# REPORT: Trump relaunches peace at G7 Évian — Zelensky between hope and suspicion

> On June 16, 2026, on the sidelines of the G7 in Évian, Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky came face to face. After devoting several months of his attention to Iran since the spring of 2026, the American president announced his intention to re-energize efforts to end the war in Ukraine. His phrase — "Russia must make a deal" — became the summit's most quoted sound bite. Short,

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-trump-relance-la-paix-au-g7-evian-zelensky-entre-espoir-et-mefiance

## Introduction: June 16, 2026 in Évian — a face-to-face between two worlds

### The meeting no one expected this soon

On **June 16, 2026**, on the sidelines of the **G7 in Évian**, **Donald Trump** and **Volodymyr Zelensky** came face to face. After devoting several months of his attention to **Iran** since the spring of **2026**, the American president announced his intention to re-energize efforts to end the war in **Ukraine**. His phrase — **"Russia must make a deal"** — became the summit's most quoted sound bite. Short, direct, typically **Trump**. But what does it actually mean in the diplomatic reality of a war now more than four years old?

To understand the weight of this meeting, one must revisit the context: **Trump** had already attempted mediation in early **2026**, without success. Three rounds of US-Russia-Ukraine negotiations reportedly took place, according to diplomatic sources, without reaching a ceasefire agreement. The main reason: Russian demands for **Ukraine**'s withdrawal from the **Donbas** — incompatible with **Kyiv**'s position. The **Évian** summit did not resolve this knot. It simply put it back on the agenda.

### Three rounds of negotiations: what we know

According to diplomatic sources cited by several media outlets, **three rounds of negotiations** have reportedly taken place since the start of **2026**, involving American, Russian, and Ukrainian representatives. The details of these discussions are not public — all three parties have different reasons for not fully disclosing them. What is known: they produced no ceasefire agreement, and the front line has seen no major change in correlation with these contacts.

This underlying diplomatic silence contrasting with public declarations is telling. **Trump** wants to show he is acting. **Zelensky** wants to show he is not yielding. **Putin** wants to show he negotiates from strength, not weakness. Each is playing to a domestic audience — and the real substantive positions remain behind the closed doors of private meetings.

*Trump saying "Russia must make a deal" — I heard that phrase and immediately wanted to know more about what he means by "deal." A deal that satisfies the London conditions? A deal that leaves Russia on its current positions? The phrase is too short to contain a policy. That is the Trump problem in diplomacy: punchy phrases that don't always have the substance to back them up.*

## The Iranian detour: how Trump returned to Ukraine

### Iran first, Ukraine next — the logic of Trumpian attention

Since the spring of **2026**, **Trump** had largely set aside the Ukraine file to focus on **Iran**. The conclusion of a US-Iranian deal had occupied his diplomatic teams for several weeks, leaving **Ukraine** in a relative vacuum of American attention. This vacuum was filled by European partners, who multiplied their initiatives — **Ramstein**, bilateral agreements, financial support.

Trump's return to **Ukraine** at the **G7 in Évian** must therefore be read on two levels. On one hand, it is positive: American attention matters, and **Washington**'s political weight in negotiations is irreplaceable. On the other hand, this return after a long detour raises questions about the consistency of American engagement. Can a durable peace diplomacy be built on a presidential attention that comes and goes depending on the urgencies of the moment?

### The Trump–Zelensky meeting: between calculation and hope

The meeting between **Trump** and **Zelensky** on **June 16, 2026** was described as **"very good"** by the American president — a Trumpian formula whose real diplomatic value is difficult to measure. The two men have a complex relationship, marked by the controversial 2019 phone call that led to **Trump**'s first impeachment. That past weighs — or doesn't — depending on the needs of the moment.

**Zelensky** needs **America**. This structural reality obliges him to engage **Trump** even when American positions are not aligned with Ukrainian interests. It is an uncomfortable dependence — and **Zelensky** knows it. His strategy is to maintain American dialogue while simultaneously building the solidity of the European partnership, so as not to be entirely at the mercy of one man's moods.

*The Trump-Zelensky relationship is one of the most complex in current world diplomacy. Two men who need each other for very different reasons. Two men diametrically opposed in style and world view. And yet they must work together if peace is ever to be possible. That is one of the profound ironies of this historical moment.*

## The negotiations: what we know, what we don't

### Three rounds without agreement: the honest diplomatic balance sheet

Three rounds of negotiations, no agreement. This record confirms that peace diplomacy on **Ukraine** is in an exploratory phase — not yet a conclusive one. The parties are probing their room for maneuver, testing adversarial positions, and searching for the equilibrium point between what they can concede and what they cannot abandon without losing their internal political legitimacy.

