# REPORT: Trump and Pezeshkian sign the MoU — 14 points to stop a war

> On June 17, 2026, at the close of the G7 summit in France, U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian digitally signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding aimed at ending a war that had been ongoing since February 28, 2026. This digital signature bore

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-trump-et-pezeshkian-signent-le-mou-14-points-pour-arreter-une-guerre

## Introduction: A digital signature to close a hundred days of fire

### The moment of signing

On **June 17, 2026**, at the close of the G7 summit in France, U.S. President **Donald Trump** and Iranian President **Masoud Pezeshkian** digitally signed a **14-point** memorandum of understanding aimed at ending a **war** that had been ongoing since **February 28, 2026**. This digital signature bore none of the protocol of great historical peace deals — no handshake in front of cameras, no ceremonial pen. Two presidents in two different countries, a document circulating electronically, and a **war** that — officially — was stopping. The process had begun the preceding Sunday when Iranian Parliament Speaker **Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf** and U.S. Vice President **JD Vance** had signed an initial electronic version of the agreement, according to the White House.

**Trump**, speaking at his G7 closing press conference, announced: "On Sunday, we concluded a deal with **Iran** that accomplishes everything we set out as our objective — everything, and then some. Ending the current conflict, reopening the Strait of **Hormuz**, and preventing **Iran** from ever obtaining a **nuclear** weapon." This triumphant statement, broadcast live, coexisted with a warning: if **Iran** did not honor its commitments within the allotted time, the **United States** would "go back to dropping bombs." Peace and **threat**, in the same breath.

### A hundred days of war: the immediate context

The **war** between the **United States**, Israel, and **Iran** had officially begun on **February 28, 2026** with joint American-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear installations. In retaliation, **Iran** had closed the **Strait of Hormuz**, blocking approximately one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas trade. The human cost of the conflict was heavy: at least **7,000 lives lost** according to estimates compiled in mid-June, with Iranian, Israeli, Lebanese casualties (Hezbollah having been engaged on that front simultaneously), and members of American forces deployed in the region. Global energy markets had been disrupted for more than three months, with U.S. gasoline prices exceeding **$4.50 per gallon** according to **AAA** as cited by The Independent on **June 24, 2026**.

The **June 17** memorandum is not the end of this conflict — it is the beginning of an attempt to transform it into lasting peace. It provides for a **60-day** period, extendable by mutual consent, for both parties to negotiate the terms of a final agreement. These **60** days must resolve what **100** days of **war** could not: the future of the Iranian **nuclear** program, the long-term status of the Strait of **Hormuz**, and the regional security architecture of the Middle East.

*A digital signature to end a war. Two presidents who don't look each other in the eyes, in two different countries, clicking an electronic approval button. There is something profoundly contemporary about this ritual — and something troubling too. Great peaces are often built in the details nobody wants to look at on signing day. Those details are waiting in the 14 points of the MoU, in the vague clauses on nuclear and Hormuz, ready to explode the moment someone reads them closely.*

## The 14 points of the MoU: what the agreement says

### Immediate commitments

The memorandum of understanding, whose full text was published by **NPR** on **June 18, 2026**, provides first and foremost for the **immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts**, including Lebanon. Both parties commit to not initiating new military operations against each other and to respecting Lebanon's territorial integrity and **sovereignty**. The **United States** commits to immediately beginning to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports and to lift it completely within **30 days** of signing. **Iran**, for its part, commits to facilitating the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of **Hormuz** at no cost, for an initial period of **60** days.

On the economic front, the agreement provides for the **immediate** lifting of U.S. **sanctions** on Iranian oil and petrochemical products, which was to inject billions of dollars into the Iranian economy from the days following signing. The U.S. Treasury issued a temporary general license — valid until **August 21, 2026** — permitting transactions related to transit approved through the Strait of **Hormuz**, according to **Iran** International of **June 23**. Frozen Iranian assets, estimated at tens of billions of dollars spread across banks in various countries, are to be released under modalities to be determined within the framework of the final agreement.

### The 60-day commitments: nuclear and the future

The most sensitive point of the memorandum concerns the Iranian **nuclear** program. **Iran** reaffirms that it will not **develop or acquire nuclear weapons** — a commitment that **Tehran** had formally maintained for decades, but that the **2026** **war** had made even more critical. The MoU stipulates that **Iran**'s highly enriched uranium will be "down-blended" (diluted) on Iranian soil, under **IAEA** supervision. The exact parameters of this process — final dilution level, timeline, inspector access — are deferred to the **60-day** negotiation. This apparently technical formulation is in reality the central question of the agreement: if down-blending is not precisely defined and verified, the **nuclear** agreement will remain a statement of intent.

