS** missiles, armed drones, and anti-aircraft artillery pieces.

### Russia's 35,000 monthly losses — the human context

The loss of the **Ka-52** sits within a far larger picture of losses. **NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** stated on **July 1, 2026** that Russia loses **35,000 soldiers killed or seriously wounded every month**. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia lost **1,140 soldiers** killed or wounded on **July 2, 2026** alone. The cumulative total since **February 24, 2022** is estimated at **1,405,900 Russian military personnel** out of action.

These figures, which Moscow refuses to confirm and its state media never report, sketch the reality of an army losing men at a pace that even its vast demographic reservoir struggles to replace. Soldiers coming from the most remote, the most impoverished regions, where mobilization pressure is heaviest. Families who receive urns or bodies, not information. The loss of a **Ka-52** pilot is an infinitesimal part of this human picture — but it is representative of it.

## The Ka-52 and Ukraine's Response — a Technological Race

### How Ukraine destroys Russian helicopters

Ukraine has a varied arsenal for engaging Russian helicopters. **MANPADS** systems — portable surface-to-air missiles including **Stingers**, **Iglas**, and **Verbas** — are widely distributed to infantry units and constitute the first line of defence against low-altitude helicopters. **NASAMS**, **IRIS-T**, and **Patriot** air defence systems cover higher altitudes but can also engage helicopters. Ukrainian armed drones of various categories represent a growing threat to helicopters operating at moderate altitudes.

Russian forces have attempted to adapt their helicopter employment doctrine accordingly: reducing approach altitudes to avoid radar, using terrain as a mask, approaching targets along unpredictable trajectories. But these adaptations are insufficient to entirely neutralize the threat — as evidenced by the **353 helicopters** destroyed. The Ukrainian lesson is that diversified, distributed air defence systems are more effective than a centralized defence against helicopters.

### Russia facing a shortage of qualified pilots

Beyond material loss, the destruction of **Ka-52s** represents attrition of qualified pilots that is difficult to offset. Training an operational **Ka-52** pilot takes several years, and Russian military training programmes have been under pressure from permanent operational requirements since **2022**. Military analysts cited in **ISW** assessments note that Russia is beginning to feel shortages of qualified pilots in certain aircraft categories, forcing shorter rotations and increased exposure for remaining crews.

This spiral — fewer qualified pilots, more frequent rotations, heightened risk, more losses, even fewer pilots — is a structural dynamic that equipment deliveries alone cannot resolve. It imposes growing operational compromises on Russian employment doctrine.

## Russian Loss Totals as of July 2, 2026 — the Full Picture

### The Ukrainian General Staff figures

Data published by the **Ukrainian General Staff** on **July 2, 2026**, as reported by **Ukrainska Pravda**, provides a cumulative picture since **February 24, 2022**: **1,405,900 military personnel** out of action, **12,069 tanks**, **24,861 infantry fighting vehicles**, **45,168 artillery systems**, **1,910 multiple rocket launchers**, **1,459 air defence systems**, **436 aircraft**, **353 helicopters**, **385,190 operational-tactical drones**, **4,798 cruise missiles**, **33 vessels and boats**, and **2 submarines**. These figures represent Ukrainian estimates, not Russian confirmations — but their consistency and progression over time give them a credibility that Russian denials cannot undermine.

The helicopter line — **353** — is the one that anchors this report. But it must be read in its broader context: a Russian army that has suffered massive losses across all equipment categories, without industrial production or foreign purchases having been able to maintain its inventory at **February 2022** levels. Russia's spring-summer **2026** offensive, described by the **ISW** as having "achieved no operationally significant gains," is being fought with a structurally impoverished military.

### What the tank and artillery losses add to the picture

The **12,069 tanks** destroyed deserve mention. Russia began the war with one of the world's largest tank fleets, with more than **12,000 tanks in service or storage**. The documented attrition suggests it has already exceeded its estimated losses among active tanks and is drawing on Cold War-era tank reserves pulled from warehouses, sometimes in questionable preservation condition. The same reasoning applies to the **45,168 artillery systems** destroyed — a staggering figure that speaks to the intensity of artillery exchanges throughout the conflict.