On the Russian side, the demand for **Ukraine**'s withdrawal from the **Donbas** is politically impossible to abandon without a major concession from **Kyiv**. On the Ukrainian side, accepting the permanent loss of occupied territories is politically impossible without a major security counterpart — whether **NATO** membership or equivalent binding guarantees. This Gordian knot will not be cut by declarations at the **G7**.

### Conditions for a viable agreement: the gap between positions

For a peace agreement to be viable, it must be acceptable to both main parties — **Ukraine** and **Russia** — and guaranteed by third-party powers. None of these three conditions is currently met. Ukrainian and Russian positions are incompatible on territorial questions. The security guarantees **Ukraine** demands are not what **Russia** wishes to grant. And the format of international guarantee — who ensures compliance with the agreement — is not defined.

These obstacles are real and serious. They do not mean an agreement is impossible — wars always end. But they mean that military conditions on the ground will likely need to change significantly before a compromise becomes possible. That is why **Ukraine** maintains military pressure — and why its allies keep arming it.

*I am realistic about peace negotiations. Not pessimistic — realistic. Wars that end without a clear victory by either side require both parties to conclude that continuing the conflict costs more than an acceptable agreement. We are not there yet. But combined military and economic pressure can bring Russia to that point — with time and consistency.*

## The G7 in Évian: a platform for Ukraine between promises and realities

### The G7's concrete results for Kyiv

The **G7 in Évian** (June 15–17, 2026) produced concrete results for **Ukraine**, beyond **Trump**'s headline phrase. **G7** leaders confirmed continued support, discussed coordination of sanctions against **Russia**, and reaffirmed their commitment to the **ERA mechanism** for mobilizing frozen Russian assets. These commitments are real — even if the **Trump-Zelensky** meeting captured the bulk of media attention.

A worrying point, however: according to the **Kyiv Independent**, **Ukraine** risked leaving the **G7** summit with an **unfilled budget deficit of $52 billion** despite the announced commitments. The **United States** under **Trump** has drastically reduced direct aid, shifting the burden onto European partners. This shift is real — the **EU**'s **€90 billion** loan is its main expression — but it creates an imbalance that weakens the support coalition.

### The $52 billion deficit: the financial reality behind the announcements

Ukraine's **$52 billion** budget deficit flagged ahead of the **G7** illustrates the fundamental tension between political commitments expressed at summits and concrete financial realities. **Ukraine** needs constant financing to maintain its essential governmental functions — paying civil servants, funding pensions, maintaining public services — on top of financing its defense.

The first disbursement of **€3.2 billion** from the **EU**'s **€90 billion** loan, announced at the **Gdańsk** conference on **June 25, 2026**, reduced this pressure. But financing the reconstruction and operation of a state at war remains a structural challenge that cannot be resolved by a single announcement, however generous.

*The $52 billion deficit behind the G7's grand declarations — that is the kind of detail columnists must cite. Because the beautiful phrases from summits are easy to deliver. What matters is what arrives in Ukrainian accounts. And there, the picture is less flattering than official statements suggest.*

## Russia and the negotiations: what Moscow really wants

### Russian positions in the three negotiation rounds

According to available sources, Russian demands in the negotiations revolve around two fundamental requirements: recognition of the annexation of the four occupied Ukrainian oblasts (**Donetsk**, **Luhansk**, **Zaporizhzhia**, **Kherson**) and guarantees that **Ukraine** will not join **NATO**. Both conditions are unacceptable to **Kyiv** — and to the overwhelming majority of Western allies who have signed the **UN Charter** on territorial integrity.

Russia's strategy in these negotiations appears to be one of **maximum initial demands** — asking for the impossible in order to retreat toward the merely unacceptable and present this retreat as a concession. This is a classic negotiating tactic. But in this specific context, with war ongoing and lives at stake, playing with words and extreme initial positions is morally repugnant.