The agreement also provides for the creation of a **reconstruction fund** of **300 billion dollars** for **Iran**, funded by U.S. regional partners — with an explicit specification that the **United States** will not contribute "not a cent" to this fund. The exact nature of this fund, its governance and disbursement modalities, and the list of its contributors are all deferred to the **60 days**. Finally, the agreement stipulates that any final settlement will be "ratified by a binding **UN** Security Council resolution" — a point that **Washington** and **Tehran** interpret differently, **Washington** not being in the habit of submitting its bilateral agreements to Security Council approval.

*Three hundred billion. I want that figure stated clearly: the agreement provides for a 300-billion-dollar reconstruction fund for Iran. For a country that the United States and Israel had just been bombing for months. Trump said the United States will pay "not a cent." Okay. But who pays? Gulf states? On what timeline? With what oversight mechanisms? None of these details are in the MoU. This $300 billion fund is the big promise of the deal. And big promises without implementation mechanisms are blank checks signed in euphoria.*

## The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz: the first hours

### The ships moving again

In the hours following the signing of the MoU, markets reacted immediately. Oil prices began to fall. But the physical reopening of the Strait of **Hormuz** happened gradually and initially hesitantly. On **June 19**, the U.S. military had lifted its naval blockade on Iranian ports — "U.S. **warships** will remain in the general area," a **CENTCOM** statement cited by **NBC** News of **June 19** specified. That same day, three Saudi oil tankers had left the Gulf through the strait, along with a French ship loaded with liquefied natural gas.

The Iranian authority managing the Strait of **Hormuz** had published new directives: ships were required to submit their transit request **48 hours in advance**. No fees would be collected during the **60**-day period. This establishment of a prior-request system — which did not exist before the **war** — was perceived by some observers as an Iranian anticipation of setting up a future transit control regime, even though **Iran** insisted on the temporary nature of this procedure. In the week of **June 19-21**, the number of strait crossings had nearly **tripled** compared to the previous week, according to MarineTraffic cited by **Iran** International on **June 23**: **93 ships** against **32**.

### The 12.5 million barrels and the economic significance

According to **NBC** News of **June 19**, on the night following the signing, **12.5 million barrels of oil** transited through the Strait of **Hormuz** — a record level since the start of the conflict. This figure concretely illustrates the economic stakes of the blockade: during the months of the **war**, this vital route for global energy was partially or totally closed. The cascading effects on global energy prices, maritime insurance, and industrial supply chains rippled through to end consumers worldwide.

The return of tankers to the Strait of **Hormuz** also had an immediate effect on oil prices. Brent crude, according to **NBC** News, fell by more than **8%** in the week following the announcement of the deal — a drop reflecting not only the anticipation of increased Iranian oil supply, but also market relief at the reduction in geopolitical risk. This decline had already begun to show at the American gas pump, with the average price of regular gasoline dropping from more than **$4.50** to **$3.93 per gallon** according to **AAA** as cited by The Independent of **June 24, 2026**.

*12.5 million barrels in one night. That is the figure of decompression. After months of tension, risk of generalized war, stranded sailors, and spiking prices, the first night after the agreement saw oil flow again through the strait. This is a concrete, measurable, humanly economic moment. And it is also, I must say, the primary reason this deal was signed. Not peace in the noble sense. Oil. That is not cynical — it is realistic. Energy markets produced the political pressure necessary to advance diplomacy. That must be honestly acknowledged.*

## Who is Masoud Pezeshkian: the president who signed capitulation or survival?

### The profile of the Iranian president

**Masoud Pezeshkian**, President of the Islamic Republic of **Iran** since July **2024**, is a trained cardiac surgeon, born in **1954** in the West Azerbaijan province. A moderate reformer within the Iranian political spectrum, he was elected in a context of high abstention on a platform of dialogue with the **West** and economic revival. His electoral **victory** in **2024** was interpreted by observers as a signal from the Iranian population in favor of de-escalation — but the institutions of real power in **Iran**, notably Supreme Leader **Ali Khamenei** and the Revolutionary Guards, hold authority that exceeds the president's on questions of **defense** and foreign policy.