## The Struggle for Air Superiority — a War in the Shadows

### Ukraine cannot control the sky, but it can deny it

A fact often misunderstood in conflict analysis: Ukraine does not have air superiority — it has never had an air force comparable in scale to Russia's. What it has done is **deny Russia the air superiority it held in 2022**. By building a layered air defence system integrating high-performance Western systems with modernized Soviet platforms and asymmetric drone capabilities, Ukraine has created an aerial environment in which Russian aircraft and helicopters cannot operate freely.

The destruction of **436 Russian aircraft** and **353 helicopters** is the statistical demonstration. These losses have not eliminated Russia's aerial capability, but they have considerably constrained it. Russia now uses its aircraft primarily for stand-off strikes at secure distances with long-range glide bombs, precisely because it cannot freely operate fighters at low altitude over Ukraine.

### The F-16s and the evolving aerial equation

The progressive arrival of **F-16s** in the Ukrainian fleet since **2024** has modestly but genuinely shifted this equation. Ukrainian **F-16s** cannot, by themselves, establish air superiority against the Russian fleet. But they can intercept certain categories of missiles and drones, protect critical zones, and force Russian planners to adjust their flight trajectories. Every Russian adjustment represents an additional constraint on operational effectiveness.

The prospect of additional **PAC-2 and PAC-3** missiles — hundreds of them — for the Ukrainian **Patriot** system, confirmed in June **2026** by **United24 Media**, will further reinforce air coverage. Every reinforcement of Ukrainian air defences increases the operational cost for the Russian helicopter fleet.

## Ukrainian Resilience Under Mass Strikes

### 286 drones neutralized in 24 hours — the defensive capability

Against the **9,463 kamikaze drones** launched by Russia on **July 1, 2026**, Ukrainian forces neutralized **286 enemy drones** in 24 hours. This figure is not exhaustive — not all drones are intercepted, and many reach their targets. But it attests to a real defensive capability, sustained by Western air defence systems and a popular defence organization that integrates thousands of volunteers equipped with detection drones and early warning systems.

In the same period, Ukrainian forces destroyed a **munitions depot**, a **fuel depot**, **4 enemy vehicles**, and **3 special equipment pieces**. These offensive results, accumulated day after day, constitute Ukraine's response to Russian saturation: not only defend, but continue to degrade adversary logistics capabilities.

### The drone counterattack on Crimea and Russia proper

Simultaneously with its defence, Ukraine carries out deep strikes. Defence Minister **Mykhailo Fedorov**, according to the **Kyiv Independent**, stated that Russia is suffering "one crisis after another" in Crimea under Ukrainian drone strikes — a formulation that confirms the effectiveness of the long-range drone campaign. Ukrainian strikes on the **Slavyansk refinery**, the **Penza** defence factory, the bridges on the **Donetsk** and **Luhansk** rivers — all within the same week — map a coherent operational campaign, not a series of opportunistic strikes.

## What the Ka-52 Loss Says About Russian Doctrine

### Aviation as a substitute for insufficient infantry

The frequency of Russian helicopter losses reveals a structural tension in Russian engagement doctrine. After more than four years of war and estimated infantry losses of more than **1.4 million soldiers** out of action, Russia uses its attack helicopters to compensate for infantry whose quality and quantity have declined. **Ka-52s** are committed to close air support missions that, in an intact army, would be handled by mechanized infantry units with more cautious air support.

This overexposure of helicopters to high-risk missions in a dense air defence environment is the direct result of Russian infantry attrition. It is a vicious cycle: the weakening of infantry forces greater helicopter exposure, which produces losses that weaken the air support capability still further, which in turn undermines the infantry.

### Pressure on Russian defence industries

Helicopter losses place direct pressure on Russian defence industries, already stretched. The **Progress plant in Arseniev**, Russia's main producer of **Ka-52s**, operates under international sanctions that limit access to electronic components, advanced materials, and production equipment. Ukrainian strikes on defence factories — such as the **JSC Research Institute of Physical Measurements** in **Penza**, struck on **July 1** — add direct disruption to the supply chains of sophisticated equipment.

Iran and North Korea, members of the axis supporting Russia, can supply artillery shells and drones — but not gas turbine engines, not precision laser guidance systems, not the high-technology components required to produce **Ka-52s**. China, for its part, maintains a calculated ambiguity on the dual-use equipment it transfers, avoiding supplies that would trigger direct Western sanctions against its companies.