### Does Putin actually want peace?

The question many hesitate to ask publicly: does **Vladimir Putin** actually want peace, or does he prefer a frozen conflict that allows him to maintain control over occupied territories without the friction of a formal agreement? The honest answer is that we don't know. Some analysts believe he is looking for an honorable exit. Others believe he is ready to continue indefinitely as long as the cost remains bearable. These two possibilities imply very different strategies for **Ukraine**'s allies.

What can be said with certainty: as long as the cost of war for **Russia** remains lower than the cost of an agreement acceptable to **Ukraine** and its allies, there will be no peace. That is why military and economic pressure — including the **40-day operation** launched by **Zelensky** in late June **2026** — is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for creating the conditions for a just peace.

*"Does Putin actually want peace?" — I don't know. And this honesty is imposed on me by the fact that I cannot read minds. What I do know is that his actions — the strikes on the Lavra, the violations of Romanian airspace, the deportation of children — are not those of a man sincerely seeking a diplomatic exit. But wars sometimes end despite intentions.*

## Ukraine between hope and caution: decoding Zelensky's posture

### Zelensky at the G7: neither submission nor naïveté

**Zelensky** arrived at the **G7 in Évian** with a clear agenda: maximize support announcements, engage **Trump** without submitting to his conditions, and maintain the cohesion of the allied coalition. His attitude in response to **Trump**'s **"Russia must make a deal"** declaration was measured: he did not cry victory, he did not reject the extended hand. He said that the peace conditions remain those defined with European allies — full ceasefire, Russian withdrawal, security guarantees, frozen assets until compensation.

This posture of measured firmness is politically correct. It preserves the relationship with **Trump** without abandoning red lines. It reassures European allies who fear a Ukrainian capitulation under American pressure. And it maintains pressure on **Moscow** by refusing any sign of weakness or desperation.

### Ukraine's domestic political constraint

**Zelensky** operates under intense domestic political constraint: Ukrainian society has consented to immense sacrifices — **tens of thousands of dead**, millions displaced, a battered economy — and it will not tolerate an agreement that resembles a capitulation. Available polling shows that a majority of Ukrainians refuse to cede territories even at the price of immediate peace.

This popular pressure is both a constraint and a source of legitimacy for **Zelensky**. It allows him to resist pressure from **Trump** and others who would want a quick peace at any price. It also requires him not to sign an agreement his population would reject — which would make any agreement unstable in the long run anyway.

*Ukrainian democracy in wartime is one of the most remarkable — and least commented upon — aspects of this conflict. Zelensky is constrained by Ukrainian public opinion, which remains firmly opposed to capitulation. This democratic constraint is actually a strength: it guarantees that no agreement will be signed without a minimum of popular legitimacy.*

## European allies facing Trump: maintaining conditions without provoking rupture

### The European strategy: framing Trump without alienating him

European allies' reaction to **Trump**'s phrase — **"Russia must make a deal"** — was measured and strategic. **Macron**, **Starmer**, and **Merz** welcomed the return of American attention to **Ukraine**, while discreetly recalling that the conditions for a just agreement remain those defined at their **London** meeting of **June 7**. This reminder, without direct confrontation with **Trump**, aims to ensure that American enthusiasm for a quick peace does not translate into pressure on **Kyiv** to accept unacceptable conditions.

This framing strategy requires a delicate balance. Too resistant, and **Europe** risks pushing **Trump** to disengage further. Too accommodating, and it validates peace conditions that do not respect **Ukraine**'s territorial integrity. The **London** meeting of **June 7** was precisely designed to create this common European framework that would allow holding this line with greater collective force.

### The G7 as transatlantic coordination ground

The **G7 in Évian** served, among other things, as coordination ground between European and American positions on **Ukraine**. The bilateral meetings on the sidelines — **Macron-Trump**, **Starmer-Trump**, **Merz-Trump** — allowed European leaders to share their perspectives with the American president directly and off the record. These conversations likely contributed to **Trump** adopting firmer language on **Russia** than some had expected.

This is the value of the **G7** format for Ukrainian diplomacy: it forces bilateral conversations between key actors who, in other settings, would not have spoken as frankly. **Zelensky**, by insisting on being present on the sidelines of every **G7** since **2022**, understood this diplomatic mechanic and exploits it consistently.