Pezeshkian's signing of the MoU therefore represents a complex political act: he must defend before his population and institutions an agreement with a country that had been bombing Iranian territory for months, that maintained a naval blockade of its ports, and that demands inspections of its nuclear facilities. Ayatollah **Khamenei**, according to Fox News of **June 19**, had approved the MoU "with reservations" — a deliberately ambiguous formulation that allowed the regime to maintain critical distance from a deal that some Iranian hawks described as an unacceptable concession.

### The position of Khamenei's military adviser

**Mohsen Rezaei**, Supreme Leader Khamenei's military adviser and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, had warned according to Fox News of **June 20** that any agreement must "preserve **Iran**'s deterrence capability for the next **50** years." This statement, published in the days following signing, signaled that influential figures within **Iran**'s military establishment viewed the MoU as a text whose interpretation would need to be vigorously defended in subsequent negotiations. Rezaei notably stressed that **Iran** must maintain its "leverage" over the Strait of **Hormuz**.

This internal Iranian tension — between Pezeshkian who signed and the military hawks who are watching — is a structural fragility factor in the agreement. Pezeshkian may negotiate in good faith, but if the final terms are judged too favorable to the **United States** by the Revolutionary Guards or by Khamenei, the agreement risks not being ratified or implemented. The history of Iranian nuclear negotiations since **2003** has shown on multiple occasions that agreements signed by Iranian presidents could be challenged or hollowed out by the regime's security institutions.

*Pezeshkian signed. But Pezeshkian does not control the Revolutionary Guards. He does not control Khamenei. And he does not control the military hawks who consider Iran's nuclear capability an attribute of national sovereignty, not a negotiable diplomatic option. I'm not saying the deal is doomed to fail. I'm saying that the Iranian president's signature is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. What will be sufficient is the decision of Iran's entire power system. And that system has not yet rendered its full verdict.*

## The Pakistani-Qatari mediation: the invisible architects

### Pakistan and Qatar at the heart of diplomacy

**Pakistan** and **Qatar** played a central role in the mediation that led to the **June 17** MoU. Pakistan, which maintains relations with **Iran** based on a shared border, cultural and religious ties, and a traditional policy of active non-alignment, had been chosen as the principal mediator between **Washington** and **Tehran**. Qatar, which hosts the largest American military base in the region (Al Udeid) while maintaining diplomatic relations with **Iran**, was in a unique position to facilitate contacts.

According to Al Jazeera of **June 22**, Pakistani and Qatari mediators described the Switzerland talks of **June 20-22** as having resulted in agreement on a "roadmap" toward a final deal — with the creation of direct lines of communication to prevent incidents in the Strait of **Hormuz**, and the establishment of a "deconfliction cell" between the negotiating parties and Lebanese authorities to avoid any return to fighting in Lebanon. These operational mechanisms, modest as they may appear, are substantive developments: they create institutional channels that did not exist before the agreement.

### The mediation and its limits

The Pakistani-Qatari mediation succeeded in facilitating the signing of the MoU. But it also highlighted its own limits. Pakistan is not a **nuclear** power perceived as neutral on the question of Iranian proliferation — Islamabad itself developed nuclear weapons in the **1990s**. And Qatar, whose revenues depend massively on the export of liquefied natural gas through the Strait of Hormuz, has a direct economic interest in the rapid resolution of the conflict that could influence its definition of "acceptable terms" for a deal.

These overlapping interests do not disqualify the mediators — on the contrary, mediators with no stake in the outcome are often without influence. But they explain why the United States' regional allies in the Gulf — who have concerns about Iranian **missiles** and Tehran's regional influence that neither Pakistan nor Qatar have the same reasons to defend — sought to speak directly with Rubio during his June **23** tour.

*Pakistan and Qatar did something remarkable: they convinced two countries that were bombing each other weeks ago to sit at the same table. That is no small thing. It is even considerable. But mediation can only bring parties to the table. What happens around that table — the concessions, the red lines, the verifiability of commitments — is Washington's and Tehran's business. And these two capitals demonstrated, within a week, that they do not yet share the same reading of what the deal means.*

## What the $300 billion fund means

### The architecture of a giant promise

The **$300 billion** reconstruction fund for Iran is one of the most spectacular points of the MoU. According to the text published by **CBS** News, this fund would be "developed by the United States with regional partners" and would be activated based on Iran's "behavior." The specification that Washington will contribute "not a cent" suggests that the intended contributors are Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait — which hold the necessary sovereign reserves. According to Antiwar.com of June **17**, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf had mentioned that the fund included provisions for "approximately **300** billion in investments in Iran, part of which for reconstruction projects."