## The Human Front Behind the Machines

### Russian crews — a reality Moscow censors

Behind every downed **Ka-52**, there is a crew — typically a pilot and a weapons systems operator. In the case of **July 2, 2026**, **Charter97** reports that condolence messages published by Russian military bloggers suggest the pilot "likely perished." This information circulates within Russian militarist circles on Telegram — spaces where the reality of losses is sometimes acknowledged, in contrast to official media that systematically deny or minimize them.

These Russian military bloggers — the "Z-bloggers" — represent a crack in Russia's information censorship. They address an audience of military personnel, families, and patriots who want real information about what is happening at the front. Their very existence attests to a tension between the reality of the war and the Kremlin's official narrative — a tension that shows no sign of resolving.

### The memory of pilots the Russian state will not publicly honor

The Russian state does not honor its dead from the war in Ukraine through official commemorations — it minimizes, classifies, and drowns them in statistics. Families who receive bodies or urns are not invited to national ceremonies. The pilot of the **Ka-52** of **July 2**, if his death is confirmed, will join a list that will never be read aloud in Red Square. This absence of public mourning is itself a political act of the Putin regime — which needs these deaths to remain invisible in order to maintain support for a war that the majority of Russian society never freely chose.

## What the 353 Helicopters Mean for the Conflict's Future

### The horizon of Russian fleet degradation

Extrapolating the current rate of losses — roughly **80 to 100 helicopters destroyed per year** since **2022** — and comparing it to Russian production and repair capacity, analysts estimate that Russia could reach a critical point of attack helicopter fleet degradation within a horizon of **12 to 24 months**, absent a break in allied deliveries to Ukraine. This critical point does not mean the total elimination of Russian aerial capability — Russia retains fixed-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, Shahed drones. But it means a further reduction in close air support capacity.

For Ukraine, each helicopter destroyed is a marginal but real weakening of Russian pressure on its ground units. Accumulated across hundreds of daily combat engagements, these marginal weakenings translate into operational advantages measured in Ukrainian lives saved and positions held.

### The contribution of Western allies

Ukraine's ability to destroy Russian helicopters was not built alone. **Stinger**, **NASAMS**, **IRIS-T**, and **Patriot** systems, airspace surveillance radars, real-time data transmission networks — all of this was provided by Western allies who understood, sometimes slowly, sometimes belatedly, that supporting Ukraine is an investment in collective security. The **Ankara Summit** of **July 7, 2026** must confirm that this investment continues — and increases.

## The Challenges That Remain

### Gaps in air defence coverage

Despite the **353** Russian helicopters destroyed, Ukraine cannot afford to relax its air defence vigilance. Entire swaths of Ukrainian territory remain exposed to Russian air strikes — from missiles, long-range glide bombs, Shahed drones. The need for additional **Patriot** systems, interceptors, and advanced surveillance radars exceeds the deliveries received to date. The promise of delivery of hundreds of **PAC-2** and **PAC-3** missiles, reported by **United24 Media**, is welcome news — but delivery and integration timelines leave windows of vulnerability.

Ukraine also needs more helicopters of its own, for rescue, evacuation, and logistics support operations. Its own military helicopter fleet has suffered significant losses since **2022**. Transfers of Western helicopters — **Black Hawks**, **Cougars**, others — can be counted on one hand relative to actual needs.

### The diplomatic equation at the Ankara Summit

Beyond the military front, the diplomatic equation at the **NATO Ankara Summit** of **July 7** is crucial. The proposal by **Rutte** to impose a Ukrainian aid floor of **0.25 percent of GDP** failed even before the summit. This setback must not obscure the real progress: the **$300 billion** in European arms orders, the **160 agreements** from the **Gdańsk** conference, von der Leyen's **€6 billion** for drone production. But the gap between needs and deliveries remains significant — and every day of that gap is paid in Ukrainian lives.

## Ukrainian Forces Hold — and Count Their Victories

### The destruction of munitions and fuel depots — the daily response

Within the same operational cycle as the **Ka-52** loss, Ukrainian forces documented the destruction of a **munitions depot**, a **fuel depot**, **4 enemy vehicles**, and **3 special equipment pieces**, according to General Staff data. These results may seem modest against the **9,463 drones** Russia launched that same day. But this is exactly what a war of attrition demands: every fuel depot destroyed immobilizes convoys; every enemy vehicle neutralized reduces an assault; every special equipment piece disabled weakens Russian electronic warfare or reconnaissance capability.