*The G7 mechanic — the summits, the corridors, the bilateral sideline meetings — is a diplomatic instrument that works. Not perfectly, not always in the desired direction. But it creates conversation spaces that other formats do not. Zelensky meeting Trump on the sidelines of Évian is this mechanic concretized in Ukraine's service.*

## Military pressure as a negotiating tool: the 40-day operation

### Strike to negotiate: Ukrainian logic in June 2026

The logic behind the **40-day operation** announced by **Zelensky** in late June **2026** — striking Russian energy and logistical infrastructure to force **Moscow** to negotiate — is consistent with the realities of the ongoing negotiation. Favorable peace terms are not obtained from a position of military weakness. Maximum pressure on **Russia** is the prerequisite for negotiations that could produce an agreement respecting Ukrainian rights.

Ukrainian strikes on the **Norsi** refinery — Russia's fourth largest — on **June 25, 2026**, as well as on two refineries in **Ufa**, illustrate this strategy. Depriving **Russia** of refining capacity directly increases the cost of the Russian war effort by hitting the fuels needed for military operations. It is a strike at the logistics of the Russian war machine — a legitimate target under the law of armed conflict.

### The link between military operations and diplomatic dynamics

**Zelensky**'s teams have learned to link military operations to diplomatic dynamics. Launching the **40-day operation** after the **G7 in Évian**, after the meeting with **Trump**, after British and German support announcements — this ensures that military pressure occurs in a favorable diplomatic context, where allies have reaffirmed their support and **Moscow** is under pressure from converging announcements.

This synchronism between military operations and diplomatic communication is not accidental. It is the product of four years of learning hybrid warfare and strategic communication. **Ukraine** in **2026** is an infinitely more sophisticated diplomatic and military actor than it was in **2022** — forged in the fire of a war that has also been a school of high-intensity diplomacy.

*The 40-day operation launched by Zelensky after the G7 in Évian — that is the military response to the diplomatic dynamic. You support us, you arm us, now we strike to force negotiation. This coherence between the front and diplomacy is one of Zelensky's strengths. He never separates the two — he uses them together.*

## Conclusion: Évian, one step on a long road toward peace

### What the G7 changed — and what it did not

The **G7 in Évian** in **June 2026** relaunched American attention on **Ukraine** — that is a real gain. It produced confirmed support commitments — that is concrete. But it did not resolve the fundamental questions blocking a just peace: the gap between Ukrainian and Russian territorial positions, the format for security guarantees, and the question of **NATO** membership. These questions remain entirely open after the summit, just as they were before.

Trump's phrase — **"Russia must make a deal"** — is rhetorical pressure, not yet a policy. For it to become a policy, **Washington** would need to specify what it expects from **Moscow**, what the consequences are if **Russia** refuses, and how American peace conditions articulate with those defined in **London** by European allies. This precision work remains to be done.

### Ukraine holds — the road to peace is long

*I end this report with one certainty and one uncertainty. Certainty: Ukraine will hold, with or without Trump. Uncertainty: under what conditions will peace come, and when? These questions will remain open for a long time. And meanwhile, Ukrainians are dying. That reality never leaves me, even when I am analyzing summit diplomacy.*

**Ukraine** has held out longer than almost all experts predicted in **2022**. It continues to hold in **2026**, supported by a coalition of allies that, despite its imperfections, holds together. **Zelensky** remains at his post, continues negotiating, continues demanding. Peace will come — but it will be a just peace or a long wait. What the **G7 in Évian** showed is that both options remain open.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Straits Times — Russia should make peace deal, Trump says after "very good" Zelensky meeting — June 16, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/russia-should-make-peace-deal-trump-says-after-very-good-zelensky-meeting)

- [RBC Ukraine — No stalemate but no ceasefire either — presidential analysis — June 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/no-stalemate-but-no-ceasefire-either-presidential-1780333072.html)

- [Eastern Herald — Trump, Putin, Zelensky and the deal opening at G7 Évian — June 15, 2026](https://easternherald.com/2026/06/15/trump-putin-zelensky-open-deal-g7-macron-evian-june-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [RTE News — Ukraine strikes and G7 situation — June 15, 2026](https://www.rte.ie/news/ukraine/2026/0615/1578414-ukraine-strikes/)

- [Washington Times — Putin announces reinforcement of Russian air defenses — June 4, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/4/vladimir-putin-says-russia-bolster-air-defenses-response-ukrainian/)

- [21CIR — Analysis of Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations in 2026 — June 2026](https://www.21cir.com/2026/06/195267/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-trump-relance-la-paix-au-g7-evian-zelensky-entre-espoir-et-mefiance