This $300 billion fund raises considerable practical questions. First, have the Gulf states actually agreed to contribute to the reconstruction of an Iran whose regional influence they consider a direct threat? Second, under what conditions would this fund be disbursed — and what oversight mechanisms would guarantee it is not used to fund the military programs that Gulf states fear? Third, what role would the IAEA or other international organizations play in supervising the use of funds linked to the nuclear program?

### Trump's initial rejection: "fake news"

Before the signing of the MoU, Trump had described news of this fund as **"fake news"** when details had leaked to the press. After signing, his advisers explained that the United States would not be required to contribute, that activation of the fund would depend on Iranian behavior, and that the exact nature of contributions and governance would be negotiated in the 60 days. This sequence — deny the existence, then manage the details — illustrates the administration's difficulty in presenting an agreement containing substantial concessions as a total victory.

The concession on the $300 billion fund is real. It represents an implicit acknowledgment that the war caused damage to Iran that the international community is prepared to help repair, at least partially. For a president who had presented the war as a purely defensive action aimed at neutralizing the Iranian nuclear threat, accepting contribution to an Iranian reconstruction mechanism is politically costly. This is one of the reasons the MoU drew criticism from Republicans like Senator **Tom Cotton** of Arkansas and other members of Congress who felt the agreement gave too much to Tehran.

*Three hundred billion. Of which zero comes directly from the United States. But the Gulf states that would pay are American allies who bought American arms to protect themselves against... Iran. Now they are being asked to fund the reconstruction of Iran. I understand the economic logic — a stable region is a more prosperous one for everyone. But I also understand why the Saudis and the Emiratis look at this fund with a mixture of pragmatism and mistrust. It is money they would pay to a regional competitor in the hope of making it less aggressive. The logic is not absurd. The risk is real.*

## The first hours of the agreement: joy, caution, and incidents

### Market euphoria and expert restraint

In the hours following the signing of the MoU on June 17, financial markets responded with enthusiasm. Oil company stocks fluctuated, crude prices began to fall, and maritime freight rates started to ease. Market euphoria was understandable: after more than three months of a war that had disrupted a vital energy route, the prospect of normalization represented billions of dollars of economic relief. Geopolitical experts had a more nuanced reaction.

The questions posed by observers in the first hours were precisely those that the MoU text did not answer: what would happen to Iran's highly enriched uranium? With what precision would down-blending be defined and verified? What about Iranian ballistic missiles, absent from the text? What would be the role of Israel — absent from the agreement but a central actor in the conflict — in the weeks following signing? These questions, asked on the very day of signing, proved prophetic as early as June 19, when Israeli strikes in Lebanon nearly derailed the process after just two days.

### The first 48 hours: the Lebanese crisis and the postponement of talks

On the **evening of June 18**, Hezbollah had killed **four Israeli soldiers** in Lebanon. Israel responded with a series of massive airstrikes in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, killing at least **18 people** and wounding 33 according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health cited by NBC News of June 19. On June 19, the Israeli military had conducted more than **150 strikes** in Lebanon since midnight, according to its spokesman Effie Defrin. These actions — by an actor that had not signed the MoU — provoked exactly the type of escalation that the agreement claimed to prevent.

In response to these incidents, Vice President JD Vance had **canceled his trip to Switzerland** where technical talks were supposed to begin. Switzerland officially confirmed the postponement of talks in a statement transmitted to AFP, signaling that "planned talks between the United States, Iran, Qatar and Pakistan have been postponed." Iran had put its delegation on hold, demanding proof of implementation of American commitments before continuing. Thus the first test of the agreement — the first 48 hours — had nearly proven fatal to the process itself.

*Forty-eight hours. The agreement nearly collapsed in forty-eight hours. Not because of Iran or the United States. Because of Israel — which did not sign the MoU and continued its operations in Lebanon as if the agreement did not exist. That is the deepest paradox of this situation: the United States concluded a peace deal with Iran without being able to guarantee the behavior of its closest ally in the region. And Iran, for its part, could not fully guarantee Hezbollah's behavior either. An agreement between two parties where the actors who can derail the deal are not part of it — that is the architecture of a diplomatic time bomb.*

## The structure of 60 days: a timeline under pressure

### What must be resolved before August 16, 2026

The **60 days** provided for in the MoU run from **June 17, 2026**, setting the deadline around **August 16, 2026**, barring mutually agreed extension. Within this window, negotiators must resolve at minimum the following questions: the precise fate and timeline of down-blending Iran's highly enriched uranium; the modalities of IAEA inspector access; the future governance regime of the Strait of Hormuz after the 60 days of free transit; the modalities for the complete lifting of American sanctions; the release of frozen Iranian assets; and the details of governance and funding of the $300 billion reconstruction fund.

To these fundamental questions are added related ones that the MoU does not address directly but which will weigh on negotiations: the fate of Iran's ballistic missile program (not mentioned in the text), the future of Iran's regional influence via proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, militias in Iraq), and Israel's role in a post-agreement regional security architecture. These questions are politically explosive, and the delegations negotiating at Bürgenstock and in other formats do not have the luxury of time to resolve them all.

### The extension clause and what it means

The MoU contains a clause providing that the 60-day period can be "extended by mutual agreement" between the parties. This clause is double-edged. On one side, it provides a diplomatic safety valve if negotiations are progressing but cannot be concluded on time. On the other, it allows either party to use the prospect of an extension as a delaying tactic — "we need more time" can be a good-faith request or a way to postpone a difficult decision. In the context of American domestic politics, with 2026 midterm elections approaching, Trump has incentives to either conclude quickly, or extend indefinitely to avoid admitting failure.

Iran, for its part, has economic incentives to prolong negotiations: during the 60 days and any extension, oil sanctions are lifted, assets progressively unfreeze, and oil revenues resume. The longer negotiations last, the more Iran fattens its reserves before Washington can reimpose sanctions in the event of failure. This asymmetry of temporal incentives is one of the structural vulnerabilities of the agreement that Republican critics identified from the first days.

*Sixty days extendable. In diplomatic practice, "extendable by mutual agreement" can very easily become "indefinitely extendable at the convenience of the party that benefits from the status quo." And in this specific case, the 60-day status quo is very favorable to Iran: sanctions lifted, assets unblocked, oil flowing, and no immediate obligation to resolve the nuclear question. If I were an Iranian negotiator, I would be very motivated to find reasons why the 60 days must be extended. And I would find those reasons easily.*

## Internal opponents: critical Republicans and worried Democrats

### The Republican front against the MoU

The signing of the MoU on June 17 immediately triggered a negative reaction from a significant wing of the Republican Party. Senators like **Tom Cotton** of Arkansas and other members of Congress criticized the MoU for three main reasons: the $300 billion fund they consider a reward for an aggressor regime, the abandonment of the demand to remove Iranian uranium from national territory in favor of on-site down-blending, and the complete absence of any mention of Iranian ballistic missiles in the text.

Al Jazeera of June 18 described this Republican backlash as coming from members who felt the MoU "squanders taxpayer money and doesn't sufficiently limit Iran's nuclear ambitions." This criticism precisely anticipated the dispute that would erupt over nuclear inspections five days later. What is remarkable is the speed with which Republican voices — including habitual Trump supporters — formulated public reservations about a deal their president was presenting as a victory. This gap between presidential communications and the parliamentary reading is an additional indicator of the tensions the 60 days will have to absorb.

### The constitutional dimension: Congress's role

The June 17 MoU was signed without prior Congressional authorization. This legal reality — analogous to what led to the Senate war powers vote on June 24 — raises a question of constitutional legitimacy. If the final agreement to be negotiated over 60 days contains financial commitments (such as contribution to an Iranian reconstruction mechanism), sanctions relief (which generally requires legislative action), or provisions on the IAEA's status in Iran (which could constitute an international agreement requiring Senate ratification), Congress will have to be involved. This forced involvement is an additional complexity factor in the already loaded 60-day timeline.

The Trump administration prefers to treat the MoU as an executive agreement — a presidential commitment that does not require Senate ratification. But if the provisions of the final agreement prove to have the nature of an international treaty, a legal and political battle over the need for a 67-vote Senate ratification could open. This battle, if it materializes, would constitute yet another test of the relationship between the presidency and the U.S. Congress on foreign policy questions — a test the United States does not need in the critical window of these 60 days.

*International agreements signed by American presidents without Senate ratification have a painful history. Obama passed the JCPOA as an executive agreement. Trump withdrew from it as an executive agreement. Biden tried to revive it. And now Trump signs a MoU without going through the Senate, while the Senate votes a resolution telling him to stop the war. This constitutional loop — a president who acts, a Congress that votes symbolic texts, and a peace deal that rests on executive good will alone — is not a solid foundation for lasting peace.*

## The concrete reopening: sailors free, markets relieved

### The 11,000 sailors and the human reality

Beyond financial figures and Senate resolutions, the June 17 MoU had an immediate and concrete human effect: the progressive liberation of hundreds of ships and approximately **11,000 sailors** stranded in the Persian Gulf for months, according to the International Maritime Organization cited by Iran International of June 23. These sailors — from around thirty different nationalities, working for companies worldwide — had been involuntary hostages of a geopolitical conflict. Their situation was silent, invisible in headlines, but it represented real human suffering: separated families, crews under constant stress in a combat zone, weeks or months of life stolen from workers who had simply chosen the profession of sailor.

The reopening of the strait began to lift this human siege. On June 19, the first civilian ships resume their route. On June 20, crossings increase. On June 21, 93 ships pass through the strait in three days — versus 32 the previous week. This pace of normalization, cautious but real, is the concrete manifestation of what the MoU can accomplish in its less controversial aspects. It is also the economic foundation on which any continuation of negotiation rests: if traffic through the strait continues to normalize, the economic pressure to maintain the peace process remains strong on both sides.

### Fuel prices and American politics

For the average American voter, the war against Iran translated very concretely into the price at the pump. From more than **$4.50 per gallon** at the peak of the Hormuz blockade, the average price of regular gasoline in the United States had dropped to **$3.93** according to AAA as of June 24, 2026 — a decline directly linked to the reopening of the strait and the prospect of lifting sanctions on Iranian oil. This drop of 57 cents per gallon, across 130 million American car-owning households, represents billions of dollars of restored purchasing power.

This direct link between MoU diplomacy and American household budgets partly explains why the deal received a better public reception than one might expect from a country that had just voted 76% to say the war had "not been worth its cost." Polls show that the American public is simultaneously skeptical about the durability of peace (**63%** according to Reuters/Ipsos) and relieved that hostilities have ceased. This coexistence of immediate relief and long-term skepticism is precisely the political tension the administration must manage throughout the 60 days.

*Politics often plays out at the level of the gas pump. When gasoline drops 57 cents per gallon, political opposition to the peace deal becomes harder to sustain — even for Republican senators critical of the MoU. This is the geopolitics of everyday life: people don't vote for or against nuclear non-proliferation policies. They vote for or against policies that affect their monthly bill. And that bill just went down. Trump knows it. His critics know it too. And Tehran certainly knows it.*

## The Lebanese question: the blind spot of the agreement

### Lebanon as an uncontrolled variable

The memorandum of understanding demands "an immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon." But there is a fundamental problem: Israel did not sign the MoU. And the Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which continued after signing, illustrate that Washington cannot guarantee its ally's behavior within this bilateral American-Iranian agreement. Iran, for its part, demanded that the agreement include guarantees that "the resistant populations of southern Lebanon would not be subjected to killings" — a formulation that sets a very high standard that Israel has no intention of unilaterally honoring.

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, finally concluded on Friday June 19 according to NBC News, allowed an exit from the immediate crisis. But this ceasefire was negotiated separately from the American-Iranian MoU, in distinct conversations involving direct American mediation. Its durability remains uncertain — like all ceasefires in this conflict — and any resurgence of fighting in Lebanon can once again put the Switzerland talks at risk. Lebanon is, in this diplomatic architecture, the Achilles' heel that neither Washington nor Tehran fully controls.

### Iran's regional influence: the taboo subject

Beyond Lebanon, the MoU does not address Iran's regional influence via its proxies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq, Hamas (or what remains of it) in Gaza. This omission is deliberate — including this question in the MoU would have made an already difficult-to-sign agreement totally impossible. But it creates a grey area in which Iran can continue to exert regional influence through these actors, without formally violating the MoU itself.

The United States' regional allies — Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE — consider this Iranian regional influence a threat as serious as the nuclear program. Their dissatisfaction with a deal that does not address this aspect is structural, not superficial. And since they cannot block the MoU they did not sign, their only recourse is to pressure Washington so that the final agreement includes provisions on this subject — which Iran will very likely refuse to discuss within the framework of a bilateral negotiation with the United States.

*An agreement that doesn't mention Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias. An agreement signed by two parties while the main actor on the ground in Lebanon — Israel — did not sign it. And a 60-day window to resolve what the last three decades failed to resolve. I don't want to be the columnist of pessimism. But I must name what I see: this agreement is a partial peace architecture, built on foundations that deliberately exclude the most difficult questions. That is not a disgrace — it is sometimes the only way to begin. But it must be admitted.*

## The Iranian perspective: victory, defeat, or survival?

### What Tehran can claim

From the Iranian point of view, the MoU contains several elements that Tehran can present internally as gains. The end of American-Israeli strikes. The immediate lifting of oil sanctions. The progressive unfreezing of frozen assets. The $300 billion reconstruction fund. The preservation of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil (no export). The absence of any mention of the ballistic missile program. Each of these points represents an American concession or the preservation of a key Iranian interest.

Iranian Foreign Minister **Abbas Araghchi** had declared after the Switzerland talks that "substantial progress" had been achieved, notably on the resumption of oil exports, the lifting of the blockade, the unfreezing of certain assets, and the launch of the reconstruction initiative. This list of concrete gains explains why, despite the reservations of the regime's military hawks, the signing of the MoU was presented as a pragmatic decision by the moderate figures of the Pezeshkian government.

### What Tehran conceded — or claims not to have conceded

On the Iranian concessions side, the balance is more contested. The commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons was a position Tehran had formally maintained for decades — this is not a new concession. The on-site down-blending of enriched uranium is a significant procedural concession — but its real scope depends on its implementation and verifiability, questions that remain open. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz without fees was a necessary economic condition for lifting sanctions — not really a strategic concession, but a precondition for entering negotiations.

What Iran did not concede: its missiles, its regional influence, its centrifuge capacity, and its position of strength in future negotiations over Hormuz after the 60 days. For a country that endured months of American-Israeli airstrikes, this list of preserved positions represents a form of strategic resilience that Tehran can value internally. The West sees in the MoU a first step toward denuclearization. Iran sees in it international recognition of its sovereignty and its capacity to stand up to the world's primary military power for 100 days.

*Each party reads the same text and sees its own victory in it. That is the definition of a short-term successful diplomatic agreement. It is also the definition of an agreement that carries the seeds of its own contestation. When the 60 days of negotiation truly open — without the relative consensus of the signing, facing concrete questions on inspections, missiles, Hormuz — each party will try to put the other in a position of denying its gains. That is how interim agreements die: not in signing ceremonies, but in the negotiating rooms that follow.*

## What the West must demand in 60 days

### The minimum conditions for a credible deal

If the West wants a final deal with Iran to be credible, three minimum conditions must be met within 60 days. First, a precise, binding, and verifiable nuclear inspection regime — with full IAEA access, not only to struck sites, but to the entirety of Iran's active nuclear program. Second, a precisely defined down-blending mechanism — final dilution level, timeline, independent supervision, automatic consequences for non-compliance. Third, a legally binding guarantee on permanent freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, without fees or prior-request procedures that would allow Iran to exercise discretionary control over traffic.

These three conditions constitute the floor below which an agreement would, in fact, be disguised capitulation. Above this floor, there remains room for real diplomacy on difficult questions — missiles, regional influence — that cannot be resolved in 60 days but could be the subject of process commitments rather than outcome ones. The West, through the pressure of the U.S. Congress, regional allies, and international institutions like the IAEA, must keep this floor clearly visible throughout the negotiation period.

### The stakes for Western credibility

Beyond Iran, the quality of the final agreement that emerges from these 60 days will send a global signal about the credibility of the Western posture toward states seeking to develop nuclear capabilities. A solid, verifiable agreement will tell the world that the international community can compel even a determined state to renounce nuclear weapons. A vague, easily circumventable agreement will tell the world that resisting inspections during negotiations is a winning strategy. The reach of this message goes far beyond the Iranian case — it concerns every decision that observing governments will make about their own nuclear programs in coming decades.

This is why the June 17 MoU is a beginning, not an end. This is why every outcome of the 60-day negotiations — on inspections, down-blending, Hormuz — deserves to be followed, analyzed, and evaluated with a precision that the celebration of signing tends to make difficult. The work begins on June 18. It ends — one way or another — in mid-August 2026.

*The West has the right to feel relieved that strikes have ceased, that oil flows again, that sailors can go home. This relief is real and legitimate. But this relief should not translate into passive acceptance of an insufficient agreement. The 60 days beginning now are the real war of this conflict — the war of words, clauses, and verification mechanisms. And this war, the West cannot afford to lose on the grounds that it is tired of the previous one.*

## Conclusion: the MoU is a starting point, not an endpoint

### What June 17 accomplished

The memorandum of understanding signed on **June 17, 2026** accomplished three concrete and measurable things: it stopped the military strikes, it reopened the Strait of Hormuz, and it created a framework — imperfect, but existing — for negotiations toward lasting peace. These three accomplishments are real. They saved lives, freed sailors, brought down gas prices, and reduced the risk of uncontrolled escalation in a region whose instabilities can spread to the entire global economy.

What the MoU did not accomplish is the resolution of the fundamental questions that had led to the war: the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran's regional influence, the Gulf security architecture, the relationship between the parties and their respective allies (Israel on one side, Hezbollah and the Houthis on the other). These questions are deferred to the 60 days of negotiations. Their resolution — or non-resolution — will determine whether June 17, 2026 is the beginning of lasting peace or simply the beginning of a new crisis delayed by two months.

*From June 17, I retain this: Trump did something nobody expected of him — he agreed to negotiate with a regime he had bombed. Pezeshkian did something remarkable within his context — he signed with the country that had bombed his. This double act of pragmatism, even if incomplete and structurally fragile, deserves to be recognized. Great peace agreements often begin with small gestures of pragmatism. The problem is that small gestures of pragmatism then require great substantive negotiations. And those great negotiations are beginning now.*

## Conclusion: 14 points, 60 days, a world waiting

### The immediate next steps

In the weeks following the signing of the MoU, the world is watching three key indicators to assess whether this agreement holds. First, the continuity of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz — whether crossings continue to increase, whether fees are not imposed after the 60 days, whether the mines signaled by Rubio in June are effectively cleared. Second, progress on nuclear inspections — whether the June 23 dispute resolves through full IAEA access or whether the impasse persists. Third, the situation in Lebanon — whether the Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire holds or whether new escalation once again puts the talks at risk.

These three observable, measurable indicators will say more than any official speech whether the June 17 MoU is turning into a viable peace agreement or fraying under the cumulative pressures of two parties reading the same text with fundamentally different expectations. Whatever the outcome, June 17, 2026 will remain in history as the moment when an American president and an Iranian president took the first step toward ending a war that nobody really controlled. That step — incomplete, ambiguous, risky — was necessary. The ones that follow are harder still.

*Fourteen points. Sixty days. A world holding its breath. I covered this moment with the available data, verifiable sources, and the awareness that honest reporting requires naming both accomplishments and limits. The MoU has real limits. It also has real accomplishments. And what will happen in the 60 days beginning now — that is the report I would like the chance to write by mid-August. With as many facts, as few inventions, and the same stubborn hope that precision serves peace better than false triumphs.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [CNBC — Trump and Pezeshkian sign the US-Iran memorandum of understanding — June 17, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/17/trump-vance-iran-deal-nuclear-g7.html)

- [NPR — Full text of Trump-Iran MoU to end the war — June 18, 2026](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text)

- [CBS News — The 14 points of the US-Iran deal — June 17, 2026](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-iran-deal-memorandum-of-understanding-text/)

- [BBC News — U.S. and Iranian presidents finalize preliminary peace agreement — June 18, 2026](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr8z4z2er9o)

### Secondary sources

- [NBC News — US-Iran talks postponed; Vance cancels trip; Israel strikes Lebanon — June 19, 2026](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/us-iran-talks-postponed-vance-cancels-trip-israel-strikes-lebanon-rcna350830)

- [The Guardian — US-Iran talks in Switzerland canceled after Israel-Hezbollah incidents — June 19, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/19/us-iran-talks-in-switzerland-cancelled)

- [Al Jazeera — US and Iran agree on roadmap toward final deal in Switzerland talks — June 22, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/22/us-iran-agree-on-roadmap-towards-final-deal-in-switzerland-talks)

- [The Independent — Only a quarter of Americans believe Trump's war against Iran was worth the cost — June 24, 2026](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-iran-war-cost-poll-b3001757.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-trump-et-pezeshkian-signent-le-mou-14-points-pour-arreter-une-guerre