**Ukraine** has learned to measure its victories differently from spectacular territorial breakthroughs. The systematic degradation of Russian capabilities — one helicopter, one bridge, one refinery, one depot at a time — is its avowed operational doctrine. And over the long term, this doctrine produces results: the **353 helicopters**, the **12,069 tanks**, the **1,405,900 soldiers** out of action stand as proof of its effectiveness.

### Ukrainian tenacity as a lesson for the West

What Ukraine teaches the West, beyond drone technology and asymmetric warfare, is a lesson in institutional tenacity. A country that holds against a militarily superior power for more than **four years**, that rebuilds while fighting, that develops its defence industry under bombardment, that produces arms export mechanisms in full wartime — this country demonstrates that political will and social cohesion are force-multiplying factors that equipment tables alone cannot capture.

The pilot of the **Ka-52** downed on **July 2, 2026** was part of a system that sought to break that tenacity through quantitative crushing. Four years later, the tenacity holds. And the Russian system continues to pay the price of its failure to understand it.

## The Future: Maintaining Pressure and Preparing a Just Peace

### Military pressure as the condition for negotiation

Every **Ka-52** downed, every bridge destroyed, every refinery struck strengthens Ukraine's position for any future negotiation. **Volodymyr Zelenskyy** has been clear from the start: Ukraine will only negotiate from a position of strength, on the basis of the full sovereignty of its territory. This is not intransigence — it is the recognition that any negotiated solution that rewards Russian aggression would set a devastating precedent for the international order.

The **Ankara Summit** of **July 7, 2026** will be an occasion for allies to demonstrate that they share this vision: supporting Ukraine militarily until the conditions for a just peace are met, not until the first diplomatic pressure point where compromise demands arise. Sustained pressure — of which the **353 helicopters** are a symbol — is the condition for lasting peace.

### What the international community must remember

For the international community, the lesson of the **Ka-52** downed on **July 2, 2026** is simple: military aid to Ukraine works. It does not end the war instantly — nothing ends anything instantly. But it degrades Russian capabilities, protects Ukrainian lives, and sustains an army fighting for values all democracies share. Reducing that aid, in this context, is not a policy of prudence — it is a policy of capitulation disguised as reason.

## Conclusion: 353 Helicopters and the Truth of the Front

### What this figure tells the world

The **Ka-52** lost on **July 2, 2026** is the symbol of a reality that Russian propaganda cannot mask indefinitely: the Russian Army is degrading. It fights, it strikes, it inflicts immense losses on Ukraine. But it degrades — in men, in equipment, in qualified pilots, in industrial capacity to replace its losses. The **353 helicopters** are not an abstract figure. They are years of industrial production, decades of crew training, billions of dollars in investment — all reduced to scrap metal in Ukrainian fields or riverbeds.

This report has sought to make visible what that figure contains: the desperate close-support strategy, the human cost of the lost crews, the pressure on Russian defence industries, the Ukrainian resilience that makes these destructions possible, and the moral obligation for Ukraine's allies to maintain the support that makes this toll sustainable.

### What Ukraine asks in return

Ukraine does not ask Westerners to die in its place. It asks for the weapons to keep destroying **Ka-52s**, logistical bridges, refineries, munitions depots. It asks for the systems that allow its soldiers to survive **9,463 drones** in a single day. It asks for funding for its reconstruction while it fights. These demands are legitimate, proportionate, and serve the interests of the entire West. **353 helicopters destroyed. Ukraine continues.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Charter97 — Russia Has Lost Yet Another Ka-52 Helicopter — July 2, 2026](https://charter97.org/en/news/2026/7/2/689828/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Russia loses 1,140 soldiers and 57 artillery systems over past day — July 2, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/02/8042020/)

- [Defence Ukraine — Defence news and Russian losses — July 2026](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine war latest, drone strikes and losses — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Continuous conflict coverage — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/)

- [RBC Ukraine — Military operations and losses — July 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-un-ka-52-russe-abattu-le-2-juillet-2026-353-helicopteres-perdus-le-